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SYSTEM

OF

POSITIVE POLITY

BY

AUGUSTE COMTE

AUTHOR OF 'SYSTEM OF POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY'

THIRD VOLUME

CONTAINING

SOCIAL DYNAMICS, OR THE GENERAL THEORY OF HUMAN PROGRESS

LONDON

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1876

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REPUBLIC OF THE WEST.

Order and Progress—Live for others.

SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY,

OR

TREATISE ON SOCIOLOGY,

Instituting the Religion of HUMANITY;

By Auguste COMTE,

Author of '*System of Positive Philosophy.*'

The principle, Love;
The basis, Order,
The end, Progress.

THIRD VOLUME,

Containing SOCIAL DYNAMICS, OR THE GENERAL THEORY OF HUMAN PROGRESS.

(*PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.*)

PARIS
CARILIAN-GOEURY and V^or DALMONT
&c. &c.
August 1853.
Sixty-fifth year of the great revolution.

NOTICE.

This volume was published by the Author in August 1853.

The Preface, Appendix, Introduction, and first two Chapters have been translated by Edward Spencer Beesly, who has also revised and edited the rest of the volume, and added the Table of Contents, Marginal Analysis, references, and footnotes throughout. Chap. III. has been translated by Samuel Lobb; Chap. IV. by Fanny Hertz; Chap. VI. by John Henry Bridges; Chap. VII. and Conclusion by Vernon Lushington and Godfrey Lushington.

The references to the 'Philosophie Positive' are to the first edition of the original.

PREFACE.

This volume, containing the Philosophy of History, has been written, without hurry or fatigue, in six months, unbroken by any interruption (from February 6 to August 1, 1853). I have never been able to accomplish as much before for want of leisure; and I am the more grateful for the honourable protection accorded me by the *élite* of the Western public, a protection which enables me to devote myself exclusively to my great mission. Although this collective patronage has not yet become sufficient for my support, as the circular annexed to this preface explains, its continuous increase inspires me with a moral security which enables me to work undisturbed. Thanks to this intervention, the infamous robbery perpetrated upon me by our scientific cliques, in order to stifle my philosophic utterance, has only resulted in placing me in the most favourable position for completely developing the regeneration to which I have from the first devoted my life. Thus the Priesthood of Humanity has arisen in its most normal form; for its material existence must long rest on the free contributions of its true adherents, in order the better to guarantee to it that spiritual independence which is indispensable to its social destination.

The subject of this volume reminds me secondly of the important service rendered to me by the public spirit of M. Vieillard, when he provided me with the means of accomplishing with perfect freedom the course of philosophic lectures on the General History of Humanity which I publicly delivered in 1849, 1850, and 1851. Going over the subject thus three

times facilitated the more elaborate handling in the present work, suggesting as it did beforehand the principal improvements of which my fundamental treatise was in this respect susceptible. The following volume also will benefit by this preparation; and to perpetuate its memory I append to this preface the programme of the course of lectures which I intend before long to resume.

I must also attribute the rapidity with which I have been able to travel over the vast field of Human History to the sainted patroness who is the subjective partner of all my labours. This indissoluble association has shown itself since the publication of the preceding volume in the Positivist Catechism, a little treatise which was not embraced in the scheme of the present work, and was meant as a decisive and systematic step towards spreading a general knowledge of the Universal Religion. It will be easily perceived that I should never have been able to execute it worthily or even to plan it properly without the constant aid of the angel with whom I hold converse. Its success leads me to assume more completely my final position as founder of the Religion of Humanity, the ascendency of which is becoming more and more suitable to the essential tendencies of the situation in the West. The historical summary which terminates this little treatise, and the fact that it was composed when I was in the middle of my principal work, made the Positive Synthesis as a whole more familiar to me, and so rendered it easier for me to think out the other two volumes.

After this just acknowledgment of the three influences by which this volume has specially benefited, I must next point out its natural connection with the preceding volume and the relation it bears to the corresponding portion of my fundamental work on Positive Philosophy.

As Progress consists necessarily in the developement of Order, it is impossible to study with profit, or even to understand fairly, the dynamical treatment here employed, unless the statical theory on which it directly rests has first been sufficiently mastered. I do not conceal from myself that the

taste for the Philosophy of History, now so universal, will cause the present volume to be read by persons who know nothing of the preceding one. But I hope that most of them will soon recognise the irrationality of such a proceeding, and that a first perusal will set them to studying the second volume before finally applying themselves to the third.

If the present volume be compared with the historical part of my fundamental treatise, it will be found that while the general coordination becomes here more profound and more complete, the special explanations are less fully worked out. In the last respect, my Philosophy of History, in this its definitive shape, does not fulfil my former promises (Phil. Pos. iv. 3); for I undertook that there should be more details and proofs here than in the first sketch; to which, on the contrary, I am now obliged to refer my readers for that information. I understand better than I did then the true conditions of the philosophic regime, and I see that coordinated assertions, which I formerly regarded as a purely provisional presentation of my doctrine, must be the normal form of all really systematic exposition. The progress I have achieved has procured me a certain authority; and my conceptions are sufficiently matured. I am entitled therefore to proceed with the same freedom and rapidity as my principal ancestors, Aristotle, Descartes, and Leibnitz, who confined themselves to a definite expression of their views, leaving the verification and developement of them to the public. This exchange of intellectual services is at once more honourable to the disciples and more profitable to the teachers. The former thus become more penetrating and confident, while the latter turn their special gifts to better account in constructing new theories instead of working out old ones. If such a synthetical organisation of instruction tends to concentrate sociological studies in a few hands, that is another reason why I adhere to the plan that I have finally adopted. For it is urgently necessary, both on mental and moral grounds, to exclude from this domain all ill-endowed or ill-prepared theoricians.

It follows from the above explanation that study of the

present volume by no means does away with the necessity of returning to the last two volumes of my philosophic treatise, although the Theory of History becomes more satisfactory here. The details given in the earlier work allow me the better to direct my later efforts towards perfecting the general coordination, especially as regards the two fundamental states of Fetichism and Theocracy, of which I formerly made too little. It is particularly necessary to turn to my first work for an account of the Modern Movement which is there treated at more than three times the length available in my present plan.

As for the social influence of this third volume, it must specially assist the intellectual reorganisation directly instituted in the second. Statical Sociology founds the notion of *order*; then comes Dynamical Sociology and establishes the conception of *progress* as eternally subordinate to order. Here it is that the new priesthood, speaking to the Living in the name of the great company of the Dead, establishes its universal supremacy, which the next volume will complete by making it the direct organ of Posterity. Ruling thus the objective population of the living with the necessary concurrence of the two subjective populations of the dead and the unborn, the positive church has the means of wielding an authority superior to that of any theological church. For the old priesthood, having always been incapable of placing itself directly at the social point of view, could never become the minister of Humanity, the power which, though hitherto unrecognised, really governs the whole of human affairs. This new authority, the like of which was never before known, is already making itself felt in consequence of the natural concurrence of the present volume with the second, even without the remaining and decisive element of strength to be contributed next year by my concluding volume. The general notion of continuous progress more and more governs modern politics. Hitherto it has been apprehended in but a confused way, and has consequently been a source of disturbance. Here it is systematised, and so converted into a necessary support of the fundamental order.

As for retrograde politicians, this result of the present volume ought, if not to convert, yet at least profoundly to modify all of them who are really conscientious and judicious, and only reject progress from a legitimate though empirical aversion for anarchy. They find here a full consecration of all the previous regimes, each of which, when at its best, was a necessary element in the human developement, however degenerate it may have become in its tendency to survive its usefulness. This empirical clinging to the worn-out is especially excusable in the Catholic-Feudal constitution, which, as the last form of the Theological and Military system, had to linger on in its decay until the advent of Positivism, in order to furnish the only representatives of order still existing. The true religion alone can do justice to this party, which, in spite of its exhaustion, is still widely extended, since it really comprehends the pretended conservatives, who, for want of an appropriate doctrine, are always driven to retrograde courses when they are in power. It is called immovable. It has, however, moved more than any other party since the beginning of the French Revolution. Becoming sensible then of its own unpopularity, it sincerely adopted constitutional monarchy, though contrary to all its principles. That modification was absolutely futile; but it proves that the retrograde party is capable of duly changing its opinions whenever it shall consider their transformation necessary for preserving order, of which it has made itself the only guardian in the West. Its official preponderance will naturally continue till the rise of the Positivist Dictatorship. From it and no other party, therefore, will the statesmen prepared by the Religion of Humanity suitably receive their political investiture.

Upon the revolutionists the effect of this volume will be to increase the aversion which their chiefs, with some noble exceptions, naturally feel for a doctrine which has always tended thoroughly to discredit them. The true partisans of *progress* will learn here that to direct it fittingly they must connect it with the *order* which it developes, and must regard each step as

resulting from all those that have preceded it. Now these two conditions must profoundly impress them with the incapacity of the guides they have so deplorably chosen. The notion of progress is entirely positive in its origin, and is, therefore, directly incompatible with a necessarily immovable metaphysic, which takes for its type a pretended state of pure isolation anterior to all human growth. Positivism comes forward to oust the demagogues for ever from a domain which they could never have usurped if the retrograde policy had not driven the people to shape its social aspirations provisionally according to a doctrine that is never anything else than negative. Henceforwards the revolutionary leaders must be regarded as the principal enemies of the new faith, because it is robbing them of popular confidence, to which the other camp does not pretend. The Conservative or retrograde politicians have no doubt made the mistake of not favouring, in the name of order, the free propagation of a doctrine which, ever since it made its first appearance in 1822, has furnished the only true and decisive refutation of anarchical teaching. But at least they have never thwarted its spontaneous developement, whereas the Revolutionists have always tried to arrest it by any and every means. After having promised me in 1847 the scaffold of Condorcet, they had to be content in 1849 with predicting for me the hospital of Tasso; and now they spare no calumny to turn the people away from Positivism. Following the fundamental principle of Negativism, each of them recognises no other authority than his own, with respect at least to the most important and difficult questions. They cannot, therefore, but rebel incessantly against the discipline instituted by the Religion of Humanity.

But the new priesthood will soon show them how efficacious is that discipline which alone will deliver the West from a party that has become the principal obstacle to the final regeneration. Positivism will even deprive them of the sympathy inspired by persecution; for it will dispose governments always to respect freedom of exposition and discussion, the abuses of

which will be harmless when order shall be systematically defended by the aid of an adequate doctrine. Stripped of the prestige of martyrdom, the three or four hundred incurables who disturb the whole West will speedily subside into the social nullity suited to their mental and moral nature. Their contradictory Equality, which objects to superiors but not to inferiors, will vanish in a state of Liberty. Liberty, therefore, is what they fear, now that free discussion confirms the condemnation pronounced on their doctrines by experience. Although the demagogues call all those who cultivate Veneration servile, the respective attitude of the two parties towards material power shows in which of them true independence is to be found.

Nevertheless, while unmasking worthless chiefs, Positivism ought never to neglect the conversion of the really honest revolutionists who unfortunately still trust them. Minds the most unsettled by subversive dogmas are susceptible at the present day of the most complete discipline, if only they are really disposed to Veneration and sincerely love Liberty. Those alone are to be regarded as quite incurable who have neither of these saving virtues, but trade on the anarchy of our time in order to raise themselves, at any cost, to an eminence they do not deserve. However, even putting aside such exceptionally unworthy characters, Positivism must regret that the unreasoning resistance of Conservatives to any innovation whatever obliges it, as was explained in my last preface, to address itself in the first instance to Revolutionists. For one can hardly reckon on the steadiness of converts gained in an irrational camp where the question of progress is always isolated from that of order.

I have met with some valuable exceptions, especially among proletaries, but I have never disguised from myself the natural fragility of such adhesions, so that any falling away will find me quite prepared.[1] Few stood the trial involved in the dicta-

[1] Among these revolutionary backsliders I am sorry to be obliged to notice the distinguished artist (M. A. Étex) who was stated in the preface of the last volume to have become a Positivist.

torial crisis of December 2, 1851, even among those who had at first received most favourably the scheme of a more complete dictatorship propounded in the new doctrine. The majority of them, when they fell back into the revolutionary state, showed their moral deficiency by ceasing to subscribe to my subsidy, as if the founder of Positivism deserved to starve because he approved of the abolition of the parliamentary regime.

It is in the opposite camp then that the true religion must henceforth chiefly look for converts, as was specially pointed out in the preface to my last volume. There Positivism can assume its normal attitude, because there the paramount question is that of *Order*, which Positivism alone can solve, and which stirs, particularly at the present day, anxieties more deep-seated than the vague sympathy for an isolated conception of *Progress*. But the Governments of the West are too much given over to a retrograde empiricism to welcome the new polity as they ought. This is why I am obliged to address myself to the East in order to sketch the direct relations of Positivism to European conservatives. By way of doing so I have offered the part of this treatise already published to two eminent chiefs, in the two manifestoes appended to this preface. Although the first of these manifestoes cannot yet have arrived at its destination,[1] its

[1] The following letter, sent direct by post, and remaining as yet unanswered, will sufficiently explain this unexpected delay:—

To His Majesty Nicholas I., Emperor of Russia, St. Petersburg.

Paris, Thursday, Archimedes 20, 65.
(April 14, 1853.)

SIRE,

I have determined to present to your Majesty the first two volumes of my *System of Positive Polity* and the little episodic work called *the Positivist Catechism*, which is intended to describe succinctly my doctrine as a whole. These three volumes ought to reach you, along with a special letter of December 20, 1852, calculated to give you some idea beforehand of the nature of the new faith. You would have received the whole ere now, if I had not counted too much on a special means of transmission which seemed to me preferable to the ordinary mode. But being compelled to resort to the latter, I applied recently to the Russian Embassy, where I was informed that they could not, by their rules, undertake to transmit it without a direct and special authorisation. It is this leave, Sire, which I now venture to request of you. The free circulation which my fundamental work has always had in Russia encourages me to hope that a worthy reception will be accorded to the treatise which completes it, and which is a proof that from the very centre of Western agitation can arise conceptions neither

importance determines me to publish it at once. Besides, this may be the most effectual way of laying it before the person to whom it is addressed. The second letter was transmitted without any obstacle to the noble Vizier, during his short retirement from the office which he has since worthily resumed.

It will at first be thought that as the Czar has shown a disposition to disturb Europe since my Russian manifesto was written, I had better have deferred publishing it until these unforeseen disorders, which cannot last long, should be at an end. But besides that I read this piece to the Positivist Society December 29, 1852, the need for its full publication appeared to me upon the whole to be too urgent to brook such delay. I am therefore bound to express at the same time my formal disapprobation of the Czar's conduct in deviating if only for a time from his usual policy. The scrupulous preservation of peace in Europe is, in the existing political system, an axiom so universally admitted, that the mere appearance or threat of violating it can only proceed from want of energy. No chief, however, is better placed than the Czar for duly resisting the mistaken impulses of a backward people, whose blind enthusiasm he does not share. Indeed with the people itself the enthusiasm is more factitious than real.

The second manifesto is less important than the first; but I would point out that it has an indirect as well as a direct use. While it elucidates the polity of the East, it may also react on Western thought and help to place it at the true point of view for the reorganisation both of Islamism and Catholicism; for since the end of the Middle Age these two problems are in their essential features the same. The habit of regarding them as connected will do more than anything else, both in the East and in the West, to make men see what must be the

frivolous nor subversive. Having regard to the involuntary delay in the transmission of my books, I venture to press for a prompt despatch of an authorisation which will permit me to show the just respect of a true philosopher for the only statesman of Christendom.

Salutation and Respect,
AUGUSTE COMTE.
(10 Rue Monsieur-le-Prince.)

nature of that universal religion, the search for which has been the main preoccupation of both halves of the Roman World.

Before concluding this preface I must give two personal explanations, the one rectifying a gross error, the other fulfilling a pious duty. When I am able to found the 'Occidental Review,' its quarterly publication will afford me the means of making such announcements suitably. Till then, as I have no access to the journals of the day, I can only publish these special reports in my prefaces, where they are certainly somewhat out of place.

From the outset of my career I have never ceased to represent the great Condorcet as my spiritual father. This regular filiation appears clearly from a comparison of our doctrines, since my foundation of Sociology consisted chiefly in duly carrying out the plan conceived by my predecessor for subordinating Polity to History. But the personal analogy between us, I make bold to say, goes to confirm our relationship as philosophers; for in both cases there is a Mathematical preparation resulting in a continual tendency and a constant endeavour to carry the scientific spirit into the domain of Society.

Such points of contact, to say nothing of my constant declarations, ought to satisfy all impartial and judicious minds that it is absurd to trace my labours to the original prompting of any one else than Condorcet. Nevertheless my unfortunate connection in early youth with a depraved charlatan has suggested to envious and frivolous persons an hypothesis which, notwithstanding its irrationality, has been widely circulated. An ephemeral sect, worthy in all respects of the chief whom it invented for itself, had a principal hand in spreading this fable, which enabled it at once to gratify its hatred and to make capital out of my earliest writings. This was why I thought it right to insert a special note on this subject in the last preface of my fundamental work. I should have confined myself to that decisive explanation if I had not afterwards found that it had not prevented several writers, some of them well disposed towards me, from thoughtlessly propagating a supposition more

ridiculous even than it was odious. Any one who set the doctrines side by side might long ago have seen how little truth there was in this self-contradictory calumny, according to which my first inspirations were derived from a source which repels them. But, lest my silence should contribute to prolong this misconception, I return, for the last time, to painful memories in order to declare here that I owe nothing to that personage, not even the smallest instruction.

When he got hold of me I was not quite twenty years old, and my enthusiasm, which till then had found its heroes only among the dead, soon led me to regard all the conceptions which sprung up in my own mind during our intimacy as due to his original inspirations. When I had recovered from my illusion, I saw that the only result of this connection had been to hamper my spontaneous meditations, previously guided by Condorcet, and that I had gained from it absolutely nothing. From other persons whom I knew in those days I gained light on secondary points, as I have always been glad to acknowledge. But from my acquaintance with this man I gained nothing of either scientific or logical value.

Such barrenness of result is easily explained by his nature and education. He was a mere writer, and that a vague and superficial one. He only differed from other literary men in being less lettered than they, though in want of scientific instruction he was quite on a level with them. Of original creation he was always incapable. Even his mistakes he stole from other people's brains.

His transient renown will be looked on by posterity as one of the characteristic symptoms of our mental and moral anarchy, resting as it did on nothing but rampant charlatanism without a grain of real worth. The heart and the intellect of this personage are exactly painted in the cynical *résumé* of his life which he was fond of giving; one half of it, according to him, had been devoted to buying ideas, and the other half to selling them.

I must now conclude this preface by deploring the peculiar

ill-fortune which recently deprived me of an eminent disciple, who would, I doubt not, have become one of the best supports of Positivism. When I noticed in the preface of the preceding volume the worthy adhesion of a noble citizen of Philadelphia, I little thought that a fatal malady was about to rob me of the ill-fated Wallace at the age of thirty-five.

I had only three conversations with him—which, however, were of a decisive character—and our correspondence in the intervals was as short as it was precious; but I saw enough to convince me of the loss he has been to Humanity. With his rare qualities of heart, intellect, and character, he must have powerfully expedited the difficult transition which is the task of the nineteenth century. His speculative culture, esthetic as well as scientific, was worthy of his fine natural gifts, and was free from all affectation. But, from what he spontaneously confided to me, I had reason to think that, notwithstanding the literary attempts of his youth, he would have distinguished himself more in active life, in a country where great citizens are of more account than magistrates. As an estimate of his true worth I venture to compare him with the most eminent of American statesmen, Jefferson, although, from the inequality of their developement and the difference of their situations, the intellectual and moral resemblance between the two men is not easily recognisable.

Whenever I see a really superior man thus pass away before his time, I deplore the fate of Humanity in being powerless against the external laws which rob her of her best organs. Although the subjective influence of the dead perpetuates the services they rendered to their race in life, it can never make us forget that we lost Bichat, Vauvenargues, and Bellini before we had felt their full ascendency. Theological optimism prescribes a stupid respect for such calamities. But the Positive Religion bids us deplore them as the most painful of the imperfections in the Universal Order. May these legitimate regrets at least dispose us to be more sensible of the value of great men while we have them with us, that we may surround

their lives with everything that can further their office instead of letting them waste their energies in the struggle with envy and misery!

In concluding this communication I must signalise the noble example set by my unfortunate friend Wallace spontaneously in his last hours. He had become my largest subscriber, and this objective patronage he subjectively perpetuated by leaving me an annuity of five hundred francs. His worthy brother, whom he charged with the execution of his last wishes, accomplished this special duty with admirable delicacy.

AUGUSTE COMTE.

10 Rue Monsieur-le-Prince.) Paris, Dante 23, 65. (Sunday August 7, 1853.)

APPENDIX TO THE PREFACE.

I.

SYLLABUS

OF THE

COURSE OF PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURES ON THE GENERAL HISTORY OF HUMANITY.

Delivered gratuitously, on twenty-nine consecutive Sundays, at the Palais-Cardinal, with perfect publicity,

during each of the three years, 1849, 1850, and 1851,

BY THE AUTHOR OF THE 'SYSTEM OF POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.'

Opening Lecture. General remarks on the Philosophical Character and the Social Purpose of the instruction to be given.

EXPOSITION OF THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

Nature of the Evolution.

2nd Lecture. Fundamental Theory of Human Nature, according to the subjective doctrine of Cerebral Functions.

3rd Lecture. Fundamental characteristics of the Human Evolution in both its Intellectual and Social aspects; or General Statement of the Human Problem.

4th Lecture. Necessary conditions of this spontaneous evolution; or General Theory of the Family.

Progress of this Evolution.

5th Lecture. Fundamental Law of Historic Filiation; or 'Law of the Three States.' (First Sociological Law.)

6th Lecture. General Law of Hierarchical Classification. (Second Sociological Law.)

7th Lecture. Complementary Law of Practical Activity. (Third Sociological Law.)

CONSTRUCTION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

ANTIQUITY.

8th Lecture. General account of the Fetichist State.

9th Lecture. Fundamental characteristics of the Polytheistic regime treated as a whole.

10th Lecture. General account of the Theocratic age. (Conservative Polytheism.)

11th Lecture. General account of the Greek Elaboration. (Intellectual Polytheism.)

12th Lecture. General account of the Roman Incorporation. (Social Polytheism.)

THE MIDDLE AGE.

13th Lecture. Fundamental characteristics of Western Catholicism treated as a whole. (Progressive Monotheism.)

14th Lecture. Fundamental characteristics of Feudal Civilisation treated as a whole. (Defensive Wars, two series.)

15th Lecture. General account of the First Phase of the Middle Age. (The foundations laid.)

16th Lecture. Second Phase of the Middle Age. (Polytheistic invasions repressed.)

17th Lecture. Third Phase of the Middle Age. (Monotheistic invasions repressed.)

THE MODERN PREPARATION.

18th Lecture. Fundamental characteristics of the Modern Movement, intellectual and social, treated as a whole.

19th Lecture. General account of its spontaneous Phase. (Fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.)

20th Lecture. General account of the Protestant Phase.

21st Lecture. General account of the Deistic Phase.

22nd Lecture. General account of the Negative part of the Final Crisis.

GENERAL CONCLUSION. THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY.

THE FINAL STATE.

23rd Lecture. Picture of the chief features of society in its Final State as regulated by the Religion of Humanity.

24th Lecture. Complete regeneration of Western Education, both intellectual and moral.

25th Lecture. General account of the new Spiritual Regime in both private and public life.

LAST TRANSITION.

26th Lecture. Fundamental characteristics of the last Western Transition treated as a whole.

27th Lecture. Temporal organisation of this Transition.

28th Lecture. Spiritual organisation of this Transition.

Closing Lecture. General summary of the Positivist Theory on the appreciation of the Past, the conception of the Future, and the ordering of the Present.

III.[1]

To His Majesty the Czar Nicholas, St. Petersburg.

Paris, Bichat 19, 64. (Monday, December 20, 1852.)

SIRE,

A philosopher, who is a steady republican, offers to the most absolute of existing kings a work which explains systematically how Humanity is to be regenerated both socially and intellectually. But such a proceeding is easily explained by its special circumstances. For this thinker, ever since his first decisive step in 1822, has always combated the Sovereignty of the People and Equality more radically in the name of progress, than any retrograde school has been able to do; and this autocrat, from his accession in 1825, has always worthily placed himself at the head of progress in his vast states, while preserving them by his wisdom and firmness from the agitation of the West. Such being its antecedents, the communication I am now making may serve as a type of the normal relations which in a well-ordered society should exist between true theoricians and eminent practicians. In France my attitude as a philosopher is necessarily anomalous, because the unfitness of the upper class obliges me habitually to appeal to the lower; a course which gives a revolutionary colour to the best counsels. In Eastern Europe alone can enlightened theories now find chiefs disposed to appreciate and able to utilise them. This contrast is a natural result of Western anarchy, which generally lodges power in the hands of the most mediocre, because it profoundly disturbs the most difficult of social functions, the abstract classification of individuals according to their proper worth.

The nature of this vast malady is such that its treatment must be left chiefly to philosophers; for it consists in a sort of chronic insanity which, since the end of the Middle Age, disposes each individual to recognise, in ultimate analysis, no authority except his own, at least in the most complicated and important questions. It results from the hopeless decay of the old faiths, and it will never be remedied until a new faith arises proof against the dissolving influence of discussion. Not only is the disorder in the world of action a mere consequence of the spiritual disorganisation, but this latter is more an intellectual than a moral disturbance. The social *sentiments*, no doubt, are already much impaired, especially the most common of them, Veneration; still, they are the sole support of Western life, and if they are unsettled it is because the corresponding *ideas* are unsettled. That the latter should thus react on the former was inevitable; but the process has now been carried so far that it is seriously threatening our true aptitude for society; for it has almost entirely suspended the instinct of Continuity of successive generations, the most distinguishing characteristic of Humanity, and has left no feeling but one of a coarse

[1] The second piece of the Appendix, consisting of the Author's fourth 'Annual Circular,' has been omitted, as not relating to the subject of the present work.—ED.

Solidarity with our contemporaries, which thus often becomes a source of disturbance. The collective revolt of modern thinkers against all the authorities of former times has gradually produced in each individual an habitual insurrection of the mind against the heart, tending to destroy all human discipline. The whole West is thus drifting towards a savage communism in which true Liberty would be crushed under a degrading Equality.

It is an unprecedented situation. We shall understand it better if we contrast it with the only case in history which to some extent resembles it—the passage of the Western world from Polytheism to Monotheism. That long and painful transition was more social than intellectual; and therein lay its principal difficulties, which consisted in a profound alteration of ancient civic life in order to the entire abolition of slavery. The Modern Revolution, on the contrary, coming after that decisive transformation, is chiefly intellectual, its main tendency being towards a radical renovation of human conceptions. Here we notice the silliness of our learned doctors whose theoretic impotence and temporal ambition dispose them to represent as political a question which is essentially religious. Incapable of founding a faith really new, they confine themselves, each in his own way, to restoring the old one, shorn of the institutions indispensable to its completeness. In the pursuit of this phantom, their efforts only tend to prolong indefinitely the revolutionary state, by continually inciting the populace in every country to new political attempts which can lead to nothing unless they rest on a true philosophic reconstruction. Thus it is that in our day theoricians are the most dangerous sources of disturbance because they are at bottom no less retrograde than they are anarchic. Deplorable as is the stationary, or rather obstructive, empiricism of Western governments, it is really more conducive to every kind of progress than the theories of our philosophers, by the very fact that it maintains material order in the midst of spiritual disorder.

In this confusion, which many had honestly begun to think hopeless, the source of the remedy becomes evident the moment we carefully examine the disease. The fact is that the revolt of modern intellect is far from being absolute. It has indeed rejected beliefs which had become really hostile to human reason; but it has submitted with docility to the growing authority of the new dogmas of science, though not acquainted with their demonstrations. True, this submission is at present limited to Natural Philosophy. But from its continual extension we are entitled to infer that it will apply also to the higher domains of Morals and Sociology, provided that their theories are worked out after the same method which has regenerated the lower sciences.

The chief difficulty then of Western reorganisation consists in rendering Social Science as positive as all the sciences preceding it. When that is once effected, each of the general maxims needed for our private or public conduct can be firmly established; for they will rest on true demonstrations, always open to the examination of competent minds, and spontaneously accepted by the vulgar. Such a reconstruction is possible because the future of Humanity, like every other future, is the result of a past that may be completely understood, but which no intervention of the present, however energetic, can modify except in a secondary degree. This was why my principal precursor, the eminent Condorcet, tried to found Polity directly on History. His admirable effort was doomed to fail because the preliminary

sciences were not at that time sufficiently elaborated. But he left me the clue to the construction of Sociology when the outlines of Biology should be adequately traced. Thenceforward my principal task was to discover the fundamental laws of the human evolution. The historical theory to which I was led soon proved capable of embracing all real knowledge; and the systematic unity of which modern reason was in want was constituted by the foundation of a completely positive philosophy.

This philosophy, which shows that a movement supposed to be purely critical has really an organic tendency, had no sooner appeared than it made its way into Russia. Your government, though exercising a wise vigilance over the importation of Western books, never impeded the free circulation of the six volumes of my 'Positive Philosophy,' published between 1830 and 1842. From some valuable communications—I may specify two personal interviews with the old Count Romanzoff on his return to Paris in 1836—I had soon reason to know that the better class of readers in Russia do not look on the French intellect as hopelessly given over to anarchical sophisms. I desired here to express openly the gratitude which I shall always and justly feel for this honourable distinction.

I need say no more on my philosophical foundation, with which you are sufficiently acquainted. What I particularly desire to submit to your eminent judgment is the religious construction firmly built on that foundation. The work I am sending you relates exclusively to that subject.

According to my encyclopedic classification, social speculations are subordinate to the whole body of positive theories on the simpler and more general phenomena. Hence the most difficult of all studies are confined to a few minds of the highest class, and those only when suitably prepared. We have here therefore a discipline to which none can refuse submission, and which is calculated to deliver the West from sophists and rhetoricians. At the same time the logical and scientific preponderance henceforth acquired by the social point of view cannot but lead the modern Intellect to return to its proper allegiance to the Heart, and so put an end for ever to Western anarchy. But this twofold tendency can only be realised by extending Positivism to the principal human domain, that is to say by applying it directly to the Affective Life.

The positive spirit always consists in acquiring a sufficient knowledge of reality to improve it as much as possible. It arose at first out of practical wisdom, and it gradually regenerated the whole field of speculation. The last step in its conquest of these two domains was the foundation of Sociology, by which it embraced the most complicated and most modifiable phenomena. But this did not enable it to regenerate Religion. For as it is the business of Religion to regulate human existence, it has above all things to take account of the principal motors thereof, that is to say, the Feelings. Positivism, therefore, could only accomplish the religious regeneration of the West by condensing itself into a single dogma, which should be as fit to direct our Affections as our Thoughts and our Acts. To establish such a single dogma is the peculiar and direct aim of my second career. Although the treatise which has this for its object is not yet finished, the two volumes sent herewith form its most difficult and decisive moiety. Moreover their perusal should be preceded by that of the Positivist Catechism, containing a summary but complete exposition of the new religion, the full developement of which may be afterwards studied in the Positive Polity.

Thoroughly as this religious construction had been prepared by my philosophic foundation, I should not have been able to carry it out properly if I had not myself at the right moment undergone a searching moral regeneration under the holy influence of a woman—an influence which during the last seven years has been continually strengthened, and perfected by her death. For the modern spirit could only be renovated by one who had been radically imbued with it. This had been my case, and I had therefore full experience of its anarchical opposition to the normal rule of the Heart, the cultivation of which in myself was indispensable to the accomplishment of my last work. I should hold myself chargeable with both ingratitude and self-deception if I did not draw due attention to this angelic influence; moreover it affords an example of the ultimate state of human reason, in which Man will think under the spontaneous inspiration of Woman.

Thus by a due cooperation of Heart and Intellect, and in the central seat of modern anarchy, arose the fundamental dogma of Humanity, the only possible basis of the Universal Religion which had been sought in vain for twenty centuries in the West and in the East. Henceforth our Unity consists in always connecting our life, whether public or private, with this immense and eternal Being, composed of all individuals really capable of assimilation. Our whole developement, whether individual or social, is governed by her normal destiny, which in its turn is ever subordinate to the immutable laws of the Universal Order; nor can our feelings, thoughts, or actions be fully regulated in any other way than by loving and knowing her in order to serve her. The mere general conception of Humanity at once gives us the sacred formula of the Positive Religion: *The principle, Love; the basis, Order; the end, Progress.* For the better guidance of actual life, this universal rule is divided into two mottoes for ordinary use: one moral and esthetic, *Live for others*; the other political and scientific, *Order and Progress*; the first being more specially appropriate to the affective sex, the second to the active sex.

The spontaneous germs of this final religion necessarily exist even in the earliest state of mankind. Amid the variety of religions incident to the long childhood of our race, we can always discern the worship of Humanity underneath the two worships which naturally precede it, that of Family and still more that of Country. This twofold preparation is most clearly seen in the case of those exceptional families, which through a succession of generations have been devoted to the principal public service. The organs of this hereditary office are, from their position, more likely than other men to catch the social point of view, and, if disposed to do their duty, soon rise above the supernatural destination which would prompt them to isolation, and feel themselves to be servants of Humanity, instituted by the Past in the interest of the Future. Every normal supremacy tends to react in this way on those who wield it, and the more deeply and definitely in proportion as the authority is more vast and varied.

As the different modes of Polytheism were always closely connected with polity, they never hindered the ancients from developing the feelings naturally excited by collective activity. But Monotheism, especially the Christian form of it, could only systematise human life by concentrating it on an essentially personal end, which assumed such overwhelming importance that it would have precluded all social progress if affective and practical impulses did not always get the better of speculative obstacles. Posi-

tivism will revive this spirit of earlier times; and the noble instincts, which of yore impelled the Scipios, the Cæsars and the Trajans to devote all their powers to the constant service of Humanity, will prevail again and for evermore. That end too will now be directly aimed at, which it could not be while our intellect was mainly occupied with chimerical speculations, and our highest activity was wasted in mutual hostilities. The complete advent of the Great Being could not even be conceived as long as Theologism and War prevented the requisite universality of opinions and manners. It was thus that the Modern Movement served as a preparation for the Positive Religion, by gradually substituting real knowledge for supernatural beliefs, and the industrial life for the military.

Notwithstanding this necessary opposition, it is the first duty of Positivism to render full justice to all earlier regimes as having been spontaneously instituted by Humanity to direct her laborious initiation. It is even more true of the race than of the individual that life must have two successive stages: the first purely preparatory, and destined mainly to *develope* our powers by a natural exercise of them; the second definitive, in which we *regulate* the use of those powers by an adequate appreciation of the laws relating to them. But in this final state we are only marching *systematically*, though of course more completely and directly, in the same path which we had before pursued *empirically*. For though supernatural beliefs promised a solitary immortality, what men always aimed at was to live honourably in the memory of their fellow-men. And similarly in the midst of military manners we easily detect the natural human preference for the peaceful charms of domestic life, which is allied to the only form of public activity capable of becoming universal.

Although the preparatory regime seemed opposed to Positive belief and Industrial activity, it never ceased to bring us gradually nearer both, as long as the Theological spirit and Military life continued indispensable to the developement of intellect and sociability. The West of modern times owes all its advantages, first to the Mental evolution of the Greeks, then to the Active career of Rome, and lastly to the Affective training of the Middle Age. This threefold preparation itself rested on the universal foundation laid by primitive Theocracy. Thus Positivism explains and glorifies all the preceding regimes, no one of which became essentially vicious till it was drawing near its fall and was unduly prolonging a rule that was naturally provisional. Even these late degeneracies may oftener than not be excused on the ground that it was impossible to avoid them when there was no theory to point them out, and no means of intervening to prevent them; two privileges exclusively belonging to the normal and only systematic order.

This spontaneous capacity for understanding and honouring the whole Past is the most characteristic property of the Positive Philosophy, which by virtue of its uniformly relative spirit could alone give to historical conceptions their indispensable completeness. Under the religion of Humanity, History becomes the Sacred Science, as being directly devoted to the study of the destinies of the Great Being. Upon it chiefly is based the just authority of the Positive priesthood, which alone is fit to form conclusions as to the Future of the human race from an interpretation of its Past. The main object of all other real theories is to lead up gradually to this science. For it is only by a twofold relation with it that they can have an encyclopedic unity. On the one hand, the progress of the various sciences, which has so profound an influence on human progress as a whole, must be unin-

telligible to one who is unacquainted with them. While, reciprocally, no one can be really master of any science unless he studies its special history, which again is bound up at every step with the general history of Humanity.

Not only does the Positive Doctrine lay stress on the preeminence of historical conceptions, but the Positive Worship promotes it. The habit of adoring worthy ancestors, public as well as private, becomes in fact indispensable to the regular developement of the instinct of Continuity, the principal type of sociability. The cultivation of this feeling is so urgently needed at the present day, that I have thought it my duty already to propose to the West an historical Calendar, calculated to systematise the daily commemoration of the entire past.

What the Positive Doctrine and Worship have commenced, the Positive Regime completes. It, too, contributes to the normal preponderance which belongs to History as the true guide of human life. The fundamental principle of human *Order* is this: *The Living are essentially and increasingly governed by the Dead.* It is only when this fact is recognised that the general notion of immutable Laws can really prevail in Polity, to the utter exclusion of all arbitrary Wills, human as well as divine. As for human *Progress*, both intellectual and social, its kind and degree are determined in each case by the general direction in which Humanity is necessarily moving. When this truth is seen, the Present finds a sure rule of action in what is its natural aim: to carry out the transition from the Past to the Future in such a way as to prevent or repair fluctuations and deviations.

This historical basis having been laid, we are better able to estimate the capacity of Positivism for regulating the whole of human existence.

Under its intellectual aspect, the Religion of Humanity sanctions most profoundly all sound scientific studies; but at the same time imposes upon them a wise encyclopedic discipline by constantly subordinating special research to broad general views. The entire system of positive theories may thus be condensed into two grand sciences, Cosmology and Sociology, studying respectively the Earth and Man. These are necessarily insusceptible of further condensation, as neither can be reduced to the other, notwithstanding their mutual relations. Without Cosmology, Sociology can have no logical or scientific consistence, both by reason of its greater complexity, and because the human order depends upon the material order. But, reciprocally, when once Sociology is constituted, it furnishes the only discipline for Cosmology, giving to the relative spirit its due predominance, and banishing every absolute tendency; for we ought only to study the World with a view to the study of Humanity. The true Encyclopedic Hierarchy is instituted by breaking up each of these two theoretic domains into its different essential elements. Hence we get, first, the Inorganic series, consisting of Mathematics as the foundation, and Astronomy, Physics, and Chemistry comprehended therewith; secondly, and depending on this necessary basis, the Organic series, commencing with Biology and specially characterised by Sociology, properly so called, with Morals for the crowning science.

From the subjective point of view, this natural classification institutes Positive Logic by determining the unalterable succession of our abstract studies, no fundamental step of which can be omitted, even by the most gifted thinker, under penalty of radical failure. From the objective point of view, it marks the universal order of beings or existences. Thus, when

we look at it as a whole, we gather from it the most general law of the World of Man, according to which the nobler phenomena are always subordinate to the coarser, these latter being also the more regular, because the simpler. The increase of dignity then is everywhere accompanied by an increase, not of independence, but of submission. But, inasmuch as the most complicated phenomena are also the most modifiable, the superior laws always react upon the inferior, and thus are ever ameliorating the natural order, which necessarily rests upon the preponderance of the latter. The most eminent of all known beings is at once the most dependent and the most active in a general economy, of which it is the only true Providence.

Under its moral aspect, the chief characteristic of the Positive Religion is that it is founded upon, and lends its support to, the benevolent instincts, the natural existence of which was necessarily denied by Monotheism, though it had been represented in a confused way by Polytheism. To live for others becomes at last the law of happiness as well as of duty, in consequence of the scope afforded by social life for those inclinations in following which all individuals spontaneously cooperate. The moral discipline of Catholicism did not profess to do more than bridle the personal instincts. That of Positivism consists chiefly in a continuous stimulation of the sympathetic affections, the normal activity of which furnishes the best check upon our selfish tendencies. The true Religion devotes all human life, private as well as public, to universal improvement, beginning with our external situation, and so proceeding to the amelioration of our own nature, the principal object of our interest, whether as individuals or collectively. It treats egoism as our greatest infirmity, from which, owing to our bodily needs, we can never entirely escape, and strives to subordinate it habitually to altruism, the empire of which can never become oppressive. When that is effected, the constant attention we are obliged to pay to our personal wants is purified by being regulated in conformity with the social purpose for which we exist.

But this full developement of the sympathetic instincts exhibits successively three natural stages, no one of which can be dispensed with. Love relates first to Family, then to Country, and not till after these to Humanity. This normal progression affords the only solution to the great problem—how to make Sociability prevail habitually over Personality. Hence domestic life is the necessary basis of the whole Positive regime, as being the only source whence the true social sentiments, both of Continuity and Solidarity, can derive their first training—a source too from which they must never cease to draw fresh strength in the course of their ulterior developement. This is why the Universal Worship exalts the affective sex into the Moral Providence of Humanity. The three domestic types of that sex furnish each of us with the three guardian angels who ought constantly to keep us back from evil, and urge us to good. Nor does this holy office terminate with their death, but rather tends to be ever more perfectly performed.

Woman's province is limited, and with her own free consent, to the sanctuary of Home. Her business there, especially as mother and wife, is to improve the inner nature of man; while he, ruling by virtue of his active qualities, is bound to preserve her from labour outside the home, and from the degradation of wealth. Accordingly the Positive Religion confers upon her the superintendence of all *education*, and even the direction of *instruction* of that essentially esthetic kind which can be given in the family,

and which prepares for the scientific training to be imparted by the Church.

Under this feminine influence, Art, the soul of Worship, developes its aptitude for strengthening our best feelings by their ideal exercise in worship, the habit of which alone can prevent or remedy the hardening tendency of speculation. Initiated by Woman into esthetic culture before the Priest introduces us to science, we acquire a disposition always to cultivate the instinct of perfection which must lend a charm to active life, and even help to guide it.

Under its political aspect the chief feature of Positivism is that it everywhere substitutes duties for rights, as it does laws for causes, by the radical elimination of arbitrary wills, that so the relative may supersede the absolute. Thus, every worthy citizen becomes a social functionary, not only exercising a special office, but taking part according to his qualifications in the general economy. Confidence and responsibility—such are the two perennial conditions of service as between man and man, the conditions under which independence and concert are brought into thorough harmony. When power and wealth are constantly connected with their social purpose, it is at once seen that they must be concentrated in the hands of individuals and that the possession of them must be justly protected, if they are to be useful to the public; for great duties require great powers. Thus it is that the universal preponderance of the human point of view ennobles and consolidates both obedience and command.

As the Positive Religion makes happiness consist in the full play of the sympathetic instincts, it disposes every one to seek principally for the pleasures of family life, these being naturally accessible to all, and indeed in a special sense the privilege of the lower class. This being recognised, worthy members of the higher class will see that their principal civic duty, whether as individuals or as a body, is to secure everywhere the material conditions of such an existence, by a righteous employment of the capital which Humanity has entrusted to their disposal. *To live without concealment* becomes the habitual rule of their conduct, because their aim is to deserve public esteem; and for this they have to look chiefly to the proletariat, which is prepared, by means of the education given to all ranks alike, to add weight to the judgments expressed by the priesthood with respect to the patriciat. There is no subversive parliamentarism, but the humblest citizen spontaneously exercises such consultative influence as his virtues and lights command. The worthy exercise of power implies, as its necessary consequence and complement, freedom to transmit it. Hence it is a fundamental law that each functionary chooses his successor, subject to the approval of his own superior.

This rule must extend even to property. There must be complete freedom to bequeath and to adopt, in order that responsibility may increase with authority. The principal remedy, then, which Positivism has to offer for the standing inconveniences of material property, consists in replacing the theocratic inheritance, founded solely on birth, by the sociocratic inheritance, which is more modifiable and better regulated. Moreover, as Positivism is above all things intended to discipline the various forces wielded by Man, it does not so much ask how they have originated in each case as how they are usually exercised; and, from the latter point of view, it is always for the interest of the public that functionaries should be permanent. When the plebeians are satisfied with their habitual position, they will pro-

perly protect the patricians against the turbulence of ambitious spirits in the lower ranks.

The whole of this system, intellectual, moral, and political, depends for its working on the constant care of a worthy Priesthood, completely distinct from, and always independent of, the government, properly so called. This fundamental separation between counsel and command was admirably commenced in the Middle Age; there however it proved incompatible both with the preponderance—of course absolute—of theological beliefs, and with military activity, which always tends towards an entire concentration of power. But it takes place spontaneously in a regime which combines the scientific spirit with industrial life. The normal division between theory and practice is here completed by being extended to the principal cases of each.

The systematic direction of the education given to all classes alike rests solely with the priesthood, which thus obtains a basis for its consultative influence on the whole of human life, private as well as public. All of us have to work together for the continuous improvement of Humanity, but the noblest share in this work is specially reserved for the priesthood. For the systematic amelioration of our threefold nature, physical, intellectual, and moral, necessarily constitutes the indivisible domain of the spiritual power, which alone is sufficiently acquainted with its laws. The temporal power confines itself to carrying out the habitual improvement of our material condition, in accordance with what it knows of the external order from the teaching of the priesthood. By virtue of the confidence reposed in it by all, the religious authority becomes the normal arbitrator in the chief disputes which may arise, whether domestic or civic. It consolidates the family by sanctioning the just influence therein of woman; and it does this chiefly by means of the law of eternal widowhood which is distinctive of Positivist Marriage. By its nine social sacraments it solemnly connects all the essential phases of each person's life with the universal harmony.

In civic life the priesthood becomes the normal director of public opinion, and is alone able to coordinate its different principles and give them a wise application. Speaking as the sole organ of Humanity, it consecrates in her name, relying on the past and providing for the future, all practical authorities, which, if they had not such a title, could not command sufficient veneration until they had been long exercised. Being the only competent judge of the dead, it is thus led to judge also the living, who are governed by the dead. All its social functions may be summed up in the statement that it classifies men according to their personal merit, that is to say, according to their fitness to represent Humanity, independently of their special office, but without ever altering the grades of the practical hierarchy. The priesthood ought especially to encourage such a mode of estimating men among the proletaries. For as human labour is necessarily gratuitous, the true reward of the worker consists in a just esteem, which is often refused to the powerful.

But this growth of real dignity can only become complete by means of the subjective life. There the priesthood rules, and its rule is freely accepted when it has passed a definitive judgment on the career of each individual. In a regime where public opinion is systematically developed, even the humblest types ought to receive that posthumous glorification, the degree and duration of which are measured by the services they have rendered. Lastly, with respect to the widest human relations, the priesthood is the

only power which can be universal in its extension. Political authority cannot long be exercised over too dissimilar populations without degenerating into tyranny. The whole of Western Europe cannot be embraced under one temporal power. Most even of the states which, since Charlemagne, have composed this Western Republic, are become too large in consequence of the temporary though indispensable incorporations due to the spontaneous break-up of the Catholic-Feudal system. These violent or factitious aggregations will soon be dissolved when the reconstruction of the spiritual agglomeration shall have rendered the temporal concentration superfluous.

Religious union, on the contrary, is naturally suitable to the whole human planet. If this universality so much desired and even hoped for does not yet exist, the reason is to be found chiefly in the impotence of the beliefs which have hitherto directed the preparation of it. Theological faith, by reason of its essentially subjective nature, never succeeded in uniting more than a feeble minority of the human race. But the complete reality which distinguishes the Positive faith will enable it to assume a universal and freely accepted ascendency when the more backward populations shall have duly reached the normal level of the West. Then one and the same priesthood will directly bind together all peoples by a uniform education, similar manners, and common festivals. Its intervention will be accepted in their disputes, and its direction in their concerted schemes for progress.

If the Positive clergy is to render all these intellectual and social services, its first need is entire independence of every temporal power. But in the normal state the practical authority can never seriously endanger the fundamental separation of the two powers, although it may often desire to tyrannise over the priesthood. For it will never pretend to rob the latter of its principal office, education, since that requires a long and difficult theoretic training. The danger will rather lie in the opposite direction. For the speculative corporation might easily acquire such deeply-rooted popularity that some of its members might be tempted by a culpable ambition to usurp temporal supremacy, and so make sociocracy degenerate into theocracy. Here is the rock on which the Final Regime might most easily make shipwreck; and there will be incessant need for the spontaneous vigilance of good citizens and the systematic care of worthy priests to check this retrograde tendency, which unfortunately corresponds to the natural infirmity of the best human types.

This is why the first promise of the priesthood will be a solemn renunciation, not only of all temporal office, but of all wealth, even held collectively, whether acquired or hereditary. Every member of the Positive clergy, from the simple vicar up to the high priest of Humanity, will have no means of subsistence but a fitting annual subsidy, at first arising from free private contributions, and ultimately provided by governments. The priest who should make any other profit out of his office, even by the sale of his books or by lectures, would be liable to deprivation. The only ambition that any theorician may rightly feel is, to merit in his own person the pre-eminence which his class justly enjoys in the public esteem. This disposition will be all the easier because the number of the Positivist priests will be small, both from the difficult preparation they have to go through, and on account of the expense they involve. A complete and always demonstrable doctrine, rarely requiring systematic interpretation, will allow of a

great reduction in the number of the contemplative class, which has hitherto been swelled exorbitantly. All the spiritual necessities of the hundred and twenty millions of Occidentals will always be met by a body of twenty thousand theoricians, or of a hundred thousand for the whole earth, each representing a cost of fifteen thousand francs a year, which would include not only their salaries, but all expenditure necessary for the due performance of their functions.

This supreme corporation, at present consisting only of its founder, is bound already to practise worthily the rules of conduct which will enable it to preside over the regeneration of the human race. For the spiritual power, though more susceptible of diffusion than any other, (since every soul of either sex may share it in a secondary degree,) is also the most susceptible of condensation. It necessarily begins with a single brain, in which however are contained all its essential institutions, not only of dogma, but of worship and even of regime. This law, which may be verified in the case of the great Saint Paul, the only real founder of Catholicism, must be even more suitable to Positivism as being a more complete and better coordinated religion. It was necessary therefore that my own conduct, both private and public, should by anticipation furnish as far as possible the type of the priesthood which I am instituting.

So fully do I feel this obligation that I have been gradually led to convert all the incidents of my own career into so many decisive manifestations for the guidance of my successors, especially as regards that fundamental rule, the refusal of temporal greatness. Inherited wealth I never possessed; and of all my professional resources I was at last robbed, by the persistent injustice of our scientific cliques, notwithstanding the sincere but unavailing sympathies of our different governments. Since that time I have been able to exemplify in my own person the normal situation of the Positive priesthood, by publicly renouncing, first, all temporal office, next, every sort of scientific post or pension, and lastly all pecuniary profits from my freely undertaken labours, whether of writing or lecturing. My subsistence depends solely upon the voluntary annual subscriptions of my adherents. Although this subsidy is still insufficient, it will steadily increase, and I shall soon find myself spontaneously protected by the *élite* of the Western public against all unworthy attempts to disturb my religious career.

As I am thus certain of being able to use to the best advantage my last ten years of full cerebral vigour, I congratulate myself on having an opportunity of exemplifying in my own life the attitude required for the just independence of the new priesthood. The small acceptance which my doctrine is likely to find with those who in the West have the distribution of high temporal positions, gives me ground for hoping that this example will bear fruit among my assistants or successors, whoever they may be, even independently of their own spontaneous abnegation. For the West contains the only public which is now prepared for the early advent of the Positive Religion, universal as it will become in two or three centuries.

At present, Positivism is only suitable to the Occidental Republic which was founded by Charlemagne on the basis of the Roman Incorporation, was developed afterwards under the Catholic-Feudal regime, and has finally gone through the twofold Modern Movement of general decomposition and special recomposition. Indeed this is not the only distinction which must be drawn. Of the five populations of the West, the central one alone is fit to commence the regeneration, which will be duly welcomed by the

neighbouring nations, first in the South, then in the North. If the whole course of the past has reserved this perilous privilege for France, to no other country has it given the political attitude requisite for producing the change, which could only arise out of a free empiricism necessarily destitute of coordination. This is why all the real statesmen of the last century instinctively respected not only the negative preparation which brought about the French explosion, but even the stormy course of the latter, as long as it preserved its true character. Its principal feature was the advent of the Republic. This completed the dissolution of the old system, and made it possible to conceive and work out the new order.

History will always determine the character of the French Revolution by the radical upheaval of 1793, without dwelling on the vague prologue of 1789, which is now accepted by the counter-revolutionists of all colours. French royalty, having become definitively retrograde in the second half of the reign of Louis XIV., succumbed for ever with Louis XVI. after a century of increasing putrefaction, which pointed to such an issue. Never was it again established, notwithstanding the different official illusions which prevailed, while men mistook words for things, and forgot that its two essential characteristics, inviolability and hereditary succession, did not belong to any one of our subsequent dictators. But in consequence of the universal empiricism, people did not sufficiently feel that the situation of France was necessarily republican until the overthrow of our last sham monarchy. The four years which have elapsed since have spread, though confusedly, among all Frenchmen the conviction which was previously confined to such theoricians as were guided by a sound historical doctrine. Nevertheless Positivism alone can give solidity to this republican tendency, by clearing it of metaphysical beliefs, which at first favoured its growth, but are really foreign to it. Moreover, through Positivism alone can the French Republic purify itself from all subversive leanings in its external as well as its internal policy. However, the Positive doctrine is still far from being sufficiently influential to direct our revolutionary movements immediately impending. These must continue to feel their way empirically as they have done in their recent course, which has been substantially as follows:

EMPIRICAL DEVELOPEMENT OF FRENCH REPUBLICANISM.

(*Note written on the 17th of June* 1852.)

1. The French Government has to be Republican, and not Monarchical. (Crisis of February 1848.)
2. The French Republic has to be social, and not political. (Crisis of June 1848.)
3. The Social Republic has to be Dictatorial and not Parliamentary. (Crisis of December 1851.)
4. The Dictatorial Republic has to be Temporal and not Spiritual, with entire freedom of teaching and even of discussion.
5. Decisive advent of the systematic Triumvirate, the shape to be taken by the Temporal Dictatorship, announced by Positivism, since 1847, as the preparatory government adapted to the Organic Transition.

The plurality thus at last introduced into the supreme magistracy of France is not peculiar to the generation of transition. It is only more indispensable there, in order the better to get rid of retrograde tendencies on the

part of practicians to usurp spiritual power, but for which it would be easy to bridle anarchical ambition on the part of theoricians. But in the normal state this threefold division of power will be quite conformable to the industrial nature of the temporal authority, which will never be concentrated in the hands of a single chief, in order that it may correspond better to the different forms of practical work, agriculture, manufactures, and commerce. In each Positivist republic, as in the international relations of all of them, political unity must result from nothing but the common preponderance of the fundamental doctrine. The only point of difference between the preparatory and the final dictatorships will relate to the class from which the triumvirs will be chosen.

In the final dictatorship they will come from the industrial patriciat, three members of which will become chiefs of the nation, without any election properly so called, by the free choice of their predecessors. But the present generation of employers are still in the leading-strings of the legists, and are far from having acquired the generality of views and the elevation of sentiments requisite for their arrival at political power. To become true patricians, worthy to govern the labourers of the West without exploiting them, they need to finish their social education under the just pressure of some eminent proletaries raised exceptionally, for the space of a generation, to be supreme chiefs of the French republic.

The tenure of office by these revolutionary dictators will not be limited in point of time. But it will be possible to replace them regularly whenever the case shall arise. Their election will always rest with Paris, subject to the approval of the provinces; and as the vote will be quite public, and each man may delegate the exercise of it if he pleases, universal suffrage, the last form of our political malady, will gradually die out. Both these antidotes will also be applied to the triennial election of the Assembly. This body, which will be purely financial, will vote the budget as a whole, and will discuss the accounts of previous income and expenditure, but will have no legislative functions.

From the first, this proletarian triumvirate will announce the progressive tendency and the practical character of its dictatorship by two decisive measures: the entire abolition of the French army, which will be replaced by eighty thousand gendarmes; and the suppression of every sort of theoretical budget, whether for churches, universities, or even academies. Its fundamental programme will always be to maintain material order energetically, to give a discerning encouragement to the growth of industry, and scrupulously to respect the intellectual movement. It will prepare the way for the normal ascendency of public opinion, by submitting all its projects, selections of persons not excepted, to free and universal consultation long enough beforehand for the collection of all opinions worth having, even from foreigners. But the decision of the triumvirs, whatever it may be, will always be upon their own just responsibility, and will be completely independent of these first opinions, which moreover will generally be discordant. Internally, their policy will tend to a constant diminution of the temporal centralisation, in proportion as the spiritual reorganisation makes free progress. They will prepare the way for the peaceable dismemberment of France into seventeen independent republics of which Paris will be merely the religious metropolis, as she will soon be of the whole West, and eventually of the whole World. In its relations with the rest of Europe, the French dictatorship will regenerate diplomacy in accordance with the

relative spirit of Positivism, both in the West, where it will appeal directly to populations still unprovided with worthy chiefs, and in Eastern Europe, where it will address itself to cautiously progressive rulers.

By opening the eyes of retrograde governments to the dangers of a blind repression, it will turn the Western peoples from vain political agitation, in which an imitation of the French type only results in prolonging a metaphysical influence that needs to be extinguished everywhere. While the suppression of our army will reassure the rulers of Eastern Europe against any warlike disturbance, our diplomacy will prudently aid their praiseworthy efforts for the improvement of their peoples. It will preserve the latter from the contagion of anarchy by letting them see that it is destitute of social aim, and it will cure the former of any admiration for Western empiricism by teaching them to appreciate better their national advantages. Although our true republicanism must spontaneously extend to all peoples, even the best prepared are not ready for it immediately. Half a generation will elapse between its decisive establishment in France, and its real introduction into the rest of the West, first in Italy and Spain, then in Germany and England.

Every premature movement in these four populations impedes the general solution by tending to displace the centre in which it is to be worked out. As for the immediate extension of the regime which suits France to the different countries of Eastern Europe, and *à fortiori* to the rest of the globe, it is nothing but a dream inspired by the vain metaphysics from which our true theoricians and worthy practicians will agree to deliver the world. At the present day to wish to abolish royalty in Russia would be even more absurd than to pretend to establish it again in France, although ultimately it must cease everywhere as being the last vestige of Theocracy.

Such considerations are sufficient to show that the rulers of Eastern Europe who are worthy of their position, far from having reason to dread the triumph of Positivism in France, will, on the contrary, find it a solid guarantee of order and peace. No doubt the Religion of Humanity must long be peculiar to persons endowed with the choicest qualities of heart and character; though such souls, it may be observed, are less rare proportionally among the proletaries than among their superiors, in the West, and especially in Paris. But before it aspires to popular success it may justly expect that its profound social aptitude will give it political ascendency in a community unprovided with any sort of convictions and constantly menaced with complete anarchy. The anti-civic doctrines of Catholicism prevented it from reaching the government until it had converted society. Positivism, on the contrary, must expect that conversion to its theories will not take place on the largest scale until its practical superiority has come to be spontaneously appreciated. The doctrine and even the worship, preeminent as they are in themselves, will be chiefly recommended to the Western public by the excellence of the regime.

The political advent of Positivism is so urgently needed, in the present situation of France, that a thousand worthy adherents would be enough to make the country see that it affords the only issue from our revolution, because it is the only means of at last reconciling progress with order. Our empirical conservatives who are imperilling the substance while they are vainly struggling to keep a worn-out form, will not be long before they feel the superiority of those systematic conservatives who consolidate the sub-

stance by means of a better form. In the meantime, our routine revolutionists, seeing that the demagogues have become the principal support of retrogression, will respect Positivism as offering the only political creed fit to direct the republican instinct which finds itself at last betrayed by its once worshipped metaphysics.

By the happy cooperation of these two opposite tendencies, the Positivist party, in spite of its numerical weakness, will soon become the rallying-point for all honest and clear-sighted men, who only remain attached to the various existing schools till they can obtain better guides. Then our party will have the upper hand politically, although our religion will still not have acquired a decisive ascendency. It is only needful that the religion should have made sufficient way at first to constitute spontaneously this worthy nucleus of true sociocrats, which will soon be swelled by the best aristocrats and democrats.

Over and above the general service to be rendered by Positivism in overcoming Western anarchy, the dangerous influence of which spreads in all directions, it has a special interest for the progressive governments of Eastern Europe, because it throws light on the whole of their peculiar political developement.

The fundamental laws demonstrated by sociology respecting the nature and destiny of Humanity, are necessarily true for all peoples, subject to secondary modifications, which can always be estimated, relating chiefly to the unequal rates of speed in the evolution accomplished by all alike. An historical theory answering exactly to the most complete case must also apply to all the other cases, since they do but reproduce, in a succession of localities, phases which have already been estimated in the succession of ages.

A skilful application of this theory will be a valuable compensation to the backward populations for their retardation, for it will enable them to pursue their progress systematically instead of, as at first, empirically. The Positive Theory of Human Transitions warns these peoples against a servile imitation and points out to them the course best adapted for each nationality, so that they may rise to the final level of Humanity more readily and more peaceably than was possible in the case of the original evolution.

When the meritorious chiefs of Eastern Europe know by observation of the Western case the necessary goal—in their own case more distant—of the universal movement, they can thenceforward smooth the way for, and at the same time hasten its attainment in their own countries, by preserving their peoples from the storms that marked the first renovation. Cautiously moving in advance of their respective civilisations, their business is to direct the final transition from theocracy into sociocracy. There is at the present day increasing room for the exercise of such an office, even in the case of Russia, though that is the case least removed from the Western type—a fact indeed which makes such watchfulness more urgently needed.

Notwithstanding the human infirmity which makes us like to govern without being criticised, no Czar worthy of his place will fear to submit his noble policy to the salutary examination of a doctrine which will lead to its being better appreciated. Moreover, from the extreme diversity of the theological beliefs prevailing in this vast empire, the divine sanction claimed for its chiefs is vague and precarious. The doubts thus inevitably suggested to many of their subjects tend to spread to all the others; for the first germs

of metaphysical anarchy are to be found in every sort of theology, which is always absolute and vague. The chief of an empire in which are to be found the three monotheisms, Jewish, Christian, and Mahometan, mingled with several sorts of polytheism, and even with pure fetichism, ought to feel that the Religion of Humanity alone can become universal, and confer a sanction that will be respected everywhere.

At your accession, Sire, the Russian crown was in uncontested possession of an ecclesiastical supremacy that had long been rendered necessary by the degradation of the priesthood. But the Positive church will never have to fear such a usurpation. Thanks to the scientific training wisely given you in your youth, you feel too deeply the encyclopedic qualifications required for the new priesthood to think of encroaching on the domain of theory. There would be more reason to fear this from the lowest members of the literary class in the West.

When the time shall be ripe for the necessary transformation of the Russian royalty into a republican dictatorship you will have a worthy successor, who will be able to accomplish it peaceably under Positivist inspiration, without losing any real authority by the change. All he will have to do will be to replace the theocratic mode of inheritance by the sociocratic, as is quite possible in a progressive government. Every noble chief will willingly renounce a mode which imposes upon him beforehand an heir often very unsuitable, and will welcome a rule which allows him to choose his successor freely from any rank, under the obligation only of first adopting him into his family. The principle of castes, so long the universal basis of the constitution of Society, ceased to have much attraction for the superiors when it became less useful to the inferiors. Long ago the best Roman emperors showed little attachment to their dynasties, and furnished noble examples of adoptive succession. This institution, which has become so familiar to mere industrial chieftains, will easily become the practice with worthy autocrats, who perhaps secretly desire it. But it cannot be wisely introduced until there has been a sufficient preparation of public opinion, of which the Roman government had less occasion to take account.

When this decisive transformation has been accomplished, the Russian dictators of the next century will be in a position to direct suitably a great political operation founded on the Positivist principle, which restricts the territorial areas of temporal governments. They will then be able to carry out maturely and systematically the peaceable dismemberment of the empire; for none can be so sensible of its overgrown size as its worthy chiefs, notwithstanding the outcry in the West about their unmeasured ambition. This vast sovereignty has, in a minor degree, a social purpose resembling that of the great Roman incorporation: *pacis imponere morem.* It is still useful in preparing very dissimilar populations for the advent of the Universal Religion, just as the sway of Rome prepared the West for Catholicism. But the Russian empire is less homogeneous and less spontaneous, and ought therefore to cease more speedily in proportion as the spiritual reorganisation shall advance. Such a dismemberment will naturally begin with the case in which annexation has been most artificial, most violent, and most recent. The same principle, however, which bids the great Eastern Empire acquiesce in the approaching separation of what is really a portion of the West, affords a means of avoiding all the subversive tendencies likely to be set up at the present day by Polish independence. Instead of reconstituting the whole of ancient Poland, as empirical

politicians desire, to fall again under the retrograde yoke of an unworthy aristocracy, Positivism will advise that this imperfect nationality should be so far broken up that its different peoples may be unable to bring on any European disturbance.

As for the social improvements which the rulers of Russia are already pursuing, a sound historical theory will lead them to avoid all ill-advised imitation in order the better to make use of local antecedents. For instance, while carrying out with admirable perseverance its noble abolition of serfage, your government is at the same time gradually extinguishing the great territorial fortunes, in imitation of the Western movement, which was spontaneously hostile to the aristocracy. But this is empiricism; and it is artificially raising up in Russia a grave social danger, of which in the West we are now well aware, especially in France, where the insufficient concentration of wealth will seriously embarrass the practical reorganisation. Positivism will therefore advise the Czars to respect and value such accumulations, and only to try to transform their possessors into industrial chiefs—principally agricultural—as is possible now that their military character has for ever disappeared.

Again, the exceptional control which your government exercises *empirically* over the intellectual movement may be improved by the aid of a wise *system*. In the West there ought to be no interference of the police with publications of any sort except a strict enforcement of complete signature—a regulation which French legislation has recently borrowed from Positivism. Any other intervention on the part of the temporal power would henceforth be tyrannical, and could only hamper the religious reconstruction. But in the present state of the Eastern populations, their worthy rulers may and even ought to assume a greater influence over thought. You already exert such influence wisely to preserve Russia from a multitude of writings with which the West is infested. Positivism will advise you to go further as regards your national literature. Your care should be extended to the authors themselves, who should be required to furnish personal guarantees. In the anarchical West the rough and inadequate test of signature is all that can be exacted. By imposing upon writers, with due discretion, the conditions of qualification and probity, you may usefully anticipate the more perfect discipline which the Positive Religion will institute.

Having thus indicated the bearings of Positivism, both general and special, I venture to propose to you, Sire, that you should publicly accord to doctrines which are completely organic a patronage equivalent to that bestowed by the great Frederic, and even by your celebrated ancestress, on a work which was essentially critical. None of the Western rulers at the present day can afford this noble patronage; they are all absorbed by anarchical disturbances and reactionary projects. Yet it would be more valuable to the Positive philosophy than it was to the Negative, which found easier access to, and was more favoured in its growth by the spontaneous disposition of almost all classes in the West. My own persecution is but the natural foretaste of the reception which the managers of our different cliques, especially the literary ones, are preparing for Positivism, when it shall begin to extend. For the Religion of Humanity is a direct menace to all the ill-founded supremacies which have gradually grown out of our modern anarchy.

But besides silencing an incompetent and subversive Literature, it has

to sanctify Science; and this it can only do by disciplining the savants, to the extent of proscribing as idle and even mischievous nearly all the labours of our academicians. Although according an honour to Art such as no previous religion could bestow, by incorporating it profoundly with itself, Positivism requires from artists a generality of thought and a generosity of feeling to which unfortunately their present speciality and venality render them very alien. It summons the chieftains of Industry to a temporal supremacy such as they hardly dared to dream of; but on condition of moral and intellectual qualifications which their successors alone will possess. Proletaries and women are the best support for Positivism; but its doctrines will, for some time to come, shock the anarchical habits of the former and the retrograde illusions of the latter. Such being its situation, the Universal Religion must look to some high quarter for an assistance which though, as a rule, only moral may sometimes need to be also material. This it cannot find in the West. Hence it is that I address the present communication to the chief least affected by all these disturbing influences, to him whom I have long regarded as the only real Statesman of the nineteenth century.

Already, Sire, as became you, you have authorised the free circulation of my *Positive Philosophy*. When you shall know enough of my *Positive Polity*, which completes that work, I hope that you will nobly favour a prudent propagation of it, especially by expressing your decisive approbation of it as a whole. The natural chief of European conservatives ought not to be long in seeing the value of a doctrine which consolidates and developes the conservative policy by raising it from its present empiricism to the completely systematic state required by its principal destination.

Salutation and Respect,

AUGUSTE COMTE.

Born at Montpellier January 19, 1798.

10, Rue Monsieur-le-Prince.

P.S. Positive morality requiring me to live without concealment, I have always given a proper publicity to every important step I have taken. I shall therefore think it my duty, Sire, to append this letter, with your reply, to the Preface of the third volume of my *System of Positive Polity*, which will appear towards the middle of 1853.

IV.

To His Excellency Reschid Pacha, late Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire.

Paris, Homer 7, 65. (Friday, Feb. 4, 1853.)

MY LORD,

In the present century there is a characteristic contrast between the policies of Eastern and Western Europe. The governments of the West, having become incapable of directing the social movement, now only

exercise a blind repression, which, though still indispensable to the immediate maintenance of material order, tends to perpetuate the revolutionary situation. But the rulers of the East have really remained at the head of their respective nations, and always strive to fulfil worthily the twofold function of every government—to promote what is good and resist what is evil. This noble attitude is now not less marked in Turkey than in Russia. Your administration happily contributed to it by its wise continuance of the work energetically begun by a reforming Sultan. It will never be forgotten that you have completely marked out the two lines of progress which are now of most importance to Mussulman civilisation by giving a striking example of monogamy, and by suppressing the slave-market which still dishonoured the capital of the Osmanlis. These special motives have determined a true philosopher to address to you personally his systematic exposition of an intellectual and social renovation, for which the East no less than the West is waiting.

The temporary leisure consequent on your honourable retirement from power gives me room to hope, at the present moment, that you will pay sufficient attention, first, to the *Positivist Catechism*, which will give you a general view of my doctrine, and then to the *System of Positive Polity*, which for ever establishes it. When you have read these two books, you will feel that, under the impulse of a decisive situation, the genius of the West has at last shaken itself free from secondary and local views and will henceforth be occupied with conceptions directly relating to such needs as are common to all civilised peoples.

For many centuries East and West have been seeking with equal ardour for the Universal Religion, but till now have never been able to attain it. In both quarters it came to be recognised that Polytheism could only furnish *national* beliefs, and Monotheism was then looked to as a sure source of unanimity. But experience and reasoning have completely demonstrated the emptiness of such a hope. The two great attempts of the white race to establish a monotheistic universality have mutually neutralised one another, the Roman world being irremediably divided between Catholicism and Islamism. This double failure is no matter of wonder to the disciples of sound philosophy, which directly points out the impossibility of such an agreement upon opinions essentially vague and necessarily undemonstrable.

The spontaneous accord between Orientals and Occidentals with respect to the scientific domain which they have simultaneously cultivated, forms an instructive contrast with these irreconcileable divergencies. Taking this fundamental fact for my clue, I was led to discover the really universal religion, which puts aside every theological belief, and embraces the whole of human existence, collective as well as individual, in a completely Positive faith. Having had the happiness to hold this view from my early youth, I have been able to devote my whole life to systematise and develope this final solution of the highest of all problems.

The emancipation of the higher minds from theology, since the end of the Middle Age, necessarily proceeded *pari passu* in both East and West, though under different forms. For it resulted principally from the decisive conflict which compelled men to feel that the incompatible pretensions of both Monotheisms to the universality reserved for Positivism were alike ill founded. The genius of Islamism must even be less opposed than that of Catholicism to the final advent of the Positive Religion, inasmuch

as it has always tended more towards reality, in virtue of its simpler creed and its more practical direction.

The incomparable Mahomet, observing the profound contrast between the two dogmatically identical religions of Rome and Byzantium, duly recognised the intellectual and moral advantages belonging to the normal separation between the two human powers. But his eminently social turn of mind enabled him to see that this improvement, to be decisive, required a more advanced civilisation than that which went along with the theological principle. With a presentiment that so premature though admirable an attempt must fail, he contented himself with instituting a transitional regime which was simpler and better adapted to the nature of Theologism.

The East had therefore to leave it to the West and to the true Catholic regime to initiate the glorious social revolution consisting in the two gradual emancipations of women and labourers. But the Orientals became better fitted than ourselves to reap the definitive fruits of the great movement which followed this decisive prelude. For they were thus preserved from the principal intellectual and social difficulties entailed on the modern inhabitants of the West by the too mystical character of their beliefs, and, above all, they have been saved from the metaphysical disorder involved in the spontaneous decomposition of their artificial regime.

Although by reason of the whole preparation required for the Positive Religion, its birthplace was necessarily in the West, Islamism must be held to have rendered the East more favourable to its final admission. For, on the one hand, that religion has protected the populations against the revolutionary poison, since its doctrine was not susceptible of the Protestant or Deistic degenerations, while its regime was far from admitting the hereditary principle in its strictest form. And on the other hand it has maintained the normal supremacy of governments, because it has made Mussulman rulers always more disposed than Christian sovereigns to look at the social problem as a whole, in consequence of the less imperfect harmony subsisting between their theoretic conceptions and their practical notions. Hence the final regeneration may triumph in the East without arousing the anarchical agitation to which the West was condemned by its initiative; the philosophers being obliged there to address themselves to the lower classes, because they cannot get the upper classes to understand them.

Reasoning from this historical estimate of the genius of Mahometanism, I do not doubt that its present representatives, when their first astonishment has passed away, will welcome the Positive Religion as offering them spontaneously the unexpected satisfaction of their chiefest aspirations. Passing straight from Islamism to Positivism, without any metaphysical transition, they will feel that they are worthily continuing the admirable designs of their great Prophet, the universal glorification of whom is systematised for ever by the Positivist worship.

The Osmanlis will thus be led to repudiate a vain political unity, and will cease to grieve over the necessary dismemberment of their empire. For they will see in it a normal application of the sociological law which everywhere restricts the territory of temporal dominions to its natural size. Moreover, the Ottoman rulers will be relieved from their anxiety, as disastrous as it is chimerical, with reference to the approaching aggressions of a power still less homogeneous than their own, and therefore still more subject to this spontaneous dismemberment. And since, according to the fundamental spirit of Islamism, the only purpose of political concentration

is to procure and consolidate a uniformity of opinions and manners, they will soon recognise that this great end is better secured when God is replaced by Humanity.

Salutation and Respect,
AUGUSTE COMTE.

10, Rue Monsieur-le-Prince.

END OF THE PREFACE.

Additions and Corrections.

Page 37, line 13, *for* 'should' *read* 'would.'
„ 87, *transfer* marginal heading 'Culture of Plants' to fourth paragraph below.
„ 131, heading of Chapter III., *for* 'APPRECIATION' *read* 'ACCOUNT.'
„ 228, line 30, *for* 'divergations' *read* 'divagations.'
„ 235, line 20, *add* footnote, 'Some commentators have considered the opening lines of the *Iliad* to be spurious.'
„ 255, last marginal heading, *for* 'in Chemistry' *read* 'on Chemistry.'
„ 269, marginal heading, *for* 'Apollonius of Perga's Initiation opens' *read* 'Apollonius of Perga opens.'
„ 397, line 21, *for* 'would have' *read* 'had.'
„ 489, second marginal heading, *for* 'remarked' *read* 'marked.'

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SYSTEM

OF

POSITIVE POLITY.

SOCIAL DYNAMICS; OR, GENERAL TREATISE ON HUMAN PROGRESS (PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY).

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

The distinctive characteristic of the present age will be the importance it assigns to History, by the light of which philosophy, politics, and even poetry will henceforth be pursued. This universal preference for the historical point of view is at once the essential principle of Positivism, and its general result. True positivity consists above all things in substituting the Relative for the Absolute; its ascendancy therefore is completely established when we learn to see that the orderly change already recognised in the Objective World extends also to Humanity itself, the variations of which thus govern our conceptions of every kind. At the present day, no other authority could conquer the deep dislike felt towards the encyclopedic system, and so establish the supremacy of the true Theoretic Unity. On the one hand, it follows from the decisive influence exerted by the advance of the sciences on human progress as a whole, that historical conceptions must be subordinate to the essential notions of Natural Philosophy, using that term in its widest sense. But on the other hand, no science can be really understood apart from its special history, which again cannot be separated from the general history of Humanity. Hence the true historical spirit is naturally universal. It receives from

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all quarters provisional materials, and its special office is to convert these everywhere into definitive conceptions. Its province is not even limited to the achievements of the Intellect. Bound as it is to give an account of Human Progress as an indivisible whole, not one necessary element of Human Existence must be neglected. It was thus that modern thought, in spite of its excessive tendency to the abstract, was at last led to combine with Speculation not only Activity but also Imagination and even Sentiment, in order that its conceptions might be sufficiently real.

The importance which the historical point of view is about to assume will be best understood if we consider its Social bearing, when we shall see that it is as necessary to the Heart as to the Intellect. In fact the anarchy of the West consists chiefly in the interruption of human continuity; first Catholicism cursing Antiquity; then Protestantism reprobating the Middle Age; and lastly Deism denying filiation altogether. Nowhere is there more call for the intervention of Positivism, to furnish the one satisfactory solution of this revolutionary state of opinion, by overcoming doctrines, all more or less subversive, which gradually stirred up the Living to revolt against the whole mass of the Dead. When History has rendered this service, it will soon become the sacred science, occupied, as it normally should be, with the direct study of the destinies of the Great Being, in which notion all our sound theories are summed up. Thenceforward, systematised Polity will connect all its undertakings with History, seeing that they must depend upon that stage of the grand Evolution within which they fall. Even Poetry will assume a new life and will prepare the Future by its idealised pictures of the Past.

It follows from such a convergence of reasons that Sociology consists essentially of Social Dynamics, the sole source from which the priesthood derives at once, its general counsels for the direction of public life, and its principal authority as the supreme organ of Humanity. It was for this reason that, in my fundamental treatise on Positive Philosophy, I was obliged to treat of Sociology under its Dynamical aspect and to make the Statical aspect subordinate. But in this my final and constructive work I must systematise the theory of human Movement by connecting it with that of human Existence, the subject of the preceding volume. I have already shown, at the

close of that volume (ii. 384–7), how Social Dynamics form the necessary complement of Statical Sociology, which without them would remain incapable of guiding actual life, where a crude application of Statical laws would often cause serious confusion.

Nevertheless, theory as well as practice would suffer, unless we conceived of Progress as subordinate to Order. Once separated from this Statical basis, History would lose seriously in consistency and, before long, in morality. For its laws of evolution would remain too empirical, and in demolishing the Absolute it would be apt to set up Instability in its place. Besides the flat immorality of such a disposition, the historical spirit has a natural tendency to make us disdain Sentiment, from constantly dwelling on results without taking account of intentions. It might thus so far misunderstand its true mission as to procure a sort of systematic sanction for those most mischievous corruptors of society who think to magnify the importance of public life by disparaging that of private life.

But all these intellectual dangers are at an end the moment we found Social Dynamics in accordance with their true nature; that is to say by making Movement uniformly dependent on Existence, as in the other sciences. Even in my first work, though specially devoted to Progress, this necessary condition could not be neglected; and I had frequently to suspend the Dynamical investigation while I established its Statical basis, as the need from time to time arose. The provisional course I there adopted was in itself an indication of the method to be pursued in the definitive construction of Social Dynamics, which I briefly announced at the end of my treatise on Positive Philosophy.[1] The present volume is the fulfilment of that promise. It will place in a striking light the normal superiority of this final method in giving a precision and coherence to historical conceptions, which otherwise they would never attain. Thus condensed, they will be better adapted for practical application.

We become more familiar with the laws of Progress when they are subordinated to those of Order; for these latter are the easier to recognise directly, although their greater degree of abstraction makes it difficult to reduce them to a system.

[1] These important pages will only be found in the original. They are altogether omitted in Miss Martineau's Condensed Translation.—Tr.

In the historical sketch at the end of the first chapter of the preceding volume (ii. 70–119), I was already able to mark out the essential features of such a method. By no other could the true Philosophy of History be constructed, so as to combine the spirit of induction with the force of deduction, the rightful claims of each being respected. Its principal conceptions would remain exposed to serious fluctuations, were it not thus directly connected with the corresponding laws of Human Nature, which in their turn would never be sufficiently clear to us if we could not observe their influence in the Movement of society. It was this reciprocal action which constituted the chief difficulty in my discovery of Sociological Laws, at a time when Dynamical and Statical conceptions were equally vicious, and I had to be rectifying both together. But now that we have got over that preliminary difficulty, Movement, through which alone we got our first glimpse of the laws of Existence, must submit to be systematised in accordance with those laws.

To go to the root of the matter, the difference between erecting Social Dynamics into a science and determining its relative rank, corresponds to the difference between the classification employed in the *Positive Philosophy*, and that arrived at in my present treatise on Positive Religion. The former went on the supposition that the one grand object for which other sciences exist is Sociology ; whereas here we see that it is Morals, with which, as has been shown in the previous volume, (ii. 353-5) Science ends and Art begins. Not that there is any real contradiction between the two views, for in the former, Morals were included under Sociology, though indistinctly. If then we treat them as normally distinct, it is only to perfect the abstract Hierarchy of the Sciences, by carrying out our grand principle of arrangement according to Increasing Complexity and Decreasing Generality. The importance, both theoretical and practical, of this step will soon be felt by all true thinkers, and will be regarded by posterity as the principal philosophic feature of the second phase of my life. Now from it follows as a corollary the subordination of Social Dynamics to Social Statics, because, as was stated at the opening of the preceding volume (ii. 2), Morals have a special affinity with conceptions of Order, as Polity has with those of Progress.

To complete this Introduction I must explain briefly the

sequence and the respective objects of the seven chapters which together will form my Philosophy of History.

The first will establish my fundamental theory of Evolutions as based on the systematic demonstration of the three grand Laws of Sociology. Since my discovery of those laws (in 1822), I have frequently had occasion to put them forward under different aspects. But I could not expound them as a doctrine till now, their true principle—*Progress is the development of Order*—not having been laid down till the close of my treatise on Positive Philosophy. It will be seen in the course of this demonstration how profoundly rational Dynamical theories become, when they are suitably subordinated to Statical conceptions. Divested thus of everything empirical, the laws of Evolution will connect Human Progress as a whole with the constitution of Human Nature in its broad general features. Thenceforward, when we apply them to History, we shall see how inevitable has been the succession of our principal intellectual or social phases. And yet we shall never lose sight of the fact that these phenomena are the most modifiable of all. For when I have pointed out the path by which progress in the first instance has been made, as the work has been spontaneously taken up by the more advanced populations in succession, I shall proceed to examine the modifications suitable to backward populations whom we are now in a position to influence in a really systematic way. Thus in the first chapter I shall complete my account of the main stream of progress, by laying down the General Theory of Human Transitions, thereby rendering it possible not only to interpret the past but to direct the future. From this estimate of the variable and the invariable in the Human Evolution, it will be seen how important it was, that the originally inductive conception of the dynamical laws should be rendered deductive.

In the second chapter I shall commence my direct explanation of the past by an account of Fetichism. This is the universal starting point. It is the one stage of our Initiation which can never be avoided, either in the case of the individual or in that of the race, and its spontaneous preponderance essentially continues during the other preliminary stages. Although therefore this earliest age is the least known, it is the one of which it is most important to form a just estimate. A rational examination of the most backward civilisations will

enable us to understand it sufficiently, notwithstanding the meagreness of documentary evidence as to our ancestors.

The study of Fetichism will lead me naturally to that of Theocracy, to which I shall devote the third chapter. For Theocracy in its earliest stage is always purely Fetichist, though its principal development must eventually be Polytheism arising gradually out of Astrolatry. Of all theological organisations, this is the only one really durable. It is entirely based on the great institution of castes, the principle of which survives through all the succeeding theological phases, and is the only bond which holds society together during their ascendency. This is Polytheism in its conservative form; and as all progress took its start from this point, we must acquaint ourselves with it, first, in its proper form, as the earliest type of systematisation; secondly, under such spontaneous modifications as it admits, though these have always been of stunted growth. From a rational study of it, under this last aspect we may obtain valuable hints as to the not distant transformation of vast populations to Positivism.

Amongst the most gifted portions of the race Theocracy at length passed away. Then they entered on the immense transition leading finally to the revolutionary crisis which we now behold. We must study this transition with most care so long as it still retains any organising force, that is to say, till the close of the Catholic-Feudal period. In its organic phase it divides into three stages, each necessary, and preparatory for the final consummation. The first relates especially to Intellect, the second to Activity, and the third to Sentiment. This spontaneous succession is the key to the whole period comprised between Theocratic antiquity and the modern Revolutionary movement. The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters of the volume will therefore give an account of the Greek Elaboration, the Roman Incorporation, and the Catholic-Feudal Initiation respectively. Viewed as a link in this series, the Middle Age will be seen to be a spontaneous outgrowth from the whole of Antiquity, while it is at the same time the least durable of the three Organic Transitions, and the one with which backward civilisations can most easily dispense.

When this last preparatory stage had done its work, the Theological and Military system was essentially exhausted. The process of decomposition continued, and, the last trace of

organic force having disappeared, tended only to pure anarchy. This however was inevitable, owing to the radical impossibility of then instituting the Final State, of which the true nature was not even known. Thus arose the twofold Revolution which separates the present crisis of the West from the Middle Age. I shall devote my seventh and last chapter to advancing a sound theory of the five centuries during which this Revolution has been going on, carefully marking its two simultaneous movements—the total break-up of the provisional regime and the gradual elaboration of the elements of the order to be finally established.

The six divisions, of which my explanation of the past in this volume consists, are of about equal length, notwithstanding the very unequal periods of time to which they correspond, because each succeeding stage of the preparation for Positivism requires a closer examination. In conclusion I shall briefly review the ground we have traversed and show that the vast Initiation, through which Man has been passing, is now completed. Our Normal State, the nature of which, apart from considerations of time, was determined in the last volume, will have in the next to be studied directly and decisively, with a view to shaping henceforth the different tendencies of Humanity towards its final settlement.

CHAPTER I.

POSITIVE THEORY OF HUMAN EVOLUTION; OR, GENERAL LAWS OF INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

OBJECT AND PLAN OF THIS CHAPTER, pp. 8–15.

THE general results of the last volume may be thus summed up;—the normal type of Human Existence is one of complete unity. All progress therefore, whether of the individual or of the race, consists in developing and consolidating that unity.

Unity is the normal type of Evolution no less than of Existence.

Looked at in this light, the Social Series is but a prolongation of the true Animal Series. The terms of the first indeed are successive, while those of the second are simultaneous. But in both alike we find a continually increasing complexity which would involve a conflict of the component elements if it was not always accompanied by an increasing perfection of general unity. Just as life, even in its lowest forms, surpasses all inorganic compounds in both these respects, so, as we go higher in the biological scale, we arrive at last at Humanity, the most complex and most harmonious being of all (Phil. Pos. vi. 827). From that point commences a new development of unity, and the series is continued in the collective evolution of the dominant species. There is now a relation not merely between *contemporaneous* but between *successive* elements. There is Continuity as well as Solidarity; and the harmony characteristic of the Great Being becomes more and more perfect.

Social Dynamics are summed up in one general Law: Man is ever becoming more Religious.

In the second volume (ii. 293) I showed that the whole of Social Statics may be summed up in the single principle of *co-operation*, provided that word be understood to include the combined action of successive generations as well as of contemporary families. Now under the influence of these two converging social forces the unity of the *individual* is ever being developed, and a closer connection is established between the two essential properties of religion, by virtue of which it binds men together, and regulates their conduct.

All systematic study of human Progress must then consist

in the development of its one law—Man is ever becoming more religious (ii. 381). In fact Social Dynamics are nothing but an explanation of the past in accordance with this fundamental principle obtained from Social Statics, a principle which also indicates what the future of our race will be. For although the type of unity determined in the preceding volume will never be actually reached, there will be a continual tendency to approximate to it.

The object of this chapter is to establish Special Dynamical Laws.

By thus keeping dynamical notions in a general subordination to statical principles, we ensure that the examination of History to which this volume is devoted shall be of a strictly rational character. But though when our work is completed we shall be able to sum it all up in the law of religious development above mentioned, that law will not, in such an abstract and general form, be a sufficient instrument of investigation. We must first deduce from it particular laws applicable to each of the main phases of human progress, and to the direct explanation of History. To do this is the object of the present chapter, without which the spectacle of the past would remain unintelligible.

These will relate to Intellect and Activity, but not directly to Feeling.

The statical elements of our nature being three in number, Feeling, Intellect, and Activity, we might expect that there would be as many dynamical laws to correspond to them. But we remark for the present, that they are necessarily reducible to two, one for the Intellectual, and the other for the Practical development. For the Moral development there is no special law, and the general principle of the increase of unity will be found sufficient to explain it when the way has been prepared by the examination of the other two modes of progress.

Why there is no special law for the Affective evolution.

How is this important difference to be accounted for? We must remember that according to the cerebral theory established in the first volume of this work (i. 553), the Affective region of the brain has not like the regions of Contemplation and Action any direct contact with the external world, but receives its impressions at second hand through those groups of organs. Hence the mutual influence of contemporary families and of successive generations cannot directly modify our propensities. It affects them only by means of the changes which it works in our thoughts and actions. If man were to become stationary as regards thought and action, it is impossible to conceive any general or regular alteration of his moral state. Individual

variations there might be resulting from the conditions of vegetal life. But how these conditions operate is at present unknown, nor can they produce any general results worthy of notice, because, occurring in different individuals, they would neutralise each other. Conversely, our propensities affect the progress of society only as they modify our opinions and conduct. In other words, progress depends *directly* on the intellectual and active faculties alone.

The modifications then of society, whether in thought or action, are in the last resort governed by the external Order; our own individual instincts being subject to the same inevitable influence in an indirect way. If these latter were capable of having direct and habitual relations with the outer world, the irregular perturbations to which they are exposed from the vegetal viscera would prevent any human Harmony (ii. 311). But these irregularities, though always imminent, are repressed by the preponderance of the External World, acting uniformly and continually on all individuals.

It is only during disease of the body or brain, that this external regulative force is overpowered by the perturbation within. We then have a temporary interruption of unity. Here may be seen the full philosophic bearing of my theory on the nervous isolation of the affective region of the brain (i. 553). So indispensable to the Positive explanation of Social Statics, and consequently of Social Dynamics, is this theory, that, even if it had not been directly established on biological grounds, its sociological consequences would have been a sufficient though indirect reason for accepting it.

However that may be, we may now reduce the general laws of human progress to two rules, connected but distinct, explaining the simultaneous development of the intellectual and active faculties. The course of our affective development is sufficiently marked out in advance by the broad principle that it depends on the degree of harmony in our ideas, and of co-operation in our actions (ii. 318). In other words, Man becomes more Sympathetic in proportion as he is more Synthetic and more Synergetic. It will be our duty however, as we explain step by step the spectacle of history, to examine carefully this valuable reaction of speculative and practical progress upon the affections and its tendency to strengthen that inward source of human unity. But this is not the direct object of Social

Dynamics. What they are immediately concerned with, is the continuous movement of thought and action resulting from the development of the external conditions which control the destinies of the true Great Being. The influence of this twofold growth in indirectly strengthening the affections gives the best measure of its real importance. For as our life is before all things a unity, of which the source is always Moral, all Speculative or Practical progress not tending ultimately to promote that characteristic unity, whether in the individual or in the race, must be regarded as illusory.

Dynamically the Intellectual Evolution takes precedence of the Active;

The fundamental laws of the human evolution being thus reduced to two, belonging respectively to the speculative and active faculties, I must, before establishing them, determine their coordination relatively to one another. The real supremacy must be assigned to the speculative faculties, though the least energetic of the three grand divisions of the cerebral system. Such a coordination may seem anomalous; yet it has always been usual to make the progress of Humanity consist in the advance of the intellect. Thus my true philosophic father, the great Condorcet, called his book a 'Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind,' though it dealt in its own way with the whole of human existence.

Though statically Speculation is subordinate to Activity.

No doubt we can now trace this habit to the metaphysical regime which regarded man as a mere thinking-machine, and neglected Feeling, and even Activity, because it could find no appropriate place for them in its empty theories. Still it results principally from a very legitimate, though hitherto but dimly apprehended, motive, which will ensure its continuance, subject to suitable rectifications, when a sound philosophy shall have triumphed. For although the intellectual faculties are in themselves weaker than the active, they appear to tell more on progress, especially on the progress of the race. But the dynamical estimate is, at bottom, in no way inconsistent with the statical; for it admits that Speculation is always essentially directed by Activity, and never escapes from its control entirely or for long together.

Explanation of this apparent contradiction.

To explain this control we must consider intellect and activity as tending spontaneously towards the same general object—the universal Order. Intellect strives to understand this Order, that activity may succeed in modifying it. In consequence of our bodily necessities, our whole practical existence

is subordinated to this preponderating order, which also becomes the object of all our speculations. The province of intellect therefore, coincides with that of Activity, and the latter spontaneously supplies the stimulus which sets the former to work. Even when the mind appears most absorbed with self-derived suggestions, it never ceases to obey this twofold impulse from without, failing which its operations would be disorderly as having neither principle nor purpose.

The fact that men long searched for causes rather than laws constitutes no exception to this fundamental law. For really they were only trying to reach the first cause of the order of nature, in order to influence it. No powerful and sustained effort of the intellect was ever due to mere pleasure of contemplation. When the wisdom of Theocracy proclaimed its principal precept, *Know in order to Improve*, it did but formulate the instinctive tendency to reject abstract speculations pointing to no concrete result. Before the advantage of studying Natural Laws was clear, to search for Supernatural Causes could not but seem more useful for practical purposes, and even for scientific prevision. But as soon as this mistake was corrected by experience, a change came over speculation, and researches which had once absorbed the highest intellects were at length abandoned to inferior or ill-trained minds.

Abstract speculation then, with no practical object, is a dream of intellectual pride. All revolutions in thought have been born in turn of the exigencies of our practical situation. Our needs determine our instincts, our instincts prompt our activity, our activity regulates broadly the exercise of our intellect. Nevertheless, the importance of the intellect is extreme, because without such an instrument activity would be helpless; for the steps we take, even *individually*, to modify the Natural Order, will be profoundly influenced by the conceptions we have formed of it. But *socially*, this office of the intellect becomes much more prominent. For it is the sole source from which are derived, first, the community of opinions indispensable to any cooperation, and, afterwards, the consecration necessary for a spiritual authority.

If then Intellect appears to direct human progress, it is in virtue of these two qualities—the capacity to know and the capacity to agree. Although therefore it is really but the instrument of the Active faculties, themselves set in motion by

the Feelings, the efforts of the Intellect must be the most prominent feature of History. Only we must always remember that those efforts are not self-prompted. Such is the reason why the Intellect, notwithstanding its cerebral inferiority, is the principal object of study in Social Dynamics.

The First Dynamical Law then will be concerned with the history of Thought, to which that of Action is subsidiary. (First Reduction.)

Thus, of the three regions of the Brain, the most powerful, the Affective, is without any distinct dynamical law. Of the other two, it is the feebler, the Intellectual, which claims our chief attention as respects its special course of development. This apparent anomaly ought not now to offer any serious difficulty. As for any secondary difficulties that may remain, the continual use which will be made in this volume of the explanation above given will gradually dissipate them. For the present it is enough that I have reconciled the principal contradiction appearing to exist between the statical and dynamical aspects of human nature. Our chief business then is to study the general law of the Intellectual Evolution, and afterwards, as strictly complementary to it, that of the Practical Evolution. But in giving our chief attention to the former, we must never forget that it is a Social rather than an Individual growth, though the spontaneous development of mind in the Individual must follow essentially the same course.

To enter on this capital investigation with effect I must establish, first its main *object*, and secondly its true *principle*.

Thought is exercised on Practical as well as Speculative conceptions; the First Dynamical Law will be concerned with the course of the latter, which, however, is modified by the former. (Second Reduction.)

The one object of the human intellect, even when it was striving to penetrate Causes, and still more since it has contented itself with discovering Laws, has always been to understand and to modify the universal Order. The Intellectual Evolution then of man must embrace all the principal opinions he has held with respect to that vast field which comprises his own nature, whether social or individual. These however may be at once reduced to the Theoretic conceptions round which our Practical ideas group themselves. Only we must allow for the spontaneous reaction of the latter upon the former, or our explanation of the Speculative Evolution will be inadequate.

Especially must this allowance be made in studying the period during which these two orders of thought were not sufficiently in harmony, that is to say, during the larger portion of the past. The different phases of Theoretic Reason were during that period determined by the continual exigencies of

Practical Reason ever in search of conceptions which should assist it to understand and to modify nature. Still, however great this influence of Practical Reason may at any time have been, the Fundamental Law of the intellectual movement remains independent of it. Our Dynamical investigation then reduces itself to a direct examination of the march of Speculation.

Speculative Conceptions are either Moral, Physical, or Intellectual; the First Dynamical Law will be concerned with the Filiation of the last. (Third Reduction.)

From this simplification we proceed to another. Thought is the product of the brain; and the history of thought must be broken up into three divisions to correspond to the three constituent parts of the brain, Feeling, Intellect, and Activity. Although each separate step we accomplish in Speculation, as well as in Action, is due to a concurrence of all these faculties, yet, take the whole mass of our speculations, and they range themselves under one or other of the three heads. Hence, if our study of the universal Order is to be complete, we must have three distinct and parallel classes of theories, Moral, Intellectual, and Physical. The last deal with both the External World and the Human Body on which our Practical efforts naturally concentrate themselves. The other two deal respectively with the Feelings which prompt our Action and the Ideas which guide it.

All three of these classes of theories, which assign the Laws or, during the theological and metaphysical stages, the Causes of the corresponding phenomena, are included in the Intellectual movement. But its Fundamental Law must relate essentially to the progress of Intellect itself, the sovereign judge of all. For the spontaneous evolution of the human Understanding necessarily governs the changes in our opinions, with respect to the Moral and Physical worlds. Hence the Dynamical investigation to be pursued in this chapter undergoes a third and last simplification. Reduced to its essence, it consists in determining the phases through which the Intellect itself passes, irrespective of any special object of study.

The Law of the Filiation of Intellectual Conceptions will have to be complemented by a Second Law Classifying the Sciences.

But this fundamental Filiation of our conceptions of every kind being established, we shall have to determine also the general order in which our theories on different branches of study are affected by it. Without such a Complementary Law, the Law of Intellectual Progress proper would not suffice to explain the changes of human opinion exhibited in history. It appears then that, whereas we spoke above (p. 9) of *one* law for the

mental evolution, it finally, in the positive conception, requires *two* laws, inseparable indeed, but still distinct: one of Filiation common to all our theories; the other of Classification, coordinating them according to their subject-matters. The latter figures in this place as dynamically subordinate to the former. Nevertheless this treatise will subsequently demonstrate that the Law of Classification is statically independent of the Law of Filiation; and this has been already indicated by the frequent use I have made of each of them in the two preceding volumes, as a result of my fundamental work, the Positive Philosophy.

The object and plan of this opening chapter having been thus sufficiently marked out, I must now proceed to explain its principal theory by establishing the general law of the Historic Filiation of human conceptions.

FIRST SOCIOLOGICAL LAW: (LAW OF FILIATION OF CONCEPTIONS), pp. 15–33.

This Dynamical investigation rests like every other, and even more than any other, on the corresponding Statical doctrine. My first step therefore must be to recapitulate the leading views of the preceding volume with regard to the permanent *constitution* of the Intellect. We shall then have precise and coherent principles to guide us in framing a theory of its growth.

Statical doctrine of last volume must first be recapitulated, pp. 15–22.

The whole economy of the human mind is subject to that general law prevailing throughout the Real Order, according to which the nobler phenomena are everywhere subordinate to those which are grosser but also simpler and more regular. Thus it is that Man is entirely subordinate to the World, as each living being is to its own environment. Now by a legitimate extension of this Biological dependence to the Mental functions, we at once get the essential principle of the Intellectual Economy (ii. 310–318). For it consists in the necessary and continual subordination of our Subjective Conceptions to the Objective Materials from which they are constructed; a truth substantially established by Aristotle in the aphorism: *There is nothing in the Understanding that did not originally spring from Sensation*; elucidated by the addition of Leibnitz: *except the Understanding itself*; and completed by Kant's distinction between *Objective and Subjective Reality*. But from the Biological point of view, this dependence of Intellect on Sensation is perfectly analogous to that of the bodily Functions upon the Environment which controls the whole vital Existence.

First condition of Mental Harmony: Thought depends on Sensation.

Or, more broadly, on the Environment.

It is the Environment which feeds, stimulates, and regulates each Function;—Three indispensable conditions if the living being is not to act blindly but to produce regular and calculable results. By the same threefold title does it govern the understanding itself. Thus the true Intellectual Economy, discerned, though imperfectly, by the most eminent and ancient of my precursors, is shown by the Positive Philosophy to be a simple application of the principal Biological law, on the Adjustment of Organism and Environment; which again is but one form of the universal law of the Natural Order, on the subordination of higher phenomena to lower. Thus corroborated, the luminous aphorism of Aristotle acquires a coherence that will henceforth be proof against all sophisms.

Second condition of Mental Harmony: Mental Images are weaker than External Impressions.

Besides putting the statical principle of the human understanding into its final shape, Positivism adds to it a necessary *Complement*, without which it would not form a sufficient foundation for Intellectual Dynamics. If the Subjective is to be completely subordinate to the Objective, it is not enough that the materials of our Thoughts should invariably be derived from our Sensations. It is further necessary that the picture in the mind should be fainter than the corresponding impression on the senses. Unless that condition were satisfied, the Brain would not be strictly *subordinate* to the Environment, vastly as the latter preponderates, and the mental intercourse of Man with the World would be reducible to no regular law. For the pictures in the Mind would be ever confusing the impressions on the Senses, and this to such a degree as often to render even our humblest cognitions worthless. What would make the confusion the more hopeless, is that the same object will often under different circumstances convey different impressions, each of which would tend to predominate if the influence of the World Without, outweighing them all, did not repress the anarchy Within.

For the Brain is not passive.

To bring out more clearly this *complementary condition* of Mental Harmony we must remark that the Mind is never merely passive in its relations to the World without. The impressions conveyed from the Object are always more or less modified by the state of the Subject. Even in the most trifling judgments formed, the *hypothesis*, according to which each group of sensations decides on the character of the particular object judged, is furnished purely by the Brain. True, the

Brain has constructed this hypothesis out of materials derived in the first instance from without. But those materials may be applied and combined in so many different ways, that there is plenty of room for confusion, and even for error, if the Brain itself has any such tendency.

The Intellect is in a state of continual balance between two opposing forces, tending to make it, the one too passive, the other too active. On the one hand it has to reflect faithful impressions of the External World, and on the other to construct the link for them without which they would remain incoherent. Now to reconcile these conflicting tasks would often be found impossible if *recollections* could become as forcible and distinct as *sensations*.

We see then that Aristotle's aphorism was not a sufficient basis for Mental Statics till Positivism had added this complementary law. Both alike depend upon the great Biological law which subordinates Man to the World; and either can be deduced from it, according as the external influence is regarded from the Nutritive and Stimulative side, or from the Regulative.

In Dreams and Madness the second condition is absent.

Although the second condition of Mental Harmony is of no use except to complete the first, and notwithstanding that both of them spring from the same natural source, they are so far distinct that their habitual coexistence may be interrupted. Madness, properly so called, is such an interruption, being always characterised by excess of Subjectivity, as Idiocy is by a deficiency of it. Not that in madness the World Without ceases to furnish the materials for the construction going on Within; for in dreams and the wildest delirium, the external origin of the elements worked up by the brain can always be traced. The derangement consists solely in the fact, that in consequence of too great cerebral excitement, the recollections become more vivid and distinct than the sensations. In that state the Outer cannot *regulate* the Inner, though it continues to *feed* and *stimulate* it. We see now why Aristotle's principle was utterly insufficient to establish the theory of Madness; and the normal state could never be thoroughly understood till contrasted with the abnormal. The full importance of the complementary law introduced by Positivism is thus brought out, in the process of proving its strict independence of the earlier law, though our system finally combines both. For

Mental Harmony nothing more is necessary, but nothing less would be adequate.

The subordination of the Subjective to the Objective varies between the extremes of Madness and Idiocy.

I had to dwell the more carefully here on this explanation, because it has a direct bearing on the real connection between the statical and dynamical aspects of the Positive theory of the Human Understanding. On the one hand, a suitable subordination of the Subjective to the Objective marks the normal state of every mind. On the other hand, the Subjective really governs the Objective in certain pathological cases, some intermittent, others continuous. Thus according to the principle of Broussais, that the phenomena of health and disease are essentially homogeneous, the subordination of the mind to the outer world may exist in many different degrees between the two opposite extremes of idiocy and madness (i. 527, ii. 359).

Intellectual Evolution consists in a certain succession of these variations.

The whole development of the human intellect consists in a regular series of such spontaneous variations, the general law of which has here to be determined. It can be discovered in the first instance only by studying the evolution of the race, that alone being on a sufficiently large scale and sufficiently regular; but, as the foregoing indications show, it will hold good also of individual life. Any one in fact may verify it for himself by observing dreams, which are an intermediate state between reason and madness; or rather a dream is a temporary, but real, and often well-marked state of insanity.

Mental Harmony being a relative term.

Now that Positivism is everywhere substituting the Relative for the Absolute, Mental Harmony ought no longer to be regarded as something fixed and unvarying. That was the idea of the theologians, and still more of the metaphysicians, but it is incompatible with any systematic conception of human progress. The equilibrium required for mental harmony, between suggestions from within, and impressions from without, is eminently modifiable, yet its variations always obey certain laws, even when they reach the pathological state. To discover their general law is here the chief difficulty of Social Dynamics. All the modes of equilibrium which may occur *successively* in the development of the race, are repeated *simultaneously* in the different individuals. This consensus goes to show that truth predicated of human opinions, and sanity predicated of individuals, are both relative terms (ii. 373).

The Law of their Succession consists

To discover the constant law, according to which one mode of mental harmony succeeds another, we must go back to the

general principle which always connects Dynamical investigations with Statical theories, namely that Progress is nothing but the development of Order. Now as the equilibrium of the mind consists in the subordination of the Subjective to the Objective, it follows that intellectual progress consists in rendering that subordination more perfect.

in an increasing subordination of the Subjective to the Objective.

Carry this subordination as far as we will, our doctrines never represent the outer world with exact fidelity. Nor is it needful that they should. Truth in any given case, social or individual, means the degree of exactness in representation possible at the time. For positive logic is but the construction of the simplest hypothesis that will explain the whole of the ascertained facts.

Though exact objective truth is unattainable and unnecessary.

Any superfluous complication, besides causing a waste of labour, would be a downright error, even though a fuller acquaintance with facts might at a later time justify it. In fact, without this rule subjectivity runs wild, and the mind tends towards madness, as is so vividly brought home to us by the admirable portraiture of Cervantes. But in proportion as our observations are extended, we are forced to adopt more complicated theories in order adequately to represent facts. A vicious persistence in the simple explanations with which we start would, under pretext of stability, tend towards idiocy.

The simplest hypothesis compatible with known facts being for the time the *true* one.

The logical procedure I have indicated is a necessity, and therefore the human mind always kept to it essentially, though long unconsciously. That it did so spontaneously is sufficiently accounted for by the constant preponderance of active life, which always demands such theories as combine reality with simplicity. Thus it is that, looked at as a whole, the intellectual movement has consisted in an ever closer approach to reality in our doctrines as to the world without, by means of a continually increasing complexity in the theories suggested from within.

To make this fundamental explanation sufficiently clear, we must in employing it distinguish carefully between the Preparatory stages of Humanity and its Normal state. For, as I am about to show, the force of subjectivity varies inversely as the progress of the former, but directly as the completeness of the latter.

But the Law above given applies only to the Preparatory period.

During our long nonage as individuals or as a race, that is to say, while the search for causes prevails over the study of laws, the progress of reason consists chiefly in more and more

restraining the suggestions from within, in order to make them more conformable to the impressions from without. In the earliest stage of all, before observation has had time to store up a single analogy capable of guiding our tendency to synthesis, we have only our own brains to draw upon for colligations, so that our first steps are the result of a purely subjective logic, and the sway of Subjectivity is at that time almost unlimited. From the first rise of the objective method it rebelled more and more against the earlier method, and struggled to assert its own preponderance. The new tendency was already well marked in later antiquity; but it is most characteristic of modern thought during the special preparation required for the Positive spirit. We thus see that, in the period which has elapsed from the first birth of thought to its present maturity, Subjectivity, though at first preponderant, has had less and less share in framing our theories; a fact which seems to contradict the rule lately laid down as to the general direction of the intellectual movement.

In the Normal state Subjectivity will resume its sway.

But however protracted may be this Preparatory period—and even among the choicest intellects it is but just completed—it cannot be the Normal state of human reason. When the universal religion shall have acquired sufficient ascendency, the boundless future opened to our intellect would soon cause us to forget such a past, but that an evolution essentially similar will be repeated in the case of each individual. So far from the objective method ever bearing a sway comparable to that of its predecessor, the latter in a regenerated form will resume its rightful empire, which will not again be shaken, because it will be the sole possible source of any synthesis (i. 361–368).

I gave the first decisive example of the final state when I laid down the outlines of systematic Biology at the beginning of the present treatise, the chief characteristic of which will be its employment of this subjective logic, my fundamental work on Positive Philosophy having paved the way for its introduction. Doubtless a preponderance of Subjectivity in its old shape would now-a-days tend towards *madness* by neglecting external data on pretext of dignity. But in spite of the prejudices of the scientific world, we must equally recognise that the modern ascendency of Objectivity, by repressing the imagination under pretext of reality, is now tending to *idiocy*.

There is such a thing as *Objective* Absolutism,

Empiricism and Mysticism are the eternal Scylla and Charybdis of human reason. But the time has come when the true Positive spirit can mark out the course between them by a right estimate of what a sound theory is and what it is wanted for. While always subordinating Imagination to Observation, this Final Regime nevertheless calls forth the highest powers of the intellect. For it is the Intellect alone which creates the intercourse between itself and the External World, seeing that the latter contributes nothing but the materials for it. Under the Final Regime we shall eschew the absolute on the side of the object no less than on that of the subject, and content ourselves with aiming at such theories of the external Order as will enable our practical wisdom to ameliorate it systematically.

Which Positivism will check.

In this normal state Subjectivity, as I have indicated above, will certainly play an increasingly greater part. For the hypotheses it forms must needs become gradually more complex if they are adequately to represent observations, seeing that these will continually become more complete and precise, in proportion as our necessities call forth a thoughtful activity, of which at present hardly the rudiments are visible. Sensible that the value of true theories lies in their practical results, men will even reject inopportune facts, a premature attention to which would but embarrass our hypotheses on the plea of an idle accuracy not practically needed.

Theories may be admissible even when not demonstrable.

When disciplined by religion, the scientific spirit will never forget its principal office, but will resume with dignity its rational freedom, which at present is fettered by the scruples of the empirical school. A theory *subjective* in its origin will be held admissible when it sufficiently explains the essential phenomena, without waiting for the *objective* verification, and even where that complement to demonstration can never be obtained.

As, for instance, the Positive theory of the Brain.

I had no hesitation in claiming this privilege of the Normal Regime, after fulfilling the preliminary conditions of it, when I established my cerebral theory in the first volume of this work. My decisive application of that theory in the second volume, and the still wider use I shall have to make of it in constructing what remains of my religious system, will soon overcome the opposition of academic pedantry, although the anatomical verification may long remain insufficient. For the

time is at hand when, among the better minds, the logical authority attaching to a theory closely bound up with the highest speculative and the most important practical ideas will prevail over the almost superstitious credit still accorded to special facts.

But the Final or Normal Synthesis will be Subjective in the sense of being *relative* to Human needs.

But the preponderance of Subjectivity in the Final Regime will be something very different from what it was in primitive times, in consequence of the all-important substitution of the *relative* for the *absolute*. In the attempt to penetrate Causes, our synthetic fictions, as being the only possible guides for our earliest intellectual steps, must have free play, regardless of the conditions imposed by reality, which are out of place in the domain of fiction. It is enough if these first attempts at synthesis satisfy a rough natural logic while generalising and coordinating our spontaneous conceptions. The search after Laws, on the contrary, until it is systematised by Positivism, breeds a no less absolute pretension to objective knowledge; and then the dignity of reason is sacrificed to material reality. In the Normal state we first of all recognise that the subjective ought always to be subordinated to the objective, and then we complete that fundamental principle by conceiving the subordination as purely relative to our needs, to which our procedures have to be adapted. Thus giving up all idea of an objective synthesis, we establish one that is subjective, the theoretic nature of which is determined by the practical use to which it is to be put.

The final change then in our logical method amounts to this: that we do advisedly, in order to give a wise direction to our activity, what in primitive times we did instinctively, to gratify an idle curiosity. We form of our own free will hypotheses capable of verification in order to establish laws sufficient for our conduct: we do not aspire either to form an exact representation of the world or to gratify mere intellectual cravings. We do not seek for a mental unity apart from that general unity which results from a just subordination of speculation to action, and of action to affection.

The Statical basis having been thus recapitulated, we proceed to establish the First Sociological (or Dynamical) Law.

This explanation will suffice to mark the necessary and continuous tendency of the intellectual movement looked at as a whole. I can now proceed to establish directly the dynamical law which governs our gradual progress towards this Normal state, so different, at least in appearance, from our Primitive state. The determination of this law, the only possible basis

for a philosophical examination of history, is the principal object of this chapter.

The goal towards which this preparatory movement of the intellect tends we know already. It consists in so subordinating the subjective to the objective that the logical order represents the physical, and that we can, where suitable, make reflection do duty for observation. This intellectual state was clearly explained in the last volume (ii. 72), and not as a state of the intellect only, but in its relations to the other permanent facts of human nature, both social and individual. With Positivism it becomes systematically preponderant; its further development is thenceforward strictly gradual, and always regulated beforehand, so as to be safe from any revolution.

The movement we are investigating consists in a gradual subordination of the Subjective to the Objective.

Compared with this final state, the preparatory march of the intellect seems to consist in a long series of radical changes. But the positive theory of the mental evolution will modify that estimate which irrationally breaks the continuity of progress. In his judgments of the past, as in his conceptions of the future, the true philosopher always sees a development of one and the same tendency towards complete unity, each generation getting a little nearer to it than the last. To every discerning and relative thinker it is clear that the impulse which modified opinions long ago is none other than that which directs true speculative progress now, namely, a craving for a complete harmony between conceptions and observations. Such will be the general conclusion of sound historical doctrine.

In spite of appearances this was always its character.

Seen in its full completeness the fundamental law of the Intellectual Evolution consists in the necessary passage of all human theories through three successive stages: first, the Theological or fictitious, which is provisional; secondly, the Metaphysical or abstract, which is transitional; and thirdly, the Positive or scientific, which alone is definitive. Of this *Law of the Three Stages* I have to demonstrate here only so much as concerns the order of succession in the two that are Preparatory. For the preceding volume sufficiently explained the Final stage and the general tendency towards its full realisation; and that explanation will be completed with more precision in the following volume where I treat of the future of Humanity. Here I have only to demonstrate the twofold preparation required for Positivism, the advent of which, as

Law of Three Stages stated. This volume deals only with the Preparatory State (first two Stages).

belonging to the domain of social Dynamics, is naturally left undetermined by Social Statics.

(1) Theological Stage, pp. 24–30.

To understand the first stage we must examine it first in the case of the individual, then in that of the race.

(*a*) Influence of Fictitious Synthesis on Individual.

The first of these examinations establishes the necessity in the earliest times, chiefly on intellectual but also on moral grounds, of a fictitious synthesis, which would long remain as indispensable as it was inevitable.

(*a*) Intellectual aptitude. It is inevitable.

The most remarkable thing about this synthesis was its incomparable spontaneity, owing to its perfect adaptation to the needs and means of the mind in its earliest state. Causes will be sought after as long as laws are undiscovered, and laws cannot be discovered without a long series of observations. The primitive logic is naturally adapted to such inquiries. Its answer to them—the only answer that suits them—consists in referring everything to the human type, and conceiving all phenomena as produced by Wills analogous to our own, and for the most part superior to ours only in a degree proportioned to their effects. To complete the synthesis, it is supposed that the feelings thus manifested relate essentially to man's destinies, influencing them most frequently for good, but sometimes for evil. This gives us at once a provisional harmony between Man and the World—the only harmony possible so long as the immutable preponderance of the latter remains unrecognised. In a word, the laws proper to physical facts being unknown, those facts were grouped in the mind under moral laws, the outlines of which from the first naturally suggested themselves to Man.

So suitable to our primitive situation is a logic of this sort that, given the appropriate conditions, it prevails equally among the most exalted minds and the humblest—even those of the brutes. Every attempt to speculate as to events the *laws* of which are not yet known, naturally aspires to determine their *causes*, and this always leads to the hypothesis of Directing Wills. We cannot escape this twofold tendency except by abstaining from speculation, and that is not always possible or even proper. Whatever maturity human reason may attain, every one will find himself always prone to think of inanimate matter as animate, in order to supply the shortcomings of *law* by *cause*.

Nor is it only when some passion impels us to speculations which we might avoid, that this disposition shows itself. It is

just as strong when there is the best reason for our inquiries, as long as the laws relating to them remain unknown. The anarchy of the West at the present day furnishes too many examples of such a tendency in social speculations, these being often taken up by men who do not recognise any necessary law of social phenomena, and so treat them all as produced by arbitrary Wills, either divine or human.

Substantially this primitive logic amounts to a substitution of meditation for contemplation, as in the Final State. The only difference is that the subjective guess has no objective basis, which is as unattainable then for Laws as it would be useless in the quest for Causes. Speculation at this stage, instead of being stimulated from without, is prompted by Feeling, the only incentive adapted to such inquiries. With respect to all events which interest us, an at least general knowledge of an invariable Order is the only check upon our spontaneous tendency to form our *opinions* in accordance with the hopes or fears resulting from our *desires*. Politics are not the only department of thought in which this tendency is still observable. It is exemplified every day in the slightest physical conjectures, whenever for their rational formation an acquaintance with concrete laws would be requisite. Those laws are at present for the most part unknown, and so in the absence of external motives the intellect cannot help pronouncing according to the internal impulse.

It is indispensable.

This process is not only inevitable but indispensable. No other could stir the intellect from its primitive torpor, because it affords the only means possible at that time for connecting our observations with each other. True, no conception can be real or durable unless it has an objective basis, and that is why our first synthesis is necessarily chimerical and transient, in so far as it is purely fictitious. But on the other hand, *some* theory is as indispensable for observation as for prevision. No fact can be remembered while isolated; oftener than not it escapes notice, as is the case with the many physical events, celestial and even terrestrial, which have no interest for man.

These two necessities, mutually incompatible yet equally insurmountable, confine the mind at first in a circle whence there is no issue but by the Fictitious Synthesis, which, as it seeks not laws but causes, has no need of an objective preamble and therefore rises spontaneously. In my treatment of history

I shall show by many glaring instances how speculation has suffered, when modern empiricism, under pretence of reality, has prematurely discarded this primitive mode of connecting observations, before it was in a position to establish any other. This purely subjective logic is at first as legitimate as the best scientific methods are now. It furnished the only means then available for connecting facts, and so developing observation whence was to arise the Final Synthesis.

(β) Practical aptitude.

For want of reality, this earliest speculative regime is radically unfit to direct practical progress, and it is to the irresistible exigences of the latter that the principal modifications of the former are due. Yet even from the practical point of view the fictitious synthesis possesses an important property, not indeed mental, but moral, in virtue of which it is no less indispensable to the decisive awakening of Activity than to that of Intelligence. For it holds out the prospect of unlimited empire over the material world, by the help of the dominant Wills to which prayer is addressed, and thus exerts a powerful and continuous stimulus on our aspirations and even on our hopes. If a knowledge of natural laws had been possible from the first, it would have preceded the necessarily slow growth of our power to modify nature, and the result would have been a fatal check to our activity. For we should have been discouraged by the *immobility* of the Eternal Order, which, being its essential characteristic, would be recognised sooner than the secondary variations of which it is susceptible.

These spontaneous illusions are long valuable because they give us the energy and perseverance required for our earliest industrial progress and for the scientific researches prompted thereby. Even among the moderns, philosophic minds have recognised their prolonged importance in astronomy and chemistry. The ardour for grand social improvements which is so universally prevalent among Western nations is largely due to the belief in analogous chimeras as to perfectibility, and would be damped by a faulty appreciation of social laws (ii. 62). To speak generally, a consideration of the most complex phenomena will be enough to convince us that the fictitious synthesis, which at first suited all human speculation, is still, for the majority of men, a moral and intellectual necessity.

(γ) Esthetic aptitude.

In Art its efficacy is still more incontestable than in Speculation and Action, as resulting more directly from its peculiar

spontaneity. The primitive belief that all objects are alive and concern themselves with Man is eminently adapted to stimulate and direct ideality, by surrounding us with sympathies which promote the expansion of all our sentiments. So strongly marked is this property of the earliest supernatural faith, that it has been erroneously supposed impossible to obtain an equivalent for it under any other intellectual regime. The Final State however must certainly surpass the Primitive Synthesis even in this respect, as my last volume will prove.

(*b*) Influence of Fictitious Synthesis on Society.

The Social efficacy of the Theological stage is much less direct, and will require more explanation. It will be fully dealt with in the course of this volume, but I must briefly indicate it here.

Being essentially Personal, it did not *directly* promote Social progress.

Although here also the influence results from the spontaneity of the synthesis, it is foreign to the nature thereof, which was always essentially personal. As the theological faith is inspired from within, the human type, which it supposes to prevail everywhere, is conceived in a mode necessarily individual, never collective. Each man frames or accepts the supposition for himself, as if he lived in isolation. Its field is long restricted to the world of matter, and does not embrace social phenomena; hence, though widely extended, it does not react on society.

It even tends logically to Individualism.

This personal tendency ought even to be regarded as a necessary consequence of the spontaneity characterising the Primitive Synthesis. There is in fact a natural connection between Egoism and the Absolute. The explanation of all phenomena by arbitrary wills, and the direct subordination of each existence to unlimited powers, must point to isolation. So natural is this tendency, that when the Fictitious Synthesis becomes fully systematised in Monotheism, it is necessarily led to deny the existence of all altruistic sentiment.

But *indirectly* it promoted social progress by (*a*) furnishing common opinions, (*β*) founding spiritual authorities.

However, as history shows beyond dispute that the primitive faith did exercise a certain social influence, the doctrinal explanation must be, that while Theologism could not find a place for or cultivate the social sentiments, it indirectly yet continuously stimulated them. It exerted this precious influence in virtue of two kindred but distinct tendencies: the one, to produce a community of opinions, the other, to found spiritual authorities. We have here the two conditions of any true social organisation.

(α) Men naturally yearn for sympathy of opinion.

The essential uniformity of human nature disposes us all to think in the same manner, when our situations are sufficiently similar. This disposition is too strong to be neutralised by the vagueness inherent in supernatural beliefs in consequence of their purely subjective source. The fact that they are spontaneous, and not framed after reflection, tends to prevent discordance; and a still greater influence in this direction must we attribute to the instinctive sociability which insensibly urges every man to an intellectual communion no less precious to the heart than to the intellect.

This craving is Moral rather than Intellectual.

Even in the most trifling opinions that we form from our own personal observation of facts, we may every day see how needful to us is the assent of others. Unless we have it we hardly dare trust our own judgment. The serious mental confusion experienced by highly intellectual men, when they have been too much in the company of lunatics, proves that this mutual influence extends even to pathological cases. Its intensity depends on superior strength of character rather than of mind.

Such is the double path by which our sympathetic instincts lead us naturally to uniformity in all our opinions, not excepting those which are most largely derived from our own inspirations. The tendency is in this case the more powerful because it concerns more important doctrines, with regard to which we feel greater need of agreement.

Fictitious Synthesis easily moulded to suit social needs.

The very vagueness of supernatural beliefs is often favourable to unanimity, because it facilitates the acceptance of the modifications in them implied by the spiritual ascendency of strong minds over weak. From their vagueness, too, these dogmas more easily take that social bent which is unconsciously communicated to them by our altruistic instincts. Nay, even our selfish instincts strengthen this bent, for they prompt each individual to protect himself against the oppression of his neighbours, by invoking the supernatural powers from which the earliest sanction of all human discipline spontaneously proceeded. Further, notwithstanding its anti-social nature, the Primitive Faith engenders a deep feeling of respect and even love for divine beings, and so directly favours the growth of our love for one another.

(β) Spiritual authorities naturally

I need not here explain at length how spiritual authorities spontaneously grow up under the Fictitious Synthesis. That

point will be specially treated in my historical survey. I must however distinguish between two sources of them which have been erroneously confounded—one common to all beliefs, the other peculiar to a supernatural faith. As to the first, every general doctrine supposes a teaching in the first instance, and indeed a continuous interpretation, both of which may be either empirical or systematic. This grows at once into a spiritual authority, which soon extends its sway over the whole life of each individual. Though the Fictitious Synthesis is spontaneous, it cannot dispense with such an office, wanting which its vague character would prevent it from attaining sufficient fixity or true community. Spiritual authority grows with the importance of doctrines, and as they become more uniform. Only modern anarchy could imagine such a subversive dream as a Faith without an Organ. As to the second source, the special interpreters of supernatural beliefs would soon acquire a sacred authority, as being needed to intervene between men and the divine powers. Such is the twofold source of the theocratic character which all spiritual authority at first exhibits.

grow out of community of belief; especially where this is supernatural.

We see now why the Fictitious Synthesis was long able to exert a profound *social* influence, notwithstanding its directly *personal* character. It will easily be conceived how its two tendencies, to a community of opinions, and to a spiritual authority, would mutually strengthen each other. The spiritual authority could not attain considerable proportions except by the spread of supernatural beliefs. But these again were largely indebted to the authority for the development and consolidation of their empire. Without its help their vague character would have exposed them to the risk of spontaneously withering away. We must even recognise that the principal utility of the Primitive Faith was always due to its priesthood.

The Belief and the Authorities mutually strengthen each other.

Thus Mental necessity, Moral motives, and Social needs concur in demonstrating that the Fictitious Synthesis was no less indispensable than inevitable, as the only possible starting-point for civilisation. But the same considerations also prove that its service was to be, from all points of view, purely provisional, until the Positive Faith should have taken shape sufficiently to lead instead of merely to modify. Under the steady pressure of Sentiment and Activity, even independently of

But though the Fictitious Synthesis was Inevitable and Indispensable, it was purely Provisional.

Intellectual preference, the search after Causes, the recourse to the aid of imaginary beings, and supernatural discipline, were always confined to departments of knowledge not yet accessible to Positivity.

The moment Positivity becomes possible in any department, it is spontaneously accepted.

As soon as the substitution of the relative for the absolute, of the real for the imaginary, and of altruism for selfishness, becomes sufficiently practicable, it obtains everywhere a spontaneous assent, which soon surmounts the resistance of the primitive system. So congenial is this tendency to all three parts of our nature, that very often it appears before the time is ripe, as I shall prove historically by many decisive examples, even in the remotest antiquity. It would be superfluous here to dwell further upon an explanation for which the first half of this treatise has so thoroughly prepared the way. In what remains of it, I have only to study more clearly the two inevitable processes which, since the first start of civilisation, have been dissolving Theologism and preparing the way for Positivism.

(2) Metaphysical Stage, pp. 30–33. This is but the Transition from the Fictitious to the Positive Synthesis.

Between these two incompatible systems the Metaphysical spirit spontaneously effects a transition. Its function extends no further. To give a better idea of this intermediate state I must first indicate the three necessary phases of the Fictitious Synthesis, although this chapter is not the proper place to examine them in detail, or to point out their interconnection. It is in the transitions from one to another that the action of the Metaphysical spirit is most conspicuous. This must cease when the last phase is accomplished.

Fictitious Synthesis divided into Fetichism and Theologism proper.

Humanity, in its passage from infancy to maturity, exhibits Supernatural Faith under two forms which are quite distinct, though they are generally confounded; first Fetichism, and then Theologism properly so called, which, as being the only form now well known, often gives its name to the whole system. These two broad divisions of the Fictitious Synthesis differ radically in their conceptions of the directing Wills. In the first, or more spontaneous state, these are supposed to reside in the bodies whose phenomena they seem to explain. The second and more fictitious does not localise them, but attributes them to Beings each of whom is independent of the bodies he governs. Thus the fetichist sees the human type in an object more directly and sensibly; while in the god of the theologist the same type is more complete and more modifiable.

Although necessarily consecutive, these two forms of the Fictitious Synthesis are hardly ever sharply separated. Whichever is preponderant, the presence of the other may generally be detected. Thus the passage from Fetichism to Theologism is everywhere an insensible process, although it is the most profound and decisive of our preliminary revolutions. The affinity of the two systems consists in this,—that the first deals rather with *objects* themselves, the second with the different *phenomena* common to several objects; that being the natural course of contemplation, whether individual or collective. Now the spontaneous preponderance of one of these two modes, would never cause the other to fall into entire desuetude. Minds most devoted to concrete contemplation sometimes fall into abstract contemplation, for example with regard to diseases, and, above all, to death, which is everywhere personified. The opposite disposition is still more easily conceived.

These two States seldom entirely exclude each other.

When Theologism supersedes or rather absorbs Fetichism, it takes two forms successively, one Polytheistic, the other Monotheistic, the distinction between which is undeniable, although as a rule undue stress is laid upon it. It consists not so much in the plurality or unity of the fictitious Beings as in their independence or subordination. The truth is, they always remain very numerous as long as Theologism preserves a true social or even intellectual activity. But the divine hierarchy may consist either of gods, each with a province of his own, as in Polytheism, or of angels and saints ministering to a supreme being, as in Catholicism. The *spontaneity* of the first mode renders it both more complete and more durable. It is in every respect the principal stage of the Fictitious Synthesis. The second being *systematised*, and therefore capable of being discussed, can have no solidity mental or social. Its function dwindles to softening the change from Theologism to Positivism, the last organic transition; one, in fact, which other races may omit, when it has been gone through once for all by those of Europe.

Theologism proper divided into Polytheism and Monotheism.

We have here then a development of the Fictitious Synthesis through three natural ages, a development which is *general* to all branches of knowledge, and which yet, so far from intensifying the Synthesis, weakens it, owing to the increasing pressure of Positivity. This latter on the other hand, while in course of elaboration, is necessarily marked by a *speciality*,

During these three ages the Fictitious Synthesis is really being replaced by Positivity, but apparently by the Metaphysical Stage.

which though ever diminishing, long hinders it from reacting directly on Thought as a whole. Positivity having not yet taken shape as a philosophy, its work is provisionally delegated to the Metaphysical spirit, which thus seems to become the essential *agent* of the transition, whereas it can never be anything but an *instrument* of it.

Because Positivity is at first *special*, while the Metaphysical spirit is in its way *general*.

Now Ontology is not special. In its way it is no less general than the Theology from which it springs. Like Theology, it essays the search for Causes, and in a fashion equally absolute; only for deities, the *spontaneous* creation of the mind, it substitutes entities, the creation of *systematic* thought; and these, from the very fact that they are shadowy, are the better adapted to a transition. For each entity may be viewed, either as the spiritualised representation of the deity which it supersedes, or as a name for generalised phenomena, according as the thinker is more disposed to Theologism or Positivism. Thus the famous controversy between the Realists and the Nominalists, in whatever department of knowledge it arises, is the turning point in the Metaphysical state.

But the latter being purely solvent, must end simultaneously with Theologism.

This fluctuating condition of the human mind is incompatible with any genuine organising influence, even in speculation, and still more in action. All the Metaphysical spirit can really effect, is to dissolve the Theological spirit without in any way filling its place, being impotent for construction. It next tries to corrupt the Positive spirit in order to set up its Entities above Wills and Laws alike. But here its attacks are harmless, for as there is no affinity between the two, there can be no true admixture of them. This is why the office, be it intellectual or social, of the Metaphysical spirit necessarily ceases when the Fictitious Regime is no longer able to direct Humanity.

When Ontologism acts upon an excessive Theologism, its solvent force is really useful, in speculation as well as action, though always negative. That is its contribution to the revolutions which precede Man's maturity. But whatever results of these are organic are always due to remnants of Theologism which have escaped the corrosion of the Metaphysical spirit.

The steady decline of the Theological spirit is really the work of the Positive spirit, and of nothing else. It is to be measured by the substitution of relative for absolute conceptions. In the succession of the three phases belonging to the

Fictitious Regime, the unseen but real agent is Positivity, although Metaphysics figure as the ostensible instrument of it, because it is their nature to embrace all departments of thought. Facts have already been advanced showing that the transition from Fetichism to Theologism was due to the spontaneous birth of the Positive spirit, which was then rising from the concrete observation of existences to the abstract observation of phenomena. Ontology springs from such a revolution rather than directs it. In the substitution of Monotheism for Polytheism its action is distinctly traceable, but not before. Even then its success depended on the unnoticed support it received from the progress of positive knowledge, which already disposed men to cast off theology altogether. If the Theological Regime was prolonged for a while, it was solely to meet social necessities, as my survey of history will show.

In modern times it is at once retrograde and anarchical.

In the monotheistic stage, Ontology becomes incurably subversive, because its dissolving force has nothing to act on but a Theologism already reduced to the lowest point compatible with any social efficacy. Then stands confessed the necessary tendency of all Metaphysical thought to set up scepticism in philosophy, corruption in morals, and disorder in politics. Nevertheless the anarchy of modern times being not only inevitable but indispensable, this corroding influence retains a lingering utility until Positivity is sufficiently systematised. But when Laws have been extended to all departments of knowledge, so as to be in a condition to supersede both Wills and Entities, then the Metaphysical spirit becomes retrograde without ceasing to be anarchical. Divorced from science, from which it borrowed all its force, and from theology, which alone gave it something to do, it vainly aspires to absolute dominion at the very moment ordained for its entire extinction. Henceforward it forms the principal obstacle to the advent of the Final Synthesis, for which it had indirectly smoothed the way.

SECOND SOCIOLOGICAL LAW: (LAW OF CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTIONS) pp. 33–44.

I have thus presented in one view the intellectual and social considerations on which rests the general demonstration of my *Law of the three stages*. But before stating it I had established that, to complete the fundamental theory of the speculative evolution, it is not enough to show, as a matter of history, the filiation of our conceptions, unless we supplement that law by a second, which shall classify the sciences as a matter

of doctrine. We are now in a condition to appreciate the importance of this second law to any special application of the first, and even to the general illustration of it.

This Second Law is needed here for Dynamical application; but its Statical explanation must also be briefly indicated.

Although each class of speculations really passes through these three successive stages, the rate of progress is not the same for all. Hence while some speculations have already become Positive, others still remain Metaphysical or even Theological; and so it will be till our race has entirely accomplished its Initiation. This temporary coexistence of the three intellectual states furnishes backward thinkers with their only plausible excuse for denying my Law of Filiation, which has been discovered now more than thirty years, and will never encounter any other serious objection. Nothing will completely clear away this difficulty but the complementary rule which lays down that the unequal rate of progress is caused by the different nature of the phenomena in each class. It is from this dynamical point of view only that the Law of Classification requires to be examined in this place. But independently of its dynamical use, it admits of a direct *statical* explanation, which I must also indicate here—although the full development of it belongs to the next volume—in order that the encyclopedic hierarchy of the sciences may be conclusively determined (p. 44).

Its Subjective or Logical aspect.

This second Sociological Law from its nature presents two distinct though inseparable characters, the subjective and the objective, according as it is applied to our *conceptions* or to the *existences* which correspond to them. The first aspect demands our chief attention here, that the agreement between the law of Classification and that of Filiation may be more clearly brought out. When these have been pieced together, we shall have our instrument for historical investigation.

Our Subjective conceptions reach the scientific or Positive stage in the order of their dependence on each other.

Looked at from this logical point of view, the order in which our principal theories complete their passage through the three stages is determined by their dependence on each other. Of course it is possible to study all the sciences at once in outline; and that in fact is what we do, because we want them for practical purposes. But such simultaneous cultivation of them embraces only the inductions peculiar to each class of speculations; and principles sufficient to constitute a science cannot be developed from these bare inductions, except in the simplest departments of knowledge. Everywhere else sufficient princi-

ples can only be established by subordinating each class of scientific *inductions* to the whole body of *deductions* obtained from domains less complex and so less dependent. Thus, from the *doctrinal* point of view, our different theories rest one upon another according to an invariable order; and in that order, as a matter of *history*, had they to make their decisive appearance; the most independent having necessarily and always grown up soonest.

Corresponding to the order of dependence of Objective phenomena, which is one of Decreasing Generality and Increasing Complexity.

But how comes it that the sciences are logically dependent on each other in this order? Because there is in nature a corresponding subordination of the phenomena to which they respectively relate. Our theoretic classification is not a thing that can be altered at pleasure, since it is based immutably on a sound philosophy. In framing then our second sociological law, the main point is to determine the natural order of dependence among phenomena. We discern it by applying the fundamental principle: *Decreasing generality*, *increasing complexity*.

The Objective or Physical principle of Classification is Decreasing Generality.

Phenomena which are more general, that is to say, common to a greater number of objects or modes of existence, always govern phenomena which are less general. Not that the latter cease for a moment to obey directly their own peculiar laws; but while the general law governs the special, the special law only modifies the general. By thus arranging all the different ultimate phenomena, according to their decreasing generality, we construct a natural hierarchy in which each class governs that which follows it, and modifies that which precedes it. Such is the objective foundation of the second sociological law. But before it can be of any use either in theory or practice, we must notice two properties belonging to it from the subjective point of view, one moral, the other intellectual.

The Subjective principle is twofold: (*a*) Intellectual: Decreasing Generality is accompanied by Increasing Complexity.

Under the first head we remark that the coincidence between decrease of generality and increase of complexity is a constant and necessary one. Phenomena common to several cases must always be independent of the influences special to each case. Thus the most general laws are not only scientifically most independent, but in virtue of their simplicity are also logically the easiest to study. Hence another and a broad reason why the construction of theories should always conform rigorously to the encyclopedic order, so that the mind may

never attempt the more difficult speculations without the successive degrees of preparation afforded by those which are easier. As a logical maxim this rule would hold good even if we were to suppose that the different fields of speculation do not depend on each other.

(*b*) Moral: Decreasing Generality is accompanied by Increasing Dignity.

We remark secondly, that decrease of generality is always and necessarily attended by an increase of dignity. For we naturally measure the real nobleness of the different existences that pass under our view by the true human type, because we know of none higher. Now that is also the most special, and most complex case of all. A comparative examination of all the domains of nature profoundly confirms this moral significance of my second sociological law.

From the simply mathematical existence which is best exemplified in the heavenly bodies, up to the complete human existence, an immense series may be constructed, chiefly biological, each term of which is at once more particular, more complicated and more dignified than all those which precede it. This hierarchy exhibits the increasing dignity of the different positive studies, in proportion as their objects become less material and more human. It furnishes a rational basis for the noble prejudice which always branded with the just title of *materialism* the spontaneous tendency of the inferior sciences to dominate and even absorb the superior by crude deductions. Yet it affords fresh proof that the superior sciences need the inferior as a preparation, not only because of the dependence of the object studied, and the training of the student, but that the calmer speculations may always pave the way for the more passionate.

By these three tests the Classification of the sciences is to be determined.

The principle of the true positive classification has thus been viewed under three aspects, the physical, the intellectual, and the moral. With its help I must now construct the Encyclopedic Series, in its grand divisions, with special reference to the service that series is to render to the philosophy of history.

They themselves furnish the first broad classification: Moral, Intellectual, Physical.

The very proof of the hierarchic principle suggests at once a primary series, which embraces all positive theories, and is fully borne out by history. For it is enough, to begin with, to distinguish three essential classes of natural laws, moral, intellectual, and physical, with a subordination similar to that of the phenomena corresponding to them.

At the outset of this chapter I sketched this division, deducing it subjectively from the true theory of the brain, the three grand elements of which are Feeling, Intellect, and Activity. But it must now be established objectively; and here is our first opportunity for applying our canon of classification to history.

Which also corresponds to the triple division of the Brain.

The physical, or External Order,—including therein the laws of both Matter and Life,—is as superior in generality and simplicity to the Human Order, whether intellectual or moral, as it is inferior in dignity. The latter works under the dominant influence of the former, though reacting upon it by secondary modifications. Thus the easier and calmer study of the first should always precede and prepare that of the second. Hence resulted the historic division of the whole field of philosophy into Natural and Moral.

(1) Physical Order, more general but less complex and noble than Human Order (Intellectual and Moral).

The outlines of these two departments of speculation were necessarily sketched by the earliest efforts of human reason. Practical Activity, whether industrial or military, spontaneously stimulated the search after the *physical laws* which govern its exercise; while the Intellect of priests and the Sentiment of women would be occupied in studying the *human order*, with a view to a wise modification of it. In the latter department however the success would be but empirical and provisional, since Moral philosophy could not be cultivated systematically and decisively, till the way for it had been prepared by some study of Natural laws. This explains why the only real steps made in speculation during the whole Initiation of Humanity belong exclusively to Natural philosophy, and even there, complete success was, for a long time, achieved only in the most elementary branches.

The division of the Human Order into *intellectual* and *moral* is also a result, though a less obvious one, of our principle of classification. For the field of Speculation, besides being less noble, is less special and less complicated than that of Emotion. That these three tests necessarily coincide becomes more evident here than anywhere else, in consequence of the natural coincidence, in this department, of the objective and subjective points of view. In this agreement of the constitution of the human faculties, as shown in the cerebral theory, with the encyclopedic rule, there is nothing surprising, since both are governed by the same law of classification.

(2) Intellectual Order more general but less complex and noble than Moral Order.

Intellectual laws govern Moral laws, and are themselves governed by Physical laws.

The mental order necessarily dominates the moral, although the latter profoundly modifies the former, a reaction which may be observed throughout the positive hierarchy of the sciences. For each affection supposes a previous and sufficient knowledge of the corresponding object. On the contrary the laws of the intellect are subordinate to none but physical laws, whether material or vital. For their special study the special preparation is therefore natural philosophy. As soon as it was itself fairly started, natural philosophy furnished spontaneously a valuable collection of logical facts, on which alone the study of mental philosophy can be solidly based. The truth is, that in every research accomplished by the mind we may trace the reflection of the laws of the mind itself. But as the true progress of the intellect takes place in the race and not in individuals, intellectual science can only be thoroughly appreciated when it is identified with sociology properly so called—sociology which I established on its true basis when I discarded for ever he worthless study of the individual mind pursued by metaphysicians.

Laws of Mind could only be discovered by exercise of the Mind in a Positive way.

Not one of the true mental laws, statical or dynamical, could be known until the human mind had by exercise reached a sufficiently advanced stage of development. Doubtless the analogy subsisting between the laws of the intellect and those of the other vital functions furnishes valuable hints with respect to the former. But though by that method we obtain the indispensable verification, we should never make a decisive discovery. The same must be said of the direct light furnished by the study of brute intellect, our acquaintance with which is always too loose to reveal the laws in question, though it is most useful for confirming and even completing them, as I proved in the first volume of this treatise (i. 505). This difficult discovery could not be made till human reason, by reaching the positive stage, had furnished the most complete and only decisive case for examination.

Individual mind too narrow a field for discovery of Mental laws.

Now the life of the Individual would be too narrow a field for this purpose, even though we could eliminate from it the influences of Social life. In truth, the progress made by each individual mind is never sufficiently marked even in the choicest intellects to give the clue to the intellectual progress of the race. It is therefore only by the positive study of human progress as a whole that we can discover the real laws of the

mind. When these are once found, the individual life furnishes the best possible verification of them, since the individual and social growth must always be essentially similar. When by observing the progress of the Race I had discovered the law of the three stages, a study of the Individual afforded me a most useful confirmation of it. But I might have observed the Individual for ever without making the original discovery. We must even regard the chief use of this general agreement as consisting in the power it gives us of better understanding and more perfectly working out individual progress. Better pattern we could not have.

Nor can they be obtained from a survey of the Collective development till this is completed.

He who would fully realise how completely the special study of the Mind is included in Sociology, must remember that the laws of the mind could not have been discovered from any single phase of history—that for such a purpose nothing less wide than the whole course of progress as yet accomplished would suffice. In truth the whole past does but carry us through the Initiation of man to the dawn of the Normal State, which, though not actually reached, is now quite within our ken. But before the preliminary stage was closed it was impossible to estimate the nature or the growth of human reason, because its characteristics were not sufficiently clear; and each one-sided manifestation of it, monotheistic, polytheistic, or even fetichistic, might equally claim to be its universal type. In the case of the species even more than in that of the individual, there can be no decisive study of the intellect till we examine its adult state; always premising a previous consideration of its gradual preparation.

Real Psychology is therefore a department of Sociology.[1]

How necessary this precept is we see but too clearly at the present day from the radical disagreement existing on every kind of notion relating to Mental Philosophy. Twenty-two centuries have gone by, and the fundamental truth broadly laid down by Aristotle encounters objections and misrepresentations essentially the same as those with which the sophists of his day greeted it (p. 15). I venture to affirm that my creation of sociology and the complete inauguration of Positivism involved therein were indispensable not only to the completion and systematisation of his principle but also to its undisputed acceptance. A real knowledge then of the Laws of Mind can only be furnished by the

[1] M. Comte always denied himself the use of the word *Psychologie*, because in his time it was identified with the doctrines of a Metaphysical school.—TR.

Positive study of the whole course of human devolopment, and is but a department of Sociology.

In fact it is essentially the same thing as Sociology.

But, conversely, Sociology is essentially reducible to true Mental Science. For the study, whether statical or dynamical, of the human intellect, comprehends the exercise of Practical Reason no less than the growth of Speculative Reason. Although the latter assumes most prominence when we are demonstrating the fundamental law of progress (that of the Three Stages), it is on the former that we mainly rely when we seek to interpret history; because each successive phase of speculation has been stimulated by the promptings of Practical Reason, as was pointed out early in this chapter (p.12). Looked at thus in its full extent, Mental Science must needs form far the largest part of Sociology.

For though Activity also is a department of Sociology, it is so as depending on Mind.

Sociology must in truth embrace not only the Intellectual but the Active faculties, while it leaves to moral philosophy the peculiar and direct study of Sentiment, the ultimate motor of human life. Now the principal achievements of our Activity, whether it be personal or social, depend necessarily on Mind. When the philosophy of the Mind is placed on its normal footing, so as to include on the one hand a theoretical knowledge of the order of nature, and on the other a practical acquaintance with the means by which that order may be modified, nothing remains as regards Activity but to consider its proper purpose. That, in fact, is the normal domain of the Third Sociological Law, as I stated at first. But although this complementary law is indispensable, it is none the less evident that the main element of Sociology is Mental Science in the widest sense.

(3) Morals.

Leaving Sociology, it only remains for me to describe the third term of the grand progressive series, which gives us the true encyclopedic hierarchy; I mean the study of Moral Laws, the necessary goal of all healthy speculation.

Moral Science less general but more complex and noble than Mental (or sociological) Science.

The field of Morals is at once more *special*, more *complex*, and more *noble* than that of Sociology strictly so called, the exact rank of which has just been determined. More *special*, because Active life and even Speculative life are more general to all real existences than Affective life; at least if we take the latter in its fullest sense, for its grand characteristic is sociability. Below that step in the biological scale at which complete distinction of sex begins, we have an immense series of

animals incapable of any form of association, which yet continue to act, and even to think, for their food if for nothing else. Secondly, Moral laws must needs be more *complex* than Intellectual or Sociological laws, because they work in subordination to the combined operation of these, though not without profoundly modifying it by reaction. Although in the true harmony of our nature, Intellect and Activity become merely the necessary servants of Feeling, it is only through these two intermediaries that the latter, on its central throne, can receive impressions from, or react upon, the external world. Thus Moral Science, or the positive study of the field of Sentiment, is always complicated by the sciences studying the fields of Intellect and Activity. But there we have the reason why (thirdly), Morals is the most *eminent* of the sciences, both because of the superior dignity of its object, Man, from which we get our type of true nobleness, and because, as I am about to explain, of its theoretic plenitude.

It is also the only *complete* science; for all others are preliminary.

Till Moral Science is instituted, all branches of speculation, even Sociology, using that term strictly, can be only preliminary; they can do no more than prepare gradually by the abstract study, first of Matter and Life, then of Mind, for the concrete study of the indivisible being Man, the only ultimate object of every human speculation. Till that point is reached Science is unfinished; but there its analytical conceptions receive their final condensation, and it becomes synthetic. Then it allies itself systematically with Art, which necessarily and spontaneously has always looked at the order to be dealt with, as a whole. Thus at last we have Human Reason normally constituted, all its efforts, theoretic and practical, converging directly towards their sacred destination, the conservation and perfecting of the true Great Being.

And it alone can deal with the influence of Body on Brain.

The name *Morals*, by which this crowning science is usually designated, suggests too exclusively its main object. Still it must be carefully preserved, that we may accustom ourselves to regard Feeling as the fundamental principle of true unity. Feeling in fact does constitute the essential domain of both theoretical and practical Morals, since it is the keystone of our nature, and directs our conduct. Hitherto the systematic study of it could only be sketched, or rather prepared, first indirectly in Biology, then directly in Sociology, where, however, Intellect and Activity are more prominent. But the proper

study of Feeling belongs to Moral Science, which treats it, not only as influenced by the material world and society, but as reacted on by the vegetative viscera, a relation that no other science could notice. This intimate connection between the bodily existence and the economy of the brain had, in fact, to be put aside in Biology as premature, and in Sociology as exercising no sensible influence on the Collective Order. But when we come to study the Individual Order, it acquires a capital importance both theoretic and practical, and to neglect it would be to ensure radical failure. We now see how real a difference there is between Morals and Sociology, and how the former necessarily surpasses the latter in *plenitude* and in *dignity*, though objectively subordinated to it.

Thus the Statical and Dynamical classifications are identical.

The above is a sufficient account of the grand scientific progression of which the three terms are Natural Philosophy, Sociology, and Morals. The scale of Order, in its most general shape, turns out to be the same as that of Progress, viz. Physical, Intellectual, Moral. Such a conformity is the crowning mark of the reality and scope of this fundamental progression (ii. 357).

But this Ternary Series must be further expanded.

Nevertheless this scale as it stands will not serve as the Encyclopedic Hierarchy which, for ordinary use in science, and even in practice, must be a more expanded series. But the complete scale is easily deduced from it. We have only to break up the first term sufficiently to exhibit the rise and filiation of its irreducible elements. Sociology and Morals neither require nor admit of any division; besides, they link to each other directly and obviously (ii. 353). But the subjects of Natural Philosophy are too heterogeneous, and if they are lumped together, neither the origin of Physical theories, nor their connection with Intellectual and Moral theories, is at first sight clear.

Natural Philosophy divided into Cosmology and Biology.

Natural Philosophy must first be divided into two great sciences, Cosmology and Biology, studying respectively the material and vital orders. Of these the latter must remain undivided, being evidently the link between Cosmology and the two Human sciences. But Cosmology may and indeed must be further broken up, because as it stands we can conceive neither how it was born nor how it gives birth to Biology. Accordingly, this second partition is not less ancient than the first.

Cosmology subdivided into Mathematics and Physics.

It consists in distinguishing researches strictly Mathematical from those directly Physical. The former deal only with Existence in its most universal form reduced to its three necessary attributes, number, extension, and motion. Under all three aspects this earliest of the sciences may rise spontaneously, since the smallest exercise of human reason must give rise to the first numerical, geometrical, and mechanical notions. Mathematics then are necessarily the logical, and even the scientific foundation of Cosmology, and not only of Cosmology but of all sound philosophy, the object of which is to study systematically the Real Order. Although dealing with three forms of Existence, and so requiring subdivision, Mathematics must be conceived as a single Science on account of the intimate connection of its three aspects.

Physics subdivided into Astronomy, Physics (proper), and Chemistry.

It is the second part only of Cosmology which studies directly the material order, Mathematics being simply preparatory thereto. It may keep the broad name of Physics. But we at once feel the need of a further division. For it is not sufficiently apparent how Physics, in this wide sense, link on to Biology on the one hand, or even to Mathematics on the other. To bring out the scientific continuity, we must make a more precise application of our hierarchical principle. From the trunk, to which we leave the name of Physics, we must separate two branches, Astronomy and Chemistry: by the first of these Physics link on to Mathematics, by the second to Biology. The scientific continuity is then so unbroken that unphilosophic minds are often puzzled to distinguish between the provinces of two consecutive sciences.

Historical confirmation of this arrangement.

Cosmology, or the study of Material Order in the broadest sense, having been thus by successive processes resolved into four irreducible sciences, we arrive finally at a septenary arrangement of the Encyclopedic Series, which at first was ternary. My sketch of the steps by which the definitive state is reached is as much confirmed by history as is my account of the earlier steps by which science first took shape. In fact the only branches of Natural Philosophy cultivated by the ancients were Mathematics, Astronomy, and Biology, and these only in rough outline, and almost simultaneously, as our different physical needs prompted. Although Aristotle's systematic conception of the four elements prepared the way for Chemistry, that science did not arise till the Middle Age under the stimulus of

industry. The last link in the chain of speculation was added in the West in modern times by the institution of Physics properly so called, which in its distinct shape was necessarily posterior to the two sciences between which it was to form the positive transition.

Final statement of Encyclopedic Scale.

Such then is the natural order in which the different classes of human speculation are developed, according to the decreasing generality and simplicity, or increasing dignity of the phenomena they deal with—Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Sociology, Morals (ii. 352). Even at the Theological birth of our different theories, when they started from spontaneous fetichism, this fundamental series is observable. But it is more sharply marked in the order of their arrival at the Positive state after the Metaphysical transition.

Complementary axiom on Modifiability.

To establish my Encyclopedic Series, as a complete instrument of historical investigation, one more observation must be made, which is that, its source being objective, it determines the concrete order of Beings or Existences no less than the abstract order of Phenomena. The systematic coordination then of practical conceptions, coincides with that of theoretical conceptions; so that the catenation and classification of the arts are the same as those of the sciences. The Theoretical and Practical aspects may be connected by one general axiom, which completes the Hierarchical Principle, or Law of classification: *The more complicated phenomena become, the more susceptible are they of modification.* Thus Modifiability and Dignity necessarily go hand in hand.

The First (or *Fundamental*) and Second (or *Complementary*) Sociological Laws combined, form the *Law of the Mental Evolution.*

The Second Sociologic Law has now been sufficiently demonstrated. The two together form the theory of the Mental Evolution. When we shall have found the general law which regulates the progress of Activity, the three together will form the theory of Social Evolution as a whole.

THIRD SOCIOLOGICAL LAW (LAW OF THE ACTIVE EVOLUTION), pp. 44–55.

Coming after all we have already said, the demonstration of this third and last fundamental Law of dynamical sociology will not task us severely, so naturally does it follow whether from a true knowledge of human nature or from a sound appreciation of the past. The main difficulty consists in duly limiting its special domain. To this I will at once address myself.

First Reduction: Activity is either

To begin with, there are two sorts of Activity; there is the speculative Activity, called Expression, which is but an in-

strument of the Intellect, and there is the true practical Activity which governs the Intellect. Biologically there is no distinction between them, both being muscular exertions determined by the active region of the brain in obedience to some instinct. But sociologically they differ by the purpose and results of the muscular exertions. The first does but manifest the internal state of the animated being. The second modifies the external world; and in virtue of that influence, to say nothing of its superior intensity, is entitled to monopolise, as it has always done, the appellation of Activity. Yet expression of the thoughts or sentiments, whether vocal or mimetic, is produced by the same muscles, speaking generally, as external action.

Theoretical or Practical.

Although this distinction is purely sociological, it is very important as bearing upon the fundamental division of the two human powers. An entirely speculative life is but an anti-social chimera. Every thinker feels a natural craving to communicate the result of his contemplations and meditations. Now such communication is the sort of Activity appropriate to the speculative class. A philosopher who should constantly refuse to impart to others the fruits of his speculative labours would become a real parasite, receiving all from society, and making it no return. His duty then is to speak and write suitably to his destination as a citizen. Although this sort of Activity has not, like the other, any material results to show, it is often attended with equal dangers. In a word, theoricians act upon men, practicians upon things; the former modify our inner nature as much as the latter do our outward situation.

But although Speculative Activity is no less real and important than Practical Activity, it must be completely put aside here, because it requires no new sociological law. Being only the instrument of the Intellect, it necessarily follows the march of the Intellect. All the notions belonging to it come under the theory of language. The main principles of that theory were established in the last volume, and they only require to be completed dynamically by a view of the normal variations of human expression, such as an historic examination will naturally exhibit.

The former is to be put aside here.

In this place then I must attend exclusively to Activity properly so called, which is ever modifying the External World in obedience to the unalterable requirements of our nature,

From Practical Activity springs the Temporal Power.

corporeal or mental. This work, which is always going on, gives rise to new influences, which in sociology are mixed up with, and have a constant tendency to dominate those of intellect. But before we can trace its stages we must draw a second distinction needed to complete the first.

Second Reduction: The Law of the Active Evolution will relate to the End pursued, not to the Means employed.

This distinction consists in drawing a careful line between the examination of the Means and that of the End. For here again the first belongs to the Intellectual Evolution; consequently that Third Sociological Law of which we are in search has nothing to do with it. Whatever be the direction of our Activity, it is essentially the Intellect which selects the Means to be employed. In fact that is its chief occupation, the principal purpose of speculation being to perfect Means. A dynamical estimate of Means therefore comes under the two laws of mental evolution, looked at in its full natural extent, as previously explained. These two limitations made, the Third Sociological Law is finally reduced to a determination of the general order in which the various ends of human Activity have succeeded each other. To assign it any wider field would necessarily confuse it, by irrationally mixing up with the Active Evolution influences already examined in connection with the Speculative Evolution.

In the Final State Activity is Industrial.

Thus limited, the law of which we are in search is ascertained with little difficulty. For the only direct source from which our material wants are or can be satisfied is labour properly so called, that is to say, action of a useful kind on man's environment. In treating of Social Statics, I have systematised that mode of Activity as the only one suited to our Normal State (ii. 146–148). But while describing its features, I intimated that its final ascendency had to be preceded by the provisional preponderance of another sort of Activity destined to last, though with ever decreasing force, during the Initiation of Humanity, and indeed to bear a necessary part in it (ii. 320). The moment has now come for explaining directly this essential distinction; for it is the peculiar domain of the Third Sociological Law.

But in the Initial stage it is Military.

Labour does at last become the only mode by which material wants will be satisfied; but not until the whole population of the globe is taken into account. For to each partial association another solution commends itself at first as readier and more spontaneous, which is to impose upon certain other men a rule analogous to that which our race exercises

over the auxiliary animals. For production indeed of wealth, direct labour is indispensable; but accumulated products avail little unless they pass from hand to hand, and voluntary exchange is not the only mode by which such transmission may take place. There may be forced exchange, that is to say, conquest, by which those who disdain pacific Activity, and cannot prevail upon others to give them freely and regularly what they need, will subsist. It is true that this mode of livelihood is not available for all; still each hankers after it, flattering himself that he is best qualified to win at the game. In early times therefore the leading form of Activity, especially of a collective kind, is War, though Labour is never entirely absent, the results of war being in their nature uncertain.

The Military Regime is *inevitable* because instinctive.

Man is spontaneously impelled towards military life by two very powerful instincts: the repugnance he long feels for any daily labour; and a downright taste for destruction. The latter instinct which is always more energetic than that of construction, is besides continually developed by his exertions in procuring animal food. Both brain and stomach therefore concur in making military Activity preponderate over pacific at the outset of human association.

It is also *indispensable*, because it stimulates not only Intellect, but the three Sympathetic instincts.

We ought now to be able to see that a Military Regime was as indispensable as it was inevitable. Take first its influence on the individual. Nothing else at that early stage could develop the principal Mental and Moral qualities of man. Although its ascendency is at first largely due to sloth of mind and body, it soon begins to act as an habitual stimulus on both, because attack calls forth defence. Of all forms of the chase war is soon seen to be the most difficult and dangerous, the prey being here on a level with the hunter. Every one of the Active and even of the Intellectual faculties is incessantly sharpened by the efforts and contrivances required on each side. On the Affections the influence of military life is less favourable, since it directly stimulates the various personal instincts. Still it specially cultivates, though within too narrow a circle, Attachment between equals, Veneration towards superiors, and even Benevolence to inferiors. But this threefold Sympathetic influence can only be sufficiently appreciated by examining, what was long the best feature of Military life, its tendency to promote *collective* action.

Attachment, Veneration,

It develops this admirable character spontaneously; for

and Benevolence.

war is a form of Activity which can never succeed without association of some sort. Reduce it to its most rudimentary shape, even to simple brigandage, still you must have a partial solidarity, temporary perhaps but always profound, and having a tendency to continue even after its end has been attained. Before the need of union for defence, and still more for attack, personal feelings naturally give way, and so habits of discipline are formed, in which each individual finds the best guarantee for his own safety. The value of this social influence will be understood if we consider how many and how strong are the tendencies which make such a subordination repugnant to our imperfect moral nature. This is why we must look on war as having long been the best school of obedience, and the principal source of command. Then again the qualifications for this sort of command are such as can be easily judged, especially in the infancy of the military art, and thus the mass of associated warriors submit cheerfully to real superiority, and repel ill-founded pretensions. Lastly, success in war develops generosity in the chieftain, who can easily distribute almost inexhaustible rewards.

Military life is at first superior to Industrial life in morality.

These are the normal characteristics of Military life; and there are tendencies inherent in Industrial life which, by the side of them, long show to great disadvantage. Industry in its infancy is an affair of the individual, or at best, of the family. It retains this selfish taint even when it has reached a vast development, as we see but too plainly in our own day. Hence arises the chief obstacle to normally systematising human life on a Pacific basis; while Military life has a moral aptitude, which renders it easily susceptible of complete organisation. We now see how it is that though Industry is the only form of Activity which can be continuous, and can be shared by a whole population, this natural superiority has hitherto been neutralised. Whatever be the public utility of Industrial services, as long as it is not suitably present to the mind and feelings of each individual cooperator, its chief value as a moral reaction is lost. In spite of the superior nobleness of the instinct of construction, that of destruction remains the more worthy, as it is the more energetic, if the former is exercised for personal satisfaction, but the latter for a social purpose. The moral element at the bottom of voluntary exchange almost disappears, when the substitution of Labour for Conquest seems to be only replacing violence by fraud.

But besides this moral superiority which long remains characteristic of Military life, it behoves us still more to notice here its political efficacy, that being the side from which it was destined chiefly to influence the whole Initiation of Humanity.

And in political efficacy.

Our attention ought for that period to be concentrated on systematised Conquest, which is the normal result of Military Activity when suitably developed. It brings about naturally two kindred transformations equally indispensable to the training of our race, the extension of society among the conquerors, and the preponderance of industrial habits among the conquered.

Systematic Conquest the normal result of War.

It is with Labour as with Science. Although they are the only principles compatible with true universality in the domains of Action and Intellect respectively, it is the opposite principles of War and Theologism which alone can preside over the earliest enlargement of human relations. The necessity in each case is to be explained on grounds essentially analogous; so that after my previous demonstration of them in the Intellectual case (p. 25), I may pass over the Practical case with a short and easy explanation. For industrial progress is at first shut up in a vicious circle, from which nothing but war can give an opening; a service similar to that rendered by theologism to the rise of science. In each case the difficulty in the way of progress arises from the opposition of two equivalent necessities; and in each the solution is due to a spontaneous issue.

War the first step towards Industry.

The only means by which human association can be carried to its fullest extent is Labour. But the first steps in the developement of labour suppose the preexistence of large societies; and these can be founded only by War. Now the decisive formation of large societies came to pass naturally from the spontaneous tendency of military activity to establish universal dominion. In my survey of history I shall explain the special conditions requisite for the sufficient realisation of this tendency; for though common to all peoples, it was necessarily a failure in the majority of cases. We are concerned here only with the general principle, which is clearly incontestable. Notwithstanding the dangers inherent in these great military incorporations, and their natural instability, their existence was indispensable if industry was to grow up. Although after a time a community of ideas, even of a theological kind, had the power to draw together vast associations, such spiritual union

War indispensable to the establishment of:—(1) large societies,

could only become complete and solid among populations already cemented by conquest, as I will explain by-and-by.

(2) Industrial habits.

Secondly, we must remark that the systematic developement of military activity furnished the only means at first of establishing an industrial existence among the vanquished, according to the incomparable hemistich of Virgil,

Pacisque imponere morem.

Conquest made it impossible for masses of men, as slavery did for individuals, to ameliorate their situation otherwise than by labour. Man's early tendencies to war are everywhere so pronounced, that they would drag him incessantly into barren struggles, if the irresistible compression resulting from a common yoke did not intervene to forbid all destructive activity. For we feel even greater repugnance collectively to a life of labour than we do individually. Even among modern populations, where the immense majority has long been accustomed to live by labour, it is still only too easy to excite to conquest by playing on pride and vanity, which again are often a cloak for cupidity. The fierce wars that raged in the Middle Age between the Italian cities, which had only just obtained freedom by industry, show clearly how indispensable external compression long remained to internal pacification. This need necessarily lasts as long as the whole Human Preparation is going on, that is to say, until the manners and opinions proper to our Normal State are sufficiently in the ascendant.

Such are the different moral and political qualities in virtue of which the military type of society necessarily presides over the first steps of human progress. I have thus demonstrated the only term of the Third Sociological Law presenting any considerable difficulty—I mean the proposition that Primitive Activity must be of the military type. For the previous volume explained what shape Activity will take in the Final State, and I need not go over the ground again here (ii. 318–336).

The military regime was evidently provisional, and was always expected to end in peace.

The decisive preponderance of industrial life in the West in modern times is already accepted as incontestable by all judicious observers. I have but one remark to make on it. I have demonstrated that Activity in primitive times must take the shape of war. But that very demonstration, taken as a whole, represents the necessity as provisional. The barren con-

tests of petty communities in primitive times seemed likely to go on for ever. But such could not be the case with the Systematic Conquest which is the great social end of war. Conquest of that kind necessarily ceases as soon as it has reached the fullest extent of which it admits. Then comes the direct rise of industrial existence, indirectly prepared by the military regime, the principal representatives of which always had a presentiment that such would be the end. If then the general Law of the Practical Evolution had been reducible to its two extreme terms, we must have regarded it as having been more or less known in every age. In the midst of the most warlike populations poetry always proclaimed the final advent of a pacific state of society.

But between the states of war and peace a transitional stage had to intervene.

But however natural was the succession of one extreme to the other, their opposition necessitated an intermediate state adapted to direct the transition, just as metaphysics intervened between theology and science. But this indispensable element of the Third Sociological Law remained unknown till my time for want of a sound estimate of the Middle Age. Since modern manners have become sufficiently marked, many thinkers have systematically pointed out in what their broad contrast with those of antiquity really consists. Although they did not adequately realise how necessary military civilisation had been in early times, they had already formed a worthy conception of the ultimate preponderance of industrial life. In this sense Hume must be regarded as the founder of the law of the Temporal or Active Evolution, afterwards judiciously elucidated by M. Dunoyer under the luminous impulse of the French revolution. But no one determined the middle term, without which the law could be but of little use for explaining history.

This transitional stage is Defensive War.

Now in my meditations on sociology I soon saw that I must concentrate them on an appreciation of the Middle Age as the real key to a true philosophy of history; and so I was not long in filling up this great chasm by determining the intermediate stage. My Law of the Spiritual Evolution suggested that Defensive Activity must discharge in the practical Order a transitional office analogous to that of the Metaphysical Spirit in the speculative Order.

Which characterised later Roman history and Feudal times.

The fact is that the Systematic Conquest of antiquity, as developed finally by Rome, could not have led directly to industrial civilisation unless it had embraced the whole of our

species. Such completeness being impossible, Military Activity continued to flourish among the peoples which had escaped the gradual incorporation. But thenceforward this activity was chiefly directed against the population of the Roman Empire, which thus came, at first spontaneously and afterwards systematically, to change its attitude of aggression for one of defence. Thus the association founded on Conquest had to be succeeded by Feudal civilisation, that the way might be prepared for the Industrial regime. Applying this general principle, I explained the temporal significance of the Middle Age; of its spiritual significance De Maistre had already caught a glimpse. Thus the discovery of the Third Sociological Law is really due to Positivism, though less exclusively so than the other two. Here we may notice a new and marked example of the logical law that *The sound appreciation of every intermediate state is subsequent to that of the two extremes which it is to connect* (i. 417; ii. 296).

Combination of Third Sociological Law with First and Second, pp. 52–55.

It remains for me now to mark the necessary harmony between this general law of the Temporal Evolution and the pair of laws governing the Spiritual Evolution. It is only when the three are finally combined, that they become a complete and effective instrument for their common purpose—the explanation of the Past; and it will then be seen how utterly useless were all partial glimpses of the Third Sociological Law. But, what is of more importance, it will be demonstrated that such a system is as sufficient as it is necessary for the direct construction of the Philosophy of History, guided by the teaching of Social Statics.

Correlation of stages in Intellectual and Active Evolutions.

These three consecutive modes of Activity—Conquest, Defence, and Labour, correspond exactly to the three successive states of Intelligence—Fiction, Abstraction, and Demonstration. This fundamental correlation gives us also the general explanation of the three natural ages of Humanity. Its long infancy, covering all antiquity, had to be essentially Theological and Military: its adolescence in the middle age was Metaphysical and Feudal: and lastly, its maturity, which only within the last few centuries has become at all distinguishable, is necessarily Positive and Industrial.

Forms a Triple Dualism.

That we may get a clear conception of this triple dualism, we must examine, as we did in the case of its component elements, first the two extreme pairs, and then the middle pair.

First Dualism: Relation of Theology to War for Conquest.

Notwithstanding the diversity of their origin and character, Theological authority and Military power have sufficient affinity for as close a combination as their nature admits and their purpose requires. For beliefs which cannot be demonstrated, and commands which may not be discussed, must afford each other mutual support. Polytheism is the principal state of the Fictitious Synthesis, and Polytheism spontaneously adapted itself to systematic Conquest, the essential end of War, by permitting a complete incorporation of the conquered. Nevertheless the necessarily absolute tendency which belonged equally to both these primitive powers, always hindered a complete alliance between them. As each aspired to exclusive supremacy, their combination supposed a previous abdication, on the part of one, of the independence alike dear to both. This is why ancient civilisation, though sometimes promoted by their continual rivalry, was often disturbed by it, notwithstanding their spontaneous coexistence and their political solidarity. There was no sufficient harmony between them except when one submitted to the other, War lending itself to propagate theocratic domination, or Theologism to consecrate military ascendency.

Third Dualism: Relation of Positivism to Industry.

Between the two powers composing the final couple the union is naturally more complete and durable, because it does not require the sacrifice of any legitimate independence. There is a counsel that can be demonstrated, and a command that may be discussed. Equally disclaiming all mysterious pretensions, and both emanating directly from the fundamental inclinations of human nature, the Priesthood and the Government concur freely in the direction of real life both public and private. Each of them spontaneously finds in that field its proper destination, according to the natural division between speculation and action. Without repeating here the statical explanations of the preceding volume (ii. 336-346), I have only to add that the two powers, Theoretic and Practical, may be developed to any extent without giving rise in the modern regime to perturbations comparable to those they caused in the ancient. For the normal separation of them, which was impossible when their character was absolute, has become both inevitable and indispensable now that it is relative. The systematic study of the Real Order, and the wise introduction of such modifications as it admits, are functions too closely connected not to

establish an intimate alliance between their respective organs. Besides, it will always remain so obviously impossible for either Wealth to obtain an intellectual, or Science a material supremacy, that no serious usurpation will have any chance of success. Struggles no doubt there will be even between the component elements of the positive pair; but they will proceed only from the passions innate in man, and will not be specially due to the system. Pride on the one side will occasionally be met by vanity on the other. Sometimes the practical man will disdain the lights of science; and more often the philosopher will forget that Speculation does but minister to Action.

There is also a diagonal opposition between the members of the extreme pairs.

To complete our insight into the first and last pairs, it is well to notice the natural antipathy of the Spiritual element in each for the Temporal element of the other. Although the Theological spirit is not, as a matter of history, incompatible with a development of Industry, the former cannot consecrate the latter without a real inconsistency, which was felt though never consciously recognised. For as industry presupposes everywhere immutable Laws, it is in doctrinal contradiction with Theology, which constantly asserts the supremacy of arbitrary Wills. Similarly the secondary assistance which Science and War naturally afford each other cannot disguise their radical antipathy. The Positive spirit protests against Military domination as much as the latter dreads Positive discussion.

It is now easy to complete this appreciation of the harmony between the corresponding phases of the Intellectual and Active movements by characterising the intermediate pair.

Second Dualism: Relation of Metaphysical spirit to Defensive War or Feudalism.

In placing the principal Metaphysical state in the Middle Age, I may seem at first to be forgetting the purely negative nature which I previously attributed to the ontological philosophy. But this apparent contradiction arises only from the fact that at the present day we judge this spirit merely by its modern degradation, and do not go back to its more honourable career. The corrosive action peculiar to Metaphysics comes out when it tries to dominate Theologism instead of modifying it by a gradual dissolution. But so long as Ontology remains subordinated to Theology its purely negative character is kept in check, and it gives rise only to useful transformations which do not destroy all efficiency for organisation. Such was the case in the Middle Age. At bottom Polytheism is the only

true Theological state, because there alone imagination reigned without control. Monotheism is always the result of an essentially Metaphysical Theology which pares down fiction by rationalising.

Bearing this explanation in mind we can easily estimate the spontaneous harmony of the two elements peculiar to the Middle Age. Nevertheless we must not expect to find this transitional couple anything like as closely connected as the definitive, or even as the provisional couple.

The attraction of the two powers of the intermediate pair for each other is not caused merely by the vague nature and equivocal character common to both. There is a more deep-seated affinity between the Feudal instinct peculiar to defensive war, and the Monotheistic spirit resulting from the moderated action of ontologism on theologism. In fact Monotheism harmonises with Defence as much as Polytheism does with Conquest. The feudal lords formed as complete a transition between the military and industrial chieftains, as ontology did between theology and science. We may even distinguish on the Temporal or Feudal side an element corresponding to that negative tendency which characterises the Spiritual or Metaphysical side. For the revolutionary instinct of modern Occidentals may be traced back to the vicious tendency to resist a central authority, which in the Middle Age became so common that it has led some, with an irrational exaggeration, to accuse that great Organic Transition of anarchy (p. 6).

Such are the three dualisms, in the necessary succession of which we at last find the Fundamental Theory of the Human Evolution, that evolution having, as a preliminary step, been reduced to its essential elements, the Intellectual and the Practical, as was explained at the beginning of this chapter (p. 9). We have established first, the Dynamical Laws belonging respectively to Intellect and Activity, and secondly, the complete natural harmony of those laws. But for the construction of the true Philosophy of History this is not enough. It is further requisite that the application of the Dynamical Laws to history should always remain subordinated to the Statical theory of Unity, according to which the Speculative and Practical elements of our nature are never more than necessary ministers of the Moral element.

FOURTH SOCIOLOGICAL LAW (LAW OF THE AFFECTIVE EVOLUTION), pp. 55–58.

In every normal existence Affection maintains a continuous

Human Progress as a

whole must be measured by growth of Feeling.

control over Speculation and Action, although it is only indirectly through them that it can receive and adapt impressions from the world without (p. 9). It is with reference to Affection therefore that every step in theory or practice must be judged. Since our evolution consists at bottom in the developement of our Unity, and since the exclusive source of that Unity is Feeling, all progress, intellectual or practical, which does not influence Feeling, must be looked on as either abortive or purely preparatory.

Such is the only standard by which we can properly measure Human Progress as a whole—*Civilisation*, as we so well call it, because it always starts from civic union. Any theory of history which should stop short of that point would remain profoundly insufficient. It might even become mischievous, as has too often been seen, because it would dispose men to neglect Moral influences and concentrate their attention on Theoretical and Practical progress, which notwithstanding its necessary subordination is the only feature of the historic spectacle which strikes the eye.

For Feeling is at once the *source* of Progress,

This perversion of historical study ceases to be possible when Dynamical sociology accepts with dignity its subordination to social Statics which I constructed beforehand for its universal guidance. By studying Existence before Movement, we are forced to remember that Feeling is the *principle* of Order, while Progress can never be more than its *developement*. Although this developement is afterwards of necessity carried on by the agency of Intellect and Activity, the influence of its Affective origin always remains distinct.

And the *end* of Progress.

Notwithstanding that it is thus fundamentally dependent on its two instruments, Feeling is not only the essential spring of true progress, but also its main end, since our Moral amelioration is of much more importance, public as well as private, than any advance in either Speculation or Action. It may therefore be asked in what its own general Evolution consists. No doubt it does not require a distinct law. For as was explained at the outset of this chapter (p. 9), the Affective movement must always be conceived as being the resultant of the Speculative and Active movements reacting upon Feeling. Nevertheless as this resultant is the sole test of Human progress, it will be proper to give an account of its general direction, in accordance with the Evolutions of its two components.

Law of Affective Evolution stated.

This last complement of my dynamical theory may be stated thus. Feeling has its three successive stages, the spontaneous correspondence of which with those of Intellect and Activity is now recognised as the necessary consequence of the joint influence of those two evolutions. In other words, *the Social Instinct had to be purely civic in Antiquity, collective in the Middle Age, and universal in the Final State*, as its modern aspirations indicate. For Intellect when Theological and Activity when Military both tended to render all ancient associations partial, forcible incorporation being their only means of obtaining much extension. Still more evident is the natural tendency of Science and Industry to realise at last the universal assimilation which is characteristic of the Social stage of Humanity. Between the ancient and the final systems of association, the Middle Age instituted, as in the other cases, a spontaneous transition, the joint influence of Monotheism and Defensive War, creating the free collective aggregate called Christendom, thus binding together many populations without sacrificing their independence. This tendency to voluntary coalition became so pronounced that it awakened even in that age, in the East as well as in the West, admirable aspirations towards one grand social union. Although such longings were premature at the speculative and practical stage then reached, their wide prevalence did still foreshadow decisively and irrevocably the final constitution of Humanity.

The gradual restriction of the Personal Instincts affords a negative confirmation of this Law.

The law which I have just given for the Affective Evolution derives indirect but decisive confirmation from the correlation which must always exist between the extension of altruism and the restriction of egoism. For the history of civilisation as a whole exhibits a continual diminution in the preponderance, and even in the intensity, of the personal instincts. Oscillations of course we find, in periods of anarchy, but even these are more apparent than real. It is enough here to cite the two principal examples. The nutritive and sexual instincts have exercised a steadily decreasing influence in the evolution of the race, just as they do in that of the individual.

Hence the condition of Women is the best criterion of Social Progress.

Although this negative progress, as we may call it, does not admit of such sharply distinguished phases as the positive growth of sociability, it furnishes a valuable general verification of it. In fact this increase in purity not only results from the developement of our sympathies, but in turn promotes it. The

steady amelioration of the lot of women and the gradual extension of their influence, furnish the best measure of this progress, both in its negative and positive shapes, towards true moral perfection.

Harmony of Statical and Dynamical points of view.

With respect to this Law of the Three Affective Stages, we should also remark the exact harmony between the two points of view from which our whole nature, Intellectual, Practical, and Affective, may be regarded. From the Statical point of view Feeling is more powerful than Intellect and Activity, and we might therefore expect that Dynamically its evolution, although but the resultant of their evolutions, would be more pronounced. Now that is precisely what appears from the short explanation just given, which showed the three systems of Sociability to be more sharply marked, and yet more closely connected, than the corresponding triple divisions of Speculation and Action. We must not however forget that if a movement which is the resultant of two other movements seems clearest, it is because an explanation had already been given of the two components.

The Four Sociological Laws may still be reduced to Three.

Although this last Dynamical Law is not logically distinct from the two preceding it (inasmuch as it follows from them) its high importance and its frequent employment permit, and perhaps require, us to treat it here as if it was logically distinct, without fear of any serious misconception. We should thus have *four* Sociological Laws. But we may still reduce them to *three* by combining once for all the first two, which will generally be employed in close connection when we are studying the Intellectual movement. There would thus be three Laws of Evolution, belonging respectively to the three elements of our nature—Speculation, Action, and Affection. In the course of the present volume I shall have frequent occasion to prefer this last arrangement, due warning having been given to prevent any ambiguity. Similarly in Biology, the three laws of Animality having been added to the three of Vegetality, we may usefully append as a complement to that total a seventh law respecting Vital Heredity, although logically it is included in the others (i. 475–493).

THEORY OF THE NORMAL VARIATIONS OF THE HUMAN EVOLUTION, pp. 58–64.

The fundamental theory of the Human Evolution being now sufficiently established, we may use it for the direct construction of the Philosophy of History. Be it observed however that it applies only to the original movement effected

through the natural succession of certain populations more advanced than the rest. Before closing this introductory chapter therefore, I have still to mark out the Normal Modifications which this movement may undergo in more backward civilisations. Whether they are left to work it out spontaneously for themselves, or intervention on the part of the advanced guard of Humanity brings it about more systematically, a knowledge of the nature and extent of these variations, especially in the latter case, is necessary for the art and even for the science of Politics. At present however, all we have to do is to establish the philosophic principle applicable to such an investigation, which must afterwards be developed as we describe the normal course of history.

Real Order varies only in *intensity* of phenomena.

This principle then is the general complement of Social Dynamics, and from it a sound polity must obtain the positive theory of Artificial Transitions. It rests necessarily on the Statical doctrine of Modifiability, which completes and closes the preceding volume. Now I have demonstrated that by a systematic extension of the great aphorism of Broussais (p. 18), this theory may be entirely condensed into one universal principle: *Every modification, artificial or natural, of the Real Order, consists only in the greater or less intensity of the phenomena of that Order.* If the word *order* is reduced to signify *arrangement*, which is its true philosophical acceptation, this general rule becomes a necessary consequence of the fundamental dogma of the Positive religion, the invariability of all laws. For it consists in recognising that, in spite of variations of degree, phenomena always preserve the same arrangement; any change of *nature* properly so called, that is to say, of class, being besides recognised as contradictory. If the arrangement of phenomena relatively to one another were as variable as the quantity proper to any one of them is, there would not be sufficient fixity of species for the constitution of an economy admitting of rational prevision, and consequently of artificial modification (ii. 363).

Our whole real existence then requires that the variations of the universal Order should be confined to the *intensity* of the phenomena, never affecting their *succession* any more than their *nature*; and then, however extended or complicated the changes may become, they will not prevent a genuine prevision, such as may guide human intervention. We may expect

however in those cases, to find it very difficult to ascertain the true quantity of the effects we are considering, whether in theory or practice. Such in its finished shape is the principle of Modifiability, partially treated in the last volume, and henceforth inseparable from Positivist doctrine.

Hence in Social Progress there is no variation :—

By applying this principle to the social movement, we easily distinguish what is variable from what is invariable in the Human Evolution, as marked by the combined operation of the laws demonstrated in this chapter.

1. Of the general direction,

The first invariable element is the general direction of the progression, whether individual or collective. For Progress is never anything but the simple developement of Order. If it consisted of movement, sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another, Order would be radically disturbed, so that not only would it be impossible to connect Dynamical conceptions with Statical, but the latter would lose their reality, in other words, there would be an end of all Science. Retrogression, whether personal or social, can never be anything but partial and temporary, even in exceptional cases. It generally turns out to be a deceptive appearance, resulting from a too minute observation of the human movement, which is always an oscillatory progression. If we concentrate our attention upon one portion of a looped orbit, instead of following its mean path, we may conclude that the general direction of the curve is backwards, when it really never ceases to move forwards.

As our Evolution can be nothing but the developement of our Nature, the three Laws of Evolution which I have established in this chapter amount in substance to this, that we are always becoming more intelligent, more active, and more loving. How could a progress of that kind be capable of inversion without at once tending towards death? But what we are here studying is life, first in its long infancy and adolescence, and then in its commencing maturity. Many ages have yet to pass away before the true Great Being will have to turn her attention to her own decline, in order as far as possible to foresee and regulate it like any other destiny that can be estimated and modified.

But this is not all. If we examine the notion of *death* closely, we shall recognise that it only applies directly to corporal existence, or even to mere vegetative life. It does but indirectly reach the cerebral functions, and that owing to their fatal dependence on the nutritive economy. Therefore it is that these

noble attributes are perpetuated by the subjective existence when he in whom they were manifested has objective successors who, as they multiply from generation to generation, definitively incorporate him with Humanity.

2. Of the order in which the stages succeed each other.

A second invariable element in our evolution is the order of succession of the different human phases. This is as unchangeable as is their common direction, in the individual no less than in the species. For since each phase is one step more towards their general end, no alteration of their arrangement could take place unless the movement as a whole had changed its direction. History, if soundly interpreted, will confirm what has been said as to the invariability of these two elements. The irrational hypotheses of some learned persons who pretend that there was a Positive state anterior to the Theological, have been decisively upset by superior learning. Equally exploded is the theory of Christians respecting Polytheism and Fetichism, which they suppose to have grown out of the degeneration of a primitive Monotheism. These aberrations, of Atheists in one direction and Theists in the other, are but the fruit of empiricism, which disposes each man, especially when he is at the absolute point of view, to see his own opinions everywhere.

When there is temporary retrogression, the same order obtains, though *inversely*;

The order of succession of human phases, whether individual or collective, is so fixed that it holds good even in oscillations which appear to be retrograde. Even in minds where Positivism is most firmly established, strong passion, though not lasting long enough to bring on actual disease, may reproduce for a time the Metaphysical or the Theological state up to the point of primitive Fetichism. And so, *a fortiori*, individuals and peoples who have never yet emerged from the Fictitious Regime—a description which applies to almost all cases as yet seen—may return exceptionally to the anterior phases, which, at bottom, are but the same Synthesis in inferior degrees of developement. The principle of Modifiability stated above then obtains a striking verification.

Even when this retrogression is from Positivism to Theologism.

Although a temporary return from Positivism to Theologism might seem irreconcilable with invariability of arrangement, that principle remains unshaken for the true philosopher who, while holding fast to the doctrine of mental continuity, or the evolution of one stage of thought from another in a certain order, conceives also Positivism and Theologism as one and the same work in different degrees of completeness. In fact I have

proved above that they only differ by their greater or less subordination of the Subjective to the Objective. As human reason passes through its normal developement, this spontaneous submission steadily increases, at all events up to certain limits not yet reached, though I have already indicated them. But a perturbation of sufficient violence may on the contrary diminish the subordination exceptionally, without however going so far as Madness properly so called, which is always marked by an excess of Subjectivity, as I have before explained.

Such retrogressions are only variations of intensity.

All mental variations then, even the morbid, reduce themselves to simple changes of intensity, in conformity with the Law of Modifiability. Although among peoples they may last longer, and so become more appreciable than in individuals, they are not really more profound. On the contrary, their intensity must be less in the former case, since the mind of the individual, from its dependence on vegetative life, is exposed to perturbations from which the mind of society remains exempt, as I have explained above.

This rule applies not only in the Intellectual, but in the Active and Affective Evolutions.

However this may be, in the succession, whether normal or abnormal, of the different degrees of intensity which produce the different human phases, continuity always remains unbroken. There is no passing from one to another except through the intermediate conditions, whether the movement be forwards or backwards. Thus the order of the phases remains invariable. We recognised this fixity first in the case of the Speculative Evolution, which is at once more easily appreciated and more susceptible of alteration; and we may take it as true of the Active, and even of the Affective Evolution, without my being obliged to recur to it specially in those cases.

Illustration drawn from Author's own temporary derangement.

I will confine myself to recording here the valuable phenomena I was able to observe in the case of my own cerebral malady in 1826, mentioned in the preface to the last volume of my Positive Philosophy. I have already made use of them in my public lectures. My derangement having been protracted by empirical treatment through eight months, there was the better opportunity of observing my different states. The complete course of this exceptional oscillation enabled me to verify twice over my then recently discovered Law of the Three Stages; for while I passed through those stages, first *inversely*, then *directly*, the order of their succession never varied.

During the three months in which the medical treatment

aggravated my malady, I descended gradually from positivism to fetichism, halting first at monotheism, and then longer at polytheism. In the following five months, in proportion as the efforts of nature, in spite of treatment, brought back the normal state, I reascended slowly from fetichism to polytheism, and from that to monotheism, whence I speedily returned to my previous positivism. In thus furnishing me with a decisive confirmation of my fundamental law of the Three Stages, and causing me to feel more thoroughly the necessary relativity of all our conceptions, this terrible episode of my life enabled me thereafter to identify myself more completely with any one of the human phases in accordance with my own experience. The continual advantage I have derived from it in all my meditations on history, allows me to hope that readers suitably prepared will also be able to utilise this brief account of a memorable anomaly. It only remains to say that the perfect continuity of my philosophical labours before my derangement with those succeeding it, proves clearly that, relatively to the whole course of my intellectual progress, this serious disturbance was simply an oscillation, to which exceptional causes gave a more extended sweep than is reached in dreams or in states of passion.

In rapid progress or retrogression, the intermediate stages may be imperceptible.

To give sufficient precision to this general account of the possible variations in the fundamental Evolution of Humanity, I must here add that the movement may be accelerated to such an extent as to render the intermediate stages imperceptible, particularly in the case of the individual.

Hence Fetichist populations under systematic guidance may pass straight into Positivism.

That the human intellect, whether in the individual or the race, should commence by Fetichism is inevitable, since that state arises spontaneously before there can be any interference with our reason, either empirical or systematic, and even earlier than artificial language. Although the other extreme of the speculative progression may be more modified, nothing will ever prevent our reason, provided its exercise is sufficiently prolonged, from finally arriving at complete Positivism. But the speed of progress through the intermediate stages may sometimes be so great as to amount to a suppression of some or even all of them. The following chapter will prove that Positivism might succeed immediately to Fetichism, without any halt at Polytheism, and still less at Monotheism. This is a possibility of which in the case of individuals we should rarely avail ourselves, as I shall presently explain; but in the case of

peoples it may become most valuable, although more difficult of application. If then the human movement may artificially be so accelerated as to avoid entirely the halt at Polytheism, it will, *a fortiori*, be possible to escape Monotheism, as will be demonstrated in the third chapter. The immediate passage from Polytheism to Positivism will frequently take place in individuals even spontaneously, when Western education shall be worthily reorganised, as several instances already indicate. But in the progress of the race it must become of capital importance, since the most numerous populations are still Polytheistic. The true Theory of Human Evolution has here opened systematically to our practical wisdom a noble field of action upon phenomena eminently modifiable. The following volume will treat of it with suitable fulness. But there as everywhere, and even more there by reason of the greater difficulty, we feel that our power for Progress depends necessarily, first on our knowledge of Order, and then on a continual respect for its fundamental arrangements.

In this opening chapter the positive theory of the human evolution is sufficiently established. Such explanations as are still needed can only be obtained as we gradually apply the theory. In fact the system of the Three Laws of Social Dynamics itself amounted to a general coordination of the mass of historical facts before our eyes. I have therefore now to proceed to the direct and special examination of its different essential phases, with a view to determining not only the true character of each of them, but also its catenation with that which precedes and that which follows it, according to the plan indicated in the introduction to this volume.

CHAPTER II.

POSITIVE THEORY OF THE AGE OF FETICHISM, OR GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE SPONTANEOUS REGIME OF HUMANITY.

PREFATORY REMARKS, pp. 65-68.

THE Initiation of Humanity is, as I have proved already, necessarily divided into the two broad periods of Fetichism and Theologism, the fictitious synthesis being in the one spontaneous, in the other systematic. The better to explain the first, I must here offer some preliminary remarks, to put in a clearer light our fundamental theory on the nature of man, in order to give it all the precision it needs, now that it has to be applied dynamically.

How do Intellect and Activity rank relatively to each other in the service of Feeling?

Although the universal preponderance of Feeling over Intellect and Activity be sufficiently recognised, a question still remains which if left unsettled might embarrass our historical investigation. Intellect and Activity are the necessary servants of Feeling; but what is their mutual subordination? As yet, we appear to be treating them as equal, which would be a contradiction of the aphorism in which I summed up the Human Harmony: *Act from affection, and think in order to act.* According to this dogmatic line, Activity alone would be the direct minister to Feeling, and Intellect would be but under-minister. It is important here to clear up this apparent contradiction before studying the growth and operation of the organism compounded of these three elements.

Their coordination varies according to the kind of Activity.

This preliminary explanation depends on the general distinction between theoretic and practical Activity, introduced in the last chapter at the commencement of the theory of the Active Evolution (p. 44). But we have now to conceive of it in a more complete and systematic manner, and to remark two inverse relations, equally normal though not equally important, between Intellect and Activity.

The fact is, that habitual obedience to Feeling takes

two alternative forms—the carrying out of impulses, and the communication of emotions. Its two ministers, Intellect and Activity, cooperate in each of these offices, which together make up their whole destined work. But which of them is the principal and which secondary depends upon the form of satisfaction craved by Feeling, the mainspring of our whole existence.

Intellect is subordinate to Practical Activity.

When we feel an impulse to modify in some way the external world, it is Activity which takes precedence, Intellect being merely its adviser. As this is the most essential and frequent case, the formula for Human Unity contained in the aphorism above quoted had to be drawn up in accordance with it. The first half of that line describes direct Activity in which Courage is predominant; the second, that well considered Activity over which Prudence presides. Although the latter alone is of real use when once the operation has become complicated, it must yet be always preceded by the former, not only in order that some sort of solution may be provisionally sketched out, but that there may be a sound appreciation of the problem. For the human Intellect, being better fitted to improve than to create, makes little way with speculation where the enterprise in hand has not first received some sort of empirical and provisional execution. Man's feeble understanding can then study this *spontaneous* product profitably and improve it *systematically*; whereas Meditation would have been vague and without result, if instinct had not furnished such an empirical basis for special Contemplation. Here then we have the most ordinary and the most important Harmony of human nature—the case in which Intellect does but assist Activity to satisfy Feeling; in other words, is but the under-minister of Feeling.

But Theoretic Activity is subordinate to Intellect.

But in the second general case of service to Feeling, the relations become inverted. When we feel impelled to communicate our emotions to others, the Intellect rises to the dignity of principal minister of the Heart, and Activity confines itself to furnishing the necessary means of material expression, which Intellect alone can employ according to their moral purpose. Although Exposition is not the most eminent of the five mental functions (i. 577), it becomes both the habitual motive and the direct object of their combination and complete exercise. Besides that our Conceptions are always meant ultimately for com-

munication, it is only by their fitness for that purpose, that their maturity can be well estimated, as I have more particularly set forth in the preceding volumes (ii. 209, i. 578).

This second general mode of Human Harmony is doubtless not so fundamental as the first. But it is quite as certainly necessary and normal. We shall see this most clearly if we consider its social purpose. In the purely personal and individual life, the only direct use of expression is to pour out the heart, as for instance in prayer (i. 583, ii. 204). Its principal use, however, is not to furnish this solitary satisfaction, but to communicate our feelings to others with a view to obtain from them either simple sympathy or active co-operation. Although under this last aspect the end aimed at belongs to Activity, Intellect takes the lead as long as it is a question of establishing the concert that precedes active cooperation.

The Harmony, then, of the human Faculties takes two shapes, unequal in importance but cooperating, in which Intellect and Activity alternately take the lead in their joint service of Feeling, the supreme motor of our existence. When the Intellect is employed in an esthetic direction, it governs Activity, which then becomes purely theoretical, according to the distinction established in the preceding chapter (p. 45). When, on the contrary, Activity remains essentially practical, Intellect takes the subordinate position, and places the resources of science at the service of Activity.

The above explanation, though Statical, and complementary therefore to the theory set forth in the last volume, has been introduced here in the Dynamical portion of this treatise, because we are immediately about to give it an important dynamical application, which is this. Although the two inverse modes of Harmony indicated above always exist side by side, yet one of them belongs more especially to Fetichism, as being *spontaneous*; the other to Theologism, as being *systematic*. Now without these preliminary remarks, the long established habit of considering the second too exclusively would have hindered us from properly applying the first to those historic periods of which it is the only key.

The second of these modes of Unity is most prominent in Fetichism, the first in Theologism.

The way is now cleared for a systematic explanation of Fetichism. My direct exposition of this portion of Social Dynamics must be arranged under two general heads—the

We shall examine, first, Abstract Properties, then Concrete Results

of Fetichism; each division under the heads of Intellect, Activity, and Feeling.

Abstract and the Concrete. Under the first I shall treat separately the different essential properties of Fetichism; under the second I shall show what sort of manners necessarily result from those properties when combined as a whole. Such a division is substantially equivalent to considering successively the life of the Individual and the developement of Society. The proper order to follow in this twofold study is the same as that which was adopted in the last chapter with respect to the whole Human Evolution, where we examined, first the Intellect, then Activity, and lastly Feeling, with reference to which the final judgment on each human phase must always be pronounced.

ABSTRACT APPRECIATION, pp. 68–93.

1. Intellectual Properties, pp. 68–84.

(*a*) Philosophic Aptitude, pp. 68–72.

I need not here insist afresh on the fundamental distinction between the Fetichist spirit which looks on all objects in nature as animate, and the Theological spirit which regards them as passively subject to supernatural powers. Anyone who at the present day should persist in confounding these two modes of conceiving causation would by that alone show his radical inaptitude for sociological studies. I must, however, institute a special comparison between these two broad divisions of early philosophy, in order to demonstrate, contrary to the prevailing prejudice, that the first is superior to the second, not only in spontaneity but also in truth. This twofold contrast will place in the clearest light the intellectual properties of Fetichism.

Fetichism superior to Theologism in spontaneity and correctness.

The direct examination of Polytheism in the following chapter will prove that its rise was more important for social than for intellectual progress. The same statement will be proved to be even more true of Monotheism, when I come to treat of that phase. These two conclusions should add much strength to my fundamental demonstration, that a Synthesis which can only gain in authority over Practical Life in proportion as it ceases to govern Speculation, must be purely provisional in its nature (p. 31). Here, however, I merely lay down the principle of such a judgment when I establish the Intellectual superiority of the first phase of the human Initiation.

Fetichism the most spontaneous mode of philosophising.

In the matter of Spontaneity, the preeminence of Fetichism is indubitable. Not only does history always find Fetichism at the birth of every civilisation, but in the growth of the individual there is ample evidence that this is the necessary starting-point of all intellect, whether human or

animal. It is still, and will always be, possible for the best minds to verify by their own experience our involuntary tendency to philosophise like fetichists, when we seek for Causes for want of knowing Laws.

Useful even now provisionally,

Every true theorician should openly recognise and unaffectedly submit to this mental necessity, which often throws back the best-cultivated understandings on the simple method of infancy. Provided we never mistake their nature, these fetichistic explanations will always retain a part of their primitive usefulness, not only because they give animation to language, but because thought itself benefits by the passing analogies which they suggest.

Where laws are unknown,

To avoid this frame of mind would be simply to renounce all reflection on the numerous facts of which the special laws are quite unknown to us. But this pretended wisdom would not be always expedient, even though it should remain constantly optional (p. 24). For an explanation of some sort is often indispensable, as it was at the first start of human reason, if only to prevent a mental torpor which would be more deplorable than even such puerile speculations.

Or are supposed to be unknowable.

It is easy to see this now, with respect to that lofty order of conceptions which, for most minds in the present day, is still outside the domain of rational positivity. If all those who regard Morals as not reducible under any natural law were to abstain at present from contemplating that noble field of thought, they would tend towards both mental degradation and social indifference. All that, in the public interest, is needed of these backward minds is that they should recognise their unfitness for politics, and should no longer aspire to manage the general affairs of Humanity.

Concrete Laws will for the most part never be known.

With regard to the majority of Concrete questions, that is to say in almost all practical cases, we shall never know the Real Order well enough to be able to dispense entirely with all recourse to Fictitious Synthesis as a means of supplementing Positive Laws. For it is our Abstract speculations only which can be raised to complete positivity. These do indeed, by means of deduction, exercise an ever increasing influence over the whole body of concrete researches, and so place them gradually on a more logical footing. Still, Concrete Laws will rarely be discovered by deduction: they will scarcely spring otherwise than from a wise empiricism (p. 25). But this method is

seldom completely successful even for the lowest laws, owing to the difficulty of discerning an Order composed of many elements, except through the medium of the theories relating to those elements.

The two methods then of positive reasoning, the Empirical and the Systematic, do not always supplement each other's deficiencies. However well combined, they will never be able to dispense with the aid of the Fictitious Synthesis; although this, as it has already lost all influence over abstract, so it will have less and less share in concrete speculations. But the mixture of Empirical Inductions and Systematic Deductions, which will always be the occupation of Practical Reason, will never entirely cease to be complicated with the heterogeneous cooperation of the earliest method employed by man.

We fall back then involuntarily on the Primitive Logic, not merely in those exceptional cases where our passions drag us into speculations which we might eschew, but also in studies which we have the best reasons for pursuing (p. 24, Phil. Pos. v. 46). Under what restrictions it is to be normally incorporated into the Definitive Regime of human reason, will be a subject of direct inquiry in the next volume, when all our intellectual prejudices connected with theology, with metaphysics, and with science itself, shall have been cleared away by the historical theory we are here working out.

It is to the Fetichist stage of the Fictitious Synthesis that we by preference revert.

Whatever be the motive, transient or permanent, which throws us back on the spontaneous employment of the Fictitious method, it is to be remarked that we always prefer the Fetichist form of it to the less direct and more complicated hypotheses of Theology and Metaphysics (ii. 76). The speculations in which we now recur to the Fetichist hypothesis are such as could never arise in Fetichist times. When we are ignorant of laws and wish to penetrate causes, do we involuntarily set up deities or entities? No; but we always fall back on the supposition that the objects of our attention are in direct possession of life, and we explain their phenomena as resulting from their feelings. This natural disposition makes it easy for completely emancipated minds to transport themselves across the long interval which separates them from the initial regime; while among the different theologists it overcomes the superstitious antipathy inspired by their habitual beliefs.

Fetichism more logical

Such a demonstration proves beyond dispute how superior

Fetichism is to Theologism in spontaneity, the most important property of the Fictitious Synthesis, in its office of guiding the earliest steps of human reason. But it will be found to be no less superior in logical and—using the word in its wider sense—scientific correctness. Complete positivity is the normal type of mental maturity, and the Fetichist is less distant from positivity than any sort of Theologist. His general approximation to Reality is more exact inasmuch as it is more natural; in fact we do not improve upon it till we get to the Positive state. Fetichism therefore would still prevail, if social exigences had not forced our ancestors to take the Theological path in their inevitable preparation for Positivism.

and Positive than any mode of Theologism.

The better to establish this important notion, so directly contrary to all existing opinions, I must continue to compare Fetichism with Polytheism more particularly, that being in every respect the principal kind of Theologism. The demonstration will thus be at once more decisive for really emancipated thinkers, and less likely to shock those still preserving theological sympathies, from which very few minds at the present day are completely free. For where these backward inclinations now exist they relate to Monotheism, though Polytheism deserved them more.

Polytheism the best mode of Theologism with which to compare Fetichism.

The hypothesis of the Polytheist is theoretically inferior to that of the Fetichist both as to method and as to doctrine.

From the logical point of view the Fetichist hypothesis conforms spontaneously to the fundamental rule of Positivism in being the most simple that will account for the facts, while the Polytheistic hypothesis directly violates it. Consequently the former can be brought to the test of verification, which the latter never can be. To attribute life to the External World is no doubt an error of capital importance. But we can show that it is an error, and then we can get rid of it. This is no longer the case when for direct, you substitute indirect wills, belonging to beings purely imaginary. For the existence of these beings can no more be decisively disproved than it can be demonstrated. The hypothesis thus eludes our grasp, and its speculative influence can only cease when the regime of Causes has fallen into complete desuetude, and that of Laws is permanently established. The mind might, on the contrary, pass without any breach of continuity, from purely Fetichist to strictly Scientific habits of thought, the earliest state being regarded as a first

Polytheism wanders further from Positivity than Fetichism does.

approximation to reality. In fact the hypothesis of direct life is as suitable to the relative study of Laws as to the absolute determination of Causes; while the divinities of the theologist or the entities of the metaphysician can serve for nothing except to give us the conception of causation.

Thus the Fetichist method starts in the normal path of the true logic, while the Theological method goes radically astray from it. The former spontaneously confines itself to the degree of subjectivity which is indispensable to us, the latter becomes much more subjective than its theoretic purpose requires. It is our just repugnance to this excess of fiction which makes us naturally prefer the Fetichist mode in those exceptional cases where for want of the Law we aspire to the Cause. This preference which we feel as individuals asserted itself in the evolution of our race as a whole; and the superior spontaneity of the Fetichist regime is explained by its greater simplicity. If, to mark this general comparison more clearly, we carry it even into pathology, I do not doubt that insanity, especially when chronic, is more frequent and more obstinate among Theologists than among Fetichists, a surmise which I hope will be verified by judicious travellers.

(b) Scientific Aptitude, pp. 72–84.

Considered next, from the Scientific point of view, in the special and narrower use of that word, the theoretical superiority of the earliest regime of Causes is equally incontestable. We must first distinguish two general forms of Fetichist doctrine, according as it deals with the inorganic world or with living nature.

Fetichist doctrine superior to Theological as to Organic Nature,

With regard to the latter its mistake is very excusable. It does but exaggerate the fundamental analogies by which man really resembles the animals and even vegetables. Not only was this tendency for a long time inevitable, but it strengthened at first our synthetic faculties, and its moral reaction develops our sympathetic instincts. Under both these aspects the Theological doctrine goes further wrong in an opposite direction. For Theologism exaggerates the differences much more than Fetichism does the resemblances. Both regimes busy themselves with Causes; but the second carries us directly away from the true Scientific state, whereas the first leads us towards it. Human life is thus irrationally separated from the mass of animal and vegetable life to which Fetichism had too much

assimilated us. To say nothing therefore of its Moral defects, which will be examined presently, the Theological doctrine with respect to animate nature is further removed from *truth* than the Fetichist.

And also as to Inorganic Nature.

As to inorganic nature Fetichism is less satisfactory though equally excusable. But in doctrine as in method its superiority to Theologism continues to be as marked here as before. Its scientific error consists in not distinguishing *life* properly so called from *spontaneous activity*. But how could we expect such confusion to be escaped in those days, when we see it still prevailing among the majority of cultivated minds, as is shown especially by the conceptions of atheistic or pantheistic biologists? It does not carry us as far away from truth as Theologism does in the opposite direction, by its cosmological hypothesis of the universal passivity of matter.

Where the Fetichist sees Life, the Positivist sees Spontaneous Activity.

When we aspire to penetrate to Causes properly so called, we may avoid attributing physical phenomena, whether celestial or terrestrial, to supernatural beings; but to do without the hypothesis that material objects have affections and wills like those of men is beyond our power. When we subsequently give up the idea of knowing anything beyond Real Laws—that is to say, when we confine ourselves to seeking for general facts—we set aside this hypothetical assimilation of life and death as incompatible with the superior regularity of the Material Order. But by the fundamental division of Physical science into Cosmology and Biology, the existence of spontaneous activity throughout nature is maintained, cleared only of those human attributes which had been mixed up with it by Fetichism. Without such universal activity—more intense, of course, and more varied in living beings—the Natural Order as a whole would become unintelligible.

All the Sciences still retain traces of the intellectual corruption of Theologism.

Theologism was necessary to the *Social* evolution of Humanity as a means of passing from the Fetichist regime to the Positivist state, and we must value it accordingly. At the same time we must regret that the original justness of our intellect should have been so much impaired during that long transition. Even at the present day, the least imperfect sciences retain profound traces of the errors peculiar to the second general mode of the Absolute Synthesis. I have already in my fundamental work on Positive Philosophy noticed the

prevalence of this irrational influence even in mathematics, where the principal conceptions are still distorted by the cloudy hypothesis of the *inertia* of matter (Phil. Pos. i. 548).

Scientific superiority of Fetichism to Theologism further proved from consideration of the Encyclopedic Series.

Thus Fetichism is theoretically superior to Theologism in doctrine as well as in method, even as regards the inorganic world. Until the full advent of Positivism, it was really, as a whole, the best exemplification of sound logic and the nearest approximation to the General Order. This judgment is irresistibly confirmed by the Encyclopedic Progression established in the preceding chapter as most suitable from the historical point of view, when we divided natural laws into Physical, Intellectual, and Moral.

Of morals some knowledge was attained very early: Physical laws baffled research longer.

Physical laws, as was to be expected, utterly baffled our researches during that long period in which abstract speculation could not sufficiently disengage itself from concrete elaboration. Moral laws, on the contrary, were continuously and spontaneously developed by every contact between man and man, even of the smallest and purely domestic kind. Though in their earliest shape necessarily empirical, they were much more efficacious than is supposed by modern reason, which indeed is still indebted to them for its best notions in the department of Morals. As for Intellectual laws, they could only be sketched out last of all, either systematically or even empirically—an instance of the logical fatality always governing intermediate cases (p. 52). The distinct study of them had to wait for the slow arrival of a real priestly order; and besides, the priests could not make nearly as much progress in that direction as the women could with regard to Moral laws, or even as the practical chiefs with regard to Physical laws. Until the entire accomplishment of the Human Initiation, no decisive progress could be made in true Mental science, as its present state shows only too clearly.

But Mental laws were not even sought for till much later.

It was upon the Physical and Moral orders then that speculation had long to concentrate itself, stimulated continuously by Feeling and Activity. It was impossible that any deep thought should be directed to the Intellectual order until philosophy began to feel the want of a complete mental systematisation which chiefly depended thereon. As for real knowledge of it, that was destined to baffle all the efforts of thinkers until the Collective Evolution of Humanity at length furnished a sufficient basis for it, as was explained, once for all, in the last chapter (p. 38, &c.).

The earliest Synthesis therefore was limited to a combination of Morals and Physics; Physical facts being explained by Moral Causes.

It was thus that the encyclopedic question presented itself to the infancy of human reason. To harmonise knowledge it was necessary to combine directly Physical science and Moral science, by applying one to the other as far as was possible with things so heterogeneous, the gap between which could not be bridged over, till the intermediate science of the Mind should be constituted. This combination might take place in two ways: Physical laws might be regarded as governing Moral laws, or Moral laws as governing Physical. Now the former mode, which ultimately obtains our preference, was at first unsuitable for want of an objective basis. The Moral order, in spite of its greater complication (which men at that time could not appreciate), was at the outset much less unknown than the Physical, and therefore it had to preside exclusively over the Universal Synthesis. Besides the impossibility of proceeding otherwise, this was the only way to move in conformity with the fundamental rule of sound logic which lays down that *we should always pass from the more known to the less known.* Thus arose the Fictitious Synthesis, supplying the want of Physical Laws by Moral Causes.

Of this Fictitious Synthesis Fetichism was the most rational mode.

From the above reasoning it follows, that of the different forms of the Fictitious Synthesis, Fetichism is logically and scientifically the best, because it attributes all material phenomena to the direct affections of the corresponding material objects. Its *spontaneous* ascendency ought therefore to be considered as no less normal, at the outset of Humanity, than is the *systematic* ascendency of Positivism, in our final state. Notwithstanding their apparent opposition, which, so far as it is real, is much more historical than dogmatic, these two extreme regimes are equally suitable to the situations of our intellect respectively corresponding to them. It was only the intermediate regime instituted by Theologism that was truly contrary to the general laws of human reason, although it was profoundly justified by *social* necessities.

Polytheism, Monotheism, Atheism, and Pantheism are less rational modes of the same Synthesis.

When this justification for the transitory ascendency of Theologism had ceased to exist, its natural irrationality became glaringly manifest, even after it had undergone all possible reductions. We may observe this irrationality for ourselves in the theologists of the present day, down to the very atheists and pantheists who parody Positivity, but are at bottom the last representatives of the Theological spirit. Having become,

without any *social* excuse, the most inconsistent organs of the regime of Causes, they continue their search for the Absolute while rejecting the only solution which it admits. They utterly spoil the initial Synthesis, robbing it of its happy subjectivity to give it a delusive objectivity, in accordance with their characteristic materialism, which, by an abuse of the true encyclopedic subordination, strives to explain our Moral nature by the Physical world (i. 39). To compare the simple theories of existing Fetichists with the misty dreams of these pompous doctors, would be to give the former too easy a victory. But when we confine the historic parallel to the different regimes which really directed the human intellect, without attending to minds that are diseased, or have gone out of the beaten path, we are still forced to the conclusion that the most ancient and most spontaneous was also, under all intellectual aspects, the best.

From Fetichism alone could the subordination of the Subjective to the Objective have received a beginning.

That this conclusion may have its full sociological force, we must observe that it also follows directly from the universal principle of positive logic, namely, that we should suitably subordinate the Subjective to the Objective, by always constructing the simplest hypothesis that will satisfy the whole body of observed facts. Now Fetichism institutes as much as possible this fundamental submission of Man to the World, carrying it even to the extent of the adoration of matter, in accordance with the affections and wills which it attributes to external bodies. As for the broad hypothesis of universal life upon which it is based, I have already sufficiently demonstrated its superiority in all respects over the other opinions to which the search for causes has given rise. From such a synthesis alone could the subordination of the subjective to the objective have sprung in the first instance. But further I will show that no other intellectual regime, until Positivism, has been so well adapted to this, the principal destination of all our theories.

This principle was developed *under* but not *by* Theologism, which really thwarted it.

For although, under the succeeding forms of the Fictitious Synthesis, human reason became more and more submissive to the External Order, the mental discipline thus actually developed was not a result of the dominant opinions. It was always due to the increasing reaction of the Positive spirit, the spontaneous growth of which gradually replaced Absolute Causes by Relative Laws. By transferring to imaginary beings

the Wills which Fetichism supposed to reside in real objects, Theologism tended to exempt our intellect from all true submission to the Natural Order, the usual conception of which became therefore coloured by the indirect influence of our own mental state. Theologism was always threatened with this degeneration; the only corrective being the Fatalism inculcated by the priests, in accordance with their habitually practical aims; whereas the Fetichists, who were long without a priesthood, spontaneously avoided these subjective deviations, and attributed the governing Wills directly to natural objects, the existence of which, being within human ken, then regulated human imagination. Thus Fetichism forbade as sacrilegious, divagations which Theologism authorised and even inspired, in spite of all the efforts of Theocracy (p. 104).

Therefore Fetichism was the only form of the Fictitious Synthesis favourable to Science.

This high quality of Fetichist Philosophy is not seen by modern thinkers, simply because they do not place themselves at the proper point of view. Proud of their semi-emancipation, they forget that the Fetichist believed profoundly in the reality of his dogmas; and so this doctrine of the Vitality of Matter, although in fact purely subjective, might be mentally as efficacious as if it had an objective basis. Only, its empire could be no more than provisional, since the longer the External Order was studied, the more difficulty would be found in assimilating it to the Human type. But far from having been always hostile to this rise of science, as is now supposed, the Fetichist Regime for a long time aided the spontaneous growth of it, by consecrating Concrete Observation, the destined parent of Abstract Contemplation.

Subordination of the Intellect to the Heart in Fetichism,

For want of that systematic Relativity which is only attained through Positivism, people still reproach Fetichism with a tendency which true philosophers should regard as its high privilege. They reproach it with subordinating Intellect too much to Feeling. They forget that being the *Initial* Synthesis it was necessarily without an Objective basis, and was therefore obliged to borrow its theoretic principle from the Heart.

As now in Positivism.

From the fundamental doctrine established in this treatise on the true nature of Unity, it follows that the Final or Positive Synthesis of human speculation must also rest on Affection. No other basis can be found for that general systematisation of our whole nature, without which the special

Intellectual Synthesis would remain impossible. The difference between the Initial and the Final Synthesis is that, in the latter, the principle of Love directly inculcates on our intellect subordination to the External Order, which is now objectively appreciated and seen to be preponderant. But till that fundamental necessity could be demonstrated the Heart had to supply its place, not only by furnishing the spiritual impulse, but by suggesting the theory from which resulted Fetichism. The Initial Synthesis is thus no more open to the reproach above mentioned than is the Final, if its relation to the corresponding situation of the human understanding is remembered. So profoundly insufficient was the Intellect at that time, that if the Heart had not spontaneously taken the initiative, speculation would never have advanced a step.

The degree which this subordination reached in Fetichism would now be almost equivalent to insanity.

At the present day such an ascendency of feeling over reason would constitute an excessive subjectivity bordering on madness; it would in fact only differ from madness on the condition that the individual remained clear in his judgment of his intellectual state. We often yield to the natural temptation to found our opinions on our desires in those numerous cases where the special laws remain unknown (p. 24). But these spontaneous beliefs seldom last long; indeed we generally recognise them to be illusions, at all events after a short experience. If we not only admitted them as habitual modes of thought, but also lost our conviction of their inanity, we should be really insane with respect to the order of facts concerned, as is the case in prolonged dreams.

But it was then a normal state of human reason.

Nevertheless the primitive state of human reason ought to be judged completely normal, notwithstanding that it profoundly fulfilled these two conditions of modern insanity in every brain and for every speculation. This apparent contradiction is easily explained by my previous observations on the eminently relative nature of insanity, the Biological examination of which ought always to be subordinated to the Sociological, since the species governs the individual. The extent, persistence, and unanimity of the so-called aberrations of Fetichism would alone be quite sufficient to convince every true philosopher that, as a whole, they constituted the best system which our theoretical situation then admitted.

Logical advantage of the tendency

But not only may this primitive tendency to believe what one desires be justified relatively, it must be directly judged

conformable to the fundamental principle of sound logic. Of its moral reaction I say nothing here, as it will be estimated further on; I am but continuing to point out its intellectual influence. It is to be regarded as the necessary complement of the universal principle, that *the simplest hypothesis explaining the facts is the best.*

to believe what we desire.

This general precept is in truth no less normal for the Affections than for the Intellect. For every synthesis requires that we estimate the External Order with reference to our own destiny, unless we embark in a search for the Absolute, more vicious objectively than subjectively. Nothing can restrain our spontaneous propensity towards the opinions which most favour our dominant instincts but a real knowledge of the Economy of Nature. But further, this propensity is theoretically legitimate, so far as it contributes to facilitate the Universal Synthesis by increasing both the simplicity of our hypotheses and our union with the External World.

Although the order of nature is not as favourable to man as is imagined by monotheistic optimism (i. 43), the existence and progress of Humanity are a proof that it is not radically hostile to him, and that it even becomes more and more favourable mainly through his own wise action upon it. Since our principal business is to study its good dispositions with a view to their better developement, it is important that our own frame of mind should be such as to prepare us to discern them. Everyone admits with respect to the Beautiful, that to be critically appreciated it must first be admired; and the same rule is no less applicable to the study of the True and the accomplishment of the Good.

It is well that we should take the most favourable view of the Real Order.

Every feeling of antipathy for which no sufficient reason can be assigned tends to spoil the developement of the Intellect as much as the satisfaction of the Heart. Hence in the primitive situation of the human mind, where for want of an External basis speculation necessarily takes its rise from an Emotional source, that source must chiefly be our benevolent inclinations. In that primitive state therefore, despair, depreciation, and suspicion, even with regard to the Material Order, if they were not rejected *spontaneously* by our most powerful instincts, would be discarded *systematically*. For they lead us to complicate our hypotheses and so to stray further from the truth. These general maxims are even more true of the study of the

This maxim applies to both the Material and the Human Orders.

Human Order as it really is, although it is still further from perfection than the Material Order. The real spectacle unfolded by history will never be properly appreciated but by those who profoundly venerate the past as a whole.

And generally a suspicious and distrustful spirit is mischievous.

Individual human nature is even more imperfect than general human nature, because more complex. Yet even here the wise man will give play to our spontaneous predilection for the most favourable hypotheses as being necessarily more simple than those suggested by fear or distrust. I have often congratulated myself that I have almost always followed this rule in my judgments of persons, even where experience has ultimately contradicted my first suppositions. In such problems indeed, any suspicion entertained in advance of evidence constitutes a logical complication as vicious as that of the geometrician who loads a curve with parts over and above those actually indicated by the equation. What may turn out to be right would, in either case, be a matter of chance, and would not alter the irrationality of the deviation. A superfluous complication of our hypotheses, whether it proceeds from the heart or the intellect, always tends to lead us into indefinite aberrations, by producing an excessive subjectivity under no direct control. Hence the unsophisticated trustfulness of the Fetichist must appear to Positivists to be as favourable to our intellectual developement as to our moral amelioration, so long as it is not inconsistent with an effectual study of the Natural Order. This regime of man's infancy is equally suitable to his maturity; only, it will be modified in the latter stage in accordance with the progress of real knowledge, the Relative taking the place of the Absolute.

Our hypotheses should be, first, as Simple, then as Beautiful, and lastly as Moral as possible.

Our sound theories never can or need be more than imperfect and approximate representations of the External World. Such being their nature and use, we have a certain amount of liberty in framing them, which liberty we shall best employ in making them as satisfactory as possible to our good inclinations. First and above all, we must do what we can to simplify them, that they may be more useful for speculation. Secondly, we may and indeed should give them as much beauty as the indeterminateness still clinging to them permits, for this will lighten the labour of meditating on them. Lastly, we ought to make their moral character as perfect as possible, because every Intellectual exercise has its reaction on the Affections. Such

is the threefold complement, Scientific, Esthetic, and Sympathetic, which the fundamental principle of sound logic requires for the construction of all hypotheses, objectively framed and subjectively revised.

The absolute optimism of Fetichism will be replaced by the relative optimism of Positivism.

The conscientious application of this complementary rule can alone give any system to that combined use of Signs, Images, and Sentiments which is the spontaneous instrument of all Speculation. Ever since modern anarchy divorced the Intellect from the Heart, men have regarded the Morality of hypotheses less than their Beauty, and much less than their Simplicity. Nevertheless everyone who rightly appreciates our cerebral constitution as a whole will see that the first of these qualities has really a more profound though a less direct influence on our mental operations. It acquires an increasing importance in proportion as our speculations become more complicated. The Fetichists therefore spontaneously inaugurated true logic when they applied to the External World, the only object of their theories, that happy instinct which supposes moral perfection everywhere. If this is wanting, there is an intellectual craving unsatisfied, be the hypothesis ever so beautiful and simple. Positivism will consecrate this normal disposition and will turn it to further account by bringing it to bear especially on the most noble and difficult studies. Becoming Relative instead of Absolute, it will acquire a freer developement, and, when it is recognised as a Subjective institution, any scruples suggested by its want of Objective basis will vanish.

Fetichism did not attempt speculation in Sociology or Morals.

To complete my account of the Intellectual qualities of Fetichism, it remains for me to notice that, as regards the two highest fields of speculation, this initial system is necessarily one vast blank. As its fundamental principle consisted in seeing the human type everywhere, there could be no continuous synthetic study of Morals and Sociology. These superior laws relating to the Human Order, being empirically sketched and thought to be sufficiently known, served only as an explanation of the inferior spectacle of the External World, the material preponderance of which was already profoundly felt (p. 74). Any theorising by Man upon his own nature, either individually or collectively, would have been no less impossible than inopportune in that primitive stage. The Fetichist mind always remained incapable of such a refinement, and never attempted, in that great field of thought, to rise above pure empiricism.

This was first attempted by Polytheism.

This unavoidable gap could at first be filled up only by Polytheism; and this is the chief speculative merit of that system, as I will explain more particularly in the next chapter. As soon as the moving Wills were imagined to reside outside of real objects, they at once acquired an influence extending beyond the merely material use which they had at first subserved; and although this primitive office of fetiches continued to be the principal attribute of Gods, they were soon introduced into moral and even intellectual explanations, when the developement of human affairs gradually made the need of these felt.

But with little success in Morals,

But the superiority of Polytheism over Fetichism as regards Moral and Social speculations must be pronounced to be more apparent than real, if we consider how small, after all, was the success for a long time attainable in the systematic study of human nature. This highest field of thought could not be approached as it deserved, before the various inferior sciences were sufficiently advanced. No decisive step could be made towards the true theory of the Human Order until a tolerable knowledge of the Material and even of the Vital order was possible; that is to say, not until our own day. Indeed as regards true knowledge of Moral laws, Polytheistic science never advanced beyond the spontaneous results reached empirically by women.

And less in Psychology, which could not then be studied in its true form, Sociology.

As regards Mental laws, the continuous efforts of the priesthood, followed by those of the philosophers, properly so called, were even less successful in instituting a systematic study of them. Capable of judging everything directly except itself, the human understanding can only be known to itself indirectly by the observation of its operations, especially its collective operations, on a sufficient scale; and even at the present day this observation is hardly wide enough to be decisive, as I have already explained. If we except the incomparable discovery substantially achieved by Aristotle (p. 15), but always contested even till the rise of Positivism, the theoretic study of the Mind during Polytheism never produced anything but contradictory errors, among which we with difficulty descry some glimpses of truth, and these purely empirical.

The slow progress of Speculation, therefore, is not attributable to Fetichism.

The general progress of the Human Intellect was therefore in no way retarded by the necessary impotence of Fetichism as regards the highest speculations. In the eyes of a true philosopher, the artless ignorance which in this respect dis-

tinguishes the humble thinkers of Central Africa is worth more even in point of rationality than the pompous verbiage of the proud doctors of Germany. For it proceeds from a real though confused feeling that anyone who remains unfurnished with the scientific basis is unripe for such speculations; and of this basis our metaphysicians are more disgracefully ignorant than the lowest negroes.

By attempting to discover Mental and Moral laws, Polytheism gained Social but not Speculative force.

Theologism, apart from any design on the part of its organs, had the advantage of extending to the human Order, which Fetichism could not reach. But the advantage was only to its Social destination, as I shall presently explain. Its aptitude for Speculation was in no way increased thereby. However unsatisfactory in point of reality were the Theological explanations of Intellectual and Moral phenomena, the very attempt to supply them made the priestly system more complete, and so developed its Political authority. Thus the inferiority of Fetichism in this respect tended only to hinder it from directing the gradual extension of human Association without really affecting its Intellectual influence.

The impotence of Fetichism for the higher speculations was even desirable.

Pursuing the last consideration further, we shall even recognise that this incapacity reacted happily on the principal Speculative use of Fetichism, as the earliest belief about causation. For I have shown above (p. 71) that its Intellectual office consisted especially in laying the foundation of human Logic by establishing in an elementary but decisive form the subordination of the Subjective to the Objective. Now by confining itself to the External Order, it the better consolidated what it had energetically instituted—the submission of Man to the World. If Fetichism had uselessly troubled itself about the Human Order, the nascent intellectual conviction as to the inflexible preponderance of Materiality, which is the first foundation of any construction whatever, would have been seriously disturbed. If we consider what grave disorder the Theological spirit did in fact create in this respect, we shall feel that the restriction of the Fetichist philosophy to the domains of Matter and Life was as indispensable as it was inevitable.

This full estimate of the solitary speculative defect of Fetichism still leaves its Intellectual superiority to every other Fictitious Synthesis beyond dispute; and no further Abstract explanation is henceforth needed, beyond such elucidations as will come out in the Concrete examination. Besides the natural

difficulty of its demonstration, the doctrine I have here advanced is too contrary to all existing opinions not to need the most careful developement; without this, I should not have been able to utilise it fully in my general view of history, which it will influence profoundly. But here, as when I was treating the general theory of our Intellectual Initiation, my business was chiefly to explain the scientific and logical efficacy of the belief in Direct Causation, the superiority of which in point of reality over all the other modes in which causes were afterwards to be conceived, has been radically misunderstood owing to our prejudices.

(c) Esthetic aptitude.

As for the Esthetic aptitude of Fetichism, it is too evident to require a special examination now. For a system which directly assimilates to ourselves all objects, even the most inert, is eminently favourable to the rise of the poetic, the musical, and even the plastic art. If, nevertheless, Polytheism produced the principal developement of the fine arts, I shall presently prove that it did so more by certain social reactions than by any Esthetic power of its own. The forms only of art would be strongly affected by the Theological dogma, which was in no way indispensable to the imagination. Supposing Fetichism developed into a vast society, general poetry and its two special auxiliary arts would receive therein an impulse not less decisive, and more derived from the Affections, than under the best Polytheistic regime, and would, like science and industry, tend more directly towards their final state under Positivism.

2. Practical Properties, pp. 84–89.

In this abstract estimate of Fetichism it was necessary to deal chiefly with its intellectual properties, the only ones which are radically misunderstood in our day. For the same reasons which determined my treatment of the Fictitious Regime as a whole, in the preceding chapter, I am now dispensed from dwelling long on the Active and Affective aptitudes of its Fetichist phase, except so far as they may be elucidated in the Concrete examination. I must nevertheless concisely describe both the one and the other, in order to prepare sufficiently for that examination, though in nowise anticipating it.

Abstract treatment of these need not be lengthy.

They must be judged relatively to the situation.

As regards Activity, the Fetichist system would appear radically vicious, if any regime ought to be judged by its doctrine without reference to the corresponding situation. But it is sufficient here to call to mind the fatal mistake thus committed by the best Romans when they rejected nascent Catholicism, in

order to warn the judicious reader against this tendency to separate irrationally the different essential aspects of an existence really indivisible. Now it is by duly weighing these necessary relations that we shall estimate soundly the true influence of Fetichism on the developement of Activity, both Industrial and Military.

Fetichism, in spite of its doctrine, does not fetter Industrial Activity.

From the Industrial point of view, Fetichism was spontaneously suitable to our chief primitive needs. Its doctrine, it is true, tended directly to limit our Activity. For by instituting the adoration of matter, it seemed to forbid as sacrilegious any attempt to alter the conditions surrounding us. But the eminently concrete and special character of the worship naturally authorised the inconsistencies which every Synthesis contrary to any essential tendency of Humanity must submit to.

For, first, individual objects are worshipped, not species.

In the first place Fetichist adoration usually concerns individual objects, and hardly ever extends to their species. It is evident that this limitation must prevail with respect to the inorganic world, and even the vegetable kingdom, which furnishes the principal fetiches. But it also prevails almost always with respect to animals. If some species are worshipped collectively, this exception is due to the influence of the priests, which Fetichism developes in its latest stage, as I shall explain further on. Services, especially of a destructive kind, rendered to society, procured this distinction for certain animals.

And, secondly, different families have different fetiches.

Secondly, the Fetichist worship is hardly more general as to the worshippers, than as to the objects worshipped. Although tribe fetiches exist, it is most common for each family to adore specially objects peculiar to itself, and many even are sacred only in the eyes of certain individuals. This limitation might, if needful, be proved by the private enmities of which it becomes a frequent source.

Putting these two broad considerations together we shall see how unfounded are the reproaches of industrial inactivity which Fetichist adoration seems at first sight to deserve, and which would apply much more to Monotheistic worship. The consecration of individual animals, vegetables, or minerals hinders no one from modifying or even destroying the species of which they form part. The Fetichist is not in the habit of respecting any of the objects selected for a purely private worship by other families than his own.

But the tendency of Fe-

Thus the primitive religion leaves a double opening for

tichism to conserve is valuable

the destructive form of Activity, which it appears to prohibit. However, its main tendency is no doubt to conservation, and it is important now to recognise that in this respect it is exactly suited to the principal needs of our earliest situation.

For though the destructive instinct was well employed,

The fact is that the destructive instinct being more energetic in us than the constructive, first from our cerebral constitution, and secondly from our carnivorous habits, its activity largely preponderates at a time which admits of no regular discipline. Moreover, the primitive situation of Humanity furnishes a continual and legitimate employment for this spontaneous preponderance, in removing the material obstacles which necessarily stand in the way of infant civilisation. Were it not for the vast destruction of animals accomplished by the hunting tribes, and the analogous ravages by pastoral populations on vegetables, we should never have entered into possession of our planet.

It needed a check.

Now this destructive Activity, being both spontaneous and prompted by motives, no influence less steady than the adoration of matter, characteristic of Fetichism, would have availed to moderate it. Had it not been for such a religious discipline, not requiring priestly management, the blind energy of the generations destined to clear the stage for Humanity to perform its part, would have exterminated many sorts of both animals and vegetables, the real use of which could not then be foreseen. This immense benefit of Fetichism will be better appreciated if we consider the brutal ardour for destruction shown by civilised men, whenever the checks which bridle this powerful instinct give way for a time under exceptional circumstances.

Domestication of animals.

But besides furnishing this necessary check upon our principal primitive Activity, the Initial Religion specially facilitates our first industrial conquests. Too exclusively interested at the present day in triumphing over inorganic matter, we forget that the primitive victories of Humanity must have consisted above all in the domestication of certain organic, and at first even of certain animal, species. Although the importance and the difficulty of such a partnership have been habitually misunderstood since Monotheism has prevailed, everyone may easily appreciate them, by supposing it suddenly to fail us. Even confining such a supposition to animals,

to make it more imaginable, we feel at once that the loss of one principal species alone would at the present day upset human industry; and that too, although we should retain all the results due to such help since the dawn of civilisation. Those who are not carried away by the empirical enthusiasm of modern Occidentals for the mechanical and chemical arts recognise, as all antiquity did, that agriculture is necessarily the most essential of industries. Now the domestication of two animals capable of discipline was a greater step in agriculture than any which has been made since, in spite of the exaggerated importance now attached to their inorganic substitutes.

Culture of plants.

The spontaneous aptitude of Fetichism for this fundamental partnership, everywhere instituted under its ascendency, will appear indisputable to everyone who can sufficiently get rid of the haughty prejudices which hinder us from rightly understanding how it was brought about. This great achievement is attributed to a happy combination of craft and force, by which in the first instance we subdued certain animals, whose descendants have inherited their discipline. But this vulgar account, inspired by the hardness and ignorance of Monotheism, is as frivolous as it is ungrateful. It forgets that the association is still eminently voluntary in the case of every species really useful, and that the primitive alliance was always chiefly due to the fraternal manners towards animals promoted by Fetichism. It is sufficient here to recognise, that if the horse or the dog chose even now to withdraw from our rule, we should find it difficult to bring them back to it. The free consent of these eminent auxiliaries was, *a fortiori*, indispensable to their original domestication.

This precious alliance, the real source of our chief practical successes in war as well as in industry, was spontaneously instituted by Fetichist manners, which were more fitted than any others to make the sociable animals feel such a union to be both pleasant and useful. Without here anticipating explanations specially reserved for the Concrete Examination, I must, however, point out the principle and the nature of this fitness.

It results directly from the universal adoration instituted by the Primitive Religion. Although that adoration rarely extended to any species as a whole, and did not even em-

brace every species, its habitual practice sufficed to inspire us with feelings most favourable to worthy relations with any individual animal. Fetichist beliefs give us a sense of brotherhood with animals, which is both more reasonable and more useful than the cruel pride of Monotheists. At the present day, all those who are really acquainted with the manners of animals know how largely such feelings contribute to win for anyone the confidence and submission of these free helpmates of Man.

Although the law of hereditary transmission has during long ages facilitated their domestication, this cooperation will never be maintained unless we recur to the worthy habits which originally procured it for us. If new species have hardly ever been associated in this important partnership, under the different regimes which succeeded Fetichism, we must set it down to the necessary insufficiency of these, as regards both the liberality of manners and the insight into fact required for such an extension. By first fairly and respectfully judging our primitive dispositions, and then systematising them, the Final Religion will necessarily procure a better developement for them, as I will explain in the following volume.

In spite then of the exaggerations inseparable from every Absolute belief, Fetichism was eminently favourable to our Practical Evolution, by spontaneously determining first the conservation, and then the association, of the disciplinable animals. Though less evident and indeed less complete, as regards the useful vegetables, its salutary influence long remained indispensable to the rise of agriculture. Be it observed, that Fetichism acquired this twofold aptitude direct from its doctrine, independently of priestly influence, which regularised it indeed, but not till towards the close of the regime. Whereas Monotheism, now so bepraised for its doctrine, owed what real utility it had exclusively to the continuous wisdom of a progressive priesthood.

Fetichism less favourable to Military Activity.

Such are the Industrial properties of Fetichism, and admirably were they adapted to the corresponding situation. Its Military efficacy is certainly inferior, although less disputed. The vast impulse it gives to destructive activity does in truth naturally dispose its believers to war, besides making frequent occasions for fighting. It must even be admitted that the necessarily narrow limits of each Fetichist religion are a

direct cause of both public and private hostilities among the different primitive populations.

Fetichist hostilities not true War.

But these fierce struggles are still far from constituting that true War which will ever deserve the profound attention, and, I venture to say, the respectful admiration of the genuine philosopher, in virtue of its great social destination, sufficiently demonstrated in the preceding chapter (p. 49). What efficacy the combative habits of Fetichism had in that direction could be merely of a preparatory kind, besides being less in degree than its efficacy as a preparation for Industry. Their principal historic influence was not even direct, being negative rather than positive; for the thorough repression of these barren conflicts became afterwards the noblest motive for military domination.

Could not lead to Conquest except in Astrolatric stage.

The Systematic Conquest proper to antiquity long remained incompatible with Fetichist beliefs even when they had established the first condition of such conquest by substituting stationary life for nomadism. In fact, as long as they differed so much in different nations, there could be no incorporation of vanquished populations, and hardly even a religious sanction for individual slavery. All struggles of Fetichists ended in the extermination of the vanquished except where individuals were adopted by the victors, a not unfrequent occurrence. The rise of Conquests belongs exclusively to Polytheism, as will be explained in the sequel of my historical examination. Fetichism however became suitable to Conquest when its Astrolatric stage was reached, because there was then a doctrine which could spread over a wider field. But this late developement came too close to the age of Polytheism to have time to bring out the aptitude of the Fetichist Regime for conquest, at least among those populations whose social growth has been historical.

3. Affective (or Social) Properties, pp. 89–93.

After this description of the Practical properties of Fetichism I must complete its Abstract examination by a summary explanation of its Affective properties.

Apparent contradictions in Fetichist Manners caused by opposition of Intellectual and Active influences.

The evolution of Feeling can never be anything else than the continuous resultant of the moral reactions respectively due to the simultaneous evolutions of Intellect and Activity. It is only by this principle, established in the last chapter (p. 56), that we can account for the contradictions in Fetichist manners which have been everywhere observed. The two general influences which contribute to form them are, in fact, ordinarily opposed to each other, though by no means equal in force.

From Personal point of view, Fetichism favours development of Sympathy.

No Absolute doctrine can be as favourable as that of Fetichism to the direct and continuous growth of our Sympathetic instincts. Being purely an emanation from man's brain, its principle was necessarily *personal*, like that of every Fictitious Synthesis, and could therefore give no consecration to *social* life, which Positivism alone can systematise. But this Primitive Religion will be pronounced to be rather individual than egoistic if we consider not the source but the nature of its fundamental dogma. For towards all objects, even those without life, it inspires us with dispositions eminently suited to cultivate habitually our best affections.

Although Fetichist adoration always proceeds from personal motives, its perfect spontaneity corrects the profoundly egoistic character, which was only to be completely developed in the Absolute Synthesis, when this became systematised and Monotheistic. Even when Fetichist worship extended to maleficent forces, the existence of which was openly and artlessly admitted, the veneration thus excited always gave a nobleness to the corresponding fear. In all the other cases, and they are much more numerous, the habitual homage rested on love and gratitude.

No doubt love and gratitude, the source of which always remains personal, could not inspire truly disinterested sentiments, if these latter were really foreign to our natures. But the disinterested sentiments being innate, love and gratitude are well calculated to develope them. They act, in Fetichist times, like the analogous dispositions towards God cultivated by Monotheism, which has been so much extolled for its moral influence. Their action on Sympathy is in truth more extensive and spontaneous in Fetichism than under any of the regimes which separate it from Positivism. It could only be soundly appreciated since the natural existence of the Benevolent Affections has been demonstrated in modern times.

From Social point of view, Fetichist Thought is in happy contradiction to Fetichist Action.

When we inquire next how Fetichist worship reacted on Society, we see that these universal habits of confidence and respect, pushed even to adoration, must be a happy corrective of manners inspired by an Activity mainly destructive. The Theoretic and Practical influences which determine the Moral growth are here in continuous antagonism, and thus alone can we account for the incomparable warmth of affection often observed among cannibals. But to judge rightly the general

influence of Fetichism on Sociability, we must decompose the latter into private and public, for the aptitude of the former is very different in the two cases.

(*a*) Private Society (or the Family) constituted by Fetichism.

As regards Private Sociability the efficacy of the Primitive Religion is truly admirable. We certainly owe to it the constitution of the Family, the necessary base of all social order. In these elementary relations, the peculiar limitations of Fetichist beliefs have even a tendency to fortify the fundamental bond, by giving more concentration to the affections so consecrated. The three elements, Active, Affective, and Speculative, of all human association, begin to be distinctly marked in each family, as soon as the material situation is such that the women and old men can sufficiently modify the domination of the adult heads of households.

Moral influence of women begins notwithstanding Polygamy.

Although the establishment of polygamy was everywhere due to the primitive energy of the sexual instinct, we must not judge that initial institution with the blind reprobation of modern Occidentals. In spite of its twofold imperfection, conjugal and maternal, it is always the first mode of human marriage, the general properties of which it realises to a certain extent. Christian exaggeration, which represents it as incompatible with all habitual tenderness, is refuted even at the present day by the frequent experience of the most civilised Orientals.

Polygamy withdrew women from active life; and thus only in a rudimentary form could their moral influence commence. Though not very apparent, this influence was already real even over their husbands, and still more over their sons whose education was naturally left to them. Moreover, as it involved expense, it furnished one of the principal incentives to accumulations of wealth, which were long difficult to form, and yet were essential to general progress. Thus the Affective element of the moderating or Spiritual power had already taken distinct shape in the Fetichist family, and its influence thereon can be easily appreciated among most Negro populations.

Speculative influence of Old Men begins notwithstanding their abandonment to perish.

With regard to the Speculative element of that power, represented by the old men, the same assertion is at bottom true, in spite of one apparent difficulty. If the aged are as a rule left to perish, it is because of the extreme poverty too common in the primitive family. In the best marked cases, this abandonment is so little a proof of filial indifference, that each victim nobly prepares himself from childhood for solemn

submission to this fatal necessity, which is often accomplished amidst the most touching manifestations of affection. We must only rank it among the hard exigences imposed by the External World on the infancy of Humanity, at a time when the providence of the Great Being is not yet able to modify sufficiently the Material Order. But the closing scene is always preceded by a period during which the old man is treated with veneration, and the counsels of his experience exercise a power in the family, moderating the necessary preponderance of its active head.

Worship of Ancestors.

This holy influence becomes more august after death, even in those early times. Fetichism is eminently fitted to give it this consecration, by the spontaneous rise of the worship of ancestors, which everywhere dates from the Primitive Religion, and is a natural institution, at that time quite unconnected with the subtle polytheistic dogma, that attributes the most distinctive phenomena of Man to a being within him capable of existing apart from his body. It is an institution resulting directly from the principle of Fetichism, in which life being supposed to be universal, death is regarded as only prolonging, in a new mode, an existence which is not denied even to the lowest forms of matter. The Primitive Religion, then, institutes the spiritual authority of Old Age not merely in its objective, but even in its subjective shape, and hence is developed in due course the priestly power, the name of which everywhere reminds us of its domestic origin.

(*b*) Public Society (or the city) not constituted by Fetichism,

Thus, in the elementary association of the Family, our best sentiments, both of Continuity and Solidarity, are put into decisive though incomplete shape, and are spontaneously consecrated by Fetichism. But for more extended relations its influence could not be so favourable. We owe to it the Family, and even a rough sketch of the City; but it could not institute the Church, except in its Astrolatric phase, from which it soon passed into Polytheism, as I will explain below.

The doctrine not being capable of extension.

This limitation of its Social efficacy follows necessarily from the impossibility of extending its beliefs over wide areas, notwithstanding their universal spontaneity. But it is important that this insufficiency should be well understood, for it furnishes the Philosophy of History with the only general explanation of the rise of Theologism in the original Evolution of Humanity.

The Domestic union founded on Love is naturally consecrated by Fetichism, as I have just shown. Fetichism can also sketch out the Civic union which depends on Activity. For we owe to it fixity of residence, without which such union cannot begin. But it is not sufficient to institute the wider though looser bond which depends only on Belief. Far from drawing independent cities closer in that way, the Primitive Religion excites habitual conflicts between them, in consequence of the natural differences between creeds essentially domestic and almost personal. It is only under Polytheism that the Church, properly so called, can commence, that is to say, a society purely spiritual and vaster than the temporal associations between which it forms the only permanent link. The different Fetichist beliefs are spontaneously *analogous*; but they are not sufficiently *similar* to unite populations which are not directly drawn together by the habitual sentiment of a cooperation in action, even supposing that Fetichism and practical Industry could subsist side by side.

Fetichism could furnish the germ of Civic, but not of Spiritual Association.

Having thus marked out and limited the entire Affective aptitude of Fetichism, I have now finished the Abstract Estimate of it. From this difficult explanation, taken as a whole, we already see reason to regard this Initial System as essentially superior to all those which separated it from the Final System of Positivism. Between the two there is necessarily a fundamental affinity, some indication of which it behoved me thus early to give.

This general conclusion will be profoundly strengthened by the Concrete Estimate which I am now to set forth. But I must first establish an essential distinction, already incidentally applied, between the two necessary phases of Fetichism, which, from being purely *spontaneous*, became in due course truly *systematic* before generating Polytheism. As the principal results of Fetichism belong to both modes, and both must therefore be embraced in one examination, I should have either to neglect necessary distinctions, or to interrupt the unity of my exposition too frequently by calling attention to them, if I could not properly treat one phase as coming after the other.

Concrete Appreciation, pp. 93–123.

Preliminary remarks on division of Fetichism into Spontaneous (Fetichism proper) and Systematic (Astrolatry), pp. 93–97.

My Abstract Appreciation of the Fetichist Regime represented it as, upon the whole, essentially conservative. Eminently suitable to our earliest Intellectual needs, and spontaneously favourable to the corresponding form of Activity, it worthily

Fetichism is of all the provisional regimes the most conservative

consecrates the fundamental Sentiments which, when developed and consolidated, determine the principal aim of the social state. Even its single capital defect, the inability to form vast associations, tends to unite more closely the members of each tribe.

And the most durable.

It is not astonishing then that this regime has everywhere, more than any other, inspired an obstinate attachment, too well exemplified in our days by the unhappy victims of the infamous slave trade. Despite the vaunts of Monotheists, Fetichism is not only the most ancient but the most durable of all the provisional Syntheses, since it still subsists among many populations. If religion had been destined to remain for ever fictitious, this, its primitive mode, would certainly have been also eternal.

Still it must have contained a germ of further development.

Nevertheless, as Fetichism was once universal, while it is now confined to a minority of our species, its nature, however conservative, must be capable of spontaneous changes. If these are attributed to invasions, the difficulty is only thrown further back; it still confronts us in the case of the conquerors. Besides, the mutual hostilities of Fetichists can in no way modify their respective beliefs. Accordingly, at the conclusion of the present chapter, it will be demonstrated that Polytheism is spontaneously generated by Fetichism. That explanation I shall not here anticipate; but I cannot avoid laying the foundation of it somewhat prematurely, when, to smooth the way for the Concrete Appreciation, I describe the principal modification that Fetichism undergoes.

Astrolatry was such a germ.

In its universal adoration of matter, Fetichism at first accords no distinction to the heavenly bodies. Judging everything with reference to his own destiny, man long addresses his principal homage to terrestrial and even animated objects, which he thinks concern him more than the stars do. The dependence of the seasons upon the sun is not so obvious as is pretended, and would long be unrecognised, especially in the equatorial regions, where pure Fetichism still prevails. In much later times we see how difficult the early philosophers everywhere found it to get the notion accepted. Even here, in the midst of Monotheism, the principal phenomena of our atmosphere are still regarded with more awe than all those of the heavens, and it is with them, more than anything else, that men connect the idea of supernatural power.

However, the regularity of the celestial spectacle could not fail at length to attract habitual attention, when the Positive

spirit arose spontaneously, under Fetichist inspiration, from the first mathematical notions, as I am going to explain. This Speculative progress is naturally connected with the great Social revolution examined already, which consisted in the definitive substitution of Stationary life for Nomadism. The invariability of the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies could not, in fact, manifest itself with sufficient clearness to populations always on the move. But when observations were made from a fixed residence, this invariability would soon be recognised, first in the stars, then in the sun, and even the moon, and lastly in the principal planets.

This arose with cessation of Nomadism.

That point reached, the adoration of the heavenly bodies increased in importance, and Fetichism gradually passed into the state of Astrolatry. These new fetiches tended to prevail over all others, and so to systematise the primitive worship, in proportion as men appreciated their characteristic regularity and their inaccessible situation. But this preponderance could only become decisive under the influence of the priesthood, the rise of which is itself intimately allied with Astrolatry.

Fetichism must exist for a long time without needing, and even without admitting, any special priest. As long as its beliefs remain essentially domestic, each head of a family spontaneously conducts the worship of those thoroughly accessible objects whose wills can be directly interpreted. Only, when the institution of Old Age has been sufficiently established in place of abandonment, the Elders, in consequence of their superior knowledge of sacred rites, obtain a religious credit which strengthens their consultative influence. Nevertheless, until the advent of Astrolatry, Fetichism could not admit a priesthood proper, except for public fetiches; and as the attributes of these were special, the authority of their priests was naturally limited. This constitution changes gradually, as the worship of celestial bodies tends to prevail over that of bodies terrestrial.

Celestial Fetiches require a Priesthood in virtue of their qualities;

In virtue of their inaccessibility, the sidereal fetiches soon give rise to a distinct priesthood, to interpret their wills, and to transmit the homage of their worshippers. Their regularity consolidates and developes this tendency, by making men hope to understand their intentions better than those of other superhuman powers. To each believer, however, it seems that such completer insight can only be gained by special preparation, for which few think themselves fitted. The knowledge of the fixed

Which are (1) Inaccessibility, (2) Regularity.

stars indeed is not really difficult, except for nomadic populations, and soon becomes common among all stationary fetichists from its normal connection with agriculture. But with familiarity it becomes unimportant, except so far as it is subordinated to the theory of the sun, of the moon, and even of the planets. Now the knowledge of this belongs exclusively to the priesthood properly so called. Thus it was that the two essential characteristics of the celestial fetiches concurred spontaneously to cause the formation everywhere of a priestly corporation, which would in turn much develope the worship from which it arose.

(3) Universality. This last quality contributes but little to the foundation of Astrolatry;

To the scientific mind of the present day it may seem strange that I have not introduced into such an explanation the third attribute of these bodies, namely that they alone admit of universal adoration, as being equally observable among all peoples. But, in the first place, the mere fact of the universality of the celestial spectacle would have no real value, were not the spectacle important in itself, and, secondly, it was recognised later than the two principal characteristics. The different appearance of the heavens, as seen from different spots on earth, must long have made it very difficult, even as regards the stars, to realise clearly that the spectacle was one and the same for all.

Besides, it is to the Priesthood alone that we must ascribe the first decisive perception of this identity, as resulting from the unchanging configuration of the constellations, although their altitude might vary. The identification of the planets would *a fortiori* be exclusively due to a priesthood. How great the difficulty becomes in their case is shown by the fact that throughout antiquity Venus preserved the double name of Phosphorus and Hesperus, belonging to what appeared to be the two distinct stars naturally indicated by the periodical alternation of her apparent displacements, as she sometimes precedes and sometimes follows the Sun.

Thus the *universality* of the celestial spectacle ranks last of its three characteristics, in a Sociological estimate of Astrolatry, which is chiefly concerned with the decisive introduction of the Priesthood by that phase of Fetichism. For we see that, so far from contributing towards that social change, the quality of *universality* could not obtain sufficient recognition till the change was accomplished. But although it had nothing to do with introducing, it would do much towards extending and consolidating, the Priesthood.

In those respects its importance becomes at last preponderant, since it radically corrects the only essential defect which our Abstract Examination revealed in Fetichism (p. 92). For this religion would then be capable of spreading more widely than the transitional state of Theologism, and even as widely as the definitive state of Positivism; though the latter would be universal in more senses, in virtue of its Theoretic Reality, and its Practical Morality. This eminent capacity of Fetichism was everywhere nipped in the bud by the necessary advent of Polytheism. But even so, history affords several decisive instances of astrolatric union among vast populations politically independent of each other.

But much to extension of priestly influence.

This is not the place for a direct examination of the capital influence of Astrolatry on the gradual transformation of Fetichism into Theologism. That will come at the end of this chapter. I must confine myself here to describing the profound change which comes over the Primitive Religion as soon as Astrolatry prevails. It is memorable not only for its natural consequences, but because it is the first important revolution undergone by Humanity, the opinions, manners, and even government of which are simultaneously modified.

Examination of Astrolatry, as a transition to Polytheism, deferred.

This revolution would be better understood if its connection with the two greatest of social events—the institution of stationary life and the establishment of the priesthood—were not forgotten. However that may be, I must not conclude its preliminary examination without pointing out thus early the unseen but decisive influence of nascent Positivity. For if the Astrolatric Regime did much to develope astronomical studies, it owed its own birth to the first rough and spontaneous commencement of them.

Germ of Positivity in Astrolatry.

I can now proceed without break or confusion to the Concrete Examination of Fetichism, that is to say, to estimate definitively, as a whole, the intellectual and social state, which actually results from the combined operation of the essential properties described in the Abstract Examination. Although it is my business here to consider especially the completest instances, this examination must be understood to apply to all historical cases. But lest this universality of application should be thought to involve serious difficulties, I would beg the reader never to forget the great influence long exercised by

Concrete Appreciation will hold good universally, allowance being made for influence of Environments.

the Material Environment over human developement, not only on its Practical, but even on its Theoretic side.

This is a diminishing influence, and, though never to be forgotten, will not be estimated here.

While Humanity was still in her infancy, and could not sufficiently modify her planet, she was in stricter subordination to it than is now supposed. The effect of climate has been irrationally exaggerated; but it is impossible not to recognise the secondary perturbations which each Environment, as a whole, must always, though in diminishing ratio, introduce into the speed of the corresponding progress. As Social Dynamics ought not at the present day to make special allowance for these, save in some exceptional cases, it behoved me to give notice beforehand of this necessary reservation, lest my historical allusions should often appear paradoxical.

(1) Intellectual results, pp. 98–114.

To estimate sufficiently the Speculative Results of Fetichism we must examine separately, first its Philosophic, then its Scientific, and lastly its Esthetic influence, following the order which suits every truly Synthetic regime.

(*a*) Philosophic influence, pp. 98–105.

Under the first aspect, my Abstract Examination of the Fetichist system assigned sufficient reason for the admiration it deserves, as having in all respects worthily sketched the outlines of the fundamental education of human Reason. Theologism, especially of the Monotheistic type, in its ignorance and blindness, has never understood the immense benefit which Fetichism thus conferred on us; but the Final Religion will before long procure it our unanimous and perpetual gratitude. In proportion as the Spontaneous period of our evolution shall be better understood and more respected, every man's personal recollections will lead him to bless this necessary regime of both individual and collective infancy. Comparing it with the other modes of the Absolute Synthesis, the sequel of this volume will confirm its theoretic superiority, notwithstanding its political inferiority. But I must here describe its principal philosophic results, apart from any such comparison.

Fetichism more Synthetic, though less Systematic, ceeding Preparatory regimes

These, like all its other *results*, are due to the combined operation of its *properties*, moral as well as mental. For this regime, though more spontaneous than its successors, was really more synthetic, and yet less systematic. At the present day this latter contrast seems a contradiction; but it applies to all the phases of the human Initiation. The fact is that as the fitness and efficacy of the Fictitious Synthesis result chiefly from its spontaneity, it becomes always less complete and

homogeneous in proportion as it is more systematised and coordinated. For then Reason enters more and more, and disturbs the preponderance of Feeling.

Reason and Feeling are not again in harmony till Positivism is reached.

This conflict is prolonged and becomes increasingly serious till the advent of Positivism. The Final Regime is led by its characteristic Reality to take Affection for the necessary basis of the true systematisation, which is as complete as it is homogeneous. If we have already got to regard the epithets *synthetic* and *systematic* as always going together, it is because we are beginning to have a dim perception of the Normal State, while we forget the Preparatory States in which these two attributes would be profoundly contrasted. This ultimate reconciliation between Feeling and Reason was even foreshadowed in the Fetichist Synthesis, in which the preponderance of the first and the feebleness of the second were alike spontaneous, and oppression of either by the other was still out of the question.

Fundamental affinity of Fetichism and Positivism.

The more carefully Fetichism and Positivism are compared the more their fundamental affinity is recognised. Although of these two extremes, the one is a spontaneous, the other a systematic Synthesis, they resemble each other in their Subjectivity, the necessary condition of any coordinating system if it is to be universal (p. 22). Their essential opposition lies only in the general contrasts between the Absolute character of the first and the Relative spirit of the second, the one aspiring towards Causes, the other searching for Laws; the one employing the human type for worship individually, the other socially (p. 27). But these radical differences did not at first evoke any antagonism, and besides did not appear till late. For Fetichist Absolutism is very different from Theological, the one being instinctive, and resulting from an insurmountable necessity, whereas the other supposes a deliberate preference for the search after Causes, rather than the study of Laws. The spontaneous ascendency of Fetichism is no way hostile to the simultaneous rise of Positivity. But this latter cannot go on developing, except at the constant expense of Theologism.

Fetichism founded true Logic;

In all essential points the philosophic influence of Fetichism is in admirable conformity with the best precepts of Positivism; a fact which helps to account for each arising as it did. The fundamental preponderance of the Heart over the Intellect, which Systematic Positivism establishes with so much trouble finally, among minds vitiated by Theology and Meta-

physics, arose without effort primitively, from Spontaneous Fetichism. This one and only principle on which a Human Synthesis can be built, from the first led to the instinctive establishment of the true logic, which has always remained popular in spite of the efforts of learned doctors to spoil it, the logic which assigned to Feelings, Images, and Signs, their rightful share in the elaboration of Thoughts (ii. 200).

In which Feeling has a share.

Under the impulse of Fetichism, Feeling swayed logic spontaneously, as it will sway it systematically when Positive discipline shall overcome the resistance of the sophists, who pretend to regulate the Intellect without any help from the Heart. The happy disposition of fetichists to treat all objects and events with habitual trustfulness is eminently conformable to true rationality (p. 79 &c.). For it conduces to the simplification of all our hypotheses. This consists in the elimination, artificial in Positivism, natural in Fetichism, of every purely subjective element foreign to the objective purpose of the hypothesis, which is to assign, in the one regime a Law, in the other a Cause. Now whether such a complication is Moral as in the Theological period, or Mental as in the Metaphysical, the elimination is equally proper, and is important in proportion to the real intensity of the disturbance occasioned.

The touching logic of the humblest negroes has in it therefore more true wisdom than the narrow and unbending method prescribed by our literary and scientific specialists, who, on the plea of forming unbiassed judgments, by the dry light of Reason alone—an impossible aim—generally discard with suspicion and alarm any explanations suggested by our moral or esthetic instincts (p. 26). I have besides already remarked that the Fetichist principle is in spontaneous conformity with the fundamental rule for instituting sound hypotheses (p. 71). For those which it suggests are always such as might be verified if true, and consequently admit of a decisive refutation; whereas the Theological and Metaphysical hypotheses evade this test, and so their empire only ceases by desuetude.

There is nothing in the actual dogma of Feticnism to discourage the study of Laws.

Lastly, although Fetichism is necessarily occupied with Causes, its doctrine would not be unsuitable at first to Laws if the study of them could begin so early. It, in fact, results from a general assimilation between the two fundamental elements of the great theoretic dualism, Inorganic Matter and Vital Activity (i. 468). Before it was possible to sufficiently

appreciate the difference between these, an exaggeration of their resemblance was the only means of discovering which of them was really subordinate to the other.

We must then go back to Fetichism for the true origin of a logic which, in spite of the stupid pride of our pedants, would necessarily lose its chief value if it was not popular and permanent. But besides thus spontaneously founding a sound method, the Primitive Religion manifested its philosophical power by direct doctrinal results. Though these have been exposed to Theologico-metaphysical deterioration, they have not ceased to guide the whole body of human thoughts, and they only want Positivist systematisation to become the eternal base for meditation of the normal kind.

Three important doctrines may be traced to Fetichism:

The first of these results is the necessary subordination of Man to the World, a rule which Fetichism consecrated by the adoration of matter, the only shape which that fundamental institution could then take. I examined it before under its Theoretic aspect (p. 76), and I must now judge it as a whole, its Social no less than its Intellectual office. There is no sense in reproaching Fetichism with having too much materialised this rule, the first foundation of all human wisdom, practical as well as theoretical. For our reason must recognise the universal preponderance of material force before aspiring to modify it by moral force. Indeed, without such recognition, the purpose of moral force would have been inconceivable. Observation of the spontaneous reasoning of children and the uneducated classes is sufficient to establish that we begin with a predilection for physical superiority, without which the other forms of superiority would become illusory. Physical superiority is at once the most easily estimated and the most indispensable to our earliest needs.

(a) Subordination of Man to the World.

Were it not for this ascendency the Human Order could no more exist than the External Order. It is important even for the consolidation of our Morality, which is always incompatible with the empty independence dreamt of by vainglorious sophists. For this habitual submission to physical superiority is really the first basis of our principal approximation towards perfection, which constantly supposes a true humility; and this was, in a rude shape, better realised by Fetichist instinct, than by Theological discipline.

In this *spontaneous* conception of our Fundamental Sub-

Positivism corrects the

fatalistic exaggeration of this doctrine.

ordination, the final *systematisation* will find nothing essential to rectify except as regards the fatalism which always tainted it, following from the absolute character of every Fictitious Synthesis. But this vice, which only under Theologism attained mischievous proportions, is the less to be imputed to Fetichism, because our capacity for modifying the Material Order not being at first susceptible of any decisive developement, there was as little possibility of knowing that we possessed it as there was of injuring it. This impossibility even contributed to establish more firmly the dogma of the Subordination of Man to the World, which is the foundation of all wisdom.

Fatalism, however, was theoretically requisite in Fetichism.

Our practical even more than our speculative developement requires that the preponderance of the External World should be felt for a lengthened period, to the end that our Active faculties may be sufficiently preserved from the divagations to which they are liable. Now, if we had from the first been able to modify largely the Material Order, we should not have sufficiently recognised its continuous ascendency. Every one at the present day should easily comprehend this tendency, from observing how difficult many learned doctors find it to see the invariability of the laws relating to the most modifiable of all phenomena, namely, those of society. Since then there are still people who deny the Real Order because it is modifiable, the first conception of it among Fetichists needed to be consolidated by complete fatalism; the logical consequences of which, I may add, their practical reason eluded as ours does.

(β) Subordination of more Particular to more General Phenomena.

This great philosophic step, the belief in the preponderance of the External World, too much lost sight of afterwards when phenomena were largely attributed to the caprices of gods, was essentially due to pure, that is to say, strictly spontaneous, Fetichism. But Astrolatry completed it by a valuable addition, which it is important to mark as historically the root whence sprang Science in the narrower sense of the word. In exalting the celestial above the terrestrial bodies as objects of worship, that final phase of Fetichism made the initial conception of the Material Order more perfect. For it sketched in outline the second step in Subordination, namely, that of the more Particular phenomena to the more General, as I will proceed to explain.

This doctrine was established when Astrolatry distinguished Vi-

The primitive notion of the External Order did not distinguish Materiality from Vitality. Nevertheless, taking them together, it treated Human existence as subordinate to them, and this although they were spontaneously conceived according

to the Human type. That sufficed to institute in outline, but decisively, the universal principle of the final systematisation, by thus early establishing the submission of Nobleness to Force (p. 15). Astrolatry completed this principle by separating Vitality from Materiality, as being, equally with Human existence, subordinate to the Celestial Order. Although the phenomena by which Cosmology links on to Biology caused a certain confusion to remain between Matter and Life, a confusion that could not really cease till the rise of Chemistry in the Middle Age, the universal preponderance of the *most general* and *least modifiable* phenomena was thenceforwards recognised (i. 436).

tality from Materiality;

Thus it is to Fetichism that the Positivist Classification of the Sciences is indebted, both for its general principle and for its first decisive step. All those who know how to discern the value of thoughts beneath an incapacity for expression, will recognise this double service. Under the last aspect the Primitive Religion ought even to be regarded as the true source of the Objective Method, which at the present day is bringing about the final reorganisation of the Subjective Synthesis, after having gradually modified it by the slow working out of the sciences (p. 20).

A distinction which may be considered the foundation of the Objective method.

Complete Subjectivity belongs only to Fetichism proper. It is only in that spontaneous start that our mind proceeds directly from Man to the World, its absolute explanation of the External Order being founded on the Human type. But with Astrolatry begins the inverse tendency of thought, all phenomena, even those of Matter, being subordinated to the events most remote from Man. This is not the place for estimating the thorough dislocation which such a contrast must gradually introduce into a system which thus lost its primitive homogeneity. Nevertheless, while reserving this examination for the end of the chapter, I must here signalise as a second service inferior to the first, the appearance of the Objective Method under Fetichism, which thus contained all the germs of the philosophic movement.

Thirdly, we must refer to Fetichism a notion of capital importance, that of the permanence of natural species, which though seriously impaired under Theologism, and insufficiently respected by scientific empiricism, furnishes the last preliminary step necessary for the rise of Positivism. By attributing directly to real bodies all the directing Wills, Fetichism consecrated the

(γ) Permanence of Species

independence and perpetuity of each of them, with only such exaggerations as were inseparable from an Absolute conception, and which indeed strengthened its efficacy. This immense service, without which we should have wandered into endless divagations, was in danger of being radically undone when Theologism transferred the superhuman influences to purely imaginary beings, under whose capricious power matter was supposed to be entirely passive. In the course of this volume I shall point out the extent of the danger thenceforward threatening human reason. It was only saved by its inherent soundness from giving itself up to the esthetic charm of the Metamorphoses, always ingenious and often touching, which Polytheism authorised but could not regulate. At present I have only to notice in what way the substantially true belief of Fetichism was scientifically important to the Positivist principle.

Without this doctrine notions of *Law* could not arise.

Its importance lies in this, that all notion of the Real Order would necessarily fall to pieces, if species, that is to say, substances, could arbitrarily change. For since natural laws always relate to the constancy of the general arrangements between simultaneous or successive phenomena, they would become incompatible with an indefinite variation of the seat peculiar to each phenomenon. If, as every Theological faith supposes, animal, vegetable, and even mineral species could be transformed into one another at the pleasure of divine powers, would the events passing in those substances admit of any other permanence than might suit Almighty caprices? Modern science, especially in Biology, has been too subject to this subversive tendency, which is still distinctly perceptible even among atheists most priding themselves on their semi-emancipation. It is to purely spontaneous Fetichism then, that human reason will always remain indebted for this necessary complement of the true Philosophical Regime.

Emanating from a universal faith, these three doctrines were implanted everywhere.

Our estimate of the three services thus rendered by Fetichism to Philosophy will be complete, if we are duly sensible how much more they tell in the end, for having sprung originally from the only truly universal faith which hitherto has been able to prevail. The human mind has passed through many successive revolutions; but Spontaneous Fetichism was necessarily common to all intellects in primitive times, just as it will always preside over the start of the individual mind in infancy. Its philosophical influence therefore has been at work everywhere, and has even survived through all subsequent deteriora-

tions, never ceasing to reach even the humblest understandings. Upon this, the sole fund of ideas common to our race, Positivism must respectfully fall back, in order at length to *systematise* the universal religion, of which Fetichism *spontaneously* sketched the outline. For Positivism would never succeed in popularising the principal scientific conceptions without this Fetichist preparation, which already disposes uncultivated minds to accept sound philosophy more favourably than the Metaphysico-theological influence formerly allowed them to do.

(*b*) Scientific Influence, pp. 105–109.

The chief theoretic work of Fetichism was to consist in spontaneously laying these general foundations of all our speculations. It could not therefore anticipate, even in outline, the special theories reserved for later regimes, when abstract culture, under the impulse of theology, should disengage itself from the concrete study of practical questions. Nevertheless we also owe to it the first start of Science properly so called, inasmuch as it was really compatible in all minds with certain elementary speculations, before ever these were taken up by priests.

Scientific results could only concern the simplest phenomena.

But this Scientific influence of Fetichism, besides being less important, was less peculiar to it, than the Philosophic influence examined above. In fact the Primitive Religion led dogmatically to the latter, while to the former it always remained foreign though not hostile. The study of laws could only arise at first with respect to phenomena sufficiently simple to have escaped spontaneously from the regime of Causes.

Rudimentary Arithmetic and Arithmetical Astronomy;

This means no more than the first Numerical speculations, including the purely arithmetical part of Astronomy (i. 414). As for Geometry its very name would suffice to show that it could not be rationally cultivated until stationary life became the rule, and a priesthood arose, those being the two social characteristics of the Astrolatric stage, by which Fetichism passes into Theologism. We must, *a fortiori*, defer our historic examination of the first decisive discoveries in Geometrical Astronomy till we come to estimate Polytheism, notwithstanding the special preparation made for them during the latest phase of Fetichism. With Arithmetic and Arithmetical Astronomy it is different. These were always within the reach of man, even in the vicissitudes of nomadic life.

This was the first domain of Positivity.

Limited as was this primitive field of rational Positivity, and notwithstanding the disdain with which academic Empiricism regards it, by true philosophers it will always be judged

highly important. They will ever see in it the only initial domain in which the study of Laws could take shape, while the doctrine of Causes was in its highest ascendency. The subsequent growth of the Positive spirit was to rest on this spontaneous birth of numerical conceptions; for the same simplicity which preserved them at first from the Absolute Regime, naturally connected them with all other conceptions.

It is true that metaphysical subtlety strove in ancient times to bring these too under the Absolute Regime by seeking the Causes, properly so called, of the principal properties observed in numbers. But unsophisticated Fetichism was incapable of this vain refinement, which, then as now, amounted to a real disease of the human intellect, wanting to know the Cause although it knew the Law. Numerical phenomena, in virtue of their supreme simplicity, are the only ones in which general facts can be reached by induction, without any deductive assistance derived from less special speculations. That is why fetichist thinkers, happy in being able to lay hold in them of the first abstract Laws, were never tempted to pry into their Causes. If they sought for Causes of other phenomena, it was only because they were ignorant of the Laws pertaining thereto.

Numeration. The first thing to be recognised is that the institution of Numeration, the primitive base of the whole Scientific system, belongs especially to the Fetichist age, although its principal developement took place under Polytheism when it was wanted in practice. Always closely connected with our needs, it furnishes our speculative capacity with its first essential task, in which our faculties of generalisation and coordination are gently drawn out. The remoteness of its origin can only be overlooked by those, who do not see that numbers could be hierarchically ranked by means of the successive addition of units, apart from and prior to any special notation. Although the systematic establishment of the latter necessarily came much later, the spontaneous conception of the former certainly dates from the first exercise of human reason, even before language was sufficiently developed to furnish it with the best terms. Now the theoretic value of this first step in abstraction lay in the fundamental conception, though artifices of nomenclature and notation of course had their special importance.

Calculation: Elementary properties of Numbers. But we must suppose that with Numeration, properly so called, came the first numerical calculations, for which it

furnished the universal base, and to facilitate which was its chief purpose. It is important even that we should attribute to the same epoch less direct speculations as to the elementary properties of numbers. This threefold arithmetical start takes place once for all in the evolution of the race, as is confirmed by the spontaneous process in children, whose decisive initiation into rational positivity begins in the same way.

Sacred numbers.

With regard to the higher part of this earliest field of Theory, some special explanations are here needed on the true origin of certain numerical speculations, healthy enough in their spontaneous shape under Fetichism, but afterwards vitiated by Metaphysical mysticism. They concern what may be justly called the philosophical or religious properties of numbers, ignored by our academic doctors. Sociology alone can give a just estimate of them. It rests on the logical properties of the first three numbers, already pointed out in the fundamental introduction to this treatise.

Abstractedly we cannot count beyond *Three*.

Ingenious experiments have demonstrated that with animals distinct numeration is not carried beyond *Three*. But there is no use attempting to claim for our species a more extended privilege, which depends alone on the assistance of signs, a creation of Society. Without these we are as directly incapable as the animals of reckoning distinctly beyond that universal limit. Moreover in both cases it is a question of abstract coexistence only, which is always confused after *Three*; whereas animals as well as men may form an exact estimate of concrete coexistence beyond that point, objects dispensing with words. It is on this Abstraction alone that the principal philosophical character of each number depends, in virtue of its logical function. When we closely examine this intellectual phenomenon, we recognise in it the source of the mental properties which I formerly assigned to the Sacred Numbers, of which *One* always represents systematisation, *Two* combination, and *Three* progression.

Logical properties of first three numbers.

Any given existence, looked at *dynamically*, presents three successive stages—a beginning, a middle, and an end. From the *statical* point of view, it consists in the permanent correlation of two opposed but not disparate elements. Looked at as a *whole*, it presents itself always as one. Thus every Construction in which unity of principle does not reign, every Compound which is more than binary, and every Succes-

sion which exceeds three degrees, is necessarily vicious, the operation being ill begun or remaining unfinished. Fetichist thinkers are disposed by their completely subjective synthesis to feel these fundamental properties of the only numbers conceivable without signs, especially when numeration begins to be studied, and concentrates attention on the rudiments of arithmetic.

Prime numbers: The number *Seven*.

All philosophical speculations on numbers result from the subordination of the other numbers to the first three. Such speculations must therefore especially concern those numbers which being indivisible are justly called *prime*, as being universal roots. Thus is explained the predilection everywhere evinced for them. I need only specify here the predilection for the number *seven*, which is formed in two ways from the three radicals; either by a couple of progressions, followed or preceded by a synthesis, when the destination is statical; or by a progression of couples, followed or preceded by a synthesis, when the destination is dynamical. This twofold logical aptitude, completely independent of signs, operated in all minds profoundly, although its positive laws have been up to the present time ignored; just as we were governed by gravity before its scientific study was accessible to us.

Origin of the Week.

Such is, in my eyes, the origin of the universal institution of the Week. It is only by assigning it to this essentially Subjective source, that we can explain why it everywhere preceded Astrolatry, which has been wrongly thought to have created it on Objective grounds. I venture to assert that rational observers will find it among tribes which have not yet remarked the number of the planets.

Arithmetical Astronomy.

As for the Fetichist sketch of Celestial Arithmetic, if we put aside useless enumerations of stars, we shall find that it was more extensive and important than astronomers suppose. It would precede and prepare the way for Celestial Geometry, as this latter would for Celestial Mechanics, although from the doctrinal point of view, the distance was smaller and the dependence less essential in the first case than in the second. Celestial Arithmetic is now absorbed in the final coordination of Astronomy, where its influence is not appreciable.

Its proper domain comprehends the whole of those astronomical notions which only require exact reckoning without any Geometrical theory. Now these purely Numerical calculations were, during a long time, more multiplied and more important

than, at the present day, we imagine. They always included direct approximations towards the principal periods belonging to each planet, and a comparison of these with the solar or sidereal year. But besides this elementary domain, they comprehended at first, though necessarily in an empirical manner, the principal events resulting from the situations of the heavenly bodies relatively to one another, which were thus susceptible of some prevision before their true theory became possible. The importance of sacerdotal castes has been much exaggerated with regard to these astronomical calculations, which only supposed numeration assisted by a writing of any kind. Even before the rise of Astrolatry the old men, who were precursors of the priests, could, though nomads, easily make all these reckonings in rough outline.

Their concrete importance must by no means lead us to undervalue here the superior merit of the abstract speculations which I first examined. It is to these above all that the human mind will be always indebted for its first start in Mathematics, the decisive awakening of the true scientific spirit. In the introduction to this treatise (i. 377), I have already signalised their philosophic import as the first revelation of the grand dogma of Positivism, since the humblest instance of real prevision, even purely numerical, supposes *the fundamental invariability of the Natural Order*, whether in ourselves or the world without (i. 356).

(c) Esthetic Influence, pp. 109–114.

Having sufficiently marked out the Philosophic and Scientific services rendered by Fetichism, I must conclude my examination of its Intellectual Results by an estimate of its Esthetic services.

This is either General (Language), or Special (Fine Arts).

They are of two sorts: some are general and definitive, and have to do with the essential formation of human Language: others are special and preparatory, and relate to the outlines of the different Fine Arts decisively sketched by Fetichism, which taken as a whole complete the institution of Language.

(a) Language. Relation of Mimetic to Vocal Language.

As was shown in the preceding volume, this fundamental institution consists in a sufficient harmony between the two simultaneous modes which all the superior animals spontaneously employ to communicate their feelings and thoughts, in addressing themselves to the eye and to the ear. Mimetic means prevail everywhere at first, as being more natural and expressive. But afterwards in any species they become subordinate to Vocal means which are more complete and usual. This universal

subordination is the necessary starting-point for the gradual rise of human language above all the others.

All Language subserves both Feeling and Intellect.

In language, whether of Man or of brutes, and whatever the sense to which it is addressed (ii. 190), Progress consists in developing its twofold purpose, Affective and Intellectual. But in this spontaneous growth, more or less common to all the sociable species, Humanity is distinguished by its tendency always to make the communication of Thoughts, whether theoretic or practical, predominate over that of Feeling. The first, in fact, has more to do with public life, the principal characteristic of our race; whereas the second relates mainly to private life, which alone is developed in other races also.

Dynamical Law of Language consists in preponderating developement of latter service.

Nevertheless the greater developement of the Intellectual as compared with the Affective destination, constitutes the general Law governing the variations in every animal Language, in accordance with those of the corresponding society, in which the Intellectual growth becomes at once a result and a means. For in all species alike this tendency brings about the final subordination of the Mimetic art to the Vocal. Our species does but present the most pronounced case of it, as might be expected from its superior sociability.

But only during the Human Initiation: with Positivism the developement of the former service will preponderate.

However, the continual increase in this direction, like that of the corresponding subordination of the Subjective to the Objective, belongs really to our age of Initiation alone. When that long preliminary period of childhood and adolescence shall have been everywhere accomplished, the Normal or Positive state will restore the importance of Feeling in Language, while it will augment the influence of Subjective Inspiration in Thought, in accordance with the indications given in the preceding chapter (p. 42). But this is not the place for drawing out a distinction, which will find its natural place in the following volume. It is only announced now, in order to prevent mistake about the particular tendency which it is my business here to deal with exclusively. I shall go on, therefore, to treat it as though it was destined never to change, without fear of causing serious misconception.

Successive stages in Progress of Language under both Vocal and Mimetic forms.[1]

According then to the Dynamical Law of all Language stated above, the language of Man, when it takes its decisive

[1] Vocal Progress { First Transformation—Music subordinated to Poetry. Second Transformation—Poetry subordinated to Prose.

Mimetic Progress { Sculpture, Painting } Hieroglyphics—Writing.

start, exhibits two progressive and connected movements, one relating to the Vocal art, the other to the assistance lent thereto by the Mimetic art. Each progress is marked by a decreasing importance of gestures and an increasing importance of sounds. The first consists in two successive transformations, wherein Humanity tends to render its spoken language more Intellectual than Affective by the subordination, first of Music to Poetry strictly so called, and then of Poetry itself to simple Prose, the last general mode of usual discourse. In the second progress the Mimetic art generates successively the two principal arts of form, first Sculpture, and then Painting, in order to supplement the natural incapacity of the Vocal art to perpetuate the impressions it produces. The spontaneous concurrence of these two means of fixity, in the continual tendency to make Language more serviceable to Intellect than to Feeling, leads to the adoption of Writing properly so called. This, however, long remains in the hieroglyphic stage, in which visible language, although thenceforward subordinate to oral language, remains completely distinct from it, and consists of a system of signs which convey their meaning, not through the medium of words but directly. That more complete subordination, in which forms are merely used to represent *sounds*, in order to give them permanence, that is to say, alphabetic or syllabic writing, comes much later, and determines the entire systematisation of human Language.

All these stages, except Writing proper, belong to the Fetichist age.

With the exception of this final institution, which belongs to Polytheism, Fetichism certainly presides over all these successive transformations, resulting in the decisive foundation of the Language peculiar to Humanity, the Statical examination of which was given in the preceding volume. This immense service of our most distant ancestors furnishes one of the most characteristic examples of the blindness and ingratitude of Monotheism with respect to all anterior states, arising from its unfitness to judge them. Even looking no further than our present languages, we can recognise that their common basis necessarily dates from the first age of Fetichism.

Fetichist elements traceable in modern languages.

To place this beyond doubt we have only to observe how the Affective character still predominates in them, notwithstanding the long growth of Intellect, which does no more than modify the impulse originally given them by Feeling. The two principal elements of human discourse abound in all Fetichist languages, which are generally rich in substantives, and even in

verbs, as might be expected where things are regarded mainly in the concrete. This natural reason renders them, it is true, poor in adjectives, and still poorer in abstract substantives, which do not make their appearance till phenomena are looked at collectively. But none the less do they contain all the essential elements of the most complete Language.

Fundamental affinity between Fetichist languages.

Numerous as the faiths and the societies to which they correspond, these Fetichist languages everywhere exhibit the common attributes which testify to the preponderance of Feeling over Intellect, and of Private Life over Public. In spite of their natural diversity, which has been much exaggerated by superficial observers, their fundamental affinity foreshadows thus early the final connection between the universality of Religion and that of Language, of both which the outlines are spontaneously sketched at the same time by Fetichism (ii. 220, 382). Their deficiency in declensions, and even in conjugations, results from their character being more Affective than Intellectual, and does not seriously interfere with a purely oral communication, in which gesture always helps out words.

It needed all the irrationality which, till the advent of Positivism, marked the general theory of human signs, to prevent the best minds from regarding the Primitive Religion as the necessary source of an institution which must be due to the concurrence of the whole species. The only religion completely spontaneous and truly universal, it alone could everywhere direct the popular efforts, through which were successively accomplished the great revolutions destined to prepare the decisive foundations of human language, at first hardly distinct from the languages of other animals. In a very enlightened age, the Emperor Augustus had the good sense to admit that his unexampled autocracy was utterly powerless to introduce even a trifling modification into the Roman alphabet. This noble submission of personal power to the reason of society ought to have led our vainglorious theorists to perceive more clearly the essentially popular, and therefore Fetichist, origin of all the important institutions relating to human Language.

(β) Fine Arts.

That part of language which is pre-eminently Esthetic, including the whole of the Fine Arts strictly so called, where Feeling openly predominates over Intellect, does not require so much explanation here, even as respects Poetry, because the efficacy of Fetichism in that direction is less disputed. Although our principal Esthetic advance must have been accomplished under Poly-

theism, for reasons which I shall examine in my historical estimate of that stage, the reader must already feel that the nature of the Primitive Religion was, in that respect, capable of producing results very superior to those actually accomplished. Being more spontaneous and more emotional than any other religion, it rendered more direct and more familiar the double relation in which Images stand, to Signs on the one side and to Feelings on the other, and by which they form the connecting link between these two (ii. 202).

Poetry.

Although Polytheism was necessarily better fitted to develope our imagination with respect to purely *ideal* existences, Fetichism was at bottom more poetic, because its natural preeminence, as regards *real* beings, gave more play to our best sympathies. Primitive Poetry, like primitive worship, was concerned above all with the world of Matter, to which the lamentable epithet 'inert' has since been applied, because it has lost, though not for ever, the life which in our eyes then animated it, and alone adapted it for human song. Nevertheless, besides its faithful painting of animals, Fetichist Poetry was happily extended to the idealisation of our principal Sentiments, by incomparable pictures of domestic life, which was more relished among our first ancestors than by all their successors. As respects public life alone did it remain really inferior, for want of a sufficient extension of human association. If the vast societies which were possible under Astrolatry could have lasted long enough, their spontaneous developement would have doubtless left us epic and dramatic monuments equal to the great compositions of Polytheism, and probably more touching.

Dancing.

As to the special arts, if I merely mention the most natural and expressive of them all, the Mimetic properly so called, it will be felt how favourable to them Fetichism always was. We must even go back to times antecedent to the definitive establishment of spoken language, to find the best types of the Dance, which has since gradually degenerated, in all its essentials, until it no longer deserves to be called an art. Sculpture and Painting were the true esthetic successors of the earliest form of mimetic art.

Sculpture and Painting.

Now it is certainly to Fetichism that the first decisive steps in these belong, especially in Sculpture, of which such remarkable examples are still afforded us by Negro artists in spite of

their imperfect instruments. The whole growth of Sculpture is so much in keeping with Fetichism that it was especially developed in the first and most durable phase of that regime. Nevertheless as Painting was naturally unable to make much way till settled habitation had mostly superseded nomadism, this art belongs more to the Astrolatric phase, during which that social revolution was, as a rule, accomplished. In spite of the brutal destruction perpetrated in America and among the Malays by monotheist conquerors, there are remains, even now, which decisively prove the aptitude for Painting of the last Fetichist regime.

Music.

I need not extend this historical examination to the most emotional of the fine arts. Since the capacity to enjoy is at bottom identical with the capacity to produce, the difference being merely one of degree, the profound influence of Music on existing Fetichists would sufficiently prove their talent for it. Nor are direct results wanting in confirmation, the rarity of which is not surprising. In the growth of an art so conformable to the fundamental character of the Primitive Religion, each of its two grand phases has naturally a share. Melody belongs specially to Spontaneous Fetichism, whereas Harmony begins to be developed under Astrolatry.

(2) Practical Results, pp. 114–118.

All the Intellectual results of Fetichism having now been estimated, I must next point out its Practical results. In my abstract examination of its Practical *properties*, I had only to consider the ends, whether industrial or military, towards which its Activity was directed, putting aside the special means thereto, as really belonging to the speculative domain (p. 46). But in this concrete examination of its Practical *results*, the special means whereby they have been realised cannot be put aside. They will accordingly be brought under this head, the concrete examination of the Intellectual results having been confined to such as were purely theoretic.

Under this head the *Useful* Arts only are included.

This domain is technical and embraces only the different arts which aim at ameliorating man's condition by modifying the External Order, whether material or vital. As for those which improve our own nature, they are inseparably connected with each other, and together constitute the most eminent of all, namely, the Social, or rather the Moral, art which is entirely distinct from the Technical arts, and ought always to direct their employment. Though it is universally cultivated,

it is the spontaneous province of the loving sex, and still more the systematic business of the priesthood. The historical examination of it will be included in the Concrete appreciation of our Affective or Social evolution. It is not concerned with Activity, the theoretic form of which is nothing else than the development of our means of expression, as has been already pointed out (p. 45).

Relating to both Organic and Inorganic Orders.

Fetichism really sketched in outline all the essential branches of the true domain of Activity in both its organic and inorganic departments.

(*a*) Organic Order. Taming of animals.

In the Vital Order we owe to it the domestication of animals, as I have already remarked (p. 86). This alliance, fraught with such consequences, and the first basis of our industrial system, made no further progress of importance. It naturally belonged to the Primitive Religion, which inspired, with respect to animals, those truly fraternal manners which alone could have succeeded in taming them. Notwithstanding the exaggerations inherent in beliefs of an absolute kind, this spontaneous fraternity even then gave promise of our Normal State, in which fraternity will be perfectly reconciled with every real inequality, whether it is between men and animals or between men and men.

Fetichist presentiment of the Biocratic League for developing the Earth's resources.

The true human hierarchy is but the summit of the animal hierarchy, which again only exhibits in a more pronounced form the principles which determine the classification of all nature (p. 8). Systematically compared, each hierarchy may serve as a type of the other, sometimes for the precision, sometimes for the intensity of the essential distinctions, which always turn on the degree of Unity. Now Fetichism directly prepared this final conception when it instituted the fundamental assimilation of all beings. Uninstructed instinct had a sounder presentiment then of the general work to be performed by our race, than vain reason could attain in the succeeding stages. For we must attribute to the Fetichist regime, the first sketch of the great notion established in the introduction to this treatise, which represents the Vital Order, under the direction of Humanity, as gradually modifying the Material Order, by which, however, it never ceases to be dominated (i. 498).

This implies a Special Moral disposition,

It is very important that we should connect with our first ancestors this ripe appreciation of the true political art, which

consists in incessantly improving the whole real world, by the largest developement of a wise activity. That we get it from them cannot be denied, when we recognise that Fetichism alone, hitherto, has sanctioned the moral dispositions required in us for this eternal synergy of Vitality against Materiality. In fact, fraternity is not only always compatible with inequality, but is the first condition of all true subordination, since no hierarchy can consist of antagonistic beings.

And real Intellectual acquirements.

The domestication of animals is an evidence, not only of the moral power of Fetichism, but of intellectual achievements which now-a-days are too much looked down upon. For it could not have been accomplished without being accompanied, and even preceded, by real knowledge respecting the creatures in question. How valuable this was we shall the better feel, if we consider that no further progress of consequence was made in the moral and mental study of animals, until the advent of Positivism. Theologism, especially of the Monotheistic type, allowing them to be regarded with a cruel pride, was little fitted to assist an investigation which can never succeed if devoid of sympathy.

The last consideration is not out of place, though introduced under the head of *Practical Results*.

This was the place to point out the superiority, even at the present day, of this Fetichist knowledge over our vain dissertations, because it relates exclusively to man's Practical progress, and is not to be enumerated along with the Intellectual results of the system. However that may be, these notions are so bound up with Fetichism, that we find them even among tribes of hunters, some of which have got so far as to employ the horse, and, above all, among pastoral peoples, with whom the domestication of animals is often carried far. All this practical developement is essentially prior to sacerdotal influence, which ordinarily does no more than regularise and consolidate it.

Destruction of wild beasts.

The same special knowledge is also connected, though less completely, with the vast destruction of animals which Fetichists had to accomplish in order that man might really have possession of his terrestrial domain. Vainly does scientific pride strive to put this great service out of sight, by attributing its principal results to pretended physical catastrophes. To destroy the untameable species among the larger animals—the only formidable rivals of man—was as much the work of

the primitive populations as to incorporate the tameable; the two operations being naturally connected.

(*b*) Inorganic Order. Food; Clothing; Shelter.

As for the arts concerned with inorganic existence, Fetichism certainly gave the rudiments of those which chiefly relate to our most direct material needs, namely food, clothing, and even shelter. That the corresponding professions were little developed, resulted rather from the insufficient extension of human society than from inaptitude for handicrafts. We have direct proof of this in the remarkable works executed by Fetichists at the present day with rude tools. The great societies founded on Astrolatry, though quickly destroyed, lasted long enough to leave convincing proofs of their skill in almost all the mechanical arts. Thus the only real fault of the Fetichist regime, in this respect, is its unsuitability to the formation of vast societies.

Even the humblest of these Arts are to be regarded from the Moral rather than the Material point of view.

In considering these useful arts, we should be specially alive to the importance of always placing ourselves at the Synthetic point of view, so as never to neglect any of the essential aspects of our indivisible nature. The need of this rule was fully proved when we just now attributed the principal industrial successes of Humanity to the moral dispositions of Fetichism. But it extends even to the humblest arts, for, having a human purpose, they cannot be historically judged on purely material grounds. I will only instance clothing, in which we ought to see a moral and social institution, rather than an invention of mere physical utility. The fact that it arose in all climates clearly proves that the end sought was not so much material protection as inward purification. It was the earliest real step in that noble discipline which man has instituted for the direct improvement of his own nature, by a continuous repression of his coarsest and strongest instincts.

A struggle so necessary for our conservation could not wait for the slow rise of a priesthood, which did not, as some have thought, originate, but only systematised it. The dangers attending a free play of the sexual instinct must have been soon felt by the women, whom it threatened, and by the old men, who had ceased to be its slaves. No priestly influence has hitherto done as much as the spontaneous wisdom of these two classes did, to develope the institution of clothing, and even the other practices which bear upon our personal purity.

Arts lying between Organic and Inorganic Orders. Fire.

With respect to the arts which lie between the Organic and Inorganic fields of human industry (p. 43), the insufficiency of Fetichism must be held to be more apparent than real. For we are certainly indebted to it for the institution of fire, the first basis of all our chemical operations, the principal difficulty of which was thus surmounted in advance. We see the primitive doctrine, long before Astrolatry, spontaneously extending its universal sanction even to purely artificial states of fire, for the conservation of which at first there was need of such an adoration, regulated subsequently by the priesthood.

To Fetichism then must be attributed the decisive institution of the whole range of useful arts, the higher, the lower, and even the intermediate, and that with no more serious imperfections than such as resulted from its insufficient aptitude for public life.

(3) Affective (or Social) Results, pp. 118–123.

To complete the Concrete Appreciation of the Fetichist regime, it only remains that I should judge its Social results.

The Family.

Our Abstract Examination has already marked its complete aptitude as regards the Family, all the elements of which spontaneously develope themselves under its rule, when the surrounding conditions are not too unfavourable.

Polygamy a step in civilisation.

What I said then on polygamy showed sufficiently that it ought to be judged by comparison, not with the better forms that human marriage afterwards took, but with the purely animal state which had preceded it. We shall always have to carry our minds back to that primitive institution, if we would appreciate the gradual transformation of the sexual instinct, disposing man to feel more and more the just influence of woman. The reclusion prescribed by Fetichist marriage testifies to the importance which the dominant sex already attaches to the loving sex. It even indicates, with a necessary exaggeration, the purely domestic life ever appropriate to woman, her primitive liberty having been but the result of a brutal abandonment. Besides, its constraint is compensated by a leisure without which the true feminine qualities would never have been developed.

The fundamental principle on which the Family is established—*Man ought to support Woman*—could not have arisen in a more decisive shape. In the state of society resulting from primitive manners, polygamy is often a valuable corrective of the terrible animosities which then separated the different

communities. It tends to moderate their struggles by multiplying family alliances. Sometimes it thus unites hostile tribes by awarding to the conqueror the widows or daughters of the conquered. Even in much later times it is a peculiarity of this institution that it affords a means of worthily recompensing the services and devotion of women. There have been many instances among Mussulmans of a just transformation of slaves into wives, from a motive of gratitude or admiration. A generosity equivalent to this, and under better forms, will hereafter be regularised, but not until the normal manners of Humanity have been sufficiently developed.

Adoption.

In this earliest constitution of the household, we must note also the spontaneous appearance of the principle of adoption, the frequent exercise of which, even then, worthily foreshadowed the systematic extension awaiting it under the final regime. This practice, like polygamy, often repairs the principal disasters of Fetichist wars by taking the children of the conquered into the families of the conquerors. The two institutions are besides connected under two aspects; for polygamic manners would predispose to adoption, whether a man had many wives or none.

Slavery.

To the Primitive Regime also must be attributed the spontaneous foundation of another domestic institution, of which the initial mode was long necessary, and which, in its regenerated form of free labour, will always remain highly useful. Although the principal developement of slavery is necessarily connected with the Polytheistic age, in which alone it fulfilled its chief purpose—namely to support military societies—it certainly originated with Fetichism. It there frequently becomes, like polygamy and adoption, a compensation for the ravages of war, when the material situation is so far improved that the conqueror can utilise the labour of the conquered. This we frequently observe among pastoral peoples, and sometimes even among those who hunt on horseback.

Fetichism contained the germ only of Civic life.

The Abstract examination of Fetichism has already proved that it is much less suitable to civic than to domestic life. I have however shown that we owe to it the first outline of the City no less than of the Family, although it could not develope the former to the same degree. The touching affection of each negro for his own tribe indicates that the Primitive Religion has a spontaneous aptitude for producing small but strongly constituted societies. It is however opposed in two ways to

the direct extension of human association beyond such narrow limits, first by its multiplicity of beliefs, and secondly because it is unfavourable to the decisive rise of a spiritual authority. In matters temporal its tendency is towards the same imperfection, since it is incompatible with any vast developement of military authority, the only sort then possible.

Established Fixity of Abode,

But radically defective as Fetichism was with respect to public life, that did not prevent it from presiding exclusively at the first of the revolutions of society, the one which in reality was the most decisive, since it furnished the necessary basis for all the others. I allude to the establishment of settled habitation, and the appearance of a distinct priesthood, for which Humanity, as I have proved, will ever be indebted to its Primitive Regime. These two immense social services are naturally connected by the link of Astrolatry which followed the first and led to the second. Astrolatric priesthood I have already sufficiently described, and its developement belongs to a later time; but the establishment of sedentary life must be specially examined here, as being the principal social result of the Fetichist Regime.

And love for land of birth.

The aptitude of the Primitive Religion in this respect is incontestable, since it is a direct consequence of its special characteristic—the adoration of matter. Our attachment to our native soil must have received a powerful sanction when our principal worship was habitually addressed to objects happening to be fixed there. There is nothing comparable to the affection of Fetichists for their localities, even when these are disadvantageous. A more complete, though less spontaneous, patriotism afterwards came of the steady growth of public life, and nothing else could have produced it.

Mere material needs would not have put an end to Nomadism.

Had it not been for this artless sentiment, so worthily hallowed by the Primitive Religion, the energetic propensities which drive man to a wandering life would never have permitted settled habitation, the principal advantages of which cannot be appreciated till it has been sufficiently developed. It is a mistake therefore to attribute this transformation, as is commonly done, to calculations founded on material necessity. The economic difficulty was as little recognised as the importance of the remedy, which nothing but a religious impulse could have caused to be adopted. Moreover, the whole tendency of the Fetichist regime seconded this impulse by giving ex-

traordinary value to domestic ties, which are always incomplete without fixity of abode, and dispose even animals thereto. To this general tendency polygamy, in a more special sense, contributed, by withdrawing us more from a wandering life.

Cessation of Nomadism not abrupt.

An exaggerated conception of this transformation is generally entertained. It is imagined that there was an abrupt change from complete vagabondage to immovable residence. The first state only existed among exceptional types, which have not yet disappeared. On the other hand, the second stage long remained insufficient. There, as everywhere else, we must recognise that progress was slow and gradual. To form an adequate conception of this decisive revolution, it is important even to connect with it the general institution of property in land.

Individual Property in Land arose late and will never be general.

All objects that are used by one individual alone, and by him continuously, were always subject to personal appropriation, at least among freemen. Were it not for the social disorder caused by modern anarchy, anything so painfully anomalous, and yet so common, as the absence of property in furniture and even in clothing, would be incomprehensible except in slavery. But the appropriation of the soil is a much later institution, and its roots are less natural. To the generality of families indeed it is not suitable, except to the extent needed for a dwelling, which, from the *material* point of view, forms the complement of clothing and furniture, while under the *moral* aspect it becomes necessary as the seat of private worship. With that exception, most citizens must always remain without property in the soil, which for the good of society has to be concentrated in the hands of a few proprietors. The explanations in the second volume (ii. 145, 334), completed by those in the fourth, place this beyond a doubt even in the case of agricultural labourers. But we are not therefore to conclude that the soil remained unclaimed until the complete establishment of sedentary life.

It was preceded by Collective Property.

Long before land was appropriated by individuals, it was subject to collective property, an institution too little understood now-a-days, though we may still observe numerous and decisive examples of it. This earliest form of property must have always existed, even among the lowest tribes of hunters, who must needs possess the vast tracts indispensable to their existence. Their wanderings, though seeming to be unlimited,

were always confined within this natural territory, which was usually surrounded by other territories of the same kind. Even when this obstacle to further extension does not exist, a tribe does not abandon the tract it has occupied, unless the means of subsistence furnished thereby are entirely exhausted. This collective property usually implies that a particular worship and language have spread. It is in truth a vast domestic domain, since each tribe is in the habit of regarding itself as sprung from the same family. The cessions of territory consented to by Fetichist tribes would be sufficient evidence of the reality of this possession, and their frequent hostilities are only too strong a confirmation of it.

Family *Tenancy* an intermediate stage between these.

Between this collective appropriation, and complete personal appropriation, we must also notice one more natural transition, by which agriculture begins to supersede pasturage, before the true sedentary life has been established. The tribe cedes a part of its domain for some years to families who wish to cultivate it, in order to appropriate to themselves its principal produce. Thus arises a sort of collective farming, usually without rent and temporary.

In this way the collective appropriation of the soil, common to all primitive peoples, leads to a domestic and partial appropriation of it, in proportion as cultivation prevails over hunting and pasturage. For it is soon felt how important such possession is to the permanent success of that sort of industry. But the mere material motive would not at first have attached each family to its portion of land, if the moral impulses resulting from Fetichism had not spontaneously determined such fixity. For the practical advantages of fixity would not be appreciated until it had been to some extent realised.

In recognising these two successive steps towards an institution necessarily of late growth, we see how profoundly irrational are the different metaphysical dreams, some anarchical, others retrograde, which suppose that the soil of the West suddenly passed from an entirely unoccupied state to the form of property now prevailing.

Thus among the Social Results of Fetichism was its *preparation* for Civic union.

The great Intellectual and even Practical results of Fetichism have been already set forth: its Domestic influence has been shown to be admirable, and it now appears that, notwithstanding its natural insufficiency with respect to public life, it contributes powerfully towards the rise of the State.

But this service coincides necessarily with the approach of its dissolution, since its Astrolatric phase spontaneously gives birth to Polytheism. This fundamental transition I have now to examine. My general estimate of our Primitive Regime would not be complete if I did not thus directly connect it with my philosophy of history as a whole.

Transition from Fetichism, pp. 123–129.

High as are the intellectual and moral properties of Fetichism, and great as are its results both theoretical and practical, its profound political insufficiency stamps it as a purely provisional state, admirably suited to the infancy of our race, but tending to make that infancy eternal. For by this defect it prevented the formation of the Great Being, whose principal attributes, in all other respects, it exhibited in rough outline. The only sign of the appearance of Humanity was a multitude of little groups, each aspiring to universal expansion and all incapable of attaining it.

Spontaneous Fetichism incapable of progress beyond a certain point;

With such dispersion, the different aptitudes of Fetichism itself could not be fairly developed.

As to Feeling;

While profoundly consecrating Feeling, Fetichism afforded it no field for developement except private life. Now Feeling, when not connected with public life, falls short not only in dignity but in solidity. Here therefore we find Fetichism laying the necessary foundation of the social state, but not able to build it up. It stimulated the first growth of Feeling, but did not direct it towards its principal end.

As to Activity;

From its political insufficiency it became yet more unfavourable to Activity, which was thus deprived of all great habitual purpose, whether industrial or military.

As to Intellect. Its imperfection in this respect must be examined further.

With respect to Intellect, its completest domain, Fetichism could satisfy only our earliest infancy, in which observation prevails over reflection, and even the contemplation of objects over that of events (p. 31). As the need for the second preparatory regime was caused especially by this imperfection of the first, a fuller examination is here necessary than was required for Feeling and Activity.

Fetichism contemplates Concrete Existences, not their Abstract Qualities.

Fetichism founded admirably our spontaneous conception of the whole real or objective world; but it was radically unsuited to direct us in systematically constructing the universal or subjective harmony. For the Natural Order can be truly known to us only as regards *phenomena*, which are simple, and never as regards *existences*, which are composite (p. 69).

Again, the laws which direct our activity are not concrete but abstract, activity having to do not with substances but with their properties. Fetichism, therefore, in consecrating an observation which was exclusively synthetic, only instituted a pure empiricism, as barren in practice as it was incompatible with theory.

This Concrete Contemplation cannot recognise regularity in phenomena.

It prepared the way for sound philosophy by proclaiming the permanence of every species, the first basis of any Real Order. But it could not go on to direct the elaboration of the Natural Harmony which consists in the constancy of the relations of succession or similitude in different phenomena, varying in nothing but intensity. This immovability of arrangement, in the midst of variety of degree, is necessarily unnoticed by the concrete contemplation which alone is consecrated by Fetichism. In fact the variation of intensity obscures the constancy of arrangement, except where the attention is directed to general phenomena instead of to particular bodies.

If we fix our attention on particular bodies, they appear to admit of arbitrary perturbations which would suggest to us the wildest fancies, if Fetichism did not meet us with its doctrine of permanence of species. But then again, as this dogma is at that stage held absolutely, the objects to which it applies appear to be exempt from any modification, artificial or natural, except that real changes are explained by the conception of new substances similarly immovable. The Speculative spirit loves to discover constancy in the midst of variety; the Practical spirit loves to introduce variations, but with an instinctive submission to law. Now Fetichism keeps back both spirits alike, by leaving us to fluctuate continually between complete immobility and unlimited disorder.

Abstract Contemplation of Phenomena arose independently of Fetichism, and insensibly undermined it.

From whatever point then it is judged, this intellectual and social regime had to cease entirely, or, after preparing the way for several forms of progress, it would have prevented the final realisation of any of them. But although its characteristic persistency made it last longer than any of the other provisional systems, its natural dissolution, or rather its spontaneous transformation, became as inevitable as it was indispensable. Humanity got through the most decisive and difficult of all the revolutions belonging to her Initiation without any pronounced struggle. The happy spontaneity of this change,

which now helps to obscure its high importance, resulted from the fundamental defect of the Fetichist dogma with regard to contemplation of the Abstract, upon which scientific meditation chiefly depends. For contemplation of the Concrete, being only suitable to esthetic meditation, could never suffice for either our theoretic or practical needs, which always relate more to conception than to expression.

Led to hypothesis of Inertia of Matter;

Profound as is the philosophical contrast between the inertia and the activity successively attributed to matter, the human mind passes spontaneously from the second hypothesis to the first, as soon as it begins to study phenomena rather than examine objects. We may see this decisive transition repeated every day in the individual growth of our children, as their observation, from being synthetic, becomes analytic. In fact, we have only to extend to phenomena the explanation at first applied to objects, and gods at once take the place of fetiches, the active existence of each material object becoming passive.[1]

And so to belief in gods who are generalisations personified.

Being thus led to consider every property common to several objects independently of each of them, the mind, seeking causes in default of laws, naturally attributes the phenomenon to some supernatural Will, which can no longer be supposed to reside in any of the real substances. But the conception of this purely subjective being always continues to be formed from some one of the objective types which, by abstraction, it generalises. This twofold operation is so natural to our minds, that children spontaneously accomplish it during the second septennial period, and sometimes before the end of the first. A single decisive example will be sufficient as an illustration.

Thus Death came to be personified.

Contemplation of the concrete was never so predominant as entirely to exclude all abstract contemplation. With the humblest tribes the general notion of Death always arose from a spontaneous comparison between some particular cases, the fatal phenomenon common to all of which struck them forcibly. Only superficial observers can be misled by the absence of traces of this process in language.

At the present day, to the mind which has ceased to search for Causes and only aims at discovering Laws, by connecting each phenomenon with others according to an observed or foreseen relation, this general fact of Death suggests merely an

abstract conception, fixed by a special denomination. But under the absolute regime, which alone suits the infancy either of the individual man or of the race, the process is quite different. There, Death becomes a distinct being with attributes formed by generalisation, and with an arbitrary power which accounts for its diversity of operation (p. 31). As for its special personification, that always results from the simple idealisation of some individual type. Many maladies still furnish us with habitual examples of the same process, which is especially perceptible with respect to fever.

Abstract observation, which undermined Fetichism, was in fact the latent germ of Positivity.

In this way the necessary mixture of abstract with concrete contemplation always generated some germs of true Polytheism in the midst of the purest Fetichism. Both these mental operations have been gradually developed by our practical impulses, which directed our intellect towards the study of general laws, because these alone could be a guide for action. Now general laws can be concerned with nothing but phenomena, the only normal domain of our speculations and activity. It is therefore to nascent positivity that we must ascribe the spontaneous transformation of Fetichism into Polytheism which takes place when the study of events begins to prevail over the observation of objects. The latter continues to be necessary, but only as the basis of the former, since every property must be seated in some object.

Astrolatry naturally favoured this growth.

It is easy now to complete this explanation, by pointing out the general fitness of the Astrolatric phase to help on most powerfully this gradual revolution, which had already been carried a long way before the natural rise of the worship of the heavenly bodies. In fact, the inaccessibility of the stars, their peculiar regularity, and even their universality as a spectacle, are so many motives for referring to them all terrestrial phenomena which do not easily lend themselves to the personifications of Polytheism. Thus was gradually formed the earliest Astrology, daughter of Astrolatry and mother of Astronomy, by spontaneously exaggerating the real subordination of the earth to the heavens.

Astrolatric priesthood pared down Fetichist explanations.

This scientific tendency is profoundly strengthened by the logical character peculiar to the study of the stars, in which there is less difference between abstract and concrete contemplation than in any other department of knowledge. Lastly,

Social influences largely contributed to develope this transition. For the priesthood, which was born of Astrolatry, would be ever increasing the scope of its speculations and its practical authority, by checking purely fetichist explanations, so as more and more to systematise the primitive faith. It is true that the stars, as thus conceived, do not coincide with the corresponding Gods. But the usual names of the latter would be sufficient to indicate how they were always derived from the former, when the extension of terrestrial and especially of human attributes, made it necessary to apply the universal Polytheistic transformation to the celestial bodies also.

The germ of the Metaphysical Spirit may also be detected.

From the Fetichist spirit, then, under the latent impulse of the Positive spirit, spontaneously springs the Theological spirit. But we must remark that, from this same source proceed not only Gods, but also those accessory emanations known as Entities. Here, therefore, is the true origin of the Metaphysical spirit also, the natural office of which is to smooth the way for all our mental revolutions. Entities are in fact something intermediate between Gods and Fetiches, having a sort of mysterious capacity for accommodating themselves to either. For while they cannot be separated from the concrete objects which the Fetichist worships, they are yet, like the Gods, generalisations from phenomena. But this ambiguous character, which calls up no distinct image in the mind, is a sufficient indication that they could not arise except as a consequence of the rise of supernatural powers. When men came to believe in Gods, they would look on concrete objects as so much passive matter. But in place of the activity ascribed to these latter by the Fetichist, the Theologist would suppose them to possess a certain special aptitude to undergo the divine influence. For a God could not govern a particular substance from a distance without leaving in it a fixed emanation as his representative. This ontological spirit thus shows itself, from its very birth, critical towards the fetichist system which it modifies, although it remains organic as long as the theological system which it aids is in vogue.

Such is the general principle of the greatest of the revolutions through which Humanity passes in its progress towards maturity. Its essential consequences naturally belong to the following chapters. We shall judge it to be almost as much a

social as an intellectual revolution, if we regard the final phase of Fetichism as a normal transition towards Polytheism. For it is thus connected with the greatest temporal and the greatest spiritual modification which Humanity has up to this time undergone, in the rise, almost simultaneously, of settled habitation and a distinct priesthood.

Theory of direct transition from Fetichism to Positivism.

I shall conclude this decisive chapter by establishing in theory a principle of general application which, in the following volume, will assume a high practical importance.

In describing the character of Fetichism I have often had occasion to show its fundamental affinity to Positivism. That the two extreme regimes should come thus close to one another, is of radical importance to the true philosophy of history, in which there could be no unity of conception without such a conformity. We now recognise, what was stated by anticipation in the preceding volume, that Positivism differs from Fetichism only by its theoretic distinction between Life and Activity, from which results its practical substitution of the worship of productions for that of materials.

This can only take place under Systematic guidance.

In consequence of this close affinity, Humanity might pass, without any intermediate stage, from its Primitive to its Final state, thereby avoiding all the intellectual and moral dangers involved in the Theological transition, and the subsequent Metaphysical anarchy. But it would be vain to hope that the mental, and still more that the social process could be shortened, in the original evolution, which had always to be worked out empirically, by the spontaneous steps above explained and constantly verified in a manner that excludes any other supposition. The intermediate stages can only be omitted, where the developement of an individual or a community can be systematically directed, and sociological laws are so far known, that the points of contact between the two extreme regimes can be cultivated, and their conflicting tendencies got rid of.

There will be an opportunity for a valuable explanation of this case in the next volume, as respects the numerous fetichists of central Africa, happily beyond the reach of Western empiricism. But this being the only instance in which such a renovation is sufficiently marked as applied to communities, I shall be able to extend it suitably, to the more easy but less complete improvement of the individual evolution. Here I must confine

myself to a general indication of the principle on which it depends.

This may be reduced to a decomposition of the fetichist dogma, into the two essential elements necessarily confounded therein. Embracing the whole External Order, and leaving out nothing but the Human Order, the type by which it spontaneously explains everything, this system comprehends at once the inorganic and the vital kingdoms. It is only with respect to the first that the fetichist principle requires radical rectification; as regards the second it is merely a general exaggeration.

By distinguishing between Life and Activit

The fetichist mind may then be directly led to distinguish between Activity and Life, by drawing out the real differences essentially separating these two spectacles of nature, which it is always contemplating. Astrolatry much facilitates this way of looking at them, by bringing into contrast celestial regularity, and vital instability. But this direct transition is sufficiently normal to be consistent with even the first phase of Fetichism. The conception is one which will not be completely grasped, unless this volume should be studied by some Negro thinker, as it may be, now that all forms of civilisation are so much intermingled.

The Synthesis continues to be Subjective, but is *relative* instead of *absolute*.

When once Fetichist philosophy can undergo this decisive decomposition, it must pass rapidly into the Positive state. For the theoretic *dualism* between life and death, which only admits of a relative synthesis, thus takes the place of the *unity* confounding the two, which was consecrated by the absolute synthesis (p. 100). Then Laws thrust aside Causes irrevocably, though the systematisation continues to be subjective, in accordance with the immovable preponderance of the Human type, which however is no longer the individual but the species (p. 27).

The intermediate stages are suppressed with advantage.

While this change consolidates and systematises the philosophy founded by our Fetichist ancestors, the immense lacuna, which that philosophy could not but present at first, is entirely filled up (p. 81). For the Vital order being thus distinguished from the Material, becomes a deep-seated link between it and the Human order so as to constitute at last a truly complete system. The principal intellectual office which Theologism had to discharge, becomes then superfluous, since by the direct change

to Positivism theoretic completeness is better attained, as also the practical purpose, which is the only real reason for the intermediate faiths.

Having now quite completed the historical examination of Fetichism, I must make use of the new light it throws on the whole Human Evolution, to perfect, in the following chapter, my former general judgment on the principal Theological phase.

CHAPTER III.

POSITIVE THEORY OF THE THEOCRATIC STATE; OR GENERAL APPRECIATION OF CONSERVATIVE POLYTHEISM.

PREFATORY REMARKS.

THE last chapter established a basis for the whole Philosophy of History. For it showed that we can trace in the Spontaneous regime of Humanity the various essential germs of the other preparatory states, and even the fundamental outline of the Final Order. Although the original evolution could never pass at once from Fetichism to Positivism, yet the possibility of omitting Theologism, when the course of developement can be properly systematised, warrants us in representing this intermediate stage as a vast transition. But since it was both indispensable and inevitable, the greater part of this historical treatise must be devoted to a careful examination of it, with the proviso that we always keep in view its true purpose, which was rather Social than Intellectual.

Theologism a vast transition between Fetichism and Positivism. Its purpose was Social, rather than Intellectual.

It was the Political inadequacy of Fetichism that more than anything else rendered the Theological regime necessary. This regime could not, however, fulfil its distinctive mission without considerably modifying both the evolution of Speculation and that of Activity, by the constant combination of which the advance of Sociability is regulated. This transitory system must then be considered here in its whole extent, while we take care to avoid all illusion as to its nature and duration. Though it is less coherent than Fetichism, we must as before divide the appreciation into Abstract and Concrete. I shall even have to dwell at far greater length on the second division than was necessary in the case of the Primitive regime, so as to enable me to give an adequate explanation of the various phases of this Transition. To it I shall devote this and the three following chapters. The last of these will deal with Monotheism. But it must be remembered that this extreme and

But it could fulfil this purpose only by influencing the Speculative and Active Evolutions.

complementary phase of the Human Initiation was really nothing more than a concentration of Polytheism, which alone constitutes in all respects true Theologism.

ABSTRACT APPRECIATION OF POLYTHEISM, pp. 132–165.

(1) Intellectual Properties, pp. 132–152.

(*a*) Philosophic Aptitude, pp. 32–139.

To examine fully the Intellectual Properties of the Polytheistic regime, we must consider in succession, its Philosophic aptitude, its Scientific efficacy, and its Esthetic influence. It is not essential that the subsequent Concrete Appreciation should in every case follow this order, which however is the normal one.

Polytheism extends the Absolute Synthesis to the Human Order.

Viewed Philosophically, Polytheism had for its chief object to supply what was wanting in Fetichism, by extending to the Human Order the Provisional Synthesis, long confined of necessity to the External World. The principal results of this decisive complement are really connected with the Social destination which is the essential characteristic of the whole regime of Polytheism. Still, by instituting in a rudimentary form the great Theoretic Dualism of Man and the World, it directly exercised an important influence upon the Intellect. This conception had till then been impossible.

Fetichism had implanted a strong sense of Fixity as regards the Outer World.

For the Fetichistic Philosophy could only sanction its more fundamental element, which it was forced to regard as the sole one. This concentration of our thoughts on the External Order tended to strengthen the general basis which Fetichism had spontaneously supplied to our true Intellectual Regime, for it intensified Man's sense of his subordination to the World. But this inestimable service could not be rendered without producing a most injurious influence both in Theory and Practice; since the noblest speculations were excluded from the domain of Doctrine, and the restriction of that domain to the least modifiable phenomena gave rise to an absolute Fatalism. No doubt these two tendencies were at the outset inevitable and even indispensable, but too long a protraction of them would have effectually prevented Human Reason from ever fairly starting on its course. It was Polytheism alone that could emancipate us once for all from this First Childhood, by so remodelling the Fictitious Synthesis as to make it both include the Human Order, and represent the External Order—not excepting the Material part of it—as largely modifiable. Though the Absolute regime was thus rendered too arbitrary in either Order, it admitted of no other natural issue, if it was to fulfil its purpose as a preparation.

Hence the two systems of Causality—the first Direct, the second Indirect—concurred, albeit unequally, in the fundamental education of human reason. While the long reign of the first lasted, Man learnt to submit to the World but had no hope of modifying it. During the Transition instituted by the second, our Intellect marked out its final domain—the modification of Materiality by Humanity. So long as these two great services are isolated and considered apart, as is the modern custom, one is chiefly struck by the serious dangers that attended them. But the later necessarily linked on to the earlier; and if we pay proper attention to this close connection we soon see that it spontaneously neutralised the defects of both. When the first Fictitious Synthesis had sufficiently consecrated Order, the second came and sanctioned Progress.

Could Theologism have preceded Fetichism, its influence upon speculation would have been utterly subversive, as tending to set Movement above Existence. Impossible though such an assumption be, I must here point out this Theological leaning so as to show the full importance of the Fetichistic antecedents which counteracted it.

Without this previous preparation Subjectivity would have run wild under Polytheism.

As long as Direct Causality continues, our subjective deviations are necessarily kept within the limits assigned by the phenomena actually occurring in the bodies where the presiding Wills dwell. But this is no longer the case when each substance passively submits to the arbitrary sway of an external Being, and that Being a pure creation of the imagination. Then Subjectivity admits of no other effectual curb than the general habits of Permanence formed under the prolonged discipline of Fetichism, and continued through the natural rectitude of our Intellect notwithstanding the decay of the Fetichistic regime. Positivity in its nascent state is too deficient in energy, and still more in generality, to offer a successful resistance to the extravagances of Theology. Strong as its Fetichistic bases were, our very mental constitution was often rudely shaken when Causality became Indirect. A special illustration of this disorder was furnished by the serious changes which the Dogma of the Permanence of Species underwent when Polytheism gave an unrestricted sanction to arbitrary metamorphoses.

We can thus see how the general guarantee of its Fetichist education proved a spontaneous protection to Human Reason against the divagations attendant upon Theology. As

supernatural beliefs, in spite of the reality ascribed to them, remained without any external foundation, they were wholly at the mercy of the disturbing influences issuing from their internal source. The disorder would speedily have become irreparable, had not the Priesthood which of necessity arose under Astrolatry, before the ascendency of Polytheism, instituted a continuous discipline based on the general body of Fetichistic antecedents.

Fetichist Dogma of Fatalism a healthy corrective of Polytheism.

This normal guarantee rested principally on the dogma of Fatalism, the true origin of which I have already pointed out. It originated invariably with Fetichism, but acquired increased importance under Polytheism, to which accordingly it is usually referred. The Second Absolute Synthesis extended this dogma with the general body of its doctrines to the Human Order, and by constantly applying it developed its natural aptitude for checking the extravagances of Polytheism. Fatalism is the necessary corrective of every Theology, and what is more, it must outlast the various Preparatory Religions and be intimately incorporated, after proper reconstruction, with the Final Religion. No more is needed for its complete renovation than that, instead of remaining absolute, it should become relative under the general influence of the Positive principle.

Relative Fatalism

As Fatalism always has for its object to indicate Order, it was obliged to represent Order as unmodifiable, so long as its modifiability could not be apprehended and was even inopportune. But it also brings out the secondary modifications of Order, after there have been decisive manifestations of them, such manifestations being always free from anything arbitrary. This Relative Fatalism is sanctioned in the fullest manner throughout the Positive Religion, by which it is definitively extended to the Human Order, both individual and collective. Theologism could carry out this general application only in outline and in a provisional way, the idea of Fate being as incompatible with the doctrine of Theology as it is appropriate to that of Direct Causality. Its influence under Polytheism was always due to the wisdom of the priesthood who borrowed it from Fetichism for repressing subjective extravagances.

Finds its place in Positivism.

By the Positive principle, on the contrary, Fatalism in the true sense, independent of all artificial discipline, forms the natural groundwork of the Final doctrine. In that doctrine it indicates at once both the fundamental constancy of the Universal Order and the perfect regularity of its secondary variations.

Such relativity when definitive will effectually save this imperishable dogma from all the dangers that were imminent as long as it retained its absolute character. So far from disposing us to inaction, it simply regulates our Activity in such a way as to increase its range, and at the same time render it more effective. A vagrant and barren liberty, a liberty after all in constant subjection to the unforeseen influence of the various impulses that act upon us, whether external or internal, is thus habitually superseded by the full developement of a noble system of universal improvement.

History of the idea of Fate.

Fatalism then, originating in the doctrine of Fetichism, was alien and even opposed to the Theological principle; yet when Polytheism became general it could not but acquire new importance in the hands of the priesthood as an instrument for checking the subversive tendencies of the Second Causality. Subsequently the Monotheistic Systematisation gave it a dogmatic sanction by instituting Providential Optimism, though Catholicism made ineffectual attempts to evade this conclusion. After these successive revisions the idea of Fate is incorporated with the Final Positivism better than it was with the Primitive Fetichism. In Positivism it is directly the necessary foundation of all human wisdom, in Practice as well as in Theory. Though a part only of this explanation is required here, I give the whole now, as I shall frequently have to apply it in each part of my historical construction when dealing with a dogma which cannot be dissociated from our mental developement.

Having adequately described the spontaneous discipline which the Age of Fetichism provided beforehand for the use of the Priesthood, so enabling it to check the aberrations of Theology, I can fully define the Philosophic efficacy of Polytheism.

The Theoretic Dualism,—Man and the World,—first sketched by Polytheism.

Polytheism, in extending the Absolute Synthesis to the Human Order, traced out in its own way the fundamental institution of the great Theoretic *Dualism*, which tended from that time forward to take the place of the *Unity* of Direct Causality. And so Man came to place himself for the future in contradistinction to the World, and even strove to control its general order, with the aid of the resistless Wills, between whom and himself he supposed a free alliance could be formed. So long as Fatalism kept sufficiently in check the dangers of this regime, it was fortunate that Human Reason should be subjected to the only influence that could at the outset develope in it the instinct

of *improvement*, after the instinct of *conservation* had received from Fetichism a too exclusive consecration, necessary though this was.

Efficacy of Theologism due to its Subjectivity.

This efficacy can be rightly appreciated by none but thinkers who are completely emancipated from all belief in Theology or Metaphysics. For it was due mainly to the purely chimerical nature of the doctrines in the Second regime of Causality. I hope to make this general explanation clear to every reader who is as free from Atheism as from Theism.

The Fetichistic conceptions, being direct and concrete, were profoundly real. Their defect lay solely in the exaggeration and confusion that are inseparable from a Spontaneous Synthesis. They became chimerical only after they had been systematised by Astrolatry, this systematisation being founded on the abuse of stellar influences. Even then they retained a certain objectivity. For the hypotheses employed were still verifiable (p. 71).

Pure subjectivity gained the upper hand only when Causality became indirect. Then we confined ourselves no longer to endowing bodies with hypothetical attributes. We devised beings that were entirely fictitious, and the dominion of these beings, as it was nearly arbitrary, afforded explanations for all phenomena whatever. The only general restraint upon their interference was supplied by the spontaneous persistence of Fetichistic Fatalism suitably extended by the wisdom of the Priesthood. It is in this that the Theological Method properly so called consists, the only method by which the system of Causes can be completely developed.

Which modified the primitive Fatalism.

But as it could exert no marked influence till Human Reason had long acquired confirmed habits of stability, its characteristic dangers were necessarily checked by this Fetichistic preparation. The influence of Theology, though it could not overcome the primitive Fatalism, completely renovated it, and led us to regard it as modifiable, which no other influence could have done. Now this most important aptitude was due solely to the essentially subjective nature of supernatural beliefs, objective as they were thought to be.

The Gods being created by Man, their power was an indirect sanction of the struggle of Will

For this subjective origin enabled Theologism to sanction indirectly the constant struggle of Will against Necessity, after Fetichism had fully established the fundamental subordination of Man to the World. Substantially, all the Wills that Polytheism made to reign over us were necessarily human, though

we were unconscious of it; whereas the Fetichistic Wills, in spite of their fictitious nature, were independent of us, as they were incorporated with real substances. Every true philosopher then should regard the intervention of the Gods as a spontaneous institution of Humanity enabling her to react upon Materiality which till then had ruled her absolutely. against Necessity.

Precisely because the Gods were purely chimerical, their arbitrary power served as the organ of our higher aspirations, which at the outset could find no other general issue. The Divine Wills never really guided our desires of improvement, but they gave them a spontaneous sanction as well adapted for developing as for consolidating them. Being always subordinated to our own inclinations, they habitually tended to sanction Good as alone suited to the whole even of our individual, and much more of our collective, existence. When they seem to impel to Evil, they do but faithfully reflect the moral imperfection of the souls which feel the impulse. This explains why the dominion of Theologism, which would seem at first to be as disorderly as it is unlimited, was at once less efficacious and more salutary than the blind criticism issuing from the anarchy of modern times supposes. In the name of the Gods, Theologism contrasted Man with the World in the theoretic domain, and opposed Nobility to Force in the practical domain. Thus Theologism speculatively contrasted Man with the World and practically encouraged him to modify it.

Owing to the absolute nature of Theologism, these two services could not be rendered, without introducing changes that threatened to undermine both theory and practice. But the developement of Fetichism effected by the Priesthood saved us from the principal dangers attending these changes. Neither in theory nor in practice could the continuous progress of Humanity have been inaugurated in any other way. For the Primitive Religion had been able to do no more than consecrate Order. I shall resume this explanation below in regard to Activity; here I must restrict it to Intellect. Dangers accompanying these services.

So restricted, it consists in recognising that Theologism, in order to realise its distinctive purpose, had to aim at reconstructing subjectively the unity, then necessarily objective, which Fetichism established in the Physical Order, the sole domain embraced by the Spontaneous Synthesis. Could the Gods have gained a complete mastery over Fate, the World would, theoretically, have been subjected to Man in such a way as directly to overthrow our mental harmony. But that Tendency to subordinate the World to Man.

harmony had been so deeply rooted in us by our Fetichistic education, that this danger could never be really formidable. Still I must indicate in a general way the signs of its existence the better to explain the fundamental economy of the Polytheistic regime.

Dogma of Metamorphoses indicates this tendency.

This tendency of every Theologism to subordinate the World to us by remodelling the Fetichistic explanations, finds direct expression in the universally accepted dogma of Metamorphoses. I shall presently examine this dogma from the Esthetic, and even from the Scientific point of view. But I must now consider only its use in Philosophy.

Invariably accompanies Polytheism.

This dogma is in every case a distinctive feature of the Second Causality, in which the human type, though thenceforward indirect, is more fully developed than under the Primitive Causality. It is then employed for forming a conception of absolute origins, which could not engage our attention while Contemplation was Concrete and direct vitality was attributed to inanimate objects. The material and even the vital world was henceforth supposed to be passive, and all activity in it to have a human origin, through various divinely effected Metamorphoses.

It is a compromise between Fetichism and Polytheism as to Origin and Permanence of Species.

I have already pointed out (p. 103) the constant tendency of such explanations to undermine the Fetichistic dogma of the Permanence of Species. But the natural resistance of the Primitive Fatalism always saved us from this prodigious error, which gained a firm hold only in exceptional cases and among minds over prone to abstraction. The permanent conflict between these two influences led in all cases to the Spontaneous compromise by which Fetichism (the natural organ of Practical Reason) makes to Theologism (the necessary precursor of Theoretic Reason) this concession—that the primary origin of every species is the result of a human metamorphosis. In return for this homage, the Divine influence is restricted to this absolute origination; and the relative propagation, which alone is of essential importance, is left to the ordinary laws of the descent of species, so as to maintain the integrity of the real types.

From this explanation of the most important conflict of all, the reader can form an idea of the general reconciliation effected, under Polytheism, between the Fate of Fetichism and the Providence of Theology. The latter—which became retrograde only after it had degenerated under Monotheism—

long guided Progress while the former preserved Order. Theologism in reality grew out of Fetichism and could never thoroughly supplant it, yet in every instance so far modified it as to originate by the only method possible at the outset the theoretic dualism of Man and the World, and the practical reaction of Will upon Necessity.

Thus much for the Philosophic properties of the Second Causality. It remains for me to describe its Scientific influence.

(*b*) Scientific Aptitude, pp. 139–150.

To form an accurate view of this influence, I must investigate more carefully the combined action in all normal cases of the two sources, the one general the other special, by which Polytheism spontaneously grew out of Fetichism, as shown in the previous chapter (p. 126).

Preliminary inquiry concerning the combined action of the two Fetichistic sources of Polytheism.

I began by explaining how the constant developement of Abstract Contemplation was a direct source of Polytheism in the very midst of every Fetichism. The impulses of Practice combine with the aspirations of Theory in developing this decisive tendency. For action and prevision both equally require that the study of phenomena should prevail as against that of existences (p. 123). This tendency may even be the means of occasionally introducing the indirect system of Causality without the direct system having previously established Sedentary Life and the Priesthood of Astrolatry, but generally speaking it is not strong enough for this purpose till after both these have been established. We might conceive in this way of an exceptional Polytheism among certain nomad tribes, which should not have arisen from influences traceable to communication with the regular Polytheists.

The General source, or Abstract Contemplation.

In the great majority of cases the Second Causality is formed by the combination of this direct and general influence with the indirect and special influence of Astrolatry. The Priesthood that comes into existence with the worship of the Heavens always aims at making that worship supreme over the worship of terrestrial objects, by subordinating all the other Fetiches to the Stars. This gives rise to the abuse of stellar influences. The stars moreover are employed for systematising the Primitive Religion by a hierarchy of fictitious Wills. This final stage of Fetichism brings it very near to Polytheism, by habituating us to the supremacy of Beings that are inaccessible, though visible.

The Special source, or Astrolatry.

Still, ascribe to the Stars what power we may, they cannot permanently supersede the Gods properly so called. For these latter exercise a far wider authority, especially in the sphere of the Human Order. The chief divinities gradually come to be regarded as distinct from the stars in which they take their rise, in proportion as the combined progress of Intellect and Sociability forces us to develope the Absolute Synthesis more and more till it includes the Mental and Moral domain. As this developement soon comes to absorb the attention of the priesthood and the instinct of the people, the growth of the human attributes tends to conceal the material origin of the Gods, though this latter can always be detected.

The two sources always remain distinct.

Though normally connected, these two Fetichistic sources of Polytheism always remain distinct. They may even become opposed, when the Astrolatric priesthood has taken deep root among vast populations whose Intellectual and Social progress is retarded by an environment either too favourable or too adverse. But usually there is no conflict, and the diversity of origin only shows itself in the natural tendency of each source to make its own character predominate.

Astrolatry supplies the Material attributes of the Gods; the General source supplies their Human attributes.

Astrolatry, the *special* source of the Gods, gives direct prominence to their Material attributes; whereas their *general* source, abstract contemplation, assigns them principally to Human departments. These two classes of functions are always found in combination, but from the unequal proportions of the alloy we are able to detect which source was the predominant one. Every leading God busies himself with human interests, but his power is usually based on the part he plays in relation to the external world, though not always to the celestial portion of it. Although it is of the essence of Theologism to place Man above the World, the fundamental subordination of Man to the World had been so firmly established by Fetichism, that Polytheism could do no more than modify it.

The former source preponderates;

We even find philosophers, when too exclusively given up to speculations of the most general order, conceiving of the Gods as wholly unconnected with Human affairs. Such a belief of course could never be popular, but the fact of its being entertained at all proves that in every case the Material functions naturally predominated. This is also shown in an inverse way by the inferior rank of those divinities who had only human attributes without any function in connection with the

external world: such were the Muses, among a people too disposed nevertheless to make the intellect supreme. Still the functions assigned to them as Deities on earth modified so much the importance belonging to them as heavenly bodies that the primacy among the Gods was rarely connected with the principal luminary, except where Astrolatry, through being planted in a favourable medium, had been strongly organised at the commencement. When we see a simple planet standing for the principal God of the ancient Western world, we may be sure that the conflict between the two influences must have gradually deprived the Sun of his natural ascendency, although these religious revolutions can scarcely leave any historical traces.

And can be traced even in Christian language.

The confusion produced by the Monotheistic Systematisation is no bar to our following up even to the present day this necessary difference between the two Fetichistic sources of Polytheism, a difference often carried to the extent of a radical contrast. Moreover we may be sure that this difference has become more marked in proportion as the Positive spirit has advanced. For that spirit must have been notably developed under the influence of Astrolatry, and consequently must have tended to revive that influence when it was itself on the increase. The Christian use of the word *Heaven* and its derivatives is ambiguous; but we can distinguish the two religious meanings denoting at once the whole body of stellar influences and the providence of the supreme God. Dante's poem throughout gives clear evidence of this connection.

Respective influence of the two sources upon Polytheistic Science.

But, whether converging or diverging, the two Fetichistic sources of Polytheism were both equally favourable to its scientific influence: they were so, however, from different points of view. In conformity with their respective natures, the one encouraged the direct and special growth of real knowledge, the other the indirect and general preparation of rational Positivity. The concrete influence of Astrolatric Theologism and the abstract tendency of General Polytheism combined spontaneously—and they did so even during the civil and religious conflicts that were provoked—to procure for the Positive spirit its two chief Theoretic qualities, reality and dignity. Though it is the Final Synthesis alone that can once for all unite these two complementary attributes, the Polytheistic Initiation successfully prepared the way for their normal reconciliation. This necessary Transition developed in all

directions the desires of Prevision already connected with the needs of Action, and moreover led to the discovery of such scientific results as could then be obtained.

Polytheism developes, Abstract Contemplation, both in Method and in Doctrine.

Polytheism being, by its General root, the offspring of Abstract Contemplation, must naturally have tended to develope it, both by improving its method, and by enlarging its domain.

(a) Method. The Logic of Images.

Viewed Logically, Polytheism powerfully aided the elaboration of the whole body of Theory, by supplying all intellects with Images extremely well adapted for fixing the attention habitually upon general phenomena apart from particular bodies. In opposition to the opinion of the learned, I have no hesitation in regarding the personification of attributes as having been for a long time more necessary to Science than to Art, so difficult is it for us at the outset to keep ourselves at the abstract point of view. Such images always present accessory features that tend to embarrass our meditations concerning the principal phenomenon, particularly our deductive meditations. It is for this reason that the true Scientific Regime has more in common with the habits of Fetichism than with those of Polytheism; for that regime, instead of forming imaginary Collective Beings, borrows its Abstract Images directly from the bodies observed by putting aside all qualities not connected with the purpose of the Theory. But, though Science ultimately requires an idealisation by subtraction and not by addition, this method was unsuited to our earliest abstractions in which vagueness was the one thing above all others to be avoided.

Images gave coherence to the Meditations on Causes.

We shall not see how valuable to thought the Polytheistic Images were unless we remember that the theories which they promoted had a purely provisional use. Throughout the whole of Antiquity abstract research could achieve no definitive success, except in Mathematics. Unable as yet to discover Laws, the human mind had under the Second Causality simply to prepare the way for the studies that would decide those discoveries, and to extricate itself from its Theoretic torpor by communicating a general and continued stimulus to our various fundamental speculations. Now the Polytheistic Images were indispensable for promoting and diffusing this mental exercise, which was rather inductive than deductive. The provisional bond which observations had at that time to find in Causes as a preparation

for Laws, would have lacked coherence without this spontaneous support.

Thus the second period of our Childhood instituted, through Polytheism, the second general element of Human Logic—Images as employed to assist the elaboration of Thought, whilst the first period had based this definitively on the mental reaction of the Feelings. The Concrete nature of Polytheistic idealisation directly facilitated the thorough combination of these two spontaneous institutions. It was for Monotheism to complete this preparation by developing the Logic of Signs to aid the Meditations appropriate to our Adolescence, meditations that are rather deductive than inductive. But the inactivity of this third element in early times was a means of consolidating the habitual union of the other two, so long as language was obliged to be employed only for its direct and most important purpose. The special aberrations that resulted from the abuse of signs among the populations who had not thoroughly undergone the Polytheistic Preparation, prove the necessity of this logical phase in which Images combine with Feelings for elaborating thoughts independently of words (ii. 208).

Each Polytheistic God stood in place of a generalisation of phenomena.

This beneficial influence should lead us to form a sounder view in regard to the vast extension which Polytheism gradually acquired when the number of the Gods became almost as great as that of the terms in ordinary language, though far less than that of the ancient Fetiches. When we understand that each God represented a collective phenomenon before general relations could be in any way detected, we shall feel how frivolous are the taunts usually levelled against this wealth of Deities now that a blind Monotheism hinders the due comprehension of Antiquity. The Entities that ruled at a subsequent period were less favourable to the consolidation, and still less to the diffusion, of the intellectual exercise required for Theory, while they were not accompanied with real notions to any greater extent.

(β) Doctrine. We owe to Polytheism the initial growth of the whole body of scientific speculations.

Considered directly as to Doctrine, General Polytheism would seem to be less efficacious in that sphere than as to Method, since it furnished no decisive contribution except in Mathematics. But its purely preparatory destination affords an explanation of its Theoretic influence as well in Doctrine as it did in Method. To it we owe the initial growth of the whole body of scientific speculations, in consequence of

the homogeneity it established between all our thoughts, and the provisional links it supplied to all our observations.

Polytheism aspires to foresee the action of the Gods, and so encourages observation of phenomena:

The First Causality as it was limited invariably to *existences*, could not satisfy our general desires of Prevision called forth by our needs of Action. Under the Second which deals principally with *phenomena*, we aim at foreknowledge of the presiding Wills by carefully observing the various effects they produce. The plurality of the Gods was always indispensable for this Theoretic object, in order that the real differences might be properly represented. If the Monotheistic Concentration had come too soon, our scientific education would have been impossible, owing to the confusion inseparable from the vague uniformity of the explanations by Divine agency.

As for instance in two classes of research neglected by Monotheism.

To make this Theoretic aptitude of Polytheism more clear, I must here give particular instances of it in two important classes of general researches, which, owing to the condemnation blindly passed upon them by Christianity and Islam, have been long discontinued, and which the Positive Regime alone can revive.

Meteorology.

Although, as a concrete study, Meteorology admits of no really successful employment of Theory, I shall always regret that the prolonged investigations of the Ancient Priesthood in this wide field should have sunk into entire oblivion under the influence of subsequent prejudices of various kinds. These Polytheistic observations could not have led to general previsions, but they would have contributed indirectly to the improvement of our chief Physical researches, and directly to the amendment of the empirical laws which are the only ones that we can discover respecting such phenomena. The stupidity of modern compilations on this subject ought to induce a sounder appreciation of the illusory conceptions which guided and sustained the perseverance of the Ancient Priesthood, whose efforts were at bottom more rational than those of our so called Meteorologists.

Interpretation of Dreams.

In the second place, the interpretation of Dreams led, under Polytheism, to the institution of a valuable investigation of mental and moral phenomena. Had not men been sustained by the chimerical hope of discovering in this way the wills of the Gods, and so of foreseeing human events, they could not at that time have formed a conception of the unremitting zeal required for such difficult observations. These observations subsequently

fell into disuse, when the pretensions of Ontology supplanted—though to no purpose—the aspirations of Theology. Rational Positivity must revive these speculations, substituting in them the subjective for the objective with a view to studying the internal state instead of the external spectacle.

So modified, the doctrine of Dreams would have a real Theoretic value and an important Practical utility. For it would improve our knowledge of the cerebral reactions, and even of the general harmony subsisting between the Body and the Soul. Although the Genius of Antiquity could not have this twofold end directly in view, its noble perseverance must often have been the means of suggesting felicitous inductions in this important domain, the systematic study of which was so premature. True philosophers now see in the mystical masterpieces of Catholicism an unrivalled series of observations, real though empirical, on the whole of human nature. But this view applies with still greater force to the Polytheistic collections and should make us regret their loss all the more. For in these the Practical aim of the investigation guided the procedure more fully and more effectively, besides which the efforts of the Ancient Priesthood were on a larger scale and more lasting than those of the Catholic mystics.

These studies were universally pursued. Advantages of such Universality.

For the noblest then as well as for the simplest phenomena, Polytheism instituted a continuous study in which all intellects actively took part, and for which no substitute has hitherto been found. The catholicity of its influence was no less valuable in regard to Doctrine than it was in regard to Method, since our fundamental evolution can be affected only by results that are in the truest sense popular, whether in Theory or in Practice. By multiplying relations generally, and by always making the human end of primary importance, its conceptions, chimerical though they often were, necessarily prepared the way for our Normal Regime, in which the utility formerly attending the unreal previsions of Polytheism (as to the external spectacle) will be consolidated and developed by the reality of the previsions as to the internal state) ultimately to be attained by Science.

The Special source of Polytheism developes real scientific results in Mathematics and Astronomy.

While Polytheism, through its general source, Abstract Contemplation, thus gave a theoretic training to *all* intellects, it drew from Astrolatry, its special source, an influence which, though restricted to *cultivated* minds, was of no less importance to the Human Initiation as a whole. It was this special in-

fluence alone that produced real scientific results. These results, which were necessarily confined to the simplest speculations, exercised an increasingly powerful reaction upon the whole Encyclopedic System. To estimate them properly, I must first give a more precise account of the initial step taken by Fetichism, from which the Mathematical Spirit originates. We must include here in the Mathematical Spirit its application to Astronomy.

Fetichist preparation for these Sciences.

Mathematics and Astronomy constituted the field of rational Positivity in the earliest times, and were always limited to the domain of Number, the simplest and most general domain of all. Arithmetic, in the age of pure Fetichism, never went beyond Numeration, which it must be remembered is closely connected with the elementary operations, and also with the fundamental properties of numbers. If we go back to the actual starting-point of our scientific education we find that, for the race as for the individual, it is invariably the humble theorem to which Don Juan confines his belief.[1] This is in fact the simplest numerical relation not constituting a pure verbal equivalence. It is our earliest attainment in Abstraction, and popular instinct will always set it up as the decisive type of positive demonstration. Constant familiarity with it has misled many into insisting that it is self-evident. But the truth is that the mind, both in our individual and collective infancy, has for a long time no conception of it. The reaction it necessarily exerts on the whole Human Reason at once gives rise to an instinctive sense of the Fundamental Order, both internal and external. This far-reaching influence of the very simplest of our scientific discoveries is in fact most complete and most apparent in our First Age, when the mind works with more than usual earnestness at its earliest lessons in Theory.

Pure Fetichism carries Arithmetic to Multiplication.

Under pure Fetichism, the Numerical Calculus does not extend beyond Multiplication, and to this there is no exception in the questions of Astronomical Arithmetic that now arise. Condorcet[2] has made a judicious observation on the theory of Division in connection with the training of the individual, and this observation applies with special force to the progress of the race. Division is, as he says, a difficult and critical step in scientific education. Owing to the abrupt increase of complexity in mathematical reasoning when we reach Division

[1] 'Je crois que deux et deux sont quatre.'—Molière, *Le Festin de Pierre*, act iii. sc. i.

[2] Moyens d'apprendre à compter, 9e Leçon, Obs. (A).

the majority of cultivated intellects are still unequal to this Theoretical test: the Calculus of Fetichism is all that has hitherto been completely universal, and in this it resembles the Religion of Fetichism.

Division due to Astrolatry.

Division, with the elementary notions concerning Fractions which it necessarily involves, always belongs to Astrolatry. It is then called for by Astronomical questions, while up to that time no Practical need had stimulated this discovery. It originated mainly in the operations for determining the periodic times of the various planets in terms of their synodical periods, when the terrestrial or solar year is previously known. But this gradual developement of Arithmetic—be it that of pure Fetichism or the special developement under Astrolatry—ought never to be separated from the spontaneous growth of Algebra, since the elementary conceptions of Algebra are formed when the Arithmetical questions that correspond to them have been completely elaborated.

Polytheism created Geometry,

Starting with this numerical basis laid by Fetichism, the Mathematical Spirit advanced under Polytheism to the stage of Geometry, which will always be its chief domain. It would be impossible to conceive of Geometry as originating in Practice at an earlier period than this, as such an origin presupposes individual property in land, and this there could not be till the Sedentary existence was fully established. The influence of territorial property may have an historical importance, but the greater part of the progress of Geometry, in the earliest no less than in modern times, was due to Astronomy which is the offspring of Astrolatry.

And Geometrical Astronomy.

This was the only mode of employing Geometry likely to lead to a thorough investigation of the abstract laws of space, these laws being thus connected with the system of religion. In the Concrete Appreciation I shall assign to the various Polytheistic regimes their respective shares in the mathematical progress thus made. For the present I confine myself to giving a general recommendation always to connect the developement of Geometry with the corresponding developement of Algebra, as Algebra owes more to its Geometrical source than to Arithmetic, often erroneously assumed to be its only source. Algebra is continually emanating from both these sources, and unless this be recognised, it is impossible to form a correct idea of the nature, method, and object, of the Algebraical Calculus.

Mechanics a modern science.

Mechanics alone remained to be added,—the third essential element, which now completes the Mathematical domain by establishing its chief Encyclopedic relations. This is a science of which the Ancients knew nothing beyond the partial germs indicated in the following chapter. The fundamental conceptions of Mechanics are really more bound up with Astronomy than are those of Geometry itself. Hence they could not arise till the theories of Astronomy should require them, and this could not be till modern times, as I shall explain subsequently.

Reaction of Polytheistic Science upon Philosophy.

Thus narrow though the field of science was in ancient times, it must, by reason of its Encyclopedic position, have exercised a powerful reaction upon Philosophy, as will be shown in detail in the following chapter. These Numerical and Geometrical conceptions, being simpler and more general than any others, entered into all our speculations without exception, and thus introduced in every department an unfailing sense of the Universal Order, of which they disclosed the primary laws both logical and physical. This developement was sufficient in amount for fully displaying the characteristics of the Objective Method which originated with Astrolatry as I showed in the preceding chapter (p. 103).

And what is more, the final harmony between this Method and the Subjective Method emanating from pure Fetichism was to a certain extent anticipated by Sacerdotal Polytheism. Theocratic wisdom sanctioned both methods alike, giving precedence to the Subjective when the end in view was the consolidation of Order, while the Objective was looked to as the instrument of Progress and the guarantee of Reality. As their agreement, however, at the commencement could not be systematic, it gradually gave place to a necessary conflict between them. This conflict, to which the break-up of Theologism was in the main due, could not cease till Positivism was thoroughly established.

Preparation made for other departments of Science. Divination. Art of the Augurs. Art of the Haruspices

Although Polytheistic science admitted of no complete and lasting results outside of Mathematics, the impetus it gave to thought caused persevering attempts to be made in all other departments, attempts, however, which were of more service to Method than to Doctrine. We are too apt to forget that this Regime promoted a continual cultivation of the different branches of Natural Philosophy within the Priesthood. Divination alone, quite independently of the incentive arising from the needs of Practice, sufficed for the institution of a careful

course of observations in all the departments of Natural Philosophy, observations that were eventually turned to good account in spite of their chimerical object. The earliest important collections of Physical facts came from the Art of the Augurs, and of Anatomical data from that of the Haruspices. A true philosopher when he now views the scientific observations made while the more erroneous and less excusable hypothesis of the classic Fluids was in vogue, can better understand the higher value of the Theoretic inspirations due to Polytheism.

Scientific influence of the conception of Matter as passive.

A similar value belongs even to those fundamental aberrations towards which the Second Causality tended, when it endeavoured to systematise the spontaneous Synthesis of the First by assigning to every object a human origin (p. 138). Its conception of matter as passive, although thoroughly erroneous, was the only one that could favour the growth of Natural Laws at the commencement, because it got rid of the notion of a disorderly activity that was incompatible with any rational prevision.

Logical artifice of Inertia.

Thus the way was prepared in a confused manner for the Logical institution of Inertia, without which the Positive Spirit could never overcome the primary difficulties of Abstract Science, as we see particularly in Mechanics, where the simplest rule cannot be generalised without this hypothesis (i. 398). The artifices of Theory, in fact, always consist in successively endowing a substance, regarded at first as purely passive, with all the properties that make up the active existence we wish to study in it, throwing aside those which are marked by a higher complexity. Now, in consequence of the tendencies implanted in us by Fetichism, this Logical process would not have been attained but for the spontaneous preparation afforded in the first instance by the tendencies of Polytheism.

Scientific influence of the doctrine of Metamorphoses.

If we pursue the analysis of the reaction thus exerted upon Theory, we shall find that there was a real scientific value even in the Dogma of Metamorphoses, by which Polytheism directly jeopardised belief in the Permanence of Species. In addition to its influence upon Philosophy by placing Man in contrast with the World, this Dogma had a tendency to improve the general conception of the External Order. For the genius of Fetichism, necessarily concrete as it was, had at the outset ascribed to substances such invariability that it was impossible to conceive of any radical change in them.

It led to the Atomic Theory.

The purely arbitrary variability introduced by Polytheism

was in itself more dangerous than this absolute immutability. But, acting on the basis already laid by Fetichism, the Polytheistic dogma could not gain sufficient hold for the full developement of its mischievous influence upon Theory. In this conflict the fundamental conception of Invariability was not radically impaired, but merely modified in such a way as to prepare gradually for its final renovation when the Relative takes the place of the Absolute. The Dogma of Metamorphoses was the historical source of the Corpuscular or Atomic Theory, which (as will be shown in the following chapter) was indispensable to the effectual progress of the whole of Natural Philosophy (i. 421).

Such are the various scientific properties which enabled Polytheism to fulfil, more or less directly, its main intellectual mission, as the general inaugurator of Progress both in Theory and Practice. The reconciliation of this Progress with the Order founded on Fetichism long depended solely on the wisdom of the Priesthood, who incessantly checked subversive tendencies by means of a continuous worship of the Past. For Positivism alone can systematise the permanent combination of the two instincts which Fetichism and Polytheism were forced to consecrate in succession, instincts always opposed till now, though both equally necessary. I could not then have properly estimated the long services rendered by the Polytheistic Priesthood in regard to this combination if I had not first of all adequately considered the chief dogmatic influences, both favourable and adverse. Hence it is that I have had to dwell at such length here on this purely Theoretical side, in my Abstract Appreciation of a regime whose destination was essentially Social.

(c) Esthetic Aptitude, pp. 150–152.

I have now, before entering on the Moral and Political aspects of Polytheism, to examine its Esthetic aptitude and Practical efficacy. But of these a summary view will suffice. For in the two following chapters respectively, they will naturally form the subjects of a special exposition which must then precede the Concrete Appreciation of the regimes to which they belong. Here I must confine myself to the general features presented by Art and Practice under Polytheism in all its forms, and which the Theocratic form displays better than any other, as being more in conformity with the fundamental harmony of the second period of Man's childhood.

Full treatment reserved for Chap. IV.

Furthermore this examination must be confined to what is required for a complete judgment of the Social properties of Polytheism.

Polytheism favoured Art chiefly by developing Public life. In itself Fetichism was more favourable to Art than Polytheism.

First, as to its Esthetic aptitude. It must be evident from what has been said in the preceding chapter (p. 113) that this power is considerably exaggerated through confounding results with tendencies. In itself Fetichism was more esthetic than Polytheism, though it could not yield such decisive productions on account of the insufficiently advanced state of society. The Second Causality was really more favourable to Art only because it gave a fuller developement to Public life, without which there can be no lofty esthetic inspirations.

The Fetichistic doctrine was at bottom more favourable than any other to the universal and continuous growth of Feeling, the essential source of all the Fine Arts. In this respect our First Age can be surpassed only by our Final State, when the ascendency of the Heart will be systematised and the admiration formerly inspired by natural objects will be transferred to human productions. In regard to Imagination properly so-called,—which is concerned with the means of expression, and not with the principle, of Art,—the superiority of Polytheism to Fetichism was more apparent than real.

In fact the purely fictitious images of Polytheism were susceptible of less esthetic power than those which in the primitive age had represented perceptible objects. In this respect too our Maturity will come closer to our First than to our Second Childhood. A more extended Social field was all that Fetichism required for the full manifestation of its admirable poetic power. It must ever be a subject for deep regret that the great Astrolatrous states of Mexico and Peru should have succumbed to Christian barbarity before they had attained a fuller developement, as also that Mussulman brutality should at an earlier period have wrought a similar destruction in Malay lands, especially in Borneo. Had it not been for this twofold loss, true philosophers and the real public would now entertain very different opinions concerning the comparative esthetic merits of Fetichism and Polytheism.

Superiority of Polytheism in the creation of Collective Images.

Be this as it may, we must concede to the Polytheistic doctrine a special aptitude in the case of Collective Images. It is true I have shown that such Images are more suited to Science than to Art. Still this power of Polytheism, flowing

as it did naturally from its Abstract source, must have considerably promoted its Esthetic developement, by allowing the direct personification of compound beings. In all cases of this kind Modern Art has invariably been forced to imitate Antiquity, though the imitation could not but be ineffectual after the downfall of the beliefs upon which the influence of such a means of artistic creation mainly depended. It is reserved for the Final Synthesis to reconstruct this powerful artifice, which is intimately bound up with the whole of the Positive worship, by disposing us to take real types as the best representation of collective existences.

Belief in invisible Beings developed conception of Subjective Life.

The Esthetic influence that was really peculiar to Polytheism will be found to have depended chiefly on the unanimous belief in, and familiar developement of, the Subjective Life. And hence the Human Initiation will always be indebted to our Second Childhood for a preparation that was indispensable to our Maturity in organising its fundamental worship. As it should be Man's highest aim to live with those who exist no longer and with those who shall exist hereafter, he needed to be qualified for such companionship by intimate association with invisible beings.

Such was the necessary apprenticeship of Man's habits of gratitude and love, which he will henceforth transfer to the whole of his ancestors and descendants. Though the purely chimerical nature of these preliminary Beings must have considerably impaired the moral influence they exerted upon their worshippers, the reality ascribed to them sufficed to prevent the complete failure of the education thus given. The need of such an introductory esthetic process may be directly verified by observing those exceptional populations whom Polytheism had not moulded sufficiently, owing to the premature advent of Monotheism, which is much less competent to direct this preparation.

I must restrict myself here to the above general view of the Esthetic aptitude of Polytheism. The Concrete Appreciation will bring out more fully the real influence exercised upon Art by the Worship and Regime of our Second Childhood.

(2) Practical Properties, pp. 152–156. Full treatment reserved for Chap. V.

In regard to the evolution of Activity, it will be enough for the present to examine from the abstract point of view the powerful impulse which it must have received from the Indirect system of Causality.

(a) Industrial Aptitude. Man could now hope to modify the world.

We have first to consider Peaceful Activity, the progress of which was at that time of secondary importance, yet always necessary, and such that the advance made prepared for its final ascendency. It is easy to see how favourable Polytheism must have been to this kind of Activity. For Polytheism effected as great an improvement in Practice as it did in Theory, when it summoned Man to modify a World which Fetichism treated too respectfully (p. 85). Although Man's action always remained subordinate to the power of the Gods, the regular interference of these latter was not then productive of the dangerous apathy which was induced at a later period, especially under the influence of Monotheistic Optimism. Moreover the Wills of the Gods were the sole religious guarantee of the Fundamental Order, which Fetichism alone had directly sanctioned but for the subsequent support of which it had left merely an inadequate Fatalism. Led henceforth to regard matter as passive, we should have exercised upon it a destructive activity had we started with the idea that it could be modified except under the impelling agency of the Gods.

So far from encouraging in us indolence, this sovereign domination—while thus regulating our energy—roused us habitually to the noblest efforts. The capriciousness and plurality of the Gods contributed to save us from the torpor that might have been produced by an excessive reliance upon their help. Had it not been for the resistless aid they gave us, the absence of all knowledge of the Laws of Nature would have proved too great an obstacle to our earliest attempts to interfere with the external Order. With this support Man conceived the hope of exercising over the World an unlimited command, and that at the very time when his real power was most restricted. These illusions, though capable of becoming dangerous in the end, were for a long time necessary to our industrial education, an education essentially due to Polytheism.

With Polytheism the Organisation of Industry commences, and Capital begins to be accumulated.

Fetichism had duly prepared the way for it, by clearing the ground to serve as the scene of Man's action, by taming the animals that are capable of association, and by firmly establishing sedentary existence. Polytheism directly reared upon this threefold basis that admirable Practical superstructure which has ever since continued to advance without interruption, until by slow degrees, and as the result of a universal cooperation (pp. 37, 115), it has become the general guarantee of our material

security, and even of our moral dignity. Then commenced those invaluable accumulations by which each generation of Mankind is subordinated to the one that goes before, and prepares for the one that is to follow; and from that time forth these accumulations have gone on incessantly increasing. But I shall treat of this more fully in the Concrete Appreciation.

Such was the important use of Polytheism in regard to Peaceful Activity which long repudiates any truly collective character, invariably necessary though such character be. Theocratic Wisdom, however, made admirable albeit inadequate efforts to ennoble it as much as possible. Military Activity which, from its very nature, becomes at once Social, will be specially examined in one of the following chapters, so that here I shall only consider the general aptitude of our Second Childhood for this decisive preparation.

(*b*) Military Aptitude.

Here too, as with Peaceful Activity, the Fetichistic introduction was essential for rendering the Polytheistic developement possible, yet could not supersede the necessity of this latter. The preparatory work of Fetichism may be summed up in the sedentary stage at its close. Under Astrolatry it inaugurated the military movement (p. 89) which became the chief result of Polytheism. Then it was that struggles hitherto fruitless gradually led to the system of conquests required for rendering the Human Initiation complete, and which could have been organised in no other way.

Sedentary existence essential for the efficacy of War.

War can exercise a beneficial influence only when the sedentary existence has become habitual, and this is true no less in the case of the victor than of the vanquished. For the successive incorporation of conquered populations around a fitting nucleus would be illusory, or even impossible, if their territories were not annexed to the central city. Tribes that have no settled residence can neither conquer nor be conquered. In spite of their habitual hostilities, War can never realise among such tribes its true social destination. Thus the Fetichistic preparation was of no less importance in the developement of War than in that of Industry.

Polytheism alone adapted for Conquest on a large scale.

But when this necessary basis had been provided, Polytheism alone was adapted for the system of conquests which it everywhere conducted. For no other form of Absolute Religion could lend itself in a sufficient degree to military incorporation. Fetichism could not, as it was too dispersive, except in its final

form of Astrolatry. Monotheism, on the other hand, could not, by reason of an excessive concentration. It is solely in Polytheism that the energetic nationality of the victorious worship is admirably combined with an honourable welcome accorded to the worship of the vanquished foe. Between the extermination practised by Fetichism and the degradation inflicted by Monotheism, Polytheistic annexation afforded the only possible issue that could allow those vast incorporations which the Human Initiation required at the outset.

Slavery,

This fundamental aptitude was rendered complete by the tendency of Polytheism to sanction the great Private institution which was indispensable for the full creation of Public life.

Common to industrial and warlike peoples in ancient times. But to be estimated here with reference to the latter.

Although Slavery in ancient times was common to industrial populations and to martial nations, it must be estimated principally with reference to the latter. Its origin was essentially military; it was necessary moreover that its twofold social destination should in the main be military likewise. Among the Ancients, as among the Moderns, it has always tended to degrade equally both the master and the subject when it has been introduced into peaceful cities:—the master has become indolent, the subject has been oppressed.

Its value as a military institution. It enables the Warriors to govern, and the Labourers to be educated.

As a military institution, on the contrary, it is of extreme service to both of them, by furnishing in each case the precise stimulus required for progress. Without this basis in Private life, the Warriors could not have properly developed their collective activity, such activity being incompatible with the absorbing pursuits of Industry. On the other hand, the labourer is thus enabled, under the ægis of a patronage that is never hostile, to devote his energies to the one form of activity appropriate to him, and from which in the end his freedom will come, as before he found in it the guarantee for his personal security. These two general tendencies of ancient slavery would always exist side by side, though the full developement of them both could not be simultaneous.

Fetichist Preparation for Slavery.

Fetichism had spontaneously prepared the way for this necessary institution, even more than for Conquest its correlative, from the time when Industry had progressed far enough for the victors to be able to turn the vanquished to profitable account instead of destroying them. The preference for Private life that characterised Fetichism allowed Slavery even then to display its touching tendency to perfect the Domestic consti-

tution by connecting it, through a fitting extension of the Family, with the Civic state.

Polytheism alone could develope its two social purposes.

But it was reserved for Polytheism to develope the two social purposes of this institution, these purposes being to enable the warriors to govern, and to educate the labourers. Its influence here depends upon the same essential grounds as in the case of Conquest, only they must be applied in an individual instead of in a collective sense. The Polytheistic doctrine was exclusively adapted for sanctioning the authority of the master and the obedience of the subject, by habitually allowing them to maintain a friendly intercourse without destroying the distinctions of rank, a course incompatible with the inflexibility of Monotheism, which tolerates only oppression or enfranchisement.

(3) Affective (or Social) Properties, pp. 156–165.

Polytheism as a whole has now been treated under the heads of, first and chiefly, Theory, then Art, and lastly Practice. To complete its examination from the Abstract point of view I have still to consider directly its Affective or Social properties, which are the chief source of its historical destination.

Preliminary inquiry into theory of Social Evolution as a whole, pp. 156–161.

In this, more than in any other case, we need to determine beforehand how far Fetichism, in spite of its Political inadequacy, had already carried the Human Initiation. For this purpose I must define more fully our Social evolution taken as a whole. In this way only can we thoroughly understand the necessary Transition in the fundamental education of Man's Feelings which Polytheism alone could conduct.

Each of the three Sympathetic Instincts requires a separate social phase for its special developement.

This Preparation, whether individual or collective, must offer three distinct phases in succession, intended respectively for thoroughly bringing out our three Sympathetic instincts,—first Attachment, then Veneration, and lastly Benevolence, the relations corresponding to which are of increasing range and gradually formed as the instincts are brought out. It is true that we develope these three affections simultaneously, through constant communications with our equals, superiors, and inferiors. But, for the perfect operation of any one of them, it is essential that that one should predominate over the other two.

Attachment, Veneration, and Benevolence are developed

Now this normal predominance naturally follows the course of the three Ages, individual or social, corresponding to the three stages in the progress of Intellect and Activity. Our

First Childhood forms Attachment, a feeling as consonant with our dependence as with the restriction and intimacy of our relations. In the Second Childhood Veneration exercises the most commanding influence, because we can form a better idea of the ties of relationship while our power is still insufficient for making ourselves free. Lastly, in our Adolescence Benevolence is strongest, since we are conscious at once of our independence and of the protection which we have it in our power to bestow. Such is the course of our moral progress, and—for the race as for the individual—it admits of being altered only in exceptional cases; and these are always more apparent than real.

respectively in Infancy, Childhood, and Youth.

This normal succession, thus clearly indicated by the Positive theory of Human Nature, is fully verified in the general course of the Social Evolution. Here the three Ages of the Collective Initiation exactly correspond to those of the Individual Preparation. Thus Fetichism had principally to develope Attachment, Polytheism Veneration, and Monotheism Benevolence. Starting with this threefold basis, Positivism now establishes the final harmony of the three successively developed instincts. The necessity of this course is more clearly marked in the case of the race than in the individual, for in the case of the race it is easier to grasp the connection of the different phases and the extent of the relations that correspond to them.

Which correspond to Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism.

In the preceding chapter I fully explained how Fetichism was specially adapted for founding our moral existence, by spontaneously constituting the Human Family. The other two preliminary Ages of course improved this private life; still they could but influence it indirectly, through the reactions exerted upon it in the spheres of Theory and Practice by Public life, the developement of which was reserved for them. Previous to the advent of our Normal State, the first Human Regime was the only one that could fully consecrate Domestic existence, by making our Feelings directly supreme over our Thoughts, and even over our Acts. Hence to all noble hearts it can never be a cause for regret that this introductory phase should have lasted longer than any other, as is proved by its continuance to our own day. Had we not undergone this long preparation, the necessary basis of our whole social system could not have been established with a solidity sufficient for resisting the shocks of modern anarchy.

Fetichism founds the Family, making Feeling supreme.

And the Family developes chiefly Attachment, while the City developes Veneration, and the Church Benevolence.

Domestic existence, at least when complete, trains our three sympathetic instincts simultaneously. Still it developes Attachment most, especially when the Family is limited to the fundamental pair. Notwithstanding the inequality of ages, Family relations are too intimate and too narrow to allow a full developement of Veneration and Benevolence. To complete our moral apprenticeship, by the cultivation of these two sentiments, ties of increased extent and diminished intensity are needed, in which the Veneration and the Benevolence shall be voluntary. Civic life, which Polytheism admirably developed, could alone give to Veneration such a training as had been given to Attachment under Fetichism. Lastly, it was for Monotheism in its turn, though here the work was less thoroughly done, to finish this education of the affections by creating a special tendency to Benevolence through the influence of those aspirations after universality which formed its chief feature,—aspirations which it is reserved however for Positivism to realise.

The Social destination of Polytheism was to found the City.

The Social mission of Polytheism is defined by this statico-dynamical theory well enough for enabling us to judge Polytheism fairly, without blindly expecting from it aptitudes altogether foreign to its scope. Its special object was the developement of Activity, after Fetichism had thoroughly trained Feeling, so that Monotheism might the better cultivate Intellect. Hence this Age had to keep in view the City mainly, as the preceding one had kept the Family, and as the following one must keep the Church. Such were the means required for gradually constituting our real unity, both collective and individual, this unity consisting always in Living for Others.

Altruism should chiefly relate to Posterity.

This fundamental tendency of Humanity will not be sufficiently brought out unless we dwell more especially on our relation to the general body of our successors. We ought to love and help our contemporaries as more direct and palpable fellow-labourers in the common and unintermitting work by which the whole of the Future is united with the whole of the Past. But every great soul always labours for Posterity, and refuses to be overmuch absorbed in the Present.

The disposition to live for Posterity is both wise and noble.

This disposition is as prudent as it is noble, for it places us before the only judges who are really competent, while it purifies our sympathies by directing them towards beings who do not yet exist. Moreover it affords both individuals and

peoples the only sure protection against the aberrations peculiar to that form of Egoism which is at once the highest form and the least amenable to discipline. For Vanity—the best named of all our propensities, as being the only one that misses its end through aiming at it too persistently—could never exercise any really dangerous seductions, were we to keep prominently in view a judgment which can no more be perverted than it can be evaded. In working for others then our labour should always be mainly for Posterity, but we are not on that account to disregard the esteem of those among our contemporaries who themselves inspire us with respect.

Altruism is first Domestic, then Civic, lastly Universal.

Sound moral unity was never understood in any other way, though it is only now that such unity can be rendered systematic. In fact every noble life has spontaneously associated itself with Posterity. But this destination can be developed only by degrees, its developement following the natural extension of our continuity in the three Ages of the Human Initiation,—first, purely Domestic; next, essentially Civic; at last, completely Universal.

Fetichist lives for his own posterity; Polytheist for future compatriots; Monotheist for general Posterity;

A Fetichist labours in the main for his own posterity, and this labour suffices for regulating the only moral existence that can then be formed. When we become Polytheists we have in view chiefly our Civic posterity, as we are now engaged in a collective activity, the results of which can be fully realised only by the general body of our successors in the same nation. But with Monotheism, the immediate precursor of Positivism, came such a presentiment of the final universality that we were able at once to consecrate all our grandest works, even those that were purely spontaneous, to general Posterity, the only centre towards which all human effort can really converge.

The Positivist lives for the Great Being.

Stretching ever further under this threefold preparation, the principle of Altruism acquires in the Normal Systematisation the widest extension permitted by the aggregate of Fatalities circumscribing Humanity; that extension being secured by connecting every existence, whether collective or individual, with the true Great Being. The constantly Relative nature of the Final Religion will be the means of preserving our sympathies from the deterioration to which they are liable in consequence of their absolute character. A constant sense of the profound imperfections of the Universal Order prevents us from too deeply lamenting that the active exercise of our benevolent

affections is confined, outside of our own species, to the animal races we are able to tame.

Each of these forms of Sociability prepares for the next.

To finish this view of the general progress of our Sociability, I must notice how each of its phases issues from the one that precedes and leads on to the one that follows. The domesticity of Fetichism qualified us for Polytheistic Civism, not only by a necessary preparation of our affections, but also by the direct influence of that kind of personality which taints the first and lowest form of Altruism. For the Family, when completely constituted, begins to be animated by a collective Egoism which, in the Age that follows, urges each one to make his own kinsfolk gradually predominate.

Transformation of Family affection into Patriotism;

These affections, in spite of their natural alloy, will always have a share, though continually less and less, in the developement of Civic existence, the original consolidation of which was essentially due to them. I shall explain further on how they acquire dignity among Families who, having become sufficiently masters of their own city, aspire to raise it above other cities. It is thus that Domestic affection becomes spontaneously converted into a real Patriotism to which our private ties can always be worthily subordinated.

And of Patriotism into true Philanthropy.

A final extension of the preparatory Sociability takes place, in the same way, when the dominion of the City becomes so enlarged that there is an habitual perception of the ultimate universality of human relations. This dominion is due at the outset to collective affections that are profoundly hostile to other nationalities, but, it eventually developes our true Philanthropy which had been paralysed till then by the restricted nature of our communications. The Wisdom of the Theocratic Sage and the instinct of the Warrior converge spontaneously towards this noble goal of the Affective Preparation, a goal which every great mind anticipated from the very first. For such minds invariably aimed at a moral harmony which is incompatible with our early condition when the growth of Altruism is under the control of Egoism.

Black, Yellow, and White races are specially characterised by Feeling, Activity, and Intellect respectively.

Until the Normal State has fully combined the three fundamental aspects of our nature, the three corresponding phases of our education will be represented by the three great varieties of the human species. In the Black race Feeling predominates, in the Yellow Activity, in the White Intellect. Corresponding to this difference we have a more decided and

asting preference in the several cases for Fetichism, Polytheism, nd Monotheism—which in succession have given a fuller evelopement in each race respectively to Domestic Union, ivic Cooperation, and Religious Harmony. This dynamical istinction between the three races tended to strengthen the atical distinction of which however it was originally the esult. But when the Positive Religion is universally accepted, nese two provisional sources of difference will be once for all emoved by means of an amalgamation, partly spontaneous and artly systematic, which will improve our whole cerebral con-itution.

This Theory of Social Evolution as a whole will be frequently applied.

The above Sociological Theory will be frequently employed nroughout the remainder of this treatise. Hence I have aken this opportunity for stating it at large, nor could it e better understood than in connection with so important a ase. I must now make special use of it in examining the ocial function of Polytheism.

Special application of it to elucidate the Social Properties of Polytheism.

Our three preliminary Ages, in successively contributing to ur moral education, display unequal aptitudes for their re-pective missions. Monotheism, which scorned its two pre-ecessors and vaunted its own superiority, was in all respects ne most defective of the three for the attainment of its special urpose, as will be shown when I examine it in detail. But olytheism, which always knew how to respect its Fetichistic ntecedents, conducted worthily its own part of the Human nitiation, although the preceding Age had more effectually ischarged its office of laying the foundations of civilisation.

Polytheism has for its main office to found the City. This requires that Veneration should be specially trained.

According to the above theory, the Second Preparatory hase had for its main object to institute the City by develop-ng the only kind of collective activity that was possible at the itset. By connecting itself with the First Phase which con-ituted the Family, it enabled the third to found the Church. he destination of Polytheism then being essentially Civic, it as requisite that there should be a continued and widely-pread special training of Veneration, the essential basis of all ue discipline.

It perfected (Fetichist) institution of Family, and sketched (Monotheistic) institution of Church. But

This is the part of our moral education that fell to the share this age. Regarded from this point of view, Polytheism ill appear highly satisfactory. It really improves the Family, nough only by the reaction which the City exercises upon it. loreover, it often furnished the rudiments of the Church, by

here we attend only to its main office.

establishing unity of religion among peoples politically independent. But the complete examination of these two accessory influences must be reserved for the Concrete Appreciation.

(*a*) Principal means of Polytheism for developing Public life: Creation of common beliefs and spiritual authorities.

Confining our attention then to the distinctive function of Polytheistic Sociability, apart from the Family, which was already realised, and from the Church, which was premature, we find that this Sociability was admirably adapted for developing Public life, to which Fetichism was suited only at its close when it passed into Astrolatry. This spontaneous aptitude of the Second Causality is mainly due to its tendency to create simultaneously a sufficient community of beliefs, and genuine spiritual authorities (p. 27). Both these closely connected elements of progress were commenced under Astrolatry, but they could not be fully developed till the Absolute Religion had been extended to the Human Order, which extension constitutes the main feature of Polytheism.

These common beliefs related to Human phenomena.

In habitually preferring the study of Man to the study of the World, the Ancient Priesthood was not actuated mainly by its desire of power. This was the only doctrine then possible; and in applying it chiefly to the noble object of government, the Priesthood gave satisfaction both to our Theoretic tendencies and our Practical impulses. It was quite essential for the direction of Civic life, that the Doctrine should bear principally upon human phenomena.

As Spiritual Authorities Old Men were superseded by Priests.

When material progress had led in the Age of Fetichism to the Institution of Old Men (p. 92), these spontaneous precursors of the Priests were long able to discharge the spiritual functions that gradually fell to their share by the aid of ordinary experience alone. For these functions were limited to Domestic government, the only kind of government that could then be developed, and for which women already possessed a store of useful precepts. But for the government of Cities there was habitually required a dogmatic study, suited for the People as well as for the Priesthood, and this Polytheism alone could found.

Beliefs about Human phenomena could not at that time be Positive.

No *real* theory could be formed concerning Human phenomena at a time when rational positivity was necessarily confined to the mere rudiments of Mathematics and Astronomy. It was indispensable therefore that the spontaneity of Theology should at that time make up for the inadequacy of Science in a domain separated from the Positive Spirit by the long and

ntricate preparatory researches required for the Material and he Vital Order. Had there not been this issue for the intelect, Society could have made no progress, and the natural ascendency of Feeling would have indefinitely prolonged the Fetichistic state.

To make this clearer, I must observe that the Theological nitiative was more necessary for Social than for any other tudies, not only on account of the superior complexity of Social studies and their dependence as a rule on the whole body of studies that precede them, but also for a reason peculiar to themselves. The reason is, that in their case, it is ong before observation can secure an adequate field, so that even were the mind sufficiently predisposed to attempt them, t would be impossible to form the Theory of Society (p. 39); whereas, in all other studies, the phenomena are continually present and merely await competent observers. The general extent of the condition thus imposed upon speculation is letermined by the consideration that, exactly as in the case of Intelligence, so in that of Sociability, it was indispensable hat the whole of the Human Initiation should be accomplished before we could obtain a complete spectacle for our nigher meditations. Remembering this peculiar difficulty, we should the more respect the perseverance of the Ancient Priesthood in developing the Polytheistic doctrine in a social direction. It certainly proves the ingratitude and frivolity of the charges of systematic hypocrisy indulged in by modern critics, who nevertheless admit the sincerity of the Theological explanations for less complex phenomena.

Because these were not only very complex and dependent, but also very incomplete.

The Absolute Philosophy was able to originate this important extension without instituting Polytheism properly so called. For the last phase of Fetichism succeeded in doing so, by extending the whole body of sidereal influences to the Human Order. But the course thus adopted by Astrolatry was no less arbitrary than that of Polytheism, while the Polytheistic method had the advantage of being more direct and of wider scope, and at the same time more spontaneous and popular. The superior claims of the Polytheistic method, however, never led to an abandonment of that of Astrolatry by the Public and still less by the Priesthood. For the Sociology of Astrolatry connected best with the Past as also with the Future, in consequence of the sanction it gave to Fetichistic

Astrolatry had sketched the application of religious belief to social phenomena.

Fatalism and its encouragement of the Positive Spirit. Conversely, the Sociology of Polytheism was most suited for regulating the Present, especially by its developing Civic Veneration. When their rivalry was no longer restrained by a practical destination, the first alone survived, lasting on through Monotheism until the approach of Positivism.

But this was preeminently the work of Polytheism.

In spite of the longer duration of the more ancient method, the extension of Causality to what in the end was its chief domain—the Human Order—must, for the reasons above given, be connected principally with Polytheism proper. The Monotheistic Concentration, be it observed, was not equally well adapted to the Social destination of this Synthesis. For both heart and mind must have paid more willing homage to a noble hierarchy of independent divinities than to the arbitrary sovereignty of one sole God.

Monotheism, as a doctrine, was less adapted to the social purpose of the Theological Synthesis.

The City of the Gods could be but a reflex of the Human City. Still it sanctioned the spontaneous constitution of this latter, and led to its systematisation. Admirable was the way in which the fundamental adjustment of independence and cooperation was hallowed by the constant example of the Gods themselves. This wholesome plurality long neutralised the egoistic character inseparable from the purely individual source of every Absolute Philosophy. It was not till after the Monotheistic Systematisation that egoism became fully developed, each believer being then urged to associate himself directly only with his God. Monotheism was thus led to a dogmatic denial of the innate existence of our sympathetic instincts, whereas Polytheism comprehended them, at least implicitly, in its uniform consecration of all our propensities (p. 27).

(*b*) The two secondary means of Polytheism for developing Public Life must be only generally noticed here.

These inductions suffice for the abstract view of the aptitude of Polytheism for developing Public Life. It will be fully brought out by the whole Concrete Appreciation. I must moreover abstain at present from any but the most general explanations of two other social properties in the Religion of our Second Childhood that have alone been as yet sufficiently recognised.

(*a*) Consecration of Human Authorities.

No one would dispute its general fitness for the spontaneous consecration of human authorities who can henceforth find no substitute for its Theocratic sanction, now hopelessly enfeebled, except by receiving from Positivism a Sociocratic investiture. But what is less seen at the present day is the normal

superiority of Polytheism to Monotheism in the consecration thus given, the latter being unable to connect it habitually with the divine lineage of the human chiefs. Although the intensity of such a sanction must often have induced rulers to make tyrannical claims, it must have had an extremely beneficial effect upon the subject classes in general. For no less powerful influence would have sufficed to overcome the strong love of personal independence among primitive men and to cultivate in them the instinct of Veneration.

(β) Divine rewards and punishments. Both these related principally to present life. Apotheosis.

The aptitude of Polytheism for promoting the discipline of Man by a powerful system of rewards and punishments needs but little elucidation here. I must however note its superiority to Monotheism in this respect, a superiority even more marked than in the case I have just been considering. Monotheism was led into the most dangerous exaggerations by restricting itself to a future life. Polytheism, on the contrary, although it gave further extension to life than Monotheism did (p. 180) looked in the main to real existence, of which the fictitious state was but the developement, at least in the popular belief which alone is of importance in such a case. But its superiority is still more evident when we consider that its discipline was as well calculated for rewarding as for punishing. While Monotheism acted essentially by terror alone, Polytheism attracted men to the service of Humanity by the noble prospect of their own apotheosis, a reward discriminatingly bestowed so long as Theocratic prudence prevailed over Military ferocity.

Concrete Appreciation of Theocracy, pp. 165–202.

These remarks on secondary points are complementary to my exposition of the principal Social properties of Polytheism. The Abstract Appreciation being now terminated, I must devote the second half of this chapter and the whole of the two following ones to the Concrete examination of the various regimes of which Polytheism admitted. First of all then I must state the grounds for the general division of these regimes into two great classes, in which Polytheism, whether it remain Conservative under the rule of the Priesthood, or whether it become Progressive through the predominance of the Military element, is always working towards its historical destination—the establishment of Political life.

Preliminary remarks on division of Polytheism into Conservative or Theocratic and Progressive or Military, pp. 165–170.

Necessary confusion of the Spiritual and Temporal Powers

To make the difference between these classes clear I must explain the general necessity which, in every Polytheistic regime, entailed the normal confusion of the Spiritual authority

under Polytheism.

and the Material power, notwithstanding the invariable diversity of their natural sources.

Germs of each Power to be found even in the Family. Their differentiation increases with civilisation.

These two Powers, springing respectively from Intellect and Activity, can never coincide completely, although their separation must always be more marked in proportion as civilisation becomes developed. They are distinguished while government is still simply Domestic, at least after the Institution of Old Men has arisen. And even before this important advance has been made, we can trace in Woman's intervention, essentially Affective though it be, the first germs of a speculative influence designed for moderating the masterdom of Activity (p. 91).

In founding the City these two Powers cooperate, bringing Families together for Spiritual purposes by the same worship and by common festivals, for Temporal purposes by a collective activity, at once offensive and defensive. But this institution —essentially Polytheistic, though originating with Astrolatry— at once brings out the natural rivalry of the Theoretic authority and the Practical power which carry on a constant struggle for the headship of society. Their equally absolute character must even cause the conflicts between them to be more severe then than they can be under the Relative Regime.

They both helped to found the City; but their rivalry is already apparent there.

This explains how it was that in every period of Ancient history political harmony could be established and preserved only by the complete subordination of one of these Powers to the other, although they could never both be really combined in the hands of the same chiefs. Their complete independence is in reality adapted only for the Modern Order, in which indeed it is both inevitable and indispensable. But Theological doctrine and Military activity are alike repugnant to it, since both always create an equal tendency to absolute dominion.

And for Civic existence to continue, one of the two had to become subordinate.

The Ancient Priesthood, as the recognised organ of Supernatural Beings, was invariably forced to aim at command and could never restrict itself to giving advice. Its absolute nature precluded it from accepting counsel as its function— which however is the only function suited to Theoricians— except when the portals of government were closed to it. So far from voluntarily submitting to the rule of the military class, it spontaneously conduced to its ruin by making a peaceful activity predominate.

At the same time the Warriors were no less constrained to aim at complete social supremacy for themselves, as without it

no system of conquests could be developed. Confiding in the natural independence of the Practical power, they prided themselves at that time upon having the direction of the only activity that admitted of a collective character. Their submission to the Priests must always have seemed to them sufficiently degrading to prevent their acquiescing in it except as the result of circumstances over which they had no control.

In spite of this continued hostility, whether open or concealed, Civic existence brought about a subordination of one of these two Powers to the other, such subordination being necessary to its harmony.

Each could lend valuable assistance to the other.

Theoricians must have seen that Theologism could not possibly guard against the arbitrary deviations inseparable from its absolute and fictitious nature unless it were permanently applied to Practical government. Though proud of their mental superiority, they perceived in a confused way that Intellect cannot suffice for the habitual association of Families when there is no common Activity to keep up the Civic union. They must therefore have regarded the developement of War as indispensable for the adequate diffusion of Sacerdotal authority.

On the other hand, even those Practicians who are least inclined to relish the advice of Theoricians can never afford to look down upon a spiritual consecration. War always demands a strict discipline, increasing in intensity as the expeditions become more frequent and extend to a greater distance. Now though material influences are never given up the military chiefs soon perceived that their own personal claims to respect however great cannot supersede the necessity of a religious sanction if they would exact an obedience both adequate and lasting, and for obedience to be such, it must continue honourable and must be consecrated.

Hence they coalesced, but never on equal terms.

Such are the respective influences that lead in the end to the formation of a long alliance between two Powers that are heterogeneous and even hostile. Notwithstanding the mutual affinity between commands that may not be discussed and beliefs that cannot be proved, War and Theologism are long before they coalesce on this civic basis (p. 53). Harmony between them cannot be established except as the result of a situation so strongly marked in one direction or another that it effectually subordinates one of the Powers to the other by a suitable process of developement and repression.

Polytheism tended to be Theocratic when it sprang rather from Astrolatry, and Military when it sprang rather from Abstract Contemplation.

Thus arose the two antagonistic regimes which Polytheism required for adequately realising its Social destination. While their natural incompatibility prevented them from synchronising, their common end required them to be successive, yet among different peoples. The contrast between them corresponds essentially to that between the two normal roots of the Polytheistic doctrine. For Astrolatric Polytheism is best adapted to Sacerdotal ascendency, both by systematising it, and by enabling it to spread without any considerable developement of Conquest. General Polytheism, on the contrary, favours Military supremacy, at first by its superior spontaneity, afterwards by securing for the Warriors in virtue of their divine lineage a consecration that renders them as far as possible independent of the Priests.

To be efficacious it was necessary that Military Polytheism should follow Theocratic, but in a different population.

Hence we have naturally two Polytheistic regimes: one simply a continuation of the Fetichistic state, and essentially adapted for Order; the other more fully developing the reaction of Will upon Necessity, and conducing in a higher degree to Progress. But, as a consequence of these respective aptitudes, it was indispensable for the success of the latter regime that it should come after the former one, which alone could supply an adequate basis for the whole Human Movement. Although thus forming successive social stages, they none the less required different populations, owing to the extreme dissimilarity of the modes of life peculiar to the two regimes. Hence this indispensable combination of conditions was inevitable only under the pressure of circumstances, especially those of an external kind, which gave a predominance to one or the other form according as the situation was favourable to it or not. Among the majority of peoples there was naturally no such predominance; and as they sympathised simultaneously both with Sacerdotal and Military Polytheism, their social destiny thus depended upon the influence exerted on them by other populations whose characteristics were sufficiently marked.

Political influence of Material Environments,

It is here that the reaction of the material environment on political developement is best displayed. This is a subject which has given rise to many irrational conceptions, especially in modern times. This reaction goes on continually diminishing, as civilisation enables Man to modify the World more and more. But though the World at first seems to dominate us absolutely, the power it exercises can never affect the natural

independence of the Laws of Sociology, these laws admitting only of variations of intensity, as was shown in detail in the last chapter of the preceding volume.

Greatest in earlier times;

Since, then, the influence of the environment on Man is a regularly decreasing one, it was necessarily at its maximum in times anterior to all historical data, even the most indirect. For it must, during the first Age—the Age of Fetichism—have brought about the provisional division of our species into three distinct races, which division afterwards became the chief source of the concrete differences in the developement of Man. After the action thus exerted at the commencement, the material environment has never been able to modify the progress of Society to such an extent as it did when it gave a decided superiority either to Conservative or to Progressive Polytheism.

Determined the form of Polytheism in different nations.

The choice must everywhere depend on the continuous impulse towards either intellectual culture or military activity, which the sum of local influences may rather give.

Circumstances favourable to Theocratic Polytheism.

When the pressure of Material exigencies is so slight that the requisite accumulations can be rapidly made, the universal attraction of Domestic existence naturally causes our peaceful inclination to predominate. As such a situation favours Speculative progress at the same time that it developes Social fraternity, the Old Men are easily converted into Priests, a change required through the premature advent of the sedentary stage, and the consequent introduction of Astrolatry. Then it is that the Sacerdotal regime becomes fully developed, provided that the situation be such as not only to divert men's thoughts from attack, but also to supersede the necessity for defence. This happens when the Theocratic population is surrounded with barriers adapted for facilitating its industrial labours; such as the valley of a great river, a girdle of deserts or mountains, &c.

Circumstances favourable to Military Polytheism.

It is easier to understand the social reaction of the material surroundings which lead, on the other hand, to a powerful developement of Military activity before the progress of Intellect is far enough advanced to allow the Priesthood to exert an adequate influence. A rigorous climate or a barren soil at first delays the Institution of Old Men, and afterwards induces them to become rather the precursors of a warlike *Senate* than of genuine *Priests*, as is indicated by the etymology of the two words, an etymology that will always remind us of the difference of their Civic tendencies. The rise of the Home also is here

attended with difficulties. It is in fact not so much a residence as a military centre for offensive, as well as defensive purposes.

To render this twofold analysis complete, it must be observed that the first regime alone could afford sufficient grounds for the second, the connection between them being a necessary one. For the military tribes could not have been solidly organised had there not been already in existence by a natural process of growth industrial populations who from their peaceful mode of life would offer these tribes a prey as easy as it was inviting. But when the Theocratic state has had time to thoroughly imprint its characteristics on a people, it gloriously survives attack: either a successful resistance is offered, or it may be the conquerors are converted and devote themselves to propagating the Theocracy they had endeavoured to subdue.

Such are the natural influences which lead to the necessary breaking-up of the Polytheistic world into Theocratic or Military peoples. After Conservative Polytheism had sufficiently prepared the fundamental Order of Humanity, Progressive Polytheism working upon this basis was able to conduct from a suitable centre the effectual organisation of Collective Activity, this being the chief end of our Second Childhood.

Concrete appreciation of Polytheism in this chapter will relate to its Theocratic form only.

I must now devote the remainder of this chapter to the Concrete Appreciation of the Theocratic state, from which our various fundamental institutions, both social and intellectual, have hitherto sprung. Substantially, our judgment of it is already in a very forward state, by virtue of our abstract examination of the general properties of Polytheism. These must in fact belong most especially to its theocratic variety as being the most normal and permanent. I have now only to describe its principal results, first, Philosophic and Scientific; then Esthetic and Industrial; lastly, Political and Moral.

Preliminary account of Theocratic Constitution, pp. 170–178.

But it behoves me to preface this inquiry by an explanation of the Theocratic constitution which must at length be rescued from a condemnation that is no less frivolous than it is ungrateful. The founder of the Religion of Humanity will always regard it as a sacred obligation to render due honour to all his predecessors. This duty is especially incumbent upon me in the case of my most distant ancestors, whose cooperation was at once more meritorious and decisive, while their self-abnegation allows me to do no more than express my gratitude to them collectively (p. 204).

The Theocratic constitution, which is as simple as it is stable, invariably rests upon the necessary combination of two fundamental institutions, naturally connected, though admitting of being completely separated. One consists in the hereditary nature of all professions; the other in the common subordination of all the castes formed on this hereditary principle to the sacerdotal caste. It is easy to see the necessity as well as the spontaneity of this Civic regime, which sprang directly out of the Domestic government founded by Fetichism.

This rests on Castes and their subordination to a Priestly Caste.

The hereditary transmission of every social function affords at the outset the only means of consolidating the general division of human labour, and of preserving our acquisitions of every kind, whether processes or results. No real theory being at that time possible, there could never be any genuine teaching. Everything had to be learnt by imitation. The success of this traditional method depends upon constant practice, which must commence at a very early age, and be spontaneously carried on in the Family.

By Caste alone could results of industry and science have been preserved, and processes taught.

Until the castes were firmly established, the principal industrial, and even scientific discoveries, must have been frequently lost, and thus the need of this mode of preservation would come to be generally felt. But this regime tends to perpetuate and develope not only processes and results, but also aptitudes, in virtue of the law of Vital Heredity, a law of whose general reality there can be no doubt, though its special rules are still unknown. Education, which in modern times often counteracts hereditary influence, invariably tended in those days to favour it, at least in the case of the fundamental dispositions.

The more important and difficult the function, the greater was the necessity of this regime. Hence it is that the Sacerdotal caste everywhere presents itself as the most ancient of all, the others owing to it their systematic organisation. Nothing in after times could prove more clearly the hopeless extinction of this primitive regime than the abolition during the Middle Age of hereditary succession in the priesthood. Thenceforward the sole essential vestige of the Theocratic state remaining in the West was Royalty, which continued till its overthrow in France.

This is pre-eminently true of the Priestly caste.

This original method of transmission tends to disappear as our conceptions become gradually more and more coordinated.

Caste becomes unnecessary

when empirical teaching can be superseded by theoretical.

For when the coordination has proceeded so far that it enables us to appreciate and develope aptitudes independently of Domestic tradition, the method is one which becomes both useless and oppressive. Still, when the Castes are converted into Classes, the only change that takes place as a rule is, that each functionary is allowed to choose his successor where he pleases outside of his own family, and to receive him into the family by adoption. This Sociocratic method, which renders the hereditary principle complete by applying it to materials as well as to functions, is employed at first—and herein it is the inverse of the Theocratic method—for the less important functions, from which it is now being extended by the Positive Systematisation to the highest.

Caste was the link between the Family and the City.

No less necessary than it was spontaneous, the institution of Caste long formed the sole guarantee of Solidarity as well as of Continuity. It is by this institution that the City was constituted, when each family was naturally invested with a true Social character, in virtue of its being devoted, generation after generation, to certain assigned functions exclusively. At the same time Caste gave dignity and strength to Domestic government, by directly connecting it with the Civic constitution.

Caste feeling is never equivalent to genuine Civic feeling.

Still this regime was inadequate for fully instituting the City, because it left the Castes essentially independent of one another, notwithstanding the constant sense of the mutual assistance they rendered, owing to the limited nature of their respective functions. Here we have, in the gradual developement of the Social instinct, a phase that is too little appreciated. In this phase Sympathy extends beyond the Family so far as to take in all those who follow the same profession. Though not reaching, when thus enlarged, to the level of genuine Civism, it will always constitute a fundamental feeling that leads to partial communications between different Cities, especially in connection with the principal offices.

Hence the necessity of a supreme caste to bind other castes together.

The natural want of Solidarity in this social system brings out clearly the general need of the spontaneous authority exercised by the Sacerdotal caste over all the other castes of which it is the only systematic bond. Were it not for this second basis, the Theocratic community would soon be broken up into independent, and often antagonistic, tribes, incapable of being united by any habitual sense of human relations as a whole. Since there could be at that time no genuine Civic union—for

uch union can result only from a common and continuous ctivity—the bond formed by the Priesthood was the one sole ource of Political unity.

To understand the power of this bond, we must not attend xclusively to the religious functions of the dominant caste. What should be chiefly dwelt upon is the admirable *universality* hat characterises the Theocratic Priesthood. Being the sole epositary of all the conceptions that had been arrived at both n Theory and in Practice, it kept up special and continuous elations with each of the castes. From its synthetic character t busied itself with everything, stopping short only at the point f material execution. From this it abstained, the better to mbrace the whole range of consultative functions. Thus the uling caste could have no *speciality* except the exclusive control f general government, and this was closely bound up with its eligious office.

Priestly caste embraced all knowledge, and had consultative influence on all functions.

Now that modern anarchy has secured the temporary triumph f a dispersive analysis, this Theocratic synthesis is thoroughly nisunderstood. Our specialists strive to represent its concenration of attributes as a Social monstrosity, whereas it really ffers the best possible type of the Human Regime. No subsequent eriod has been able to show views and efforts at all comparable n their fulness to those of the ancient Theocrats, who were at nce legislators, judges, physicians, astronomers, philosophers, nd poets, while at the same time they were pontiffs. This conentration of all Theoretic offices, instead of being in any way nomalous, was in spontaneous conformity with the real nature f the Human Order. It will form—as shown in the preceding olume (ii. 265)—a still more marked characteristic of the Final riesthood, who will have a clearer perception of the necessary ndivisibility of Theory.

An unrivalled type of Encyclopedic culture.

Theocracy did what it could to originate this fundamental erception at a time when abstract conceptions were just beginning to be formed, being limited as yet to their germs in Mathematics. The one capital defect of this regime was the ntire confusion between counsel and command (ii. 342). This erious imperfection, which could not but entail by degrees the uin of an admirable constitution, was however for a long time oth indispensable and inevitable. It is inseparable from the bsolute nature of the primitive religion, and it is the sole means f establishing the necessary independence of the Contemplative

Priestly absorption of Temporal Power was necessary, though destined in the end to ruin the regime.

Class, without which there can be no great progress, either intellectual or social. In those rude times, when material force naturally predominated, Theoricians could escape being trampled upon by Practicians only by becoming universal chiefs through the medium of the religious worship.

After all the Priests did not in pure Theocracies undertake directly Temporal functions.

Still they were never able, as is supposed, to gain possession of government in the strict sense of the term. In government, whether public or private, the Priesthood never took part. Neither the command of armies, nor the conduct of industrial enterprises, ever belonged to the Priests, in whose eyes every Practical function involved a real degradation. The mistakes current upon this point arise from a vulgar confusion of true Theocracy with those degenerate temporal Theocracies in which the Warriors, after gaining the upper hand, ruled under Sacerdotal forms.

The normal separation between Theory and Practice was observed as far as was then possible.

The fundamental division, then, between Theory and Practice was established at the commencement in as normal a way as possible. Its sole defect—and that a necessary one—lay in the abuse of moral influence, resulting from an absolute doctrine inconsistent with simple advice. But this tendency, which was ever on the increase, was quite enough to corrupt and discredit the dominant Priesthood when the time at length came for Activity to cast off the exceptional yoke of Intellect.

Polytheism suitable to Theocracy.

It is easy now to complete this general examination by showing how Polytheism is spontaneously adapted for such a constitution.

Each caste had its patron god: the principal gods being the ancestors of the priests.

In the first place, the Second Causality consecrated the foundation of the various castes in a perfectly natural way by placing each of them under the special control of a divinity who is originally some representative of the caste deified on worthy grounds. Secondly, it sanctioned their general hierarchy and common subordination to the hereditary Priesthood by the normal classification of the different Gods, the chief of whom were of course the ancestors of the priestly race. The harmony obtaining between the Polity and Religion in these two respects has been foolishly ascribed to calculations that would have been no less absurd than immoral. It really was the natural result of the Subjectivity peculiar to the Polytheistic doctrine, and is no evidence of either hypocrisy or servility. This subjectivity always rendered the Polytheistic doctrine, though without our knowledge, the faithful exponent of our tendencies and wants.

Thus much for the Theocratic constitution considered directly. But to pass upon it a definitive judgment we must look to its historical destination. Now, when regarded from this decisive stand-point, the admirable nature and the thorough inadequacy of this regime are both brought out with equal clearness. For it really instituted the Normal Order as far as the circumstances of the time would allow, yet it could not properly guide the evolution of our Second Childhood.

To judge Theocracy fairly we must remember its historical purpose.

The chief danger attending it was the result of its noble tendency to systematise Human existence before our various forces had been adequately developed. The consequence was, that in the end it thoroughly impeded their most distinctive development. This had to be accomplished under Progressive Polytheism, which was less synthetic but more elastic.

It was a noble but premature systematisation.

Theocratic Wisdom, always placed as it was at the true general point of view, employed Intellect directly in its permanent mission, the preservation and improvement of Humanity. It saw clearly the fundamental importance of Public life, for which there had been too little scope under the previous regime, yet it never separated Public from Private life which that regime had fully instituted. It regarded Civic existence as intended essentially for the consolidation and developement of Domestic existence on which Man's happiness chiefly depends.

It treated Public Life as a means for the improvement of Private Life.

To this practical end, Theocracy subordinated all speculation, never encouraging the developement of it simply for its own sake. Its supreme rule was, 'Know thyself.' When I complete this by adding, 'To improve thyself,' I do no more than bring out the sense in which the general precept was always understood by the Sacerdotal genius, which avoided the subsequent extravagances of the Philosophic spirit (p. 12). Morality, in which Theory and Practice unite, was now, therefore, proclaimed to be the master science, the one sole end of all our intellectual efforts; and this was in conformity with the true constitution of the Encyclopedic Scale, the fundamental term of which had already been worthily sketched (p. 74). This Wisdom was in no way fortuitous, but was the result of the Social destination of a Priesthood constantly placed at the head of government. The leading part it thus took in action enabled it too to restrain within moderate bounds the aberrations of its Theological doctrine, a doctrine whose natural elasticity it knew thoroughly well how to turn to the utmost advantage.

It treated Morals as the highest science.

It promoted Industrial Life, and tried to correct its selfish tendency.

By always connecting Theory with Practice, this noble Priesthood strove to establish in a direct manner our true unity, both collective and individual. It attempted, even at that early period, to secure the permanent ascendency of the one form of activity that is capable of becoming strictly universal. It did so by taking special pains to develope Industrial life, which was closely associated with Domestic life by the institution of Caste. The natural leaning of the Priesthood towards the arts and manners of peace was quite in harmony with Theocratic rule, continually threatened as it was by the rivalry of the Military element. But this habitual preference never blinded them to the essentially egoistic character that long attaches to the Industrial instinct, and which taints it even in its existing state of developement (p. 48). Every true philosopher must regard with profound admiration the continued efforts of the ancient Theocrats to ennoble this existence, as far as possible, by developing the social tendency provided for it by the institution of Caste.

In short it foreshadowed the Positive regime.

Intellect and Activity then were understood and cultivated by the primitive Theocracy, in accordance with the type which is suitable to the final Sociocracy. And so this regime, which has been blindly charged with being retrograde, accomplished, as far as the situation allowed it, the most important and difficult step in the progress of civilisation, namely, to establish the first elementary type of the normal constitution of Humanity under the guardianship of the Gods. While, on the one hand, the Present was regulated with a view to the Future, it was, on the other hand, duly subordinated to the whole of the Past, and thus *continuity* was as much developed as *solidarity*. Springing as it did, in all cases, from Astrolatry, the Theocratic regime spontaneously incorporated all the remains of Fetichism. The Fetichistic worship was often sanctioned for the lower castes, though Polytheism was generally accepted among the higher. The veneration of all ancestors, whether private or public, spontaneous in Fetichism, became in Polytheism a general and systematic duty. For its importance was understood by the Priesthood, imbued as they were with a lasting sense of the fundamental value of the Fetichistic antecedents, which remained the surest guarantees of Human Order.

It failed because it was a Rule of Intellect.

Vastly superior though it was to all subsequent regimes, Theocracy could not fully realise the general object it was pre-

laturely aiming at, and even failed essentially in the partial volution of our Second Childhood. All the admirable efforts f the Priesthood to subordinate Intellect to Activity were ooomed to be unsuccessful, in consequence of the mischievous apremacy which this constitution was forced to confer upon ental influence, through not being able to separate counsel om command. Their noble perseverance was equally inapable of renovating Industrial existence, which still retains s selfish character, presenting thereby a formidable obstacle to ur modern Sociability, an obstacle it will not be able to overome until all human relations have been systematised by ositivism.

It bequeathed to succeeding stages a type of Unity and a foundation for Order.

And thus Theocracy was unable to accomplish a task which he sum of Human Fatalities reserved for Sociocracy. Nevertheless, its fundamental attempt was no less indispensable than was inevitable, for it furnished all the other phases of our reparation with a general type and with special bases. Humanity could henceforth go through her Initiation without ever eing unmindful of the Final Unity, the chief features of which ere simultaneously traced out in the Theocratic Synthesis—a ynthesis which failed only in consequence of the situation, both heoretical and Practical, that necessarily prevailed during our econd Childhood.

It tried to found the Church before the City had been constituted:

I may sum up with precision this definitive judgment of Theoracy by a suitable application of the Statical conceptions laid own in the preceding volume with reference to the three forms degrees of Human Association: first, Domestic; next, Civic; stly, Religious (ii. 250, &c.). Starting with the Family, which etichism had fully instituted, Theocratic Polytheism attempted found the Church directly, passing over the City. This view, hich is in exact conformity with our natural mode of procedure the case of all mean terms (p. 52), explains at once both the ilure and the beneficial effects of this regime. It was unsuited r founding the City, a task which implies a collective activity; nd for this very reason it could not found the Church, an initution which always has for its object to unite independent ities, whereas Theocracy confined itself to uniting Castes. But ot only did it provide the means of Order and Progress for the bsequent preparatory stages; it moreover furnished a direct attern of the Final State by placing Man's whole existence nder the control of the only power that is competent to regulate

it, allowing for the corrupting influence which was at that time inseparable from the doctrine by reason of its being absolute.

And to regulate Intellect and Activity before either had received its special developement.

Although the Theocratic Priesthood struggled incessantly against the simultaneous defects of its doctrine and situation, its admirable efforts could not supersede the necessity of our working out by other means the twofold evolution that fell to our Second Childhood. Nothing but a decisive though partial developement, first of Intellect, and afterwards of Activity, could give adequate play to forces which Theocracy attempted to discipline before they were distinctly characterised. This developement was the necessary object of the two forms of that Progressive Polytheism, which resulted from the predominance of the Military element. These will be examined in the two following chapters.

After this general appreciation of Theocracy we are in a position to estimate its special Results.

This general view of the Theocratic regime will contribute to the accurate determination of its special results, which I shall examine in the order above indicated (p. 170). It would be impossible without this common basis to convey an adequate idea of the different effects of the most Synthetic of all the constitutions that have ever directed Humanity. Accordingly the examination of these effects must always be guided by the nature and object of the regime, and both these have been explained fully enough here.

(1) Intellectual Results, pp. 178–190.

(*a*) Philosophical Influence, pp. 178–181.

The Theocratic Philosophy is strikingly distinguished by the way in which it combines a Synthetic character with a Practical tendency, and that Philosophy is rightly denominated *Wisdom* by reason of its consecrating Intellect to the permanent service of Humanity. Although the Theocratic sages could not thoroughly appreciate Abstract conceptions they were right in condemning speculations that were incompatible with that supreme end of all our efforts. As the attention of the primitive Priesthood was always concentrated upon government, they were thus led to keep their ordinary meditations as free as possible from the vagueness and arbitrariness that characterise the absolute dogmas of a Fictitious Synthesis. Their efforts will not seem too Practical, if we bear in mind that Theory was then quite in its infancy. This Practical tendency, which at that time was by no means unfavourable to the true progress of the human mind, is one that does honour to a regime in which the social supremacy of Intellect was an encouragement to idle speculations, such as are always pre-

Theocracy wisely directed Speculation to Practical Ends.

red to real problems by inferior thinkers who conceal their ental poverty beneath the cloak of dignity.

By making Morals the master science it founded the Encyclopedic Hierarchy.

Thus Theocratic Wisdom instituted the normal type of the ntemplative existence, an existence freed from material xieties in order that those who lead it may pursue their editations on the public good without interruption. By aking science consist principally in Morals, in which Theory inseparable from Practice, the Encyclopedic Hierarchy was unded (p. 41). That Hierarchy was now capable of comehending all sound speculations by degrees as their necessary lation to this common object should be clearly brought into ew. Astrolatry had already separated the Vital from the aterial Order, and pure Fetichism at the outset had made e universal ascendency of the Material Order to be adequately t. But the Vital Order could not be properly connected th the Moral Order for want of the mean term Sociology. is capital science on which the constitution of the whole ncyclopedic system depends, was for a long time incompatible th with the individual nature of Theological conceptions and th the inadequate developement of social phenomena (p. 39).

Although Theologism treated Man as dependent on the Gods, the Priests felt empirically that he depended on Humanity.

But though the Theological Synthesis, by placing each dividual under the constant guidance of the Gods, hindered e recognition of Man's necessary dependence upon Humanity, e Theocratic situation tended to correct this fault. For a riesthood whose attention was continually fixed upon the cial point of view, could not fail to have an empirical sense this subordination. Although Man's developement was in o early a stage for the detection of its special laws, the istence of such laws must have been indicated in a confused y by the Practical impulses which often gave evidence of cisive relations between Action and Prevision in that Order hich was the most modifiable of all.

While the Priests thus spontaneously provided against the consequences of their doctrine, they were disposed also, by e same social motives, to modify the doctrine itself, and, king advantage of its indefiniteness, to make it better adapted the regime.

They utilised the doctrine of Immortality for moral discipline.

The most striking example of this tendency is furnished by e beliefs connected with Eternal Life. These beliefs, which left to themselves might have inspired boundless extravahces, were thus applied artificially, though without calcula-

tion, to the consolidation and improvement of the Human Order. That Order which had now become the chief occupation of the Gods as well as of the Priests, was immediately governed by individual powers, temporarily united to our bodies, but endowed with an eternity of their own, an eternity which was the common attribute of all divinities. The perpetual Transmigration of these souls or spirits, after remaining for a long time arbitrary, eventually furnished Theocratic Wisdom with a salutary means of completing the sanctions of Morality. The present life was always of paramount importance so long as Polytheism flourished, but this dogma connected it directly with the future and even with the past life. The suppression of the past life by Monotheism was a serious inconsistency, the result of the diminution of Theologism under Positive influences.

This Immortality was neither the universal Objective life of Fetichism, nor the Subjective life of Positivism.

It is of importance not to confound this provisional belief in a fictitious eternity, either with the objective existence which Fetichism bestowed upon the dead in virtue of its animating all objects with life, or with the subjective existence which Positivism recognises after death in the case of Man's characteristic functions (ii. 54). But in explaining our bodies by our souls, the Theological grew out of the Fetichistic dogma; and in connecting the future with the past, it prepared the way for the Positive dogma.

The Divine society was an idealised pattern for Human society.

In the case of the higher divinities the constant reaction of the Theocratic regime upon the doctrine of Polytheism tended to improve the general conception of the Human Order. The hierarchy of the Gods could at first be only an involuntary reflex of the hierarchy of Man. But it was extremely well suited for idealising this latter, by sanctioning the premature aspirations by which our feelings not unfrequently anticipate our conduct, especially in the social domain. There can be no better illustration of this aptitude than the general contrast between the imperfect condition of women among the Ancients and the admirable influence which they ascribed to the Goddesses, those prophetic types of the affective sex.

The Priests modified Polytheistic doctrines favourably to the rise of science. Metamorphosis suggested distinction

Moreover, notwithstanding the necessary predominance of Practical influences, Theocracy managed to modify Polytheism in such a way as to prepare for the subsequent developement of the Theoretic genuis. This action is very clearly marked in the case of the dogma of Metamorphoses, from which the Priests by the exercise of their reason drew improved ideas

regarding the Material world, long before it became a source of graceful fictions to the Poetic imagination. It is a mistake to ascribe to the Philosophers who succeeded the Priests the general conception as to the distinction between Form and Substance, two things invariably confounded by the Fetichistic instinct. This is a conception which a mere empirical acquaintance with the processes of Chemistry would necessarily give, and such processes were at an early period well known to all the Priestly castes.

between Form and Substance.

While engaged in these various applications and modifications of the Polytheistic Philosophy, Theocratic wisdom instinctively anticipated the final ascendency of the Positive Philosophy, and always tended to prepare the way for it by encouraging the only Positive study then possible. Already comprehending both the Theoretic unprofitableness and the Practical dangers of Ontology, it sought to make Theologism continue until the advent of Positivism, and could its desire have been realised we should have been spared the anarchy of Metaphysics. But more than this, it directly traced out the general conception of real laws, both logical and physical, starting from the only types of rational positivity that could guide its synthetic meditations. The Fetichistic genius had already created abstract science, by the spontaneous rise of Numerical speculations. Now Theocratic Wisdom adequately developed the reaction of these primary Mathematical conceptions upon Philosophy, and for the first time systematised them. In this systematisation there was nothing of that mysticism which Metaphysical subtlety introduced at a later period, especially in the case of the sacred numbers (p. 107).

Theocracy shunned Ontology, and cherished the germs of Positive thought.

And this brings me to the influence of Theocracy upon Science, the other department of Theory.

(b) Scientific Influence, pp. 181–186.

Theocracy, to begin with, made considerable improvements in the Arithmetical processes, which it received from Pre-astrolatrous Fetichism. Looking to their general foundation, we are indebted to Theocracy in that part of Arithmetic for the special Notation which, forming the complement of Numeration, will always enable us to perform with ease all our elementary calculations. The synthetic spirit of Theocracy shines conspicuously forth in the philosophical conception on which this scientific artifice depends. For the tendency we have to indicate the value of the respective numerical units by the

Theocracy improved Arithmetic: invented Decimal Notation:

position of their digits, is a consequence of the natural relation subsisting between value and position. Now in order to detect in the nomenclature of numbers this constant connection which serves as a basis for admirably simplifying the writing of them, there must be a recognition of the Logical Law which always inclines us to advance from the general to the particular in applying any kind of classification. Such an artifice therefore could originate only among encyclopedic thinkers, whose practical character impelled them in all their inquiries to adopt methods that were in conformity with the spontaneous procedure of Man's Intellect. The fortunate custom of hieroglyphic writing—a mode of writing peculiar to Theocratic civilisation—led to the permanent adoption of hieroglyphics in the case of Numbers; and we are thereby furnished with a lasting evidence that this invaluable Notation could not possibly have come to us from the Military populations, to whom the alphabetical mode of writing naturally belongs.

Invented Multiplication Table (wrongly attributed to Pythagoras): discovered theory of Division and Fractions:

In addition to this fundamental artifice, the Arithmetic of Fetichism was enriched by the Sacerdotal castes, at first with a secondary improvement, and subsequently with a most important extension. These were the Multiplication Table, and Division. The Multiplication Table is much older than the philosopher after whom it is named in the West. That all products are necessarily reducible to products of the first nine numbers is a proposition of so easy and ordinary a kind, that it could not fail to have suggested itself to corporations who were frequently obliged to undertake laborious calculations, especially in Astronomy. As to Division, which the Fetichistic arithmeticians never reached, I have already pointed out (p. 147) how the Priesthood must have been led to it by the Astronomical problems with which they had to deal. This important discovery completed the fundamental operations of Integral Arithmetic, and furthermore opened up a vast field for numerical speculations by suggesting the general theory of Fractions, a theory of which all the essential conceptions date back as far as the Theocratic age.

Founded Geometry of Surfaces and Volumes, but not of Lines:

While the Polytheistic Priesthood improved and developed Arithmetic, and even so much of Algebra as is inseparable from Arithmetic, it created Geometry, a science which, for want of an adequate Practical impulse, could not be created until Sedentary existence had given rise to property in land, just

before the advent of Astrolatry. As might be expected from this natural origin—an origin which language will always call to mind—the Concrete character of the Theocratic speculations shines conspicuously forth in all the earliest Geometrical studies. For these studies have reference in all cases to the Theory of Surfaces and the most elementary part of the Theory of Volumes; the Theory of Lines—with which in our Dogmatic method Geometrical reasoning commences—was never attempted.

This inversion must have considerably impeded the developement of the Sacerdotal Geometry, thus confined by its Practical destination within a field that was too limited and inadequately prepared. Yet such a state of things was well calculated to produce a true perception of the general character of Geometrical studies, in which the final object invariably is to reduce all comparative measures of Space to simple relations between Straight Lines. For this very reason a Geometry of Volumes and Surfaces could not but eventually lead to what was its necessary complement, a Geometry of Lines.

This primitive boundary could be overstepped only by more abstract thinkers. The domain within it was explored to a greater extent than might be expected from the over-concrete tendency of the Sacerdotal genius. After the Priesthood had established all the fundamental conceptions in the case of Rectilinear Surfaces, they pushed these conceptions so far as even to deduce from Regular Polygons the Quadrature of the Circle, without however being able to solve the complementary problem of its Rectification. In Volumes they never got beyond the measurement of Prisms, and hence of Cylinders, when entire and right. But they established the theoretical relations that hold good in the case of the simpler transformations of Rectilinear Areas. I have no hesitation in regarding as of Theocratic origin the law of the three squares of a right-angled triangle, although it may have been arrived at in other quarters also.

Admitting this, it may be concluded that the Priesthood supplemented this capital theorem by the three following relations:—first, that between the Areas belonging to the sum of two Straight Lines; secondly, that corresponding to their difference; and lastly, that which results from combining their sum and difference. These four elementary laws will always have a considerable historical interest, as having formed the

Laid the Geometrical foundation of Algebra;

true Geometrical source of Algebra which we see among existing Theocracies is still essentially confined to the various transformations and combinations that can be effected by their aid. With them must be connected the extension of Arithmetic to the extraction of Square Roots, an operation called for by the needs of Practice. These needs may possibly also have led the Priesthood to the extraction of Cube Roots, by the aid of the analogous though less evident relation that obtains in this case with respect to Volumes.

Cultivated Astronomy, but not Geometrically.

The Theocratic Priesthood always gave a legitimate precedence to Astronomy, the highest department in its scientific domain, and one directly bound up with the regime that sprung from Astrolatry. But the imperfection of abstract Geometry precluded as yet any effectual developement of the chief Astronomical theories. The predictions of Theocratic astronomers—about which there have been serious mistakes among the learned in modern times—were arrived at, without the aid of Geometry, by means of Numerical calculations founded on the empirical periods disclosed by prolonged and careful observation of the complex phenomena of the heavens, especially in the case of Eclipses.

Nevertheless the Priesthood, after they had established the fundamental doctrine of Astronomy—the Diurnal Rotation—sketched out the theory of the Sun and Earth, and even that of the Moon, besides making preparation for the special study of each Planet. All the essential conceptions required for the construction at a given place of an ordinary Ephemeris, solar as well as lunar, must necessarily date back as far as this regime, which habitually connected these previsions with the whole system of the principal worship. These early solutions were in the truest sense rational, since they were obtained by forming a general conception of the spectacle presented by the heavens. They had, however, to be arrived at for the most part by purely Mechanical processes, with but little aid from Geometrical diagrams, and with still less aid from Algebraical deductions. We must not exaggerate the normal superiority of these two indirect methods to such an extent as to make us undervalue the capabilities of the direct method at a period when Astronomical investigation, whether the measurements were in angles or in time, required no greater amount of precision than such a method would allow.

Institution of the Calendar.

In spite of the imperfection of their instruments and methods, Theocratic astronomers were of necessity led, under the influence of special social needs, to effect a far greater improvement in the study of the two principal movements than is now-a-days supposed. In the case of the Sun or Earth particularly, they understood how to make up for the want of precise measurements by oft-repeated observations, it being their object to discover the essential inequalities that threw into confusion the whole of a worship in which all the periods were judiciously referred to the predominant star. Thus we are indebted to them for the important institution of Mean Time, which, though not required in purely theoretical Astronomy, is necessary for securing an exact correspondence between any of the previsions of theoretical Astronomy and our ordinary observations. In instituting the Calendar, Sacerdotal Wisdom duly recognised the essentially subjective character of the Month. The Military populations blindly endeavoured to give this period an objective constitution, thereby distorting the true Year. But Theocracy, when it admitted that the two extreme terms alone were defined objectively, might have turned to better account the artificial construction of the Months and Weeks so as to have brought them even then into proper adjustment.

Religious reason for not admitting Double Motion of the Earth.

To complete this view of Theocratic Astronomy, I must trace directly back to the period when Celestial Geometry was fairly started a scientific doctrine which was destined, when the time was opportune, to exert a vast reaction upon Philosophy. The conception of the double motion of the Earth must have naturally presented itself to the meditations of the Priesthood as an hypothesis well calculated to simplify all Astronomical theories, if it could ever be properly reconciled with Physical phenomena. But this special difficulty of reconciliation was not the only cause that retarded the definitive adoption of this hypothesis. Theocracy could never admit it, so long as the Absolute Synthesis was generally accepted; for it is impossible to adapt this Synthesis to an assumption which, by destroying the unity of the Cosmos, ruins the whole fabric of Astrolatry, and calls forth the Relative Regime.

No definite results in the other sciences attainable under Theocracy.

Such are the various essential results of Sacerdotal Science in the only part of the Encyclopedic domain which could then be effectually cultivated. In all the remaining branches of Natural Philosophy no studies were possible but those of a

There must have been a certain empirical knowledge of Chemistry and Biology.

purely preparatory kind, and of these the permanent value was confined to their affording materials for future theory. But here too Theocracy worthily maintains its synthetic character. The almost entire loss of the books that issued from these ancient corporations—who, however, wrote but little, because they were constantly engaged in action—prevents us from forming an exact idea of the Chemical and Biological conceptions that are really due to them. But their Practical tendency, and the Social objects they had in view, must undoubtedly have led them to make a careful though empirical course of such abstract observations as were necessarily bound up with their concrete occupations. The principal traces of such observations are found in Biology, the Religious Worship and the practice of Medicine having led to valuable Biological conclusions, Statical in the main, but also Dynamical.

Every Polytheism encouraged Abstract Contemplation. Theocracy alone guided Deductive Meditation.

Itself born of Abstract Contemplation, Polytheism everywhere and always encouraged this one sole source of Positive theories. But it was impossible that its influence could be equally favourable to the decisive growth of the corresponding scientific Meditations (i. 581). For the sciences can be developed only in succession, as the inductions peculiar to each class of events require to be coordinated by the deductions which emanate from a simpler and more general domain. I have just shown how Theocracy, which sprang from Astrolatry, discharged this fundamental yet special part of its Theoretic functions. In all the more complex phenomena I feel confident it conducted an exploration that was necessarily empirical with far more success than is attained by the vaunted rationality of our Academic specialism, in which a dispersive influence is not atoned for by any synthetical aim. From its Encyclopedic tendency Theocracy was not unfavourable to such constructions as were suited to the time, and from its Practical character to preparatory studies that would be of service in the future; and in both these respects it was far superior to the blind specialisation that results from our modern anarchy. Accordingly the only Subjective unity possible provisionally was employed by the ancient Priesthood for guiding in a wise spirit both the special meditations and the general contemplations required for the vast objective elaboration upon which the definitive synthesis was to be founded.

The same distinctive attributes are displayed to the fullest

extent in the Esthetic influence of Theocracy. This influence I now proceed to consider.

(c) Esthetic Influence, pp. 187–190.

Its primary Esthetic function was to complete and systematise Human Language, the rudiments of which had been adequately supplied by Fetichism. The general result of modern philological researches is to show that all the regular languages can be traced back to the Theocratic age, previous to which their essential elements only can be found. The power of the Polytheistic Priesthood to modify language was a necessary consequence of its invariably synthetic spirit and the continuity of its rule. Forming the only social bond of castes that were thoroughly heterogeneous, it naturally became the sole regulator of their spontaneous idioms, and by combining these idioms on a systematic plan was led to frame by degrees a complete and durable language. Owing to their Religious functions, and to their being consulted in the various departments of Practice, the Priests had at their disposal daily means, both public and private, for securing the general acceptance of the formulas they had constructed.

Theocracy first systematised Language.

No authority, either spiritual or temporal, could in after times gain a similar influence, nor was an adequate destination any longer to be found. Consequently all later changes in human language have been limited to a spontaneous modification of the fundamental type roughly planned by the Fetichistic instinct, and reduced to rule by Theocratic wisdom. The most ancient and protracted phases of the Human Initiation could alone perform a work that naturally belongs to the two periods of Childhood, in which Expression is preparing for Conception, with the race as with the individual (ii. 209). When the Universal Religion shall have made sufficient progress, the final Priesthood will everywhere undertake an ultimate systematisation of Language, in accordance with the whole of the modifications that have been the spontaneous outgrowth of modern civilisation. But Positivism, in extending to Expression the renovation undergone by Conception, will preserve the necessary continuity; for it will incorporate the fundamental elements as supplied by Fetichism and the form as superadded by Theocracy by reason of its natural affinity with both these preparations.

The work then done has lasted till our time Language will receive a final systematisation from Positivism.

As to Writing, the complement of ordinary Language, the ancient Priesthood really did no more than give permanence and regularity to the Hieroglyphic mode spontaneously insti-

Hieroglyphics the only universal mode of writing, be-

cause they represent the language of Gesture.

tuted by Fetichism. In spite of its serious disadvantages, we must never forget that it is the only mode which up to the present time has been truly universal, because it directly portrays language in its most natural form (p. 109). If we ascribe Hieroglyphic writing to the Priesthood, we do so only because the Priesthood developed and arranged it so as to make its employment easy and general, and because the Priests became the exclusive guardians of it, as they did of Theocratic manners and customs, when the conquering tribes succeeded in enforcing the adoption of Alphabetical characters.

Art proper was strictly subordinated to Worship.

In Art properly so called, it is difficult to determine the influence of Theocracy, owing to that profoundly synthetic tendency which led it invariably to subordinate all the means at the disposal of Art to the Religious Worship. And there they can be accurately estimated only by keeping in view their conformity with the manners which they had to consolidate and develope, manners that are now too little appreciated. But the thorough relativity of Positivism will soon lead to a better conception of this Esthetic constitution, to a conception of it as the prophetic type of the normal state of the Fine Arts.

It was thus more dignified than Greek Art, though its special developements were cramped.

A systematisation so premature must no doubt have impeded all developements of a special kind, still more in Art than in Science. But the esthetic splendour of the ensuing regime will never prevent true philosophers from being deeply impressed with the higher dignity of Theocratic Art. Under Sacerdotal Polytheism, far more than during the subsequent phases of provisional religion, Worship was, in accordance with its nature, the simultaneous idealisation of Doctrine and Regime. Now Theocratic Art formed the general instrument of the Worship from which it was never dissociated. The Final Religion alone will be better able to incorporate all esthetic functions, by establishing a fuller correspondence in the case of the Positive Worship with the Doctrine and Regime which that Worship is intended to idealise.

Public Education consisted of Festivals combining Religion with Art.

From the nature of Theocratic Polytheism, Public education under it consisted mainly in two systems of collective festivals, one perfectly general, the other peculiar to certain castes. Scientific instruction was always confined to the Priesthood. Now Art was the life and soul of these popular celebrations, the object of which was to enforce by means of vivid represent-

ations the more ordinary doctrines and rules. This sacred function must have powerfully contributed to ennoble and consolidate the synthetic character of Art, by always demanding the complete concurrence of all our means of expression. But this admirable combination precludes those for whom it no longer exists from properly appreciating the value of each esthetic element taken separately.

All the Fin Arts were executed b the Priests

With this Social destination Theocracy gave to all the Fine Arts, even the special (p. 113), powerful means and worthy exponents. The abundance and variety of the types deified by Polytheism both required and allowed a considerable amount of artistic embellishment, for widely diffusing, nay, even for clearly defining, the religious conceptions and rules which the doctrinal turn of mind could not at the outset lay down with sufficient precision. To mark out the essential features of each divinity was no doubt a purely rational process which the Priesthood alone could perform: but when this had been done, a work of the imagination was always required for providing the God with a suitable costume and history, these being indispensable to his popularity. Now this subsidiary esthetic process could not be fully successful unless it emanated from the same source as the central conception. Hence it is that all esthetic functions, under Theocracy, belonged invariably to the Priesthood, and never gave rise to a really distinct class.

Profession Artists did not exist under The cracy, and will not u der Positivism.

The subsequent existence of Artists in the ordinary sense has really been one long anomaly, which Positivism is about to terminate by restoring to the genius of Expression that discipline and dignity which it lost when separated from its Theocratic stem. In every truly normal society a man is degraded by devoting his whole life to the exclusive exercise of purely secondary faculties (i. 223) which ought always to assist our essential functions, whether mental or moral. The ideal, when thus released from its subordination to the real, impels us directly towards madness by developing an habitual excess of subjectivity. A boundless vanity then bears sway, and at the same time there is a complete absence of dignity, owing to the mercenary spirit produced by a specialisation which permits the artist to be simply the passive exponent of the inspiration of others. Art, after being set free from the trammels of Theocracy, came under the less noble and more iron yoke of material necessities, and of a monstrous cupidity, from the influence of

which it had been exempt so long as the execution of works of Art was one of the occupations of the whole Priestly body.

Poetry, Music, Painting, Sculpture, Architecture.

Notwithstanding the admirable Esthetic unity of Theocracy, we may, in dealing with it, estimate separately not only the general Art or Poetry, but also its two special complements addressed to Hearing and Sight respectively, provided that we never lose sight of the destination common to them all (i. 234). In Sacerdotal Poetry we have displayed at once the sublime nature of its functions and the dignity of its organs, as is seen most particularly in the Hebrew scriptures. We are less able to form a judgment on the Art of Sounds, and the triple Art of Form, but such specimens of them as the Theocratic age produced will always be distinguished by an imposing grandeur, which the more perfect execution of later times has never eclipsed.

This concise view will serve to obviate any future misapprehension as to the chief esthetic results of a regime which, by establishing well-marked persistent manners, satisfies the first condition of Art, and secures for it continuously a noble mental and moral destination, together with eminent organs.

(2) Practical Results, pp. 190–193.

I must now determine the Practical influence of Sacerdotal Polytheism. This influence must be viewed here as essentially Industrial. No doubt Theocracy lent its aid to the developement of Military activity, by providing it with the bases of a regular discipline, and even by improving its chief processes, whether offensive or defensive. But this twofold influence was contrary to the genius of the Priesthood. That genius was eminently peaceful, and repelled War as tending to destroy Sacerdotal authority by making the Temporal chiefs paramount. The great expeditions sent forth from Theocratic communities afforded a general means of rendering the ambition of the Warriors harmless at home by giving them an object abroad, and drafting them off to colonies from which they were never to return. Even when the Military had gained the upper hand of the Sacerdotal caste, former habits almost always retained sufficient hold to prevent the continuous growth of a true system of Conquests. Hence in judging of the Practical influence of Conservative Polytheism, the Military results must be left out of consideration. In like manner I shall eliminate the Industrial effects, when I come to examine Progressive Polytheism.

These were essentially Industrial. Military manners were discouraged. Emigrations.

Theocracy preserved Useful arts and their results; and protected and economised wealth.

It is easy to see that we are indebted to Theocracy for the effectual rise of Industry, even more than for that of Science or of Art. By the institution of Caste, Theocracy made the whole developement of Practice to depend upon the Sedentary existence in which it had itself originated, and which is the necessary basis of all normal activity, whether peaceful or warlike. It consolidated all the arts created under Fetichism, by securing the transmission of processes and the preservation of results. The Second Causality was less adapted than the First for spontaneously protecting our various materials, but such means of consecration as the doctrine allowed were turned to a judicious account by the Priesthood for guarding against or remedying destruction and waste. Thus was our common stock of wealth—animal, vegetable, and mineral—systematically placed under the continuous patronage of special divinities, who not unfrequently superseded the necessity for human agents.

Foreshadowed Positivist conception as to reaction of Vitality upon Materiality.

The Sacerdotal caste was always the more bent upon regulating and developing our Peaceful activity, as it saw in such activity its best possible security against the ascendency of the Warriors. Its synthetic Wisdom really approximated to the final conception of Human Polity, as having for its object to improve the Universal Order by controlling the continuous reaction which Life exerts upon Matter (p. 116). The Positive Systematisation alone will be able to institute a more complete and normal doctrine for the whole of our Practical existence, the chief laws of which could not be sufficiently known to the chiefs of the Theocratic Initiation.

Constitution of Industry, Agriculture, Commerce, Money, Navigation.

For the origin of our Industrial constitution we must everywhere go back to this Sacerdotal synthesis, in which the Castes gave a regular organisation to the professions developed by the Sedentary life. Agriculture then became the general basis of the manufacturing industries concentrated in the towns. Theocratic customs placed impediments in the way of foreign commerce with a view to securing national stability, but they were very favourable to internal trade, which to industry is always more important. Thus the institution of Money was consolidated and developed. This institution originated with Fetichism, but what Fetichism had done was inadequate, owing to the very limited extent of communities in primeval times. We must also refer to the Priesthood the effectual developement of Maritime Navigation. This was as early as the age of

Astrolatry, when Navigation was connected with the nascent science of Astronomy.

All trades and professions regarded as public functions. Individual Slavery of little account.

All useful professions were habitually held in honour, being regarded in the light of public functions, and each of them could boast of having a divine founder, the leading inventors having been deified in the earliest age. This Industrial constitution, it should be observed, was independent of Slavery. In ancient times Slavery was essentially an institution peculiar to the warlike populations; it never had any considerable influence in Theocratic states, notwithstanding the collective oppression to which the lowest castes were often subjected.

Theocracy did not develope true Collective activity, Industrial any more than Military.

But however favourable this regime may have been to the rise of the arts and manners of peace, it was, as I have already pointed out, necessarily incapable of properly systematising them on account of its inability to develope a truly collective activity, such activity being long confined to the Military instinct (p. 46). Then too the very institution of Caste hindered a due enlargement of Industrial undertakings by concentrating all labour within the family. This method was extremely well adapted for consolidating Domestic existence, which is sadly shackled among our modern workmen. But it would not allow of Employers in any true sense, and hence there could be no practical operations on a grand scale, which there must be, if the collective character of Industry is to get the better of its individualising tendency. The Priests and Warriors accumulated vast treasures, but these were industrially unproductive, owing to the repugnance manifested by the higher castes for directing the labours of the lower ones. In these lower castes each man traded simply upon his own insignificant capital.

Regeneration of Industry reserved for Positivism.

Thus the Theocratic regime—notwithstanding its ability to sanction professions that are useful, and to improve them so far as individual practice is concerned—was unable to effect in them a regeneration which could follow only after the Human Initiation was complete. In order to rise from the primitive egoism to the final altruism, our Industrial constitution required the series of modifications which it has undergone in the West since the abolition of Serfage. It was not likely therefore that Theocracy could attempt with any chance of success a change for which we in the present day are scarcely ripe. Still it was instinctively felt that there must eventually be such a change,

and judicious preparations were made for it as far as the circumstances of the time would permit (p. 50).

We may conclude then from this general view of the Practical domain, that Sacerdotal Polytheism could merely carry our Industrial constitution far enough for producing a general conviction that Peaceful activity must bear undisputed sway in the end. But as the time had not yet come when activity could be rendered truly collective, it was for Military Polytheism that the full developement of Civic existence—the chief end of Theologism—was reserved. It is only in our Moral education that Theocracy was thoroughly efficacious, and here we shall always be indebted to it for the definitive developement of Veneration, that sole normal basis of human discipline, a basis originating in all cases with the Polytheistic Priesthood.

Decisive creation of the City reserved for Military Polytheism. Chief success of Theocracy was its developement of Veneration.

This brings me to the direct examination of the Social influence of the Theocratic regime, an influence which forms the chief claim of Polytheism to our eternal gratitude.

(3) Affective (or Social) Results, pp. 193–202.

The great aim of Causality, when it became Indirect, was to lead us during the Second period of Childhood to study chiefly the Human Order, after our fundamental subordination to the External World had been established beyond question during the First period. This was the essential destination of Polytheism, but, as I have before explained (p. 83), it was necessarily rather social than intellectual. The Polytheistic doctrine was of course in no way competent to sketch the definite outlines of a study so premature, and lacking objective materials no less than a subjective preparation: yet it stimulated a general and continuous investigation of human nature, in which practical experience tended to correct doctrinal errors (i. 346, ii. 103).

The Purpose of Polytheism was Social rather than Intellectual, and its Social influence Empirical, not Doctrinal.

It is to Sacerdotal Wisdom, however, that we must look in the first instance for the Practical efficacy of an influence that was Theoretically erroneous. The synthetic spirit of the Polytheistic Priesthood concurred with their social authority to make them deeply conscious of the intellectual dangers of the Theological faith; hence, while they managed in a way that deserves respect to develope its admirable power of consecration, they never ceased to restrain the extravagances naturally springing from it. No Theologism, not even the Polytheistic, could systematise any but the purely personal existence, when it placed each one under the direct and entire control of the

Yet Theocracy utilised the fictitious Polytheistic doctrine to sanction empirical precepts.

Gods, a control naturally incompatible with the formation of a truly social doctrine (p. 27). But the Priests with a true instinct utilised the only doctrine at that time possible to sanction the essentially empirical suggestions of their own good sense. They effected this by availing themselves of the confusion necessarily obtaining at the outset between counsel and command, a premature separation of which would have effectually precluded so wise a course. The Theocratic genius, in putting the Second Causality to this use, felt that, until the idea of Humanity could be directly apprehended, these higher speculations were exclusively reserved for the study of Natural Laws, a study which Theocracy had successfully commenced in the lowest domain.

Theocratic Morality, though empricial and personal, is not superseded till the rise of Sociocratic Morality.

Our whole Moral existence, both private and public, was sufficiently consolidated and developed by Theocracy, to enable it in after times to resist the destructive tendencies of a dispersive developement, terminating in the continually increasing anarchy that unavoidably marked the close of our Initiation. Fetichism in its spontaneous way had admirably instituted Family life, but could neither create Social relations, nor regulate Personal morality. The Polytheistic Priesthood, starting with this basis, took in the whole sphere of Human Morals, systematising them to a degree that could not be surpassed—all subsequent progress notwithstanding—till the advent of Positivism. This primitive coordination (a coordination that was necessarily empirical, as no sound theory of Human Nature could then be formed) received from Theologism an essentially egoistic character. It took acts alone into consideration, without penetrating to the feelings that prompted them, a natural consequence of the over-practical tendency of Theocracy. But these defects were inevitable, and a remedy for them was found in the instinct of the People and the wisdom of the Priesthood. After all they have never proved a bar to the real efficacy of the Theocratic morality which in a more or less modified form always continued to regulate Man's life till the Sociocratic morality was sufficiently prepared.

(*a*) Private Life. The Individual. Theocratic precepts, though appealing to

Personal existence was subjected by Theocracy to an admirable discipline, for which no substitute has since been found other than the spontaneous sanction accorded by the public reason to the habits thus contracted. The nature of

Theologism of course compelled the Priesthood to base their precepts on purely individual motives. It was, however, only in the *consecration* of the rules that stress was laid on such motives; they had very little to do with the *institution* of the rules which had always a social purpose. If we consider how repugnant this regime must have been to the coarseness of primitive Man, we shall see that it could not have been established without a constant concurrence of the most energetic influences: but when such influences subsequently died out, the most important of the observances survived, their value having come to be generally recognised.

Personal motives, had really a Social purpose.

This Theocratic discipline extended to all the essential parts of our Physical life, the control of which was afterwards left too much to the judgment of the individual. The institution of Clothing, the first guarantee of sexual purity, was developed, and with it were connected the principal observances intended for curbing that one of all our instincts which causes most disturbance (p. 117). We have long since been accustomed to rest the great majority of our sanitary practices, both public and private, on grounds directly human, but we are indebted for them in the first instance to the Priesthood, who could not secure their general acceptance without calling in the aid of the supernatural. Besides, let the nature of the doctrine be what it may, such precepts cannot exert an adequate influence unless they are directly connected with the general system of religion. The minor Physical rules, now that they have lost the Theocratic, without having yet received a Sociocratic consecration, cannot overcome our coarser impulses, not even in the case of the physicians who recommend their adoption.

Regulation of Personal habits: Clothing; Hygiene;

The most important results achieved by this Personal discipline were in connection with the Nutritive instinct which could never be adequately controlled in any of the succeeding regimes. The rules relating to diet were not always intended for the individual merely, but were often suggested by important Social considerations as well. This was especially the case in the limitations placed on animal food, with a view to rendering man more susceptible of discipline by diminishing an energy that was the cause of disturbance. Such regulations, independently of their special influence, show generally how it is possible to induce vast populations to accept difficult and

Diet.

permanent restrictions when they are made to rest upon stable and common convictions.

The Family. Incest.

In the constitution of the Family, as it issued from Fetichism, Theocracy effected essential improvements of a kind that always bore upon its social destination. Its principal service was to check Incest, which had long proved an obstacle to the combination of families by holding out seductions that were only too natural, and the evil results of which are not obvious. In spite of the imperfection of these early steps in progress, we can now recognise their value when we see the dangerous resistance offered in Modern Europe to the wholesome rules as to consanguinity bequeathed to us by the Middle Age.

Polygamy.

The Theocratic Priesthood retained Polygamy, but restricted and regulated it by imposing duties upon the active towards the affective sex. Moreover, its tolerance in this respect must be regarded as being based upon a social requirement more urgent than monogamy, an improvement not suited to that age. For it was necessary first of all to establish the universal obligation which enjoins upon the man to support the woman (p. 118). Now the extreme accumulation of wealth among the higher castes would not have allowed this fundamental condition to be fulfilled unless Polygamy had been practised by the chiefs. Furthermore Theocratic Wisdom, in sanctioning Polygamy, saw that it would conduce to the developement of Sedentary existence, to the increased discouragement of War, and even to the strengthening of the bonds by which the various classes were knit together.

Parental and Filial relation.

In the Parental and Filial relations, as in the case of the conjugal tie, Theocracy introduced a decided improvement by making the influence of Society felt in the interior of Families; the Priesthood being naturally Society's best organ. The time had not yet come when the early omnipotence exercised by a father over his children could be directly restrained by giving it a social destination. But the Theocratic Priesthood, by constantly exerting their influence, duly prepared the way for a reform which could not be commenced till the Middle Age.

Old Men. Worship of Ancestors.

The institution of Old Men (p. 95) had preceded the Priesthood in all cases by a considerable interval. But the Priests were never unmindful of their necessary precursors, and always endeavoured to strengthen their Domestic influence, even though it might occasionally come into competition with the influence

of the Sacerdotal Caste. In order to consolidate and develope the sense of continuity, Theocracy had to sanction the Worship of private ancestors, upon which the Worship of public predecessors rests. Now this observance created an increased respect for the living representatives of the Past, both in the City and in the Family. Furthermore the Old Men remained the special organs within the families of this part of the common Worship, as they did in the case of all the institutions that originated with pure Fetichism.

(*b*) Public Life, pp. 197–202.

This brings me to consider directly the necessary influence of Theocracy upon Social existence in the strict sense, first viewed Morally, next Politically.

(*a*) Moral Aspect. Developement of Veneration largely due to Priesthood, even in Military communities.

Morally, Humanity will ever be indebted to her Second Childhood for thoroughly training Veneration, such training being the chief end of this Age from the affective point of view. Military Polytheism largely developed this fundamental disposition (i. 566), but only by securing for it a more active destination. This destination, however, would have had no effect if Sacerdotal Polytheism had not previously trained the feeling to a sufficient extent. And this holds good even for those populations among whom the Theocratic regime could take no permanent root.

The Family too narrow a field for cultivation of Veneration. Society is now held together only by this habit of mind derived from Theocracy.

This noble instinct had received a preliminary training under Fetichism, with the two other sympathetic affections. But the only part of our Moral Initiation in which our First Childhood could thoroughly succeed was that concerned with Attachment proper, a feeling to which limited relations are particularly favourable. Veneration, which is intended for ties of every kind, was not adequately trained in the Family, the sphere within which Fetichism essentially confined it. Hence it was indispensable that the human heart should receive the education of Theocracy, this being the only education that could give an adequate developement to that feeling on which all true discipline rests, after the preparation it had received in the family was complete. The Theocratic consecration, after continuing in force through all subsequent regimes, still constitutes the sole guarantee of our respect for authorities of every kind, though its hopeless enfeeblement in the present day makes the urgent need of a Sociocratic consecration to be deeply felt.

The Second Causality being at once more fictitious and

But the habit of Veneration inherited two weaknesses from Theocracy.

more absolute than the First, there were two serious drawbacks that accompanied the Moral Initiation it directed. These were the instability of the Doctrine, and the inelasticity of the Institution. Although from the nature of the case inevitable, these defects must be regarded here as forming by their joint operation the historical source of the revolutionary character which all the regimes subsequent to Theocracy necessarily presented in a greater or less degree.

It was bound up with a perishable Doctrine and an inelastic Institution—Birth.

Theocratic Veneration, being instituted with the aid of beliefs doomed to perish, was deficient in stability. As it was accorded chiefly to Birth, it must have filled the chiefs with a pride that would often be abused. But these two imperfections never prevented it from adequately realising its provisional destination, which bore essentially upon the subject classes.

But both these were originally indispensable to its growth.

Our tendency to resent discipline is so strong at the outset, that it can then be effectually overcome only by appealing to the supernatural. It must moreover be admitted that the Monotheistic beliefs, supposing they could have arisen in the earliest ages, would not have had sufficient power for this purpose. For Theocratic Veneration, which the Theological emotions did no more than strengthen, depended mainly on the divine origin of the chiefs, and this was the case even where the Caste regime had not taken root. Now Monotheism, being incompatible with such a belief, could only make up for the want of it by giving a supernatural sanction to powers of human origin. But this indirect guarantee, which depended too much on the Priesthood, and even on the People, was in no way comparable to the direct and personal veneration inspired by chiefs sprung from Gods, and often themselves qualified for future Godship.

Effect of Veneration on the Rulers not mischievous;

In judging this regime, it is usual to ignore the innate existence of the sympathetic instincts which it tended powerfully to encourage in all classes. The pride it developed among the chiefs was not incompatible with the habitual manifestation of a Benevolence which was all the more pure in that it was quite unconnected with any feeling of duty. The essential object at that time was to establish powerful authorities, leaving to the future the task of disciplining them, so as not to embarrass their formation by an anxiety that would have been both inadequate and premature.

And on the Ruled excellent.

But it is in the case of the subject classes that the beneficial influence of the Theocratic regime is most conspicuous, and deserves the admiration of true philosophers. It was this regime alone that could implant habits of subordination capable of resisting the subversive tendencies that have been continually on the increase during the five centuries of the Modern Revolution. Though charged with fostering a spirit of slavishness, the truth is that it everywhere inspired a voluntary obedience, which presents a noble contrast to the forced submission of modern Occidentals, who have arisen in open insurrection against the whole Past.

Theocratic Veneration, though concentrated on Birth, did not ignore Merit.

Theocratic Veneration, though accorded chiefly to Birth, had no tendency, as is supposed, to dispense with Merit, since Merit in those days could be fully developed only among the hereditary chiefs, whether spiritual or temporal. It was in their case exclusively that family honour concurred with the education given in the home to draw out the dispositions of heart and mind required for an authority that admitted of no better preparation. For the time was not yet come when spiritual ascendency could be founded directly on personal merit, either mental or moral, and until it did come the social claims of Merit were a cause rather of disturbance than of reform.

Veneration for Birth instead of for Age was the intermediate step towards Veneration for Merit.

Modern writers, in their invectives against the hereditary character of Theocracy, fail to perceive that in Fetichist families the only claim to spiritual authority rested, after the institution of Old Men, on Age; and that therefore a decisive advance was made in human government when Birth became the substitute for Age. Without this first step of progress it would have been impossible to prepare for the Social accession of Merit, which, as it implies a public education superior to the training given in the family, is really applicable only to the Positive state. In fact the preference shown in the City for Birth as compared with Age depended essentially on the superior qualities accompanying the former; these were ascribed to the divine origin of the chiefs, but were really due to the aggregate of hereditary influences. Clear evidence of this is furnished at the very outset of Theocracy, when women are called to the throne and even to certain priesthoods, in virtue of an hereditary descent which at that time overcomes not only the real inferiority of their sex, but also the strong repug-

nance to their supremacy. Age, Birth, Merit, form a natural progression in the continuous improvement of the Human Regime, the last term of the series requiring to be prepared for by the succession of the other two, which are the more spontaneous and the more readily discerned.

The exalted position of Theocrats enabled them to institute Judgment of the Dead.

Thus we may form an idea of the social grandeur of those sacerdotal races who, proud of their supposed origin and real antiquity, feel themselves to be, even now, superior to all temporal dynasties. It was their hereditary supremacy alone which enabled them worthily to originate in a rudimentary form that most exalted of spiritual functions, the solemn judgment of the Dead. This supreme office of the Theocratic Priesthood has, since their time, remained in abeyance, even during the Middle Age, in consequence of the usurpations of the Temporal Power. The Sociocratic Priesthood will only have to revive and to complete it by decisively systematising the practice and extending it to all classes.

The alleged deification of human vices by Polytheism a Monotheistic calumny.

Before concluding this part of my subject I must not omit to notice the reproach of immorality which Monotheists, with blind ingratitude, bring against Polytheism in all its modes on account of its alleged tendency to deify all the human vices. This absurd supposition, which would render the existence of Antiquity a contradiction, rests upon no other grounds than the Polytheistic mode of explaining each passion by a special God. For this God, the Monotheistic theory substitutes a Demon, which comes to just the same thing. Polytheism, especially in its Conservative form, always regulated human life as far as it could be regulated at that time, and more than it has been at any subsequent period. The discipline it provided could have a direct and adequate influence only upon the subject classes. Yet indirectly it reached the chiefs, even those of the spiritual order, by developing in them, if not the sense of Social *duty*, yet the Social *instinct*, which was strengthened by the unceasing attention both of Gods and Men. But, in conformity with the invariability of human nature, Polytheism never sanctioned in any class a single opinion that was really immoral, and it often furnished conspicuous examples of each of those virtues to a monopoly of which Monotheism subsequently laid claim.

Viewed Politically, the Theocratic regime does not admit of so favourable a judgment. Sacerdotal Polytheism, failing

as regards the City by the very fact of its prematurely attempting to found the Church, was obliged to leave to Military Polytheism the decisive establishment of the principal human association. The only union outside of and beyond the Family which it really instituted was Caste.

(β) Political Aspect. Here Theocracy was defective.

None the less, Theocracy alone was destined to supply the moral basis of Civic existence, and moreover directly prepared the way for it by consolidating and developing territorial property, its political foundation. In order to discover the origin of large estates, we must invariably go further back than the early conquests—the influence of which has been much exaggerated—till we reach the gifts both public and private that were freely offered to the Priesthood of Polytheism or even of Astrolatry. These vast possessions, at once the result and the condition of a high social influence, are often to be assigned a purer origin than are the smallest gains of a labour that is usually selfish and frequently fraudulent. All sedentary populations soon perceive that the concentration of property, especially of rural property, is the main security for its right use, which is always founded upon trust and responsibility. Accordingly these populations were disposed of their own free will to endow the hereditary Priesthood with material accumulations which it alone, in consequence of its mental and moral superiority, was able to turn to the best advantage for Social purposes. Could Civic continuity have been established in the old Theocracies to such an extent as to admit of their carrying industry to the height it has reached in modern times, the large capital held in this way would have taken its final direction more readily than it did by coming from the military chiefs. But though the institution of Employers was incompatible with Caste, that regime prepared the way for it by securing the general predominance of the class that was most fitted, both in heart and mind, for soundly appreciating the entire sphere of Practical existence.

Still it prepared for Political existence by developing Property, especially Landed Property;

Before concluding this head I must point out how Theocracy gave to Property, particularly to landed Property, a most powerful consecration, and a most perfect constitution. Its power for consecration still continues among the Polytheists who have not long emerged from Fetichism, chiefly in Oceania, where the institution of *Taboo*, public as well as private, allows the Priesthood to protect immovable property in its earliest

Which could hardly have taken root without its powerful sanction.

stage of formation. It is impossible to conceive of any other source for the original sanction of a proprietary right so easily infringed, and too little respected in modern life, now that the consecrations of Theocracy are worn out.

It rightly treated wealth as attached to the function rather than to the functionary.

Theocracy alone gave a normal completeness to the political Constitution of Property of every kind, by connecting the wealth with the profession, both being inherited together under the Caste regime. And thus, at the very outset, preparation was made for the final connection which Sociocracy must now establish between Instruments and Functions. The earlier regime requires in this respect but one general modification, the substitution of Selection for Birth in the succession to all social offices, whether public or private. As for the authority and the responsibility of predecessors, far from being diminished, both one and the other will be increased. But in the interval between Theocracy and Sociocracy, Property is anarchically constituted owing to a mischievous separation of Wealth from Power. This separation is no less irrational than it is immoral, and its continued increase in modern times is the main cause of the dangerous invectives launched against the abuse of capital.

CONNECTION BETWEEN CONSERVATIVE AND PROGRESSIVE POLYTHEISM, pp. 202-210.

This terminates the Concrete Appreciation of Theocracy. I must now bring this chapter to a close by a direct explanation of the historical connection between Conservative and Progressive Polytheism. But a brief notice is previously required of two exceptional cases: in one of which the Theocratic regime rests upon Monotheism, in the other is independent of an hereditary Priesthood. The importance of Judaism and even of Buddhism has been considerably exaggerated; still these two great anomalies call here for a few special explanations, explanations which will tend to throw additional light on the general theory just established.

Preliminary consideration of two exceptional Theocracies.

(1) Judaism rejected Polytheistic dogma. Monotheism never preceded Theocracy;

Every normal Theocracy is necessarily Polytheistic; whether it comes from Fetichism through Astrolatry, which is the more ordinary mode; or through the general growth of Abstract Contemplation. As Monotheism is never anything but a condensed and concentrated Polytheism, its advent cannot be the result of any spontaneous and popular tendency. It always presupposes a long series of philosophical meditations which could arise only in a Theoretic corporation whose opinions gain acceptance through formal teaching. At the same time

this intellectual priority of Theocracy to Monotheism has an important Social influence, as the excessive concentration of the hereditary Priesthood is thereby avoided. Under Polytheism, the Priesthood is naturally shared between different sacerdotal families whose mutual rivalries act as a check upon their common ascendency, although their general rank relatively to each other is settled by the spontaneous hierarchy of their respective Gods. This necessary balance of power causes that admirable self-abnegation which will ever be a bar to our distinguishing any name in the collective government of the sacerdotal castes, no member of those castes having acquired individual celebrity, even in Theory. The abuses of the Theocratic regime, being due chiefly to an over concentration of authority, would soon have proved intolerable if Monotheism had strengthened at once both the Social ascendency and the internal discipline of the predominant Priesthood.

But the Priestly castes hankered after Monotheism and taught it esoterically in Mysteries.

Nevertheless the Sacerdotal castes, in consequence either of this very political influence or of an intellectual tendency, speedily displayed their natural preference for a concentration of Theory which appeared to them calculated to consolidate and develope their Practical authority. It was mainly for the sake of spreading this belief among the Temporal chiefs, before it could be accepted by the people, that the principal mysteries of Antiquity were instituted. But the same reasons which impelled the Priests towards Monotheism would turn the Warriors away from it, these latter being always inclined to prefer Polytheism as affording more satisfaction both to their intellect and their ambition though they were generally anxious to be initiated into these mysteries as a distinction.

Warriors preferred Polytheism; this led to conflicts and to Monotheistic emigrations, such as the Jewish Exodus.

Owing to this perpetual struggle, which often provoked violent commotions, the Theocratic castes were everywhere led to attempt Monotheistic colonisations so as to secure for themselves an asylum where they would be safe from military persecution in the midst of a population devoted to the developement of their social utopia. In this way arose the small Theocracies based, contrary to the general rule, upon Monotheism. The most important and best known of them was founded between the two opposite valleys of the Nile and Euphrates by Egyptian and Chaldean colonies, with the secret encouragement of the leading priesthoods of Egypt and Chaldea.

These had the ordinary character of the Theocratic regime, but were less stable.

These exceptional Theocracies, whatever be their origin, exhibit while they last all the essential features of the regime explained in this chapter. But the special case of Judaism is extremely well adapted for verifying the general law which rests the true Theocratic constitution upon Polytheism. For here instead of the thorough coherence of Polytheistic Theocracy we have a radical instability which brings out clearly the purely artificial nature of Monotheistic Theocracy. The unpopularity of the belief developes the oppressive rule of an over-concentrated Priesthood always absorbed in the task of upholding Monotheism among subjects ready at any moment to lapse into Polytheism. In spite of this incessant care, or rather in consequence of the antipathy it arouses, the Warriors gain the upper hand of the Priests more speedily than they do in the regular Theocracies. It is to be regretted that we are obliged to draw from these Theocracies, whose span of existence was so brief, the personal types of the Sacerdotal regime, which, suppressing individual celebrity in all other cases, brought it into prominence only here. The admirable nature, both mental and moral, of the Hebrew Lawgiver whom the modern West has incorporated will never make us unconscious that he is necessarily incapable of representing the true Theocrats.

(2) Buddhism rejected the Hereditary principle for the Priesthood;

With this exception—in which it is only the Theological Doctrine that is impaired, the Social Constitution not being seriously affected—must now be contrasted that other one in which the Sacerdotal regime is profoundly disturbed while the Polytheistic Doctrine is retained in all essentials.

But inconsistently maintained it for other functions.

The abuses of the Sacerdotal regime at length gave rise, in several instances, even among the Priests and particularly under the protection of the Warriors, to attempts at reform; and of these Buddhism furnishes the best type. But they could never, though there were long and severe struggles, in any true sense renew a constitution which was in all cases destined to last until the Final Positivism should be universally established. Direct evidence of the purely subversive tendency of these attempts is furnished by the thoroughly inconsistent nature of their chief innovation, in which the necessary connection of the two fundamental institutions of Theocracy is ignored (p. 171). The hereditary practice, while retained for professions in general, was abolished solely for the sacerdotal functions, which were then open to men with a turn for Theory,

of whatever caste, after certain tests had been undergone. This radical inconsistency—which kept the hereditary principle generally, while setting it aside in the one office for which it was best adapted—was prompted chiefly by a vague tendency to make personal merit predominate at a time when its full social recognition was impossible.

Buddhist Theocracy, like Protestantism, merelyweakened the sacerdotal office without reforming the system.

This anomaly serves no purpose here except to verify more fully the necessity of the institution the reform of which was aimed at. Whatever abuses may have been occasioned by the hereditary practice of the Theocratic Priesthood, those of the Buddhist protestation, consolidated as it was by a very general celibacy, soon proved to be greater still. A pretended vocation for Theory was often a mere cloak for a blameworthy hankering to escape from Practical labour, and to secure, as the reward of a trifling preparation, the means of supporting an existence as arrogant as it was slothful. From this we can better understand how the hereditary practice of Theocracy was naturally adapted for strengthening both the Synthetic spirit and the Practical character of the Polytheistic Priesthood. The support given by the Temporal chiefs to Buddhism, like the leaning shown in after times by the kings in the West for Arianism, proves clearly that though this heresy might mischievously weaken the power of the Priests, it could do nothing to regenerate the Theocratic system.

Inferiority of Buddhism to Judaism, and of Buddha to Moses.

On comparing the two exceptions I have just been considering, we see that the second by no means deserves to be placed on a level with the first, since it has never succeeded in founding anything, though it has gained many more followers. The Buddhist lawgiver, notwithstanding his moral perfection, was too deficient intellectually to warrant us in making him, like the Jewish lawgiver, a type of Theocracy. Moreover, of whatever use this Polytheistic Protestantism may have been indirectly, through its general influence upon the Intellect, especially in Art, its claims in Theory led principally to the developement of a subtle ontology as noxious as it was chimerical.

In what sense did Progressive Polytheism succeed Conservative Polytheism?

I have now to show how Conservative Polytheism links on to the subsequent part of the Human Initiation by serving as the basis for Military Polytheism, to which exclusively our Western Civilisation is to be traced back.

The filiation is not direct; each mode

This point would be one of the chief difficulties in the Philosophy of History, were not the explanation to follow natur-

requires a distinct population.

ally from the theory established in this chapter. In fact I have already proved (p. 168) that the filiation between Sacerdotal and Military Polytheism could never be direct when the types were strongly marked. Theocracy is not stationary, as has been pretended. On the contrary, it has long been undergoing everywhere profound modifications. Still the manners which it establishes are at once too decided and too persistent to admit of this transformation.

Theocracy breaks down because the need of Collective Activity becomes pressing and because the subordination of Activity to Intellect is abnormal.

In all Theocracies the Warriors at length gain the upper hand of the Priests, when Intellectual culture and Industrial progress are no longer sufficient to conceal the fundamental need of a truly collective activity, which at that time can be no other than Military. The Priesthood puts off this inevitable revolution as long as possible by endeavouring to develope in all directions Theoretic aspirations and Practical tendencies. A mere comprehension of the necessity of this policy is enough to make us reject the charges of retrogression blindly urged against a regime in which the Priests can only avert the ascendency of the Warriors by encouraging everywhere and always progress of a peaceful kind. But, unceasing though their care was, it could not overcome the fatal contradiction of the fundamental constitution of human nature involved in Theocracy, it being a law of our nature that Intellect must normally be subordinate to Activity. No doubt the Theoretic progress of Humanity, to be effectual, required the social ascendency of the Contemplative class: but the need of subordinating speculation to action always made men feel that command belongs to Practicians just as counsel does to Theoricians.

But truly Theocratic peoples never passed into the Military phase.

Still, when the Warriors at last prevailed over the Priests, the Theocratic constitution was never changed into a true Military regime. Popular prejudice simply allowed the ascendency of Practice to be substituted for that of Theory, but the habitual tendency of the Theocratic system of society remained essentially unaltered, the characteristic institution of Caste still continuing to have a commanding influence. Though immense warlike expeditions were undertaken, no system of Conquest could be established among populations who had a radical antipathy for war, and who, in their way, had a sense of the Normal State of Humanity—thanks to the ineradicable education which they owed to the Priesthood. This revolution always ended in only developing the chief defects which Theocratic

Wisdom had with difficulty kept under. Thus the degeneracy of this regime—which modern criticism entirely misconceives—was essentially due to the triumph of the Military element. All the great Theocracies will necessarily continue to exist, in spite of all efforts, until the Universal Religion succeeds in establishing, more easily among them than elsewhere, a final state of which they themselves have always furnished the prophetic type.

Affinity of Theocracy with Sociocracy. The Transition from one to the other may be direct.

If the reader compares this chapter with the previous volume, he cannot fail to perceive a fundamental affinity between the Theocratic scheme of life, and that of Sociocracy. Notwithstanding their essential differences, it is possible to make the passage from one to the other perfectly direct, if not in the spontaneous evolution, at least by the aid of systematic guidance (p. 128). In the following volume this transition will be specially considered, with a view to gaining a clear idea of the necessary extension of Western Positivism to the Theocracies of the East. Here I must limit myself to the most general indications which, while they prove the possibility of this transition, will make us see more clearly the necessity of the historical method by which Humanity has gradually risen from Theocracy to Sociocracy. But the artificial transition would be imperfectly understood if I were not to distinguish between the Intellectual and the Social question.

Though Positivism could only arise originally through Monotheism, Polytheists will be more easily converted to Positivism than Monotheists,

Intellectually, every truly philosophic mind in the present day can easily conceive the immediate transformation of Polytheism into Positivism, without passing through any form of Monotheism. The previous chapter explains how the Philosophy of Laws might have followed that of Causes before Causality became indirect (p. 128). Still when Gods have taken the place of Fetiches, the Positive doctrine can no longer so advance as to be finally predominant in the spontaneous evolution except after a sufficient concentration of the Second Causality. Nevertheless, this previous reduction even then is demanded rather by Social needs than by Intellectual conditions. Be this as it may, Positivity, when it is at last systematised, can gain acceptance more readily among Polytheists—particularly when Theocratic—than among Monotheists, since the former are less absolute than the latter.

Intellectually, because Plurality of

The unity presented by every Monotheistic Philosophy, unreal though it be, induces a strong disposition to reject the

Laws will seem natural to Polytheist, while Monotheist clings to his unreal Unity;

Positive doctrine, necessarily characterised as it is by a multiplicity of real laws quite incapable of being reduced the one under the other, notwithstanding their mutual subordination. A judicious plurality of Gods allows the Philosophy of Causes to make far better preparation for the Philosophy of General Facts. It is enough in this case to transform the Gods into Fates, and to coordinate them in such a way as to represent the true Encyclopedic Hierarchy. When the impulses of Practice sanction rational prevision, Laws can then be speedily substituted for Wills, especially among Theocratic peoples with whom Polytheism is usually derived from Astrolatry, for Astrolatry is particularly favourable to the constancy of relations. If this initiation into Positivism is properly managed, it seems to me that two generations ought to be enough for definitively completing it.

Socially, because Theocracy and Positivism alike favour Peace and Industry.

This hope is strengthened by the general concurrence of Social influences with Intellectual tendencies. Theocratic manners can have no difficulty in falling in with the religion which proclaims universal peace, and makes the industrial state at length prevail. At the same time the Sacerdotal castes can duly appreciate the one regime able to deliver them from military oppression by restoring the Social dignity of Intellect. Positivism, it is true, enjoins upon them to exchange command for counsel, but as the rule of the Warriors leaves them very little real influence, they ought to be ready to submit without reluctance to this necessary condition, which, as they will see, is more in keeping with the true ascendency of Theory. The Theocrats, who have now long been a prey to an anarchical agitation, having Merit for its watchword, cannot fail to like a doctrine which, while it places Merit above Birth, rates Birth at its true value, as also it does Age.

In such a direct transition the Military Caste will become an Industrial Patriciate.

The Military caste can easily be converted into an Industrial Patriciate among peoples where war is impossible. Its wealth enables it to carry out effectually the transformation of Castes into Classes with the aid of a religion which consecrates Domestic life, and developes Paternal authority by substituting Selection for Birth in the hereditary transmission both of Capital and Functions. Finally, it would be superfluous to point out the sympathies which must be inspired in Women by the substitution of complete Monogamy for Theocratic Polygamy, and by the definitive accession of the affective sex to its true social dignity.

Such are the reasons, both theoretical and practical, which place beyond dispute the fortunate possibility of a direct and even rapid transition from Theocracy to Sociocracy, by artificially transforming Polytheism into Positivism. But this mighty regeneration can only be *systematic*, and requires a scientific appreciation of the two stages. An inadequate knowledge of these would prevent us from understanding, and still more from regulating, their immediate filiation. The foregoing proof therefore would suffice for indicating that the *spontaneous* evolution must be worked out in a different way, by constituting Military Polytheism as the indispensable historical link between Theocracy and Sociocracy.

But in the original evolution the transition could not be direct.

As this necessary link, however, could never be inserted in the same population, the movement of Humanity seems here to be discontinuous, since we change our ancestors (p. 168). But the Philosophy of History is in no way affected by this change, if we can show that it was always indispensable and never accidental. Now these two conditions follow naturally from the whole of this chapter, which I shall conclude with a direct summary of their proof.

The change of populations is no break of Continuity.

According to the theory above established, the principal Theologism had for its special objects, on the one hand to carry our moral education further by developing the instinct of Veneration, and on the other to prepare for the advent of the Great Being by the formation of Country. Fetichism had laid the common basis of these two general elements of progress by definitively constituting the Family and by duly training Attachment. But to complete them effectually it was requisite that Polytheism should direct, first the provisional systematisation of the Human Order, and secondly the commencement of Collective Activity. Now, these two preliminary processes could not possibly coexist either in time or in space, although both equally belonged to the Second Causality. The Active evolution of Antiquity rested upon and so necessarily came after the Affective evolution, and yet the two evolutions required distinct peoples, the peaceful habits of the one being incompatible with the warlike manners of the other.

For it was *Indispensable* to the attainment of the end;

This necessary separation was effected spontaneously, though by no means accidentally, as the result of natural causes which portioned out the populations of Mankind between Sacerdotal and Military Polytheism, according to the manner in which

And *Inevitable* on account of the influence of Environments.

they issued from the fundamental Fetichism. The tendency towards Theocracy and the inclination for War would be simultaneously manifested in all communities, but it was impossible that either one of these tendencies should predominate universally. The continuous influence of the material environment must more than anything else have decided each sedentary population to devote itself either to peaceful cultivation or to social activity. It will be seen that these two cases are equally widespread, if we take into account the unequal size of the tribes with which they are respectively concerned. Although Sacerdotal spontaneously concurred with Military influence for the first enlargement of human association, yet a Theocratic ascendency admitted of more subjects than a Warlike Patriciat, except when the latter could fully develope its system of Conquests.

Thus the first series of our Social ancestors attempted to found the Church directly without being able previously to institute the City, all they could do towards it being to establish thoroughly the moral basis of human discipline. Starting with this preparation, the Second Series—that specially belonging to Western civilisation—tended indirectly towards universal association by fully developing Civic existence with the aid of the only activity that is spontaneously collective. All the remainder of the Human Initiation, not excepting its Intellectual part, was necessarily accomplished by these Military ancestors, whose near relationship to us ought, however, never to make us unmindful of our Sacerdotal initiators.

CHAPTER IV.

POSITIVE THEORY OF THE GREEK ELABORATION, OR GENERAL ACCOUNT OF INTELLECTUAL POLYTHEISM.

Introductory Remarks, pp. 211–225.

That the nature and purpose of this chapter may be rightly understood, the general explanation at the end of the foregoing must be stated more in detail.

(1) Destination of Progressive Polytheism, pp. 211–218.

Human Progress is to be measured by growth of Sociability.

The Affective Evolution can be nothing else than the continuous resultant of the moral reactions ultimately proceeding from the Active and Speculative evolutions (p. 55). It follows from this principle that the first may conversely stand as the representative of the other two together. Now evolution of Feeling is always summed up in the gradual growth of Social Sentiment, to which all our sympathetic instincts spontaneously converge. Therefore that growth—its double origin being always borne in mind—naturally furnishes the truest measure of the Human developement as a whole. In fact, it directly marks our steady advance towards a state of harmonious union between the different faculties of human nature.

Looking at it from this synthetic point of view, I can state both more precisely and more systematically the historical theory I established at the end of the last chapter regarding the necessity of a cooperation of the two Polytheisms—sacerdotal and military—to the normal developement of antiquity.

The first basis of Social Order is Veneration of the weak for the strong.

When in the preceding volume[1] I laid down the maxim: *Devotion of the strong to the weak; Veneration of the weak for the strong*, as the twofold moral foundation of Social Order, it behoved me in formulating that Dualism to arrange its terms in the sequence adapted to the final condition of Humanity. But I noted at the time that the inverse arrangement could not but prevail during the whole period of the preparatory evolution. It is the natural course indicated by our individual experience, which teaches that advance in Sympathy ever begins with the

[1] 'Positivist Catechism,' p. 339 of Dr. Congreve's Translation.

particular, and then extends to the general (p. 156). The training of the race still more absolutely involves such an order, for there a universal prevalence of Veneration becomes indispensable as a basis for the proper developement of political forces.

In early times Authority had to be developed at all costs. This was the work of Polytheism.

Only the second term, then, of the Social Dualism could be cultivated in a direct and systematic way in ancient civilisation. The first had to be left to such indirect and spontaneous training as is involved in the impulse, which all worthy chiefs must feel, to requite sincere Veneration with voluntary Devotedness (p. 198). The task incumbent on the time was, at all costs, to build up strong human authorities. For this, the whole energy of moral culture was concentrated on the sentiment on which those authorities rest, and they were not hampered at their rise with a discipline that would have been as inopportune as it was impracticable. To train Veneration was the main function of Theologism in succeeding Fetichism, which had not gone beyond instituting the Family. Fetichism and Theologism by their joint action founded the social hierarchy; but its right organisation devolved on Positivism alone, Monotheism having been no more than a necessary precursor of the latter, furnishing a premature outline of the final system.

But this moral evolution required, in the nature of things, two distinct preparations, which, though ultimately convergent, could never be simultaneous, because the conditions under which they were respectively accomplished were spontaneously antagonistic. In fact it was essential, first of all, to regulate the growth of Veneration as a part of the inner life of each individual, and then, to develope its external destination, the City, which alone is in conformity with its true social character. These purposes were successively fulfilled by Sacerdotal and by Military Polytheism.

Theocratic Polytheism developed Veneration as a sentiment.

Following immediately on Fetichism the theocratic regime extended irrevocably to all human relations, even to such as were subjective, the sympathies bred around the domestic hearth. During its long sway men were led to treat each other as brethren by regarding all their ancestors as a collective Fatherhood, and all their successors as a common Progeny, indicated by the happy term[1] which in some languages denotes at once *descendants* and *nephews*, thus blending Continuity

[1] Nepos, Neveu, Nephew in old English.

and Solidarity. But in order firmly to establish the subjective form of Sociability (ii. 54), Theocracy specially sought to develope those well-defined ties of relationship which only the past can supply. It was left for Sociocracy to train our sense of relation to the future, when a true theory of the whole human evolution should have rendered us capable of feeling as strong a sympathy in that direction also. The developement of a generally diffused feeling of Veneration was achieved by transferring to Birth the supremacy at first yielded to Age, and ascribing a divine origin to the leading families. Its principal purpose always concerned the governed; and in this it was directly efficacious, cultivating in them a habit of voluntary submission, the primary basis of all true morality. On the governing class its action was indirect, tending to excite spontaneous devotedness in the worthier of them.

Military Polytheism gave it a Civic destination.

That inward preparation accomplished, Military Polytheism completed Man's moral apprenticeship by giving a practical character to a sentiment at first too purely abstract. The definitive constitution of civic life supplied this necessary complement. For civic life alone is the stepping-stone from family affection to universal love. It was natural that such an advance should be reserved for Military Polytheism, which exclusively presided over the only form of activity that is spontaneously Collective.

Theocracy was directly unfavourable to developement of Activity;

Theocracy was less incompetent than Fetichism as regards public life. Still it could not develope that life sufficiently. Resting on the social supremacy of the Intellect, the sacerdotal regime would naturally cherish only that peaceful activity which offers the directest scope to mental effort. But while thus sketching out the Normal Order, Theocracy most seriously impeded the moral preparation for it. Industrial life was then deeply tainted with individualism. It could not be penetrated by a transforming social spirit, until the whole of the Human Initiation had been accomplished.

And indirectly unfavourable to developement of Intellect.

But this necessary shortcoming in regard to Activity was not the only imperfection of the theocratic constitution. It was quite as gravely, though less directly, injurious to Intellect, only the earliest developement of which it was at all competent to guide. The Intellect, being invested with a supremacy at variance with man's real nature, was turned too exclusively towards practical aims. In the end this disqualified

it for adequately pursuing abstract thought, from which alone the final synthesis could possibly issue. And to this deleterious influence upon Mind was superadded the moral corruption arising from the unhealthy social ascendency accorded to an Intellectual class; a corruption which existed even before the inevitable rebellion of unsatisfied Activity had altered the nature of the caste regime.

Polytheism could only become progressive in a fresh *milieu*.

The systematic Theocracy which replaced spontaneous Fetichism was thus defective in two respects. Though eminently favourable to the growth of Feeling, which had already begun, it was never able to call forth sufficiently the two general ministers of Feeling—Intellect and Activity (p. 65). To collective Activity it was directly hostile; and indirectly it became opposed to abstract Speculation. Nor, although far from inflexible, could a regime hitherto the sole type of a complete order be capable of the deep-reaching transformation, which alone might have rectified its two essential vices. Sacerdotal civilisation allowed the two Transitions that were to be wrought under a military state of society to arise outside its own pale. When the final results of these shall have been worked out, the still existing Theocracies will duly merge in the universal association about to be systematised by Positivism.

In becoming progressive it also became revolutionary.

Such a conclusion obliges us to regard all the remainder of the human Preparation as necessarily directed by Progressive Polytheism, which could thrive among those peoples alone where Theocracy had never fully prevailed. The second half of the present volume deals with that fresh developement, which will be seen to have been prolonged down to our own times, if we duly connect with it what are in truth its necessary consequences, indirect as they perhaps appear to be at first sight. Here, too, is the point where the immense transition from Theocracy to Sociocracy first assumes the revolutionary character which ever since has been necessarily becoming more marked.

A *general* proof of this is the short duration of its various phases.

A first proof of this revolutionary character is obtained by comparing the total duration of Progressive Polytheism with that of Theocracy or Fetichism. If we regard it as spontaneously prolonged by medieval Monotheism and the subsequent state of Metaphysical anarchy, it may be said to have lasted for thirty centuries, since in the history of Western progress it dates back to the Homeric times. Yet this phase, long as it is, and itself subjected to frequent and profound

modifications, constitutes but an episode. Its ultimate result, within its own limited area, is awaited by both fetichists and theocrats with just pride in their own unequalled antiquity.

A *special* proof is that it was subversive of both Continuity and Solidarity.

Secondly, this general judgment is confirmed by a more special investigation of a twofold kind, which makes it clear that during the whole interval from Theocracy to Sociocracy Military Theologism has destroyed without replacing. It profoundly impaired the sacerdotal system of society both in Continuity and in Solidarity, by spontaneously encouraging purely subversive tendencies. These tendencies were, no doubt, as indispensable as they were inevitable; but there must be no illusion as to their character, which was necessarily revolutionary. For it was the historical source of our present anarchy, the serious nature of which can thus be better estimated.

(*a*) Continuity was impaired because there was a change of race and locality.

With regard to Continuity, the impairment of it under Military Polytheism, serious as it was, is not to be compared to the deterioration with which I shall have to reproach Monotheism, particularly Western Monotheism, in so rudely breaking with the whole of its real antecedents. For the former was essentially involuntary and solely due to the necessity previously explained, by which we were then compelled to change our ancestors (p. 209). Nevertheless human Continuity only remains strictly complete when the filiation is one of blood as well as of civilisation, which it is in the passage from Fetichism to Theocracy. When the training of the race cannot be carried forward without a change of country, it becomes necessarily discontinuous, because men cannot adequately realise the succession, especially during the childhood of the race. Hence arose the spontaneous separation which will ever distinguish the two ages respectively marked by sacerdotal and military Polytheism.

For in the West, Theocracy, though existing, was of stunted growth.

The latter, indeed, must everywhere have been built upon a foundation of the former, but a foundation imperfectly developed and therefore too faintly marked. Hence an insufficient consciousness of the preparation. One followed upon the other in virtue of the preponderance of warriors over priests which in time modifies all theocracies. But in the case we are considering, that revolution came about before caste had been able to take firm root even within the sacerdotal body. Military Polytheism therefore developed according to its natural bent, as it never can do where theocratic manners have been fully established before the warriors prevail. For this very

reason it soon effaced all memory of sacerdotal antecedents among the peoples under its influence, yet without arousing hostility towards their true ancestors. Moreover, their gratitude was almost always divided between their own theocrats and civilising colonists who imported institutions from the purely theocratic countries. Such are the different reasons of the real impairment of Continuity which spontaneously takes place when Humanity passes from Conservative to Progressive Polytheism.

Between Fetichism and Progressive Polytheism the filiation was continuous.

Both forms, however, throughout remained strongly impregnated with the primordial Fetichism which was their common source. In the descent from that stock alone did Continuity remain strictly unbroken till Monotheism attempted to destroy our true filiation. Military Polytheism, indeed, being less systematised than its predecessor, more readily assimilated and spontaneously retained portions of the fetichist worship, particularly in the case of the household gods, which are to be regarded as pure fetiches, independent of the national priesthood.

Penates.

(*b*) Solidarity was impaired.

Turning now to Solidarity strictly so called, we find a serious deterioration as regards both the universal relations of mankind and the narrower bond of citizenship.

Universal (or International) Solidarity, on basis of Religion, became impossible.

Under Theocracy there was always a disposition to conceive Polytheism as capable of being equally adapted to all peoples by means of a uniform doctrine everywhere consecrating pacific manners. It was then that the provisional religion made the nearest approach to a true Catholicity, which Monotheism has since claimed in vain as its exclusive privilege, a claim belied even in the present day by the aptitude of sacerdotal Polytheism for uniting the vastest populations. Military Polytheism, on the contrary, necessarily acquired a national character. It could not otherwise have properly performed the social task in which alone its divergence of doctrine had originated. To blame the narrowing tendency inseparable from its specific objects would be unfair. Still, looking at the whole of human relations, we are constrained to note that for a time Military Polytheism removed us further from universal association. Later on it prepared the way for that association by presiding over the political incorporation of the non-theocratic tribes.

Civic (or National) Solidarity undermined by reduction of Castes to two, the

On civic life its effect was even more emphatically revolutionary, from the radical changes to which it subjected the institution of Caste, the general basis of order in ancient times. As warlike interests grew more and more predominant, the

industrial castes, without being ever actually abolished, were gradually absorbed into the military caste. Soon also the latter either seized the chief priesthoods in order to ensure the discipline indispensable to warfare; or else the pontifical families transformed themselves into a temporal patriciate with an equivalent result—the subordination of priests to warriors. This double blow struck at Birth as the social corner-stone was compensated by the enormous developement of the institution of Slavery. It had been a mere accessory of the theocratic system; it now became the necessary basis of military developement. But wherever military life obtained full play, free men preserved only a single hereditary distinction which was at once spiritual and temporal, that between officers and soldiers.

Few, and the Many.

Counter-balancing growth of Slavery.

When reduced to these two elements the caste regime was often shaken by their deep-seated mutual hostility, even before it began to melt away under the action of Monotheism, which aimed at abolishing slavery. In the West their almost perpetual struggles soon introduced a modification into the principle of Birth, which affected the social position of the Military caste, just as Buddhism affected that of the Sacerdotal caste in the East. Here as there, order was always disturbed on the plea of giving Merit its due, for which the time had not yet arrived; and in both instances the result was alike subversive, though in different ways, according to the varying conditions of each case. The illusory examination-tests of the Eastern theoricians found their counterpart in the anarchical custom of the Western practicians by which the whole body of inferiors usurped the power of appointing their superiors, at first from within the limits of the military-sacerdotal caste, but ultimately from among all free men.

Struggles of Many against Few resulted in partial recognition of the then revolutionary principle of Merit.

The above examination shows that Polytheism could become truly progressive only by being essentially revolutionary, and that it always inclined to dissolve the existing order of society without providing an equivalent substitute. To this distant source, then, do we trace the fated incompatibility between conservatism and amelioration so largely developed among us moderns. Positivism alone can thoroughly reconcile the two. During the First Infancy of the race Fetichism spontaneously laid the foundations of human order in its different essential aspects, but was unable to promote the necessary progress in any department. Polytheism in its turn could only stimulate

Hence Theocracy was the only Conservative form of Theologism; and that only from the *social* point of view.

progress by arousing directly subversive tendencies everywhere. Upon these there was but one check: the wisdom of the priesthood, supported by the antecedents of Fetichism. We must therefore regard Theocracy as the only regime truly adapted to the nature of theological doctrine. After its decay nothing was possible but a series of transitions, more or less revolutionary, until the time should be ripe for the rise of Sociocracy.

For the *intellectual* germ of Revolution was contained in Theologism itself, by reason of its extension of the Absolute Synthesis to the Human Order.

This judgment of Theologism from the social point of view thoroughly accords with its intellectual origin, which was altogether incompatible with real coherence. When Causality became indirect in order to become complete, it necessarily forfeited the spontaneous fixity inherent in its previous incomplete but direct form (p. 132). A philosophy that explains the world on the assumption of its resemblance to man is always intelligible, and the only one suited to the early needs and tendencies of the race. Moreover it conforms to the fundamental principle of sound logic: that every hypothesis ought to be susceptible of verification (p. 71). But its applicability is naturally limited to the External Order, whether inorganic or organic, so that it becomes alike frivolous and irrational when extended to the Human Order by the substitution of gods for fetiches. Humanity cannot be included in the synthesis of Causes, from the very fact that its type is found in Man. But Humanity strictly comes within the sphere of the philosophy of Laws, being at once the objective end and the subjective source of that philosophy. It was only in response to social wants that the absolute religion had to embrace, in its own way, the general investigation of the Human Order by transforming Fetichism into Theologism. But the necessity of this transformation cannot disguise its tendency to act as a spontaneous solvent both moral and mental, a tendency which increased in every direction as soon as Military had taken the place of Sacerdotal Polytheism.

(2) Progressive (or Military) Polytheism divided into Intellectual and Social (or Military proper), pp. 218–224.

Nevertheless, though we pass such a judgment on Theologism, we should none the less carefully study this gradual decline of the Absolute Synthesis, when its purely provisional purpose has been recognised. I have dwelt enough on the really *organic* portion of the Human Initiation, which was composed of Fetichism and Theocracy with their connecting link of Astrolatry. I must therefore now proceed to the equally necessary consideration of its essentially *revolutionary* portion,

wherein I include Monotheism as a complementary stage. But I have first to complete this introduction by establishing the general division of Progressive Polytheism into Intellectual and Social, in order to elucidate its natural fitness for filling up the two gaps—mental and social—peculiar to conservative Polytheism.

Why did Military Polytheism tend to develope Intellect?

I have already set forth both the direct impotence of Theocracy with regard to collective activity, and its indirect inadequacy as to abstract speculation, in consequence of the over-practical tendency that resulted from power being concentrated in the hands of the Priesthood. How it is in the nature of Military Polytheism to correct the former shortcoming needs no further showing. But its tendency to rectify also the latter — though displayed in a different national medium—calls for a special explanation which must be the key-note of the whole of this chapter.

First we notice two steps in progress common to all Military Polytheisms.

A twofold progress everywhere noticeable at the outset of military civilisation will show in the first place its general aptitude to supply what was wanting in the theocratic type of Society, intellectually as well as morally. All tribes with whom war is of paramount interest are speedily impelled to substitute alphabetic characters for hieroglyphics, and monogamy for polygamy. When collective activity becomes dominant in the state, its earliest mark is seen in these two decisive changes, which spontaneously appear in the domains of Intellect and Feeling. The one necessarily touches all classes; the other mainly concerns the chiefs, for they alone were really polygamists (p. 196).

The Moral step—Monogamy.

Taking the moral question first, we can easily understand which way Military civilisation would tend, when we consider how naturally incompatible is the existence of the warrior with the manners necessitated by polygamy, whether the wives of each chief be left at home or follow him to the camp. Sacerdotal policy had long turned this antagonism to account, for discouraging habitual expeditions, which tended to dissolve the theocratic regime to the profit of the military caste. Humanity, then, owes to the warrior-peoples this first improvement in the most fundamental of all institutions. So closely was monogamy bound up with military life among the ancients, that in proportion as the latter expanded did the former grow stable and complete. Though at first simply a matter of

practical convenience, it would soon perceptibly react on feeling, by enabling man the better to appreciate woman.

The Intellectual step—Alphabetic Writing.

It is likewise to our second series of ancestors that we are indebted for the alphabet. That institution alone completed the unity of human language by permanently connecting its two natural modes in a visual reproduction of vocal expression, which was thenceforth to prevail over the other mode (p. 188). Hieroglyphics had constituted a double language too circuitous and obscure for the rapidity indispensable to military communications. Hence all warlike peoples, even the least cultured, are distinguished from the theocratic nations by the possession of an alphabetic writing that releases them from dependence on a special caste for the communication of their plans and the preservation of their documents. Even in those instances where the alphabet might seem to have sprung from an industrial, and therefore indirectly from a sacerdotal source, its military origin can be shown. For these debateable cases all occur in reference to maritime peoples, with whom commerce was but an accessory of war, and the specially collective nature of whose warfare would, of itself, lead them to simplify their written messages.

Secondly we notice the Intellectual progress in an exceptional Military Polytheism.

After considering these two *special* reactions of Military Activity on Feeling and Intellect, we are in a better position to appreciate its less direct tendency to promote the *general* evolution of Intellect by stimulating the all-important developement of abstract speculation amidst an exceptional people.

Military Polytheism *normally* tends to Conquest; as in Rome.

For this purpose an essential distinction has to be noted between the different tribes in which warlike life hinders Theocracy from being definitively established. In the normal case, the Military movement tends towards its social purpose by instituting a system of conquests. Success along that path cannot, however, fall to the lot of more than one nation, whose ascendency prevents, or suppresses, all rivalry. This decisive evolution of Progressive Polytheism will form the subject of the next chapter. I shall there trace the growth of civic life till it brings us to the phase which is the immediate prelude to Universal Association.

But it may fall short of Conquest under *exceptional* circumstances, and then it

But it may happen that a group of tribes sufficiently warlike to have escaped the Theocratic regime is debarred from a career of conquest by an exceptional concurrence of local and social influences unfavourable to military expansion. It is then that

Collective Activity, ever stimulated yet never obtaining satisfaction, indirectly brings about a most valuable result. The most highly-gifted natures—since a civic career is denied them—are driven to cultivate a life of speculative thought which, by the nature of the case, is liberated from sacerdotal trammels. At the same time the Public, not being completely absorbed in war, afford a passive encouragement to this ardour by freely appreciating the productions of Art and the speculations of Philosophy.

developes Intellect; as in Greece,

Such an exceptional civilisation is determined in the first place by local conditions. A territory excessively broken up checks the continuous growth of military supremacy as much as it thwarts at an earlier time the extension of the theocratic union. Where there is a numerous cluster of small islands, in the vicinity of a continent divided by low-lying isthmuses or vast gulfs, and seamed with frequent mountain ridges, the local conditions clearly negative the possibility of those strictly gradual conquests which alone produce decisive social results. The same influences, however, keep up enough mutual strife to prevent the military spirit from lapsing into a torpor that might lead to a revival of theocratic manners.

Where local conditions prevented political unification,

To the above physical conditions certain social influences must now be added for completely constituting the exceptional case in which the latent reaction of the military principle diverted Progressive Polytheism from its natural tendency towards civic developement, and stamped it with a character essentially intellectual. These complementary circumstances are easily suggested by the fundamental conditions postulated. For if several small communities are settled in a territory such as that described, they will naturally have the same manners and language. Theocracy, native or foreign, though unable to weld them into unity, has fashioned them too much alike for any one group to prevail by force of arms over the rest.

But ensured similarity of manners and language.

We thus obtain a general explanation of that great political anomaly whereon, at that time, depended our intellectual destinies; an anomaly not really more accidental, however, than the normal case, since the twofold condition which it implied was frequently realised. But neither rule nor exception could be exemplified with full success by more than one among the peoples capable of aspiring to either of the two

Why such a civilisation was only once exemplified.

forms of leadership. For it was but a limited progress, in science or even in art, of which Military Polytheism admitted, when it assumed an intellectual character. So that when the evolution of Thought was once accomplished in a particular nation, none other could share in a glory which, like military ascendency, was at the time a monopoly.

Why Social Polytheism (or Military proper) was necessarily developed later and elsewhere.

On further comparing the two forms, Intellectual and Social, of Military Polytheism in all their bearings, it is easy to perceive that they required different populations for their manifestation, and that it was necessary for the former to come first. The opinion arrived at on both these points rests on the same considerations, more fully detailed, which previously explained how it was in the order of things that Progressive Polytheism should follow upon, but localise itself differently from, Conservative Polytheism (p. 168). Military developement and intellectual success presupposed habits so incompatible, that the one could not have arisen amidst a people first given up to the other. Ultimately indeed the propagation of the intellectual movement was aided by that very military power which, had the case been reversed, would itself have been suppressed.

One-sidedness of each of these civilisations as contrasted with either Theocracy or Sociocracy.

This necessary division of Progressive Polytheism into Intellectual and Social serves to mark the essentially revolutionary nature of the special transition which it had to institute between Theocracy and Sociocracy. Two systems strictly complete, of which each in its own way embraces human existence as a whole, are thus separated by two regimes radically incomplete, one exclusively concerned with the developement of Intellect, the other with that of Activity. These two successive transitions are seen to be not only partial in their scope but also restricted in their localities, so as to contrast all the more strikingly with the universality of the systems at either end of the scale. Although Fetichism and Theocracy cover far the largest part of the human Initiation, I have been able to devote the first half of this volume to that thoroughly normal past without ever requiring to name any one people, since the movement was common to all. But in all the remaining portion of the philosophy of history, an exposition so purely abstract would be an affectation and out of place. I have now to deal with evolutions as localised as they were partial, each of which, when its characteristics have been

set forth, must remain identified by name with the scene of its essential manifestation.

The incorporation of the Intellectual civilisation by the Active led to the Affective civilisation, which was also one-sided.

Of these two successive stages, intellectual and active, the second when sufficiently developed tended to incorporate with itself the chief results of the first. Then the combination of the Active and the Speculative evolutions soon necessarily produced an Affective resultant (p. 56), qualified, it might have seemed, to re-impress on society the synthetic character of Fetichist and Theocratic sociability. In this wise, and under the inspiration of Monotheism, there arose in the Middle Age a direct tendency to systematise anew the whole of human existence. But this attempt, premature though natural, and in no way comparable to the systematisation accomplished by Theocracy, could not, from the feebleness of the doctrine and the unripeness of the situation, be otherwise than abortive. The whole result of the Monotheistic systematisation was to create with regard to Feeling a transition as partial and localised as had been the speculative and the active developements whence it sprang, and the revolutionary characteristics of which it even so intensified that they eventually pervaded the whole modern period of preparation. All that portion of the past, then, which lies between Theocracy and Sociocracy consists of the necessary succession of three Organic Transitions exclusively consecrated, the first to Intellect, the next to Action, and the last to Feeling, followed by the Critical Transition which is now coming to a close (p. 6). In this sequence of phases, each shorter than its predecessor, and all comprised in the thirty centuries of Western history, we get a sense of the profound contrast between the second series of our social ancestors and the first, between the special preparations and the general initiation which preceded them.

Intellectual Polytheism is properly democratic, Social Polytheism aristocratic.

In comparing the two decisive Transitions, intellectual and practical, successively directed by Military Polytheism, we find the negative tendency common to both most prominent in the earlier one. When the warlike impulse is sufficiently strong to throw off the theocratic yoke, but not strong enough to develope a gradual and systematic activity, it necessarily impels towards a real social anarchy. This is no longer the case when its normal purpose can be properly realised, for this spontaneously entails a continuous discipline, at least as regards practical life. Each of these cases, however, meets the needs

of the Transition to which it corresponds. Freedom from restraint was at the time as favourable to Mental expansion in the one instance as conformity to rule was afterwards indispensable to the developement of Activity in the other. This necessary diversity between the two kinds of Military Polytheism, politically speaking, gives the key to the historical purposes respectively served by Democracy and Aristocracy. Each of these was an outcome of the military usurpation over Theocracy, and each did its part in preparing Sociocracy by the successive developement of Intellect and Activity.

Both begin with monarchy.

But these two forms of government, which tallied with the two successive modes of Progressive Polytheism, had both alike to be preceded by a short phase of monarchy. The final preponderance of warriors over priests can never emanate from either senate or people, using those terms strictly, but is everywhere due to a king. Kings alone are able to consummate such a usurpation when the time is ripe for it. In well-marked theocracies the royal monocracy consolidates itself, but its military principle is modified by sacerdotal influence, which though controlled in the political, still retains ascendency in the moral sphere. When military developement precedes and prevents the definitive establishment of theocratic habits, monarchy, from its utter unfitness to direct the continuous growth of collective activity, soon disappears. Its sole use is to break the priestly yoke. That done, it simply paves the way for either democracy or aristocracy, according as the Military Polytheism takes an intellectual or social direction. It is here to be noted that these three classic forms of government necessarily exhibit an equally revolutionary character when their history is compared with either the initial Theocracy or the final Sociocracy, the only complete types of human order.

Plan of this chapter.

I have now sufficiently explained, first the specific purpose and then the grand twofold division of Progressive Polytheism. Our attention is now claimed by the direct subject of this chapter, a special examination of Polytheism in its Intellectual form.

No special section devoted to Abstract treatment: the Abstract Apprecia-

That examination, however, is not to follow the plan of the two previous chapters. It is concerned with an essentially incomplete and local case, and the normal distinction between Abstract and Concrete estimate would here be unsuitable. I

shall proceed straight to the *results* of the intellectual evolution under each of its three heads. I shall, however, take care that such examination is always preceded by a special explanation of the corresponding *properties*, when it shall happen that these have not been sufficiently indicated in my abstract appreciation of Conservative Polytheism. Indeed the order wherein I shall consider the different aspects of the question before us is determined by the coincidence which exists naturally between the need for particular changes and the historic succession of their accomplishment.

tion in Chap. III. will serve for all Polytheism.

A direct application of this rule to my inquiry into intellectual Polytheism leads me to break up the Greek Elaboration into Esthetic, Philosophic, and Scientific, that being the sequence in which those three evolutions, though necessarily simultaneous, each in turn assumed prominence. But before entering on their special treatment I must set forth the Social characteristics and results of the Regime wherewith they were coupled. For though its distinctive purpose might have no reference to sociability, yet the Social system could not adapt itself to the developement of the Intellect except by undergoing dynamical and even statical modifications which require to be well defined.

SOCIAL (OR AFFECTIVE) RESULTS, pp. 225–232.

Looking at the Greek regime as a whole, and particularly at its outset, we perceive deeper traces of its theocratic origin than in the case of Roman Polytheism. The latter, in spite of its greater regularity, had been compelled by its developement of Collective Activity to diverge further from the sacerdotal type. Greek Polytheism, on the contrary, in which the military stimulus could only subserve mental developement, remained truer to the essential principle of Theocracy. Throughout its history it showed an ever-increasing tendency to degenerate into pedantocracy, because the disposition of the public unconsciously chimed in with the aberrations of the thinkers. The danger of such degeneration—which was only stopped by the absorption of Greece into Rome—never threatened Social Polytheism. There Action had obtained its normal preponderance over Speculation, a preponderance never again to be reversed.

Estimate of *general character*: Greek Society had more affinity than Roman with Theocracy.

What distinctly indicates the more pronounced and protracted affinity of the Greek regime with the theocratic constitution is the superior authority that oracles, properly so called, retained in it. They figure in history as its characteristic in-

Greek Oracles a survival of Theocracy.

stitution. To appreciate rightly these makeshifts for the true sacerdotal rule, they must in some instances be regarded as the stunted germs of a native theocracy, in others as the fragmentary remnants of a priesthood introduced by colonists. The two cases can always be distinguished, not only by the signs of their relative antiquity, but also by the very nature of the oracle, according as it has sprung from fetichist or from astrolatric Polytheism. Dodona and Delphi may respectively serve as well-marked types. But what we ought chiefly to notice is the importance and number of these theocratic rudiments or fragments when Greece first entered upon her task of intellectual construction, in the times of which Homer sings.

Their moral influence and dignity.

Despite their natural isolation, these oracles intervened worthily in social matters, whether in adjudicating on novel cases of incest arising out of monogamy, or in protecting industrial life amidst military lawlessness. They branded the fated crime of Œdipus in energetic terms. They ascribed all the misfortunes of Ulysses to outrages committed upon herds of oxen, when the priesthood had established them as the sole inhabitants of a certain marshy island, and had placed them under the protection of the Sun. Throughout their long existence, indeed, these Greek types of true Theocracy, though so often taxed with feebleness and servility, ever showed themselves worthy of the sacerdotal office, and nothing could ever be laid to their charge except a false oracle, which was soon detected.[1]

Intellectual developement of Greece not shared by the mass of the people except as to Art.

Yet these venerable institutions were in no instance able to overrule the subversive tendencies necessarily at work wherever the permanent rupture of the theocratic bond had not been made up for by a real growth of military discipline. Greek history, as a whole, offers the painful spectacle of a nation sacrificed that speculative genius might be decisively developed in a few privileged individual organs. For in setting up Intellect above everything else this people underwent a degradation unexampled, and down to the present time unremedied, lack of Order being ill-compensated by a form of Progress in which the great mass could never have more than a passive share. In the threefold mental evolution of Greece the Esthetic developement alone was susceptible of successes at once decisive and popular. The attempts at Philosophy got no further than to raise questions

[1] Herodotus, vi. 66.

and indicate methods. In Science, only partial results were attainable. Now the importance thus accorded to the faculties of expression would preclude a worthy national life, even in a merely intellectual sense, by tending to subordinate everything to rhetorical talent. The essential defects of the theocratic principle were encouraged to develope to the full; but the admirable discipline of the sacerdotal regime was no longer there to counterbalance the vain supremacy of Intellect. Had not Roman conquest at last put a stop to this course of error and anarchy, each petty community of Greece would in the end have succumbed to the most shameful of all yokes, by falling a prey to some literary tyrant.

Estimate of *particular elements.*

This general view of Greek society is but too fully confirmed when, on a special examination of its main elements, we learn how profoundly they all suffered from the simultaneous absence of sacerdotal discipline and military stimulus, the only regulating influences of the ancient world.

Private Life. Degradation of Women.

That progress in domestic life which consisted in the substitution of monogamy for polygamy is so slightly perceptible as to be almost doubtful. In reality, woman was less deprived of the honourable companionship of man in the harems of Asia than in the gynæcea of Greece. While public life never really arose, for want of a collective and continuous activity, the disorder of private life consequent on the want of moral discipline showed itself especially in the low esteem accorded to the affective sex by a society essentially given up to pleasures of the mind. All superior men, and even most philosophers, habitually lived in the midst of courtesans, the only women capable of entering into their intellectual enjoyments. A fatally significant word will ever commemorate the special tendency of this people towards the sexual debasement naturally induced by the evil preponderance of Intellect over Feeling. The great poets alone rose to worthier conceptions of womanhood in the noble types of goddesses which they created in their unfettered utopias. But where they merely aimed at a faithful portrayal of prevailing manners they convey to us a vivid sense of the oppression exercised over the women. Of this we have an instance in the strange plea on which Orestes, with the approval of Minerva, repels the reproaches of the Eumenides.[1]

Hetæræ.

It were superfluous here to dwell on the evils of a situation

[1] Æschylus, *Eumenides* 658; Euripides, *Orestes*, 552. (Dindorf's editions.)

Public Life. Decline of Worship of Ancestors. Disdain for Past.

which, by the removal of all habitual restraints, perforce involved the unsettlement of public life. How gravely Continuity was affected is seen by the notable falling off in the worship of ancestors, even the domestic ones (p. 197), when Greek manners are compared with those spontaneously instituted by Fetichism and worthily systematised by Theocracy. What, however, specially marks the derangement of public life is a growing disdain soon felt for predecessors, fetichist and theocratic alike, who were supposed to have been incapable of relishing with sufficient refinement the pleasures which alone were now sought after.

Civic Life. Attacks on principle of Property.

In civic life the severe blow levelled at the regime of Caste, uncompensated by advantages accruing from any strictly collective purpose, began to exercise on property, more particularly landed property, a morally and often also a materially solvent action, never afterwards suspended save for a short interval (Phil. Pos. v. 406). The retention of inheritance in regard to property, when suppressed in regard to function, deprived riches of the social character wherewith theocracy had consecrated them (p. 202). Established henceforth on a personal basis, wealth remained exposed to the attacks of envy and sophistry. So inconsistent an arrangement was at the time inevitable for want of power to discriminate between provisions and instruments of production (ii. 135). Yet it could not but arouse and nourish very subversive tendencies by shaking the old principle of the transmission of property without replacing it by a new one. The majority of Greek legislators, not merely the utopists, but even the practical statesmen, held themselves free to dispose of every sort of wealth in an arbitrary manner. Wise theocrats, contemplating this series of divergations from afar, at once judged soundly of the anarchy involved. So afterwards did the Romans, by whose noble instrumentality that anarchy was brought to a close.

Political Life. Influence of demagogues. Ingratitude to great men.

It is with regard to political discipline, however, that the radical imperfections of the Greek situation become most apparent. Unbridled turbulence, occasioned by the fatal absence of social purpose, habitually places mediocre demagogues in the front rank, except when some crisis, called forth by imminent danger, vests power in the right hands. But the marked ingratitude of these unruly little communities towards their best servants, even in such exceptional cases, gives us an idea of the

disorder which was the rule. Intellect, which, when it pretends to rule, is sure to be subject to the worst inspirations of the Heart, under pretext of guarding against oppression, set itself to invent sophisms that should relieve the public from all sense of obligation. Ostracism alone would suffice to betoken the thorough immorality and profound unreasonableness of a people whose real nature will be best understood by contrasting it with its theocratic predecessors and its military successors. The view here taken should increase our veneration for the admirable leaders who, with a presentiment that they were furthering the onward movement of Humanity, voluntarily devoted themselves to the perilous service of those ungrateful and seditious multitudes. Did the existence of the sympathetic instincts stand in need of historical proof, that proof would be amply furnished by such numerous instances of a self-sacrifice for the most part as independent of divine rewards as of human approbation.

Attitude to foreigners. Mutual hostilities.

Coming at last to the widest relations, we see how strikingly different is the childish self-conceit of Greek *nationality* from either the wise *universality* of theocratic aspirations, or the noble proselytising *sociability* of Rome. If these anomalous communities cared little for true Solidarity among themselves, they cared still less to recognise it with nations outside of their own circle; while as for Continuity with any foreign civilisation they never really conceived it. All communities not sprung from themselves were invariably styled Barbarians. But their blind pride, or rather their unparalleled vanity, did not impel them in any way to deserve the pre-eminence they claimed over all other nations, not excepting the wisest or even the most powerful. And within the narrower circle of their mutual relations these arrogant little states displayed the same collective selfishness. Marked as was their community of language, worship, and even manners, the military tendency, baulked of its normal course, was always and everywhere plunging them into quarrels, which nothing but the gravest external dangers could induce them to suspend. On such occasions their joint resistance was often compromised by their reciprocal animosities, and even the best leaders were too ready to avenge the grievance of their own state at the risk of ruining Greece.

Anarchy resulted from attempts to make Merit the principle

I may usefully sum up my judgment on Greek society by connecting its various perturbations with the anarchy caused through a premature attempt to abolish the principle of Birth,

of social hierarchy.

before that of Merit could be substituted for it. For even then the subversive efforts, from which in their last stage we are suffering now, were already put forth on the plea of personal superiority. No real change can be made in the rule of human classification until Theocracy is replaced by Sociocracy, the advent of which, though inevitable and near at hand, is as little understood by the party of Progress as by that of Order. The abstract comparison of individuals will then be determined by their personal worth, but their social rank will always depend upon the place they may fill in the concrete hierarchy of offices (ii. 269). Not only so, but Birth and the still earlier institution of Old Age, now scouted by blind revolutionary prejudice, will again become titles to respect. In superadding the Sociocratic principle to the Theocratic and Fetichist principles, the final system will impressively consecrate for all time the value of those two criterions by which in the ancient world social classification was regulated. It must be evident how anarchical of necessity was any movement excited thirty centuries before our time towards the most difficult and longest delayed of social renovations, a renovation for which even yet we are hardly ripe. But this anomaly was indispensable to the developement of the Greek intellect; just as that equally vicious anomaly, the rule of Mind, which theocracy was obliged to sanction, had long been indispensable to the growth of speculative life.

The one *social* service rendered to Humanity by Greece was the repulse of the Persians.

This first conclusion established, I must complete my judgment of Greek sociability by signalising the eternal glory it deserved for having worthily protected Intellectual Polytheism, while in the performance of its destined task. An incomparable resistance, completed at last by an admirable military expedition, saved the centre of intellectual life from undergoing the oppression of a degenerate theocracy (p. 174). Under the heroic impulse of Themistocles and Alexander two exceptional phases occurred—a century and a half apart—which for some years nobly interrupted the barren continuity of internal struggles. But of these the first only, by its indisputable necessity, its decisive success, and its thorough dignity, claims our gratitude in the same degree as our admiration. The second was less due to a real need for retaliation than to a desire that mutual animosities should be suspended by a collective enterprise.

This twofold conflict was a natural result of the constant

intercourse between Greece and Persia which the numerous Greek colonies founded in Asia Minor from the Homeric times downwards had brought about. Persian theocracy, which had more than any other been impaired by the final preponderance of warriors over priests, was driven by the military stimulus to spread till it reached this dangerous neighbourhood, the solvent influence of which it soon came to feel. Notwithstanding the superficial affinity of the Greek mind with the theocratic principle, these relations necessarily produced a deep-rooted antipathy. In the one case, though there was ever a tendency to give Intellect the first place, there was no power of establishing its supremacy; hence its action became generally vague, and often subversive. In the other, on the contrary, the Intellect, secure of domination, received an exclusively practical bent, by which it was profoundly disciplined. When the dispositions were so opposite, all prolonged contact, even apart from any frivolous proselytism, would be more likely to shake Persian obedience than to bridle Greek turbulence. The Kings, after their usurpation of theocratic authority, must have dreaded this danger all the more that their exceptional government demanded a blind servility, for which sacerdotal rulers have no occasion.

This was a struggle between Theocracy and Intellectual progress.

Persian aggression, then, is to be regarded as chiefly meant to check a seditious form of propagandism. But, however legitimate on grounds of its own, it was directly antagonistic to the general interests of Humanity, then represented by the Western home of free thinkers. The Persian theocracy might entirely disappear, as the Chaldean theocracy had just done, and as also did even the Egyptian theocracy, without serious injury to the fundamental progress of the race. For the theocratic type, which will persist till we reach the sociocratic stage, was specially localised in the vast societies of India and China, where its preservation was so essential as to be proof against all revolutions, internal and external alike. But our intellectual destinies would, on the contrary, as Condorcet admirably remarks, have been gravely compromised had the battle of Salamis proved fatal to that nucleus of Greek life, for which, at the time, no real equivalent could have arisen elsewhere.

The true nature of the struggle is forcibly attested by the general manner of its accomplishment. For success mainly depended on the population specially devoted to the work of

Hence Athens rather than Sparta bore the brunt of it.

intellectual developement, while the state which was exclusively military did not materially share in it, save in the one act of sublime devotion which was to inaugurate the united resistance.

Lycurgus.

A lawgiver, more respectable than eminent, failing to perceive the incompatibility of the conditions of Greek life with any system of conquest, had endeavoured to form an aristocracy of warriors on a too artificial basis. Nevertheless, these abortive Romans would have seemed well adapted to supply the chief nucleus to the armed force of the confederacy. But, on the contrary, this haughty state, as oppressive abroad as it was at home, often endangered, nay sometimes betrayed, the common cause, and is linked with the heroic struggle by the great name of Leonidas alone. All decisive victories, whether by land or sea, were essentially due to the Athenians, under the admirable direction of Miltiades and Themistocles. In the whole range of military history there is nothing comparable to the systematic efforts of the latter chief to train his nation long beforehand for the naval success by which alone Greece could secure her work from interruption.

Invasion of Asia by Alexander.

Though the energy developed by this resistance eventually led to a more dangerous renewal of ancient quarrels that for a time had been suspended, it nevertheless produced a long and notable improvement in the moral dignity of the whole people. Each little community felt itself honoured by the noble memory of its voluntary participation in the common activity. The defence so gloriously accomplished strengthened the disposition to repress theocratic tendencies, and thereby gave fuller play to the genius of the nation. From the complementary expedition of Alexander, admirable as were its foundations (p. 239), no such reaction could follow. For when it threw the Greek troops into Asia on the pretext of demanding a guarantee of national security that was almost superfluous, the closer contact with the East aggravated the degeneracy of Western morals. And so, after lasting over a century, the struggle ended by injuring the two antagonistic civilisations equally, though not before the chief fruits of the intellectual construction, which it had been reserved for Greece to achieve, were realised. No further display of collective dignity occurred among this exceptional people until the period just preceding their incorporation with Rome; and then, as before, it was mainly the chiefs who evinced any political qualities.

Achæan League. Aratus. Philopœmen.

Before proceeding to examine the intellectual elaboration, which forms the principal object of inquiry in the present chapter, I have to complete this judgment of Greek society by considering its Practical evolution in the strict sense. But the failure in industrial life is even more glaring than in regard to military activity, and the explanation is to be found in another influence of the same disposition. For while Greek turbulence was as unfavourable to success in the useful arts as to warlike effort, the martial tastes of the nation recoiled from those servile labours the habit of which human nature acquires slowly and against the grain. Our first start in industry constitutes the most general and most precious result of the theocratic regime, which hitherto has stood alone in fitly honouring and worthily directing, after its own way, the efforts of peaceful activity. No important art can be cited of which either the first germ or the principal developement is really due to the Greeks, though their ingratitude and frivolity often disposed them to ignore the foreign origin of the inventions they applied. Even their naval triumphs were too shortlived or too secondary to call forth any marked advance in navigation. That great art could, in the West, get but little beyond the Argonautic type, until it became closely bound up with the general policy of Rome. Then it came to be cultivated steadily, and better than by its theocratic founders.

PRACTICAL (OR INDUSTRIAL) RESULTS. Greeks made little progress in any useful art.

Navigation.

We now enter upon the direct examination of the Greek Elaboration, and I have first to point out historically, as I have already done doctrinally, the error which still prevails with regard to the Esthetic evolution (p. 151). Western art, separated from the sacerdotal stem, was so possessed with pride and irrationality that it soon overlooked its double indebtedness to the spontaneous action of Fetichism and the subsequent systematisation of Theocracy. Forgetful of its own antecedents, the priority it necessarily enjoyed over the other parts of the Greek movement led it to credit itself with the intellectual and even social foundation of the civilisation from which it sprang. Hence arose the chronic craze which will do its utmost to make the Ideal predominate over the Real, until sociocratic discipline shall have taken the place once occupied by theocratic subordination. During the long interregnum, the exceptional class exclusively devoted to the culture of the faculties of expression has everywhere habitually exhibited the most exaggerated

INTELLECTUAL RESULTS, pp. 233–277.

(1) Esthetic movement, pp. 233–242.

Exaggerated pretensions of Artistic Class.

pretensions, in striking contrast with a most degrading situation.

In order to judge fairly of the esthetic state of Greece, and properly to apportion the influence respectively exercised on it by doctrine and environment, we must first compare it with the two antecedents by which it was prepared.

Doctrine of Polytheism less poetic than that of Fetichism, which could better idealise External World.

Through a misleading confusion of results with tendencies which induces us to ascribe to the doctrine of Polytheism an artistic aptitude due mainly to its situation, the Second Causality obtains a semblance of being more poetical than the First. Had the latter been able to develope public life, it would have left incontestable proofs of its esthetic power. For the direct assimilation of all beings to the human type is in itself more poetical than the indirect explanation of their phenomena by supernatural Wills. This superiority of Fetichism in dealing with the external world will ever be reflected in a style of composition that assuredly emanated from the Primitive belief, though fables, in their recognised form, were first produced under Theocracy. The Relative Spirit of Positivism, which has to incorporate the Instinct of primitive times with the Rationality of our final state, will revive those touching fictions, and give them a deep meaning. A proof of this has been spontaneously afforded by her who to all time is to be remembered as my colleague in the admirable type of fetichist poetry appended to the dedication of the present treatise.

Fables.

Polytheism better able than Fetichism to idealise Human Order; but not by virtue of its doctrine.

With regard to the Human Order, to which the Direct Causality could not extend, the poetical successes of Polytheism are in truth due only to the developement of Sociability. From the aptitude of fetichists for delineating domestic sentiment worthily, we may infer that they would have painted civic life equally well had they enjoyed a sufficient experience of it. The direct and real representation of human affections was always more beneficial and more difficult than the arbitrary fictions in which man becomes the passive plaything of divine caprice. The natural superiority of the one over the other will be placed beyond dispute when the true power of art, hitherto but imperfectly exemplified, shall have been developed by the final regeneration of Humanity. Then men's feelings will tell them whether the Ideal is better cultivated because the Real is ignored or disfigured. Every essentially fictitious regime must at bottom be anti-poetical, inasmuch as it makes Imagination a substitute

for Feeling, and so favours esthetic mediocrities, who find it easy to cultivate a conventional domain. From Homer to Walter Scott, Western art has always derived its main effects from a faithful representation of human nature irrespective of divine influences.

Greek Art being emancipated from priestly control could develope divine types and so idealise human nature.

The fuller opening up of this its fundamental domain was the chief gain it derived from its emancipation, when the conditions of Greek life relieved it from the theocratic yoke. Human nature was still too insufficiently understood, and indeed too undeveloped, to be susceptible of thorough idealisation. But Greek genius turned its peculiar freedom to good account when it remedied those two deficiencies, as far as might be, by a happy resort to divine types. So long as art was an appendage of religious worship, it was only free to develope these types in a secondary way, for the purpose of giving sufficient precision to the doctrinal conceptions(p. 189). But under cover of Greek anarchy, art soon ventured to modify beliefs so ill-defined, in a spirit that spontaneously sanctioned the noble aspirations or presentiments of which true poets have always been the best exponents. Greek art did not owe this modifying power, as the pretended preamble of the Iliad suggests, to sceptical tendencies, radically incompatible with all speculative, and especially with all poetic, depth. Its exceptional independence rather resulted from the suppleness which absence of social purpose lent to intellectual Polytheism; whereas the sacerdotal inflexibility of conservative Polytheism forbade a license afterwards still more effectually checked by the doctrinal rigour of Monotheism.

But only true Poets used this license well. Effect of Theocratic discipline on Hebrew poetry.

But the very fact that Art was thus driven to provide itself with an artificial domain, proves how unfavourable esthetically was a situation which did not habitually impart to it any lofty stimulus. Under Theocracy—though it had to submit to a necessary discipline—it had still the consciousness of being closely linked with an imposing worship. That union is immortalised in the incomparable majesty of the Hebrew lyrics, which, notwithstanding their Monotheistic character, must be considered the only true type we possess of theocratic poetry. The Greek situation could never furnish Art with a true social purpose to make up for the loss of its religious office, and therefore simply bestowed on it a rambling and barren liberty, by which the highest natures alone profited, although it chiefly tended to multiply the productions of mediocrity.

Professional artists degraded by 'Patronage.'

Moreover, the conditions of the transitory artist-class as a body soon produced among its members a personal debasement, of which, after thirty centuries, we are suffering the ultimate consequences. Having lost for ever the social dignity conferred on them by the sacerdotal regime, artists fell under the arbitrary yoke of the great and wealthy, on whom, as a name still current too expressively reminds us, they depended both for bodily subsistence and mental initiative. The unavailing regrets lavished on the miserable life led by Homer did not save his successors from habitually undergoing a yet more ignoble, though less painful, form of oppression. It is melancholy to see Pindar wasting his genius in pompous declamations for the Athletes who fed him. The great poetical compositions were necessarily free from the pressure of material life. But this servility weighed heavily on all secondary poetry; and the Special Arts, particularly sculpture, painting, and architecture, were never able to escape from it. Phidias, Apelles, and Ictinus worked to order as much as their most modern representatives, though they met with better patrons. The yoke of the theocratic regime was withdrawn; but a stern fate had decreed that art should not recover its true social dignity, nor artists their proper personal independence, until the far distant advent of Sociocracy.

Pindar.

Paucity of great poets among the Greeks. Rise of Epos and Drama with Homer and Æschylus

So untoward a concurrence of adverse influences both doctrinal and practical, can alone explain the extreme scarcity of great poets during the whole period of the Greek Elaboration. In the course of its thirteen centuries it produced but two geniuses of really first-rate order, one epic, the other dramatic, between whom there lay a long interval teeming with mediocrities. A wave of genuine public feeling, rare in that disorderly civilisation, called forth at their appointed epochs the incomparable Homer and the great Æschylus to endow Humanity with imperishable types of the two fresh developements that poetry under its newly-acquired freedom was to take. And here it may be well to carry the foregoing explanation into detail, and to examine what conditions were essential to these decisive beginnings of Epic and Dramatic poetry; for, conformably with the true nature of human events, all antecedent and contemporaneous influences contributed their share to them. If this examination is exceptionally concrete, the occasion is worthy of it, nor without it could I sufficiently illustrate the

theory which I have just established in the abstract. Moreover, that theory tends to deepen our sense of the personal superiority which enabled these noble poets to fulfil their tasks in an environment utterly unfavourable to the Principal Art.

Mainly determined by Oriental struggle.

This detailed explanation turns mainly on the natural connection of the two poets with the great struggle which I have above treated as the one glory of Greek national life.

The Trojan war came to be regarded as the commencement of that struggle.

The earlier date of Homer's poems might at first sight seem to exclude such a connection; for they celebrate a conflict, almost accidental, between two peoples intimately related by ties of common origin, language, worship, and even manners. And though one of them had undergone some modification of its Hellenic characteristics by domicile in Asia, it had not contracted any tendency towards the theocratic type of the East.

The Iliad and Odyssey.

But this great event, notwithstanding that it arose out of a domestic incident, was nevertheless calculated to inspire lofty strains, from being the only marked instance of really collective activity among the different Greek peoples who had recently shaken off the sacerdotal regime. An interval of some centuries between its occurrence and its celebration in verse had sufficed to develope the colonisations which were to result in the Græco-Persian struggle above described. Himself dwelling in the midst of them, the poet might have some dim presentiment of a grave conflict, which, taking place on the same ground, naturally became associated with the memorable expedition to Troy. The inter-relation of the two events was generally felt when the crisis began, so that the ancient destruction of a Greek colony, in reprisal for a violation of hospitality, soon came to be looked on as the glorious opening of the tremendous struggle which was engrossing the Hellenic peoples. Indeed the full popularity of the Homeric songs does not date further back than that epoch. Thenceforward the collective developement of Greek nationality led to an even warmer appreciation of the poem which inaugurated it.

Moral and Social authority of Homer unparalleled. His personality.

Thus arose, and became a potent influence, the two epic compositions wherein, for the first time, the genius of *Man* freely exercised drew a noble picture of public and private life. In them we may see how the rupture of theocratic bonds enabled true poets to realise better the fundamental purpose of

art. Left simply to his own inspirations, and addressing himself to peoples exempt from the sacerdotal yoke, he who sang of Achilles and Ulysses insensibly grew to be the universal oracle of a society destitute of all regular instruction. Throughout his two poems he is ever conscious of the dignity of his exceptional mission, giving the wisest counsel in the present and foreshadowing all that was best in the future. While he idealised war, he never concealed his personal preference for the activity of peace. He proclaimed universal brotherhood with noble courage, and this in the face of slavery, an institution which to his great soul must have seemed all the more vicious because in that civilisation it could not fulfil its chief purpose (p. 155). Although his poetic genius has already been surpassed, his social influence must for ever remain unequalled since no analogous situation can again occur. In vain has the admirable unity of his whole work been questioned by the stupidity of erudition. Our latest descendants will concur with our earliest ancestors in venerating the Western bard whose personal existence has been denied by anarchical pedants destitute of a spark of feeling.

Æschylus, the only great Greek Dramatist, wrote under the social impulse of resistance to Persia.

These epic poems would naturally give rise to great dramatic works, designed to develope their principal scenes more vividly. Yet, though largely cultivated, that form of composition could evoke but a single master of genuine eminence. Upon him was necessarily concentrated that stimulating impulse which stands alone in Greek history, and which by virtue of its high social purpose was calculated to impress upon the drama a grand poetic character. This influence of public events is more direct and more incontestable as regards the second form of the Fundamental Art, than as regards the first.

His dramas. The *Persians*.

The personal share of Æschylus in the glory of Marathon would of itself prove how deeply his genius was inspired by the heroic resistance of his country, even if one of his few dramas which have been preserved to us were not specially devoted to that theme. But the greatest of his compositions, which has been made the text of so many unprofitable commentaries, appears to me to bear even profounder marks of the anti-theocratic sentiments that must have been developed throughout Greece by the struggle against Persia. In idealising Prometheus, Æschylus purposed to brand the sacerdotal oppression exercised upon the sage who sacrificed himself that he might

The *Prometheus* represents the anti-theocratic feeling of Greece.

impart to the Greek nation the principal theoretic and practical acquirements of the theocratic colony to which he belonged, acquirements which they wished to keep to themselves as mysteries. Such cases must have often occurred during the continuous struggle which went on between this immigrant and the native theocracy, till both were, shortly before the Homeric times, absorbed by the kingly power. From among the legends that had grown up round the subject the poet spontaneously selected the one which was most strongly marked, and best adapted to satisfy the popular feeling against the regime of castes, a feeling of which his personal sympathies rendered him the immortal representative. His protest against theocratic debasement was energetic, but his genius rendered due honour to spiritual power of the true kind. That power he personified in the admirable type supplied in Prometheus, who so generously divulged the secrets of the initiating priesthood, undaunted by the relentless persecution aroused against him by the corporation he had abandoned. All the other plays of Æschylus, similarly, have an indirect bearing on the same long collective struggle carried on by his nation, whether they describe the immediate sequel of its Homeric opening, or go back to the partial coalition which was the prelude thereto.

Oresteia. Seven against Thebes.

After the two decisive efforts of Homer and Æschylus any further social mission for Greek poetry could have sprung only out of the complementary military expedition concerning which I have already recorded my judgment. But, notwithstanding its collective form, that concluding movement was both too personal and too artificial to be esthetically inspiring, even had the true glow of Hellenic art not already died out. The feeble continuer of the work of Æschylus is not without poetic qualities, but he in his turn is succeeded by the first of the long line of mere writers, whose verse or prose thenceforth was only efficacious for spontaneously propagating intellectual emancipation, and too often also moral anarchy.

Why the expedition of Alexander did not inspire a great poem.

Sophocles.

Euripides.

The servility of the Special Arts ever since their dissociation from Theocracy dispenses me from dwelling at any length on their developement. Destitute of social purpose and personal dignity, it never led beyond a technical perfection available only for preparing the real esthetic era yet to come. With regard to the art of sounds—the art nearest the parent stem of poetry, and more than any other identified with affective

Developement of Special Arts merely technical. Music made no progress.

life—no appreciable advance whether in instrumental or vocal music can be detected which really goes beyond the methods of fetichist melody and theocratic harmony (p. 114). And as to the threefold art of form, already mischievously split up from the very fact of being cultivated to excess, its debt to Greece has been much exaggerated.

Sculpture skilfully idealised a low type of beauty. Architecture and Painting inferior to those of Theocracy.

The improvement effected in it was essentially confined to sculpture. There an exceptional perfection of execution was attained, largely due to the circumstance that Greek manners favoured the frequent public exhibition of nudity, the value of which to technical execution was increased by the prevalence of an infamous kind of love. These two reasons are quite sufficient to explain why beauty was fully appreciated only in its lowest form. The finest statues are idealisations of the human body so remote from true moral or even intellectual elevation that it is characteristic of their heads to be too diminutive for either thought or love. Theocratic types of art, notwithstanding their shortcomings of execution, generally possess a higher esthetic power, particularly in the representation of divinities, which in Greece were sculptured by artists already sceptical at the bidding of an unbelieving magistracy, for a people who were indifferent. The meagre regularity of the Greek temple will never make us forget the rudimentary but imposing achievements of sacerdotal art. It will always tell of a worship reduced to out-door processions, and affording none of the collective instruction for which vast sanctuaries would have been needed. Finally, as to Greek painting, if we set aside technical improvements, there are no indications of any esthetic effects really comparable with those which—thanks to religious inspiration and the social purpose of its great compositions—theocratic art often obtained by its processes even in monochrome. Under each chief aspect of Greek art, then, we can establish, in spite of prejudices interested in maintaining the contrary, that the esthetic perfection reserved for the normal state of Humanity was never developed amidst a moral corruption which was already provoking the Western revolt of the Intellect against the Heart.

The true services of Greek Art were that it developed Subjective Life and

The judgment just pronounced is of necessity severe. I must, however, wind up this estimate of the esthetic side of Greek civilisation by recalling the transitory nature of that exceptional regime as a whole, and the revolutionary task in-

cumbent upon it. After producing a few immortal works—destined to reveal the possibilities of man's esthetic nature when allowed free play—art soon grew as frivolous as it was immoral, more particularly in its Special forms. Still it helped to prepare better times by diffusing an emancipation of thought, which had become as indispensable as it was inevitable. In one respect, indeed, as I have already shown (p. 152), its tendency was distinctly Organic. It aided the growth of Subjective Life, a result promoted, no doubt, by all Polytheistic creeds, but which, without the spontaneous assistance of the different Fine Arts, could never have become sufficiently universal to all classes, and might even have been lost again. And if this happy Mental preparation was accompanied by an unhealthy Moral reaction, in that it stimulated on all sides an excessive disposition to idealise, we must ascribe this more to the absolute want of social purpose than to the esthetic tendency itself. However, the positive advantage of familiarising men with Subjective Life was one which could not be thoroughly realised till our own day; and it was then quite cast into the shade by the negative value of Greek art, which by handling religious themes freely seconded the philosophic movement of Humanity towards a really new Synthesis. The taste of the whole nation for esthetic productions must even have helped afterwards to popularise scientific speculation, by developing the habit of abstraction, in an elementary degree, among all classes. Thus the relative spirit of Positivism can alone judge Greek art fairly in its entirety, avoiding the two opposite errors of the absolute spirit, which either stigmatises it in the name of Order, or unduly extols it in the name of Progress.

assisted Philosophic movement.

That Art, earlier than Philosophy and Science, became detached from the theocratic stem was not due solely to its less systematic and more popular character. Its precocity in emancipating itself resulted above all from its leading purpose—the ideal representation of human nature, principally under the collective aspect (p. 225). Having such an object, Art could not but feel keenly that theological doctrine was utterly powerless as regards the Human Order, and so would find sacerdotal discipline more oppressive than Science or even Philosophy did, because they were then busying themselves only with the External Order. Art would, therefore, be the first to utilise the intellectual freedom peculiar to the Greek situation, in

Why its emancipation from religious trammels preceded that of Philosophy and Science.

which the military principle checked theocracy, and yet could not itself become preponderant. Poetic liberty naturally paved the way for philosophic liberty by inspiring ideas concerning men and society, all the more decisive because there was no obligation to reduce them to any system. Thenceforth, in the highest field of speculative thought—that of Sociology and Morals—the esthetic spirit aimed at rational positivity, which alone can bring its conceptions into harmony with its tendencies. The incoherence of the regime, in which war missed its social end, naturally preserved Greek poetry from being preoccupied with military interests, and allowed it to sketch, in a way that does it honour, the sentiment of the oneness of Humanity, a sentiment already very distinct in Homer, and in Æschylus predominant even over his noble patriotism.

(2) Philosophic Movement, pp. 242–262.

This includes Scientific movement till Aristotle.

We now come to the Philosophic and Scientific evolution, which was to constitute the principal object of the Intellectual elaboration reserved for Greece, the work of Art therein being only one of general preparation. Although Greek science and philosophy were ultimately separated, yet at first they were so closely united that the growth of neither can be properly understood unless their ultimate connection be kept in view. That is why, when I come to examine the scientific developement proper, I shall limit myself to an estimate of the theoretic progress achieved after their separation. All previous theoretic progress I include in the philosophic developement of which it formed the chief foundation.

We must consider (*a*) its General Form, (*b*) its Results.

In order to seize the character of this decisive movement, the intellectual source of Western civilisation, we must consider first its general constitution, then its necessary results.

(*a*) General Form; a Spiritual Power. Conditions of its rise, pp. 242–247.

Under the former aspect I have specially to explain how the Greek situation, in developing abstract thought, made direct preparation for a true spiritual power, whose gradual establishment will be the principal basis of the final Sociocracy. Such a work required the spontaneous concurrence of two sets of permanent conditions, one intellectual, the other social, which I shall successively specify.

First Intellectual Condition: Influence of polytheistic doctrine on growth of Abstraction.

This early developement of abstraction, long restricted to the study of the Material World, was at first guided by the theoretic influence of Polytheism. Direct Causality was never able to deal with the Human Order, any fetichistic explanation

of which would involve a logical flaw, obvious to the meanest intelligence, since it was precisely to the Human type that Fetichism referred all phenomena (p. 81). The second or indirect Causality rests its chief intellectual claim on its applicability to this supreme domain.

Polytheistic doctrine attempted, though unsuccessfully, to explain *Human* order.

Nevertheless, Theologism throughout was incapable of filling up a gap destined to remain till the establishment of Positivism. Had it not been for the social efficacy which theocracy contrived to extract from those childish explanations, their theoretic emptiness would soon have led true thinkers to recognise the intellectual impotence of the regime of Causes. For all theological doctrine consists in attributing human thoughts and affections to supernatural Wills, which in their turn are equally inexplicable, and an insurmountable difficulty is thus merely removed one stage further back.

Greek Polytheism would feel that difficulty the more keenly that its abstract tendency had been strengthened and its liberty enlarged by its want of social coherence. When it came to investigate the grounds of the divine decrees, it could find no other course than to reverse its ordinary procedure (p. 75) by placing the moral in dependence on the physical world. To dispel his own hesitation between the Greeks and the Trojans, Jupiter has recourse to the law of Weight, to which he subordinates their respective fates. A multitude of other polytheistic instances show how a consciousness was already gaining ground that our speculative cravings find their chief satisfaction in connecting the most complex with the simplest phenomena, even though the links be purely chimerical. Abstract thinkers would soon recognise the necessary hollowness of Theologism and the natural incompetence of Fetichism in regard to the Human Order, and would thus feel that the universal synthesis at which they aimed could emanate only from the regime of Laws.

It was less ill suited to study of *External* Order.

But this theoretic issue, though already strongly indicated by the definite establishment of the rudiments of Mathematics, was still too remote from its most important domain, that of Morals and Sociology, to prevent the mind remaining for a long time fixed upon the Material Order in an environment which exempted it from dealing with Social questions. Now Polytheistic doctrine fitted in better with the study of the material world, though not specially designed for it, than with

that of the Human economy; for deceptive as were its solutions, they did not constitute the directly vicious circle for the former which they did for the latter (p. 218). Their office was provisionally to supplement the inevitable shortcomings of Fetichism, as regards Facts to which the Second Causality applied a doctrine equivalent to that of the First with respect to Things (p. 123). There could be no such conception as that of natural laws until the habit of abstract contemplation had been formed. Fetichist doctrine was necessarily restricted to concrete contemplation. It is therefore clear that Polytheism was indispensable to the first growth of theory. So long as the systematic study of the material world was passing through the notion of Cause to that of Law, divinities were of greater use to the mind than entities (p. 143). Subsequently the latter were preferred, since being less definite they were easier to eliminate (p. 32).

Second Intellectual Condition: Growing influence of the Positive Spirit.

Nevertheless all our speculations would have continued in a state of perpetual childhood had polytheistic influence reigned alone. But allied with it we ever discern the growing power of the positive spirit, its primitive speciality (pp. 31, 32) being compensated by the generality inherent in the doctrine of Causes, which doctrine in return derived from that alliance the impress of reality that belongs to the study of laws. This simultaneous operation of the two opposing principles had naturally begun under Fetichism, which, as I have shown (p. 71), was as well adapted to Law as to Cause. They continued to subsist side by side without difficulty during the prevalence of Polytheism; for that system had mainly grown out of Astrolatry, which, itself resulting from the first general reactions in a special department of positivity (p. 95), thoroughly sanctioned the scientific principle so long as the true Theocracy held sway. It was Monotheism alone that made apparent the utter antagonism of the two methods, when during the decline of Polytheism, while entities were taking the place of divinities, it systematised an absolute philosophy which had already become incompatible with the sum total of positive notions. In the early centuries of the Greek Elaboration Polytheism fully accepted the scientific principle, at that time represented by the first rudiments of numerical and geometrical conceptions carried up to the point of their application to astronomy. Thus did the genius of Abstraction begin its reign, when the various

concurrent influences of the Greek situation had spontaneously released it from any practical destination.

First Social Condition: Diversion of Greek intellect from politics.

It only remains for me to describe how this release took place, and the general constitution of this speculative movement will have been adequately explained. It was necessarily due to a civilisation which, at bottom, was as little military as sacerdotal, and therefore remained devoid of any distinctive character. Under the aristocracy of Rome, as under the theocracy of the East, men with a genius for abstraction would naturally have turned their hands to practical statesmanship, because a taste for speculation would have been disdained by public opinion in the one case and repressed by priestly discipline in the other. But Greek democracy, on the contrary, by the very fact of its anarchical tendency, deterred true thinkers from a collective activity habitually destitute of all greatness, and which, save during certain exceptional crises, led to the political preponderance of second-rate intriguers. The most competent statesmen, unable to feel genuinely absorbed by a social mission so purely intermittent, always took a profound interest in the evolution of thought. The public, too, even unconsciously, was actuated by the same feeling, and its attention was assured to philosophic efforts, though it not unfrequently preferred rhetoricians to thinkers. All resistance to the developement of theory was thus as a rule concentrated in the priesthood already shorn of its power, and easily controlled by the magistracy.

Second Social Condition: Spectacle of independent Greek states united by common sentiments and beliefs.

At the same time the social organisation of Greece was eminently fitted to stimulate the genius of abstraction, by directly preparing for it the noblest of missions: that of establishing the true spiritual power. In this respect the political decomposition served as a new impelling force, for it kept before men's eyes the continual spectacle of an intellectual and moral association between states independent of each other. That spontaneous church—even then as much a reality as the cities composing it—could by no territorial restriction be hindered from arousing in those whose qualities of heart and mind inclined them towards social generalisations, an unmistakable desire for a universal communion. Moreover, though Greek unity rested on Polytheism, yet the theoretic, and still earlier, the esthetic, genius, would soon feel that truly universal association could only be founded on peaceful activity

guided by the positive spirit. The order of nature had already become so far appreciable—even though only by the aid of numerical ideas—that intellects of a really synthetic stamp might feel thenceforward that it would be possible to extend the doctrine of immutable laws in every direction. To construct that sole basis of a really universal faith became then the principal intellectual aim of all thinkers of a high order. They would thoroughly grasp its direct connection with the social regeneration consequent on the establishment of Merit as the qualification for rule, which was already supplying the chief occasion for democratic turbulence.

Spiritual Power lodged successively with Old Men, Hereditary Priests, and Philosophers.

The earliest organs of the true spiritual power, which is nothing more than the normal reaction of intellect on force, were the Old Men, who, as an institution, were one of the first results of the Fetichist regime (p. 95). Under Theocracy, even while still connected with Astrolatry, spiritual power began to attach more particularly to Birth, as offering a higher guarantee of capacity, both acquired and hereditary, for the discharge of social functions. But in the final state, Sociocracy, Merit will have to be substituted for Birth, on the same grounds on which Birth superseded Age. The Greek regime necessarily induced a premature anticipation of that ultimate order of Society, when it broke down theocratic rule without replacing it by the military principle, which yet seemed to offer a sufficient basis for estimating individual worth. Though the vague desire for the supremacy of Merit was habitually anarchical, it led the Philosophers to look on themselves as the future successors of the theocratic Priests, just as these in their day had replaced the Old Men. They would also perceive that before the difficult end of Government by the Worthiest could be attained, there was an *intellectual* condition to be satisfied, namely, the discovery of a demonstrable doctrine capable of guiding the people and its leaders in the most delicate of human tasks, that of judging in the abstract what constitutes true merit. But there was also a *social* condition to be satisfied which, from the nature of the Greek situation, the philosophers could not sufficiently apprehend, namely, the continuous preponderance of a collective activity with purposes clearly defined, by which it should be possible always to determine the concrete classification of individuals (p. 230).

Nevertheless, in winding up this summary inquiry, I have to note the ennobling influence which a dim consciousness of the far-off mission awaiting their order exercised on the lives of the sages who then worthily represented it. This will be apparent to all who can distinguish the true philosophers of Greece from the mere writers still decked with so grand a title. The latter, for the most part, afforded the puerile spectacle of a vain pedantocracy bootlessly striving to succeed to the social function of a proud theocracy by erecting the most subversive utopias into systems. The true thinkers, on the contrary, wisely aware of the incompatibility of their calling with attention to politics, and spontaneously diverted from industrial activity by the prejudices of their time, aspired only to obtain such a control of the Intellect and the Will as was freely conceded to them.

Moral superiority of true Greek philosophers over mere writers like Plato.

Such are the essential bases of that philosophic constitution whose general results I have now to consider. The earliest scientific discoveries, due to the decisive establishment of a habit of abstract speculation, claim notice first; for their reaction on the whole range of thought became the true foundation of Greek philosophy, though the special nature of this influence has hitherto disguised its more general efficacy.

(*b*) Results of the Philosophic Movement, pp. 247–262.

(*a*) Earliest Abstract science: (*β*) its Encyclopedic reaction.

As regards numerical speculations, it was long before Greek science made any marked advance beyond the point already reached by Fetichism and Theocracy. But it soon developed the reaction of those speculations on philosophy; they were, indeed, one of the chief sources from which abstract thinkers derived their notions of Synthesis. Seeing that real order is nothing but invariability of arrangement, the simple series of numbers —always at first designed more for classification than for measurement—naturally constitutes the best type of order, a type at once objective and subjective.

(*a*) Earliest science Mathematical and Astronomical, pp. 247–253.

Even before the extension of the Calculus to the laws of Geometry began to mark in a direct manner the mathematical relation between the abstract and the concrete, the Greek synthesis had found in numerical conceptions alone a basis for its aspirations after universality. Amidst the subtle generalisations thus suggested, two opposing tendencies require to be distinguished: the one Metaphysical and essentially retrograde, the other Positive and eminently progressive. Their contrast comes out in regard to the philosophic properties of numbers,

Numerical Speculations. Sacred Numbers.

properties principally derived from the first three numbers, which I have called *sacred* (p. 107), and which also deserve to be called *spontaneous* owing to their independence of signs, and *universal* as being alone common to all the higher animals. Men's notions concerning these properties had always been sound, both when fetichist instinct first unveiled, and when theocratic wisdom further developed them. But Greek subtlety often impaired their theoretic character by endeavouring to subordinate Laws to Causes; a real retrogression, since Cause never serves any other end than to prepare the way for Law (p. 106). Nevertheless, the leading thinkers used these numerical relations chiefly as aids to a better conception of the universal harmony, deriving from them a sense of connection between all phenomena whatsoever. Not only were those synthetic views truer than our analytic prejudices would suppose, but they moreover favoured the precision necessary to Positive doctrine by establishing immutability in questions of quantity as well as in those of quality, although this ultimate extension is but rarely to be grasped (i. 377).

Rise of Linear Geometry. The two theorems of Thales.

But be the philosophic value of those arithmetical inspirations what it may, the special characteristic of Greek science was the decisive progress made in abstract geometry, the expansion of which, while it was cultivated by Priests, had been too much repressed by its practical destination. Till then all geometrical notions had dealt with the measurement of areas or of volumes, while linear geometry could not be said to exist. Yet the latter had to grow out of the other two as their natural complement, before forming as we now see the rational foundation on which they rest. For as the theory of areas and volumes always reduces comparisons between them to comparisons of lines, it became in many cases inadequate and even inapplicable so long as linear relations were unknown, while these latter again could not be understood without a previous knowledge of rectilinear figures, which are obviously reducible to triangles. The study of lines, then, was to be the earliest advance achieved by Greek genius, thanks to the twofold discovery of the great Thales, whose name will ever be associated with this first step in geometrical abstraction. His two laws, of the constancy of the sum of the angles of a rectilinear triangle, and of the proportionality of the sides in equi-angular triangles, must be re-

garded as closely connected. From these resulted the theory of polygons, and even the outline of the theory of the circle, as a result of the measurement of angles. There is no reason why the second law might not have been derived in a direct way from the comparison of areas, as the classical proof of it soon showed. But in point of fact it was originally a consequence of the first law, which would immediately explain the properties of parallel lines, up to that time known only in a purely inductive manner.

How he was led to them.

The importance of this fundamental advance induces me here to point out its probable connection with the general body of previously existent notions, by showing that the method of areas, employed in a somewhat exceptional way, is sufficient to lead easily to the chief theorem of Thales. That theorem substantially is, that any given angle is equal to the sum of the angles formed by any transversal with one of the sides of the given angle and the other side produced. Now, measuring each angle by the infinite area it includes, this relation is evident, if we substitute for the first of the two latter angles its opposite, and if, in the case of the second, we neglect the area of the triangle. This last process logically offers the advantage of introducing from the very outset of abstract geometry the essential principle of the infinitesimal method, that is to say, the power of mutual substitution of any magnitudes whose difference is infinitely small compared with the magnitudes themselves. Although the filiation I am suggesting must, for want of documentary proof, remain conjectural, it was of consequence to the philosophy of history to frame a clear idea of the special connection between Greek speculation and its Theocratic foundation.

He reformed Astronomy,

Thus at last arose the principal department of geometry, which, from its logical properties and scientific bearings, will ever predominate over the two other parts. Thenceforth it was continuously cultivated, and so the spontaneous institution of *Space* (i. 397) came to be developed systematically. The use of this conception was to enable us to consider extension in the abstract, apart from concrete cases ; but up to this time it had remained indistinct, for want of that effective application of the institution, which the study of lines demanded. But the importance of the new impulse given by geometry was chiefly shown in the renovation that Thales worked by its aid in the

whole body of Astronomy, a science that will ever be indebted to him for its second mathematical constitution.

By substituting diagrams for mechanisms.

Its first, or theocratic, constitution, as I have shown in the preceding chapter (p. 184), was essentially characterised by the employment of mechanism adapted for representing those movements of the heavens which first attract man's attention. However rude such a method, which at present is undervalued, would remain, it was none the less truly scientific; for it was the result of systematic conceptions, and it gave rational previsions, though both one and the other were wanting in exactness. The Greeks regenerated this theocratic constitution of astronomy in the first place, by substituting constructions on a plane surface for constructions in relief, diagrams thenceforth replacing mechanical apparatus, though the latter were never altogether discarded. That substitution, however, only became possible after an effective study of linear systems, pursued even till a first conception had been formed of the relations, whether angular or spherical, between three straight lines which form different planes around a given point. It was in this way that Thales and his school, at that early date, constituted Greek astronomy, which throughout continued to rest on graphic methods. The employment of calculation, the last stage in the formation of astronomical science, though instituted by Hipparchus, could not occupy the first rank until modern times.

But, save in regard to the diurnal motion, celestial science continued unsatisfactory during this second logical phase. The rest of its investigations remained empirical or confused. The fundamental movements of the heavens, however, became better understood as the substitution of diagrams for mechanism rendered determinations both easier and more precise. Local variations, at all events in respect of latitude, thenceforward grew clearly discernible, owing to the tolerably extended range of Greek exploration. A general comparison of those variations enabled the geometric mind even thus early to discover the double law, which proclaimed the spherical shape of the earth and the convergence of vertical lines. Although that decisive advance is commonly attributed to the school of Alexandria, I do not hesitate to place it as far back as the time of Thales. The reaction which it exercised on general thought must have produced in this father of philosophy the first awakening of systematic Relativity, the principle of which was established

He discovered sphericity of the Earth.

permanently in reference to such phenomena as were universally known. Nevertheless the influence, mainly positive but also negative, of that change could not fully tell until complemented by the Alexandrian theory of the earth's annual motion, which will be considered further on.

Geometry one of the roots of Algebra.

In concluding this survey of the first rise of abstract science, I must note as a main point the extension of Algebra. I have already shown in the last chapter (p. 147) how much more emphatically it long bore the mark of its geometrical than of its arithmetical parentage, though the latter rightly preponderated in the end. The real character of algebraic logic first came out in the discovery made by the theocrats of the precise relations between rectilinear areas. But it would be more especially developed when, from the very outset of Greek speculation, abstract geometry caused the study of lines to prevail. Of the two conditions peculiar to algebraic magnitudes, their indeterminateness in value has a more important influence in constituting their true generality than their being abstract in kind has. Now this indeterminateness is spontaneous in geometry, where the intervention of numbers is simply an artifice for measuring results. Prolonged efforts are needed, on the contrary, in order adequately to generalise arithmetical magnitudes; for when so generalised they seem destitute of all support, although this higher degree of abstraction is better adapted to the higher developements of mathematical reasoning, the deductions of which it simplifies.

The two laws of angles and lines discovered by the founder of Greek science spontaneously concurred in developing in a decisive manner the geometrical basis from which algebra arose. For the first theorem of Thales in a direct manner establishes an equation properly so called, while the second institutes a proportion. It is true the theocratic law of the three squares had already furnished the geometrical type of equations. But by discovering an analogous, simpler, equally efficient, and more usual relation between angles, the human mind would better generalise the equational method of reasoning, which thenceforth became susceptible of application to all magnitudes whatever. Yet despite its natural superiority, that first form of abstract deduction could not find a decisive field of exercise in geometry, until the theorem of Hipparchus had founded trigonometry (p. 271). It was more especially the second mode,

then, albeit less simple and more restricted, which proved essential to the logical developement of ancient geometry. The ancient geometers, in fact, managed to develope the Theory of Proportion for the furtherance of their theoretic deductions far more than we now imagine.

Pythagoras not to be reckoned among the founders of Mathematical science.

Such was the first rise of abstract science effected by the Greeks, and essentially instituted by Thales and his school. I am compelled to exclude Pythagoras and his disciples from a share in it, profoundly as I venerate that eminent philosopher. His true influence I shall soon have occasion to consider in directly judging of the general reaction of scientific culture on the universal synthesis. But such an inquiry will be more opportune when I am in a position to review that culture as a whole, by taking into account the impulse derived from Archimedes and Hipparchus, as well as that due to Thales. Though Pythagoras may have discovered the law of the three squares for himself, theocratic thinkers had long before his time arrived at it by the direct comparison of areas.

The Law of the Three Squares was discovered by Theocrats.

The only way in which he might have claimed credit in the matter would have been by re-discovering the law deductively as a linear relation from the second theorem of Thales. Now we have no indication that he actually accomplished that deduction, though it did not transcend his logical power. The supposition that the Brahmins received this great law from him is as theoretically absurd as it is historically inaccurate. In vain is it made to rest on the analogy drawn from the communication made by Thales to the Egyptian theocrats, who before he visited them knew not how to determine the height of their pyramids by the length of the shadows cast. This resemblance is purely superficial, since it overlooks the distinction between the geometry of areas, the only form cultivated by the ancient priesthood, and that of lines, which it was reserved for Greek genius to evolve.

For the sake of the intellectual glory and even the moral honour of the noble sacerdotal castes, it was incumbent on me to make this historical explanation. Devoted as they were to their social mission, and undisturbed by theoretical doubts, they were unable to develope adequately the speculative capacity of which otherwise their synthetic genius would have admitted. Standing alone, as I do, at the point of view from which they can be judged, it behoves me scrupulously to guard the integrity

of their scientific domain, which has been unjustly curtailed in favour of a philosopher who would himself have repudiated such a spoliation. The silence of all the ancients regarding the linear demonstration of the law of the three squares would, if need were, suffice to confirm the theocratic origin of a theorem in which we still trace the particular bent of mind that first led to its discovery.

(β) Encyclopedic Reaction of early Mathematics and Astronomy, pp. 253-262.

Having thus characterised the first steps of Greek science in Mathematics and Astronomy, I must now consider its encyclopedic reaction on the various kinds of higher speculation then inaccessible to rational positivity. As that reaction had always something to do with the vain attempts made to construct an Objective Synthesis, it will be necessary first to explain the two general impulses by which those abortive experiments were determined.

Mathematics and Astronomy already clashed with Theology.

Abstract Science had by this time been developed enough to render truly philosophic minds aware of its utter incompatibility with all forms of Theology. From the logical point of view this conflict was especially marked, owing to the decisive contrast between the completeness of geometric convictions and the uncertainty of theological opinions. Though their antagonism was less perceptible in regard to doctrine than to method, the growth of rational prevision in astronomy no longer allowed of an adequate reconciliation in the minds of free-thinkers between natural Laws and divine Wills.

Some philosophers turned to Monotheism; others attempted to found an Objective Synthesis on Mathematics.

This negative tendency of the first scientific movement soon carried away philosophers in the direction of Monotheism, which, from motives social rather than intellectual, had long secretly prevailed with the sacerdotal castes. Thus reduced and concentrated, Theologism was better able to adapt itself to the developement of real knowledge. Nevertheless, there were thinkers who, without renouncing the problem of the Absolute, attempted to substitute blind for intelligent Causes, for which purpose they strove to institute a purely *Objective* Synthesis.

Thus arose the Third or Metaphysical Causality.

Now the same scientific impulse which originated this third form of Causality seemed also to provide it with a sufficient basis to rest on, by means of a complete generalisation of the conceptions already current with regard to numbers and forms. But so premature an effort to emerge from Theologism could lead no further than to a provisional substitution of Entities

for Divinities, the former becoming invested with the chi attributes denied to the latter. The fact is that the hum mind can avoid Cause only by accepting Law, and the synthet establishment of Law was at that time yet far distant. Thoug theological causality was as a doctrine inferior to fetichi causality, it nevertheless had the virtue of remaining in harmon with the fundamental spirit of the absolute philosophy, by st explaining the world on principles borrowed from the huma type. Metaphysical causality does not deserve comparison wi its two predecessors, on account of its radical inconsistency pursuing the problem of Origins and Final Causes, while r jecting the only solution which it admits; not perceiving th the very notion of a *blind cause* implies a contradiction terms (p. 75).

Even were an Objective Synthesis ultimately possible, the scientific basis was then far too narrow.

In characterising these vain efforts of philosophic pride must for the present place myself at the Greek point of vie always limited to an intellectual coordination. But whe after having considered the scientific evolution, I conclude th chapter by a general judgment of the Greek Elaboration, will be made clear that every purely partial synthesis, from i failure to recognise the indivisibility of the human problen must of necessity break down (p. 277). And to complete th speculative examination of such an undertaking, I have to prov that even assuming it to have been possible and proper, it scientific basis was wholly inadequate.

Mathematics themselves only consisted of Special Geometry and theCalculus. General Geometry and Mechanics were still wanting.

However great was the synthetic power attributed in thos days to the mathematical laws by which it was sought to ex plain all things, that domain was manifestly still too imperfect cultivated for the demands made upon it. The two classes conceptions wherewith it dealt, remained essentially incoheren until by the establishment of General Geometry they becam permanently bound up together. Now this far-distant advanc involved the separate developement of Algebra, which had, a yet, no existence apart from that of its two spontaneous source Lastly, the final element of mathematical science was stil entirely absent for lack of any abstract conception of Motion o even of Equilibrium. This third gap was the more fatal t the direct construction of an objective synthesis inasmuch a Rational Mechanics necessarily constitute the principal lin between the domain of Mathematics and the whole field o Natural Philosophy.

All these special and general grounds account so fully for the utter worthlessness of Greek efforts at Synthesis, that I need not stop to examine those attempts more closely. Impotent in regard to the External World, they would yet more signally fail where the study of the Human Order was concerned, a subject wholly alien to every absolute philosophy and necessarily reserved for the relative philosophy. But these vain strivings of the metaphysical spirit procured for the positive spirit a generality of which in itself it was as yet incapable (pp. 31, 32), and which, though purely transitory, enabled it in virtue of its reality to give rise in every direction to fertile suggestions, adapted for the guidance of future efforts. The insufficiency of these inductive and deductive foundations did not prevent true thinkers from availing themselves of their synthetic power, and so arriving at important conclusions which, though naturally fragmentary, had a decisive and most valuable influence on method and even on science. These conclusions were the only valuable results of the series of radically unsound attempts to found a Synthesis. But if the main end of their authors was a failure, the accessory results will always remain an illustration of the theoretic superiority of *generality* even when most imperfect, over pure *speciality*. It is these results which I am now to estimate.

These attempts at Synthesis were useful only by their Philosophical reaction on Science.

The first philosophic inspiration due to the encyclopedic reaction of Greek science consists in the decisive establishment of the Corpuscular hypothesis. Putting aside all the disputes about its objective character, that luminous conception should be regarded as essentially subjective—a logical artifice for directing our general speculations concerning matter, as was directly explained in the first volume of this treatise (i. 421). The Corpuscular hypothesis emanated chiefly from Democritus, the primitive impulse towards it having been given by Thales. Long before the time of Physics properly so-called (p. 43), it laid the philosophical foundation of that science, which, in order to investigate the general properties of matter, has to substitute for each continuous substance a discontinuous system of similar particles.

Reaction on Physics. Democritus institutes Atomic theory.

Secondly, Aristotle's principle of the Plurality of Elements furnished a general basis to Chemistry, which any special variations in the number of bodies reckoned as simple can never affect. The original *four* elements were so happily

Reaction in Chemistry. Aristotle institutes theory of Four Elements.

selected that down to the last century they served satisfactorily to guide the general course of chemical research (i. 451). But apart from this the principle of Plurality was in itself sufficient to ensure the birth of Chemistry, a science which could not arise so long as earlier beliefs regarding the Unity of matter were in force. A false importance has been attached to metaphysical aberrations concerning numbers, by ascribing to their influence the conception of the chemical quaternity. There is no occasion for such a frivolous explanation, where the direct and rational one is so obvious. In seeking how far a general predisposition to that pregnant idea was involved in previously contracted habits of the human mind, we are led back to the universal tendency resulting from the polytheistic doctrine of the mutual convertibility of all substances (p. 149). The immediate and unanimous adoption of this necessary principle, at once objective and subjective, can only be explained by the fact that, though of Greek *institution*, it was of theocratic *origin*. It was spontaneously subordinated to the Corpuscular hypothesis, and such a connection must have facilitated the establishment and dissemination of the latter.

Thus did the first developement of abstract science in Mathematics and Astronomy lead the Greek mind to institute the two philosophic principles requisite for the ulterior cultivation of the two higher branches of Cosmology. The separation which astrolatric theocracy had already established between the study of the material world and that of the laws of vitality—investigations always confounded under Fetichism—thus became complete. The general foundation so laid gave some coherence to the employment of entities whose function it was provisionally to turn the attention of theorists in the direction of chemical and physical speculation, though the rise of Physics and Chemistry as positive sciences was still far from possible.

Reaction on Biology.

But Fetichism had in its own way embraced the whole field of Natural Philosophy, in the older and proper sense of the word (p. 37), the higher or Biological department of which would therefore also call forth decisive efforts on the part of Greek thinkers, notwithstanding its greater complexity and inferior preparation. For the abstract genius necessarily grasped in a systematic way whatever the concrete instinct had spontaneously sketched out without allowing itself to be ruled by those divisions that were subsequently introduced, and which

were intended to facilitate the progress of the sciences, and not to build a wall of separation between their results. The necessary incompetency of absolute philosophy, in dealing with the Human Order, could not extend to the Vital Order, for the latter long remained united, in that philosophy, with the Material Order.

Why Dynamical Biology (Physiology) was then impossible. Aristotle's conception of Double Life neglected till end of eighteenth century.

Thirdly therefore I have to explain how the incomparable Aristotle completed the provisional formation of Natural Philosophy by instituting so far as was possible the systematic study of Vitality. To seize the true character of that difficult construction, we must always regard it as restricted to Statical Biology (i. 522–4). With no physico-chemical science then possible, and in the total absence even of rational mechanics, it would be absurd to expect any abstract advance in Physiology, beyond the judicious but isolated conclusions of which the genius of Hippocrates had already supplied the type. Though Aristotle sketched out the general conception of the two modes of vitality, yet down to Bichat that primitive division between the life of Relation and the life of Nutrition (i. 484), had to remain almost barren of results, for want of the objective preliminary knowledge that alone could erect it into the fundamental principle of dynamical biology. But in Anatomy the main conceptions are naturally independent of such preparation, save as a matter of logical sequence, and come within direct grasp of the inductive spirit, which in Aristotle's case was always admirably in harmony with the deductive spirit.

Aristotle institutes Statical Biology (Anatomy)

All Statical biology rests principally on two closely connected institutions, at once logical and scientific: the comparison of organs, and the scale of life. Now Aristotle adequately sketched out both one and the other, by means of certain decisive conceptions with which all anatomic speculation will always be connected.

Analytically by Comparison of Organs,

He compared organs under their geometrical aspect alone, only connecting them so far as the differences between them related solely to position, form, or even size. But this first mode of comparison, which dealt only with undeniable relations, gave rise to subsequent comparisons of a profounder and more general kind, that could not have been made with requisite clearness and accuracy at an earlier stage. To Aristotle then is due the institution of the admirable series of anatomic relations which by judicious graduation have,

since Bichat, tended to link together all the different parts of every organism.

And synthetically by Classification of Species.

From these analytical comparisons of organs he in due course rose to synthetical comparisons of the entire structures of different organisms. Here he furnished the decisive type of Comparative Logic (i. 528, Phil. Pos. iii. 445), as well with regard to the coordination as to the construction of groups. Thus began that vast classification which from Aristotle to Blainville has been gradually systematised, and has aimed at bringing all living beings within one hierarchy. All that it now wants is a concentration from the subjective point of view (i. 530), and an exclusion of useless or discontinuous terms from the series.

Reaction on Sociology. Theological spirit incapable of dealing with collective human phenomena.

In this way did the spirit of abstraction bring under systematic cultivation the whole primitive domain of concrete speculation which the fundamental Fetichism, from its nature, always restricted to the external order, whether in the organic or the inorganic world. But Polytheism had in its own way completed the field of speculation, which the spontaneous reason of man thus covered, by including within it the Human Order. And though it was impossible for polytheistic doctrine ever to become so satisfactory with respect to that Order as fetichist doctrine had been in its special province, still it sufficed for sketching out the general speculations regarding the noblest of all phenomena, to which practical life was of course everywhere drawing attention. Nevertheless, apart from its illusory character, the polytheistic explanation of the Human Order could apply only to the individual, without embracing the society which dominates him. For the theological spirit is essentially and necessarily individualist, and cannot conceive of collective phenomena except as resulting from individual agencies. Its nature incapacitates it from framing a theory to interpret the gradual results of the *reaction* of individuals, and still less that of generations. Though Theocracy was early led by its practical mission to form certain rational inductions concerning Feeling and Intellect, it never rose above purely empirical views with regard to Social Activity.

Metaphysical spirit equally incapable. Aristotle's social speculations personally and exclusively his own.

The Greek situation, by spontaneously releasing abstract thought from every obligation of a concrete kind, left it free to extend even to this last field of positive investigation, to which the whole study of the Human Order was necessarily subordinate. Emancipated alike from the pressure of a military re-

gime and from sacerdotal discipline, speculative inquiry in this field could not be restrained by Theologism, from which it tended to emerge completely, owing to the continuous joint action of the other scientific influences. But the pressure of its metaphysical principles still remained, since the doctrine of entities, by its source, and even in practical application, was quite as personal as that of divinities. Law alone, in virtue of its reality, has the power to coordinate phenomena of every description—consequently also collective phenomena, to which Cause was never adapted. To him who was the most systematic precursor of Positivism belongs exclusively the credit of having impelled the liberated Greek mind to take firm possession of this highest domain of abstract thought.

Why Dynamical Sociology was then impossible.

Still the *Dynamical* study of Sociality remained more profoundly inaccessible to the genius of Aristotle, than was even the Dynamical study of Vitality, which latter, be it remembered, should have paved the way for it. Not only is the cooperation of successive generations, though more important, always less discernible than the simultaneous cooperation of individuals, but it had not at that time developed sufficiently to afford materials for determinate meditations. And if the Greek mind had been willing to extend its social contemplations beyond its own nationality and even beyond the bounds of military Polytheism, it would have found its expansion in the field of dynamics cramped by the apparent immobility of Fetichism and Theocracy.

Aristotle founds Statical Sociology, the most marvellous of all his achievements.

Restricted thus of necessity to statical Sociology, Aristotle, as was shown in the foregoing volume (ii. 234), became the real founder of that science. It is to me the most marvellous portion of his vast work, because it was less indebted to previous preparation and more decisive than any other. No doctrine of negation was so qualified to extricate the human mind from all theology as that positive construction whereby the scientific spirit claimed for ever as its own the sole domain from which the theological principle was shut out. This creation of Statical Sociology, directly connected as it was with the rational outlines of Mental and even of Moral investigations, affords the crowning proof of a synthetic power that will never perhaps be surpassed. Although Aristotle's noble simplicity in not parading his mathematical knowledge contrasts strongly

with the puerile affectation of his so-called master, all his writings testify how this encyclopedic genius had prepared for his career by a mathematical training. This is seen in the happy use to which he often turns numerical and geometrical conceptions. His sense moreover of the immense gap existing in relation to Motion was so strong that he attempted to supply it by instituting a mathematical law concerning the fall of bodies. The unsoundness of his hypothesis which makes the velocity proportional to the space was not susceptible of detection until two centuries ago, and cannot detract from the incomparable completeness of this thinker, who was as great a *savant* as he was a philosopher.

His extraordinary superiority to all ancient thinkers has only become fully appreciable in recent times.

He was so far above the rest of the ancients, that his principal conceptions—though their force was always felt at once—could never be rated at their full value till long afterwards, according as the departments of speculation to which they respectively belonged were successively invaded by the positive spirit. His chemical doctrine was not appreciated till the third phase of the Middle Age, when, under the potent impulse of free industry, the transmutation of material substances began seriously to engage the attention of speculative thinkers. In like manner, it was only in the last century, when it had become possible for Biological philosophy to rise definitely, that the value of his twofold anatomic construction could be fully realised. Finally, of the work he accomplished in laying the foundation of Social Statics we are but now beginning to judge aright, in proportion as we learn to perceive its necessary relation to the whole subject of positive Sociology whereon depends the systematic regeneration of the West. All thinkers should draw profound encouragement from the knowledge that their common father did not receive true recognition till after the lapse of twenty-two centuries, a period which, in the life of the Great Being, will count but as a mere prelude to his eternal apotheosis.

Aristotle institutes true Mental science in outline.

In my second volume (ii. 243) I have explained the bearing and reality of the principle of cooperation on which Aristotle based Social Statics. It now devolves on me to complete and systematise it in order to combine dynamical with statical Sociology. As to the positive study of the human understanding, it was sketched out when this prince of philosophers proclaimed the necessary subordination of our subjective

constructions to the objective materials out of which they are built (p. 15). But that principle was more difficult of application than the preceding one for want of the complement of Leibnitz and the systematisation of Kant. Positivism now puts it to a use which will cause men more and more to feel the profoundness of the conception, and the difficulties that stood in its way in an age of sophistry.

Aristotle even prepares the way for true Moral Science.

Although the Greek mind, for all its affected cultivation of the science of Morals, was utterly incompetent for the task, owing to an insufficient developement of Feeling and even of Activity, yet the preeminent powers of Aristotle enabled him to grasp even that supreme science. From his luminous conception upon the nature of the virtues—each of which he regarded as being always a mean between two opposite vices, one of excess, the other of defect—was to spring the positive institution of theories which weigh our several Affections with a view to regulate our conduct. For such a conception implies both the plurality of our propensities and the necessary consensus between them, the twofold basis of the whole science of Morals. Though Aristotle never distinctly enunciated these two conditions, they no less than the limitation added to his intellectual aphorism by Leibnitz must certainly have been present to his mind. Now this speculative discovery, which only now can be rightly estimated, was at that time the sole real conquest made by the genius of abstraction in the principal domain of human thought. For the ethical views of the priests had, from their practical character, remained too empirical (p. 194).

Philosophy of History not attempted by the Greeks.

But for one shortcoming then, the Greek mind might be said to have initiated the complete study of the true field of human speculation. What was still wanting, was a first sketch of conceptions directly relating to the study of *Movement*, whether in society or thought. But I have sufficiently demonstrated the impotence common to both Ontologism and Theologism in regard to social dynamics. That construction was necessarily reserved for Positivism in which it formed the keystone of the arch.

But they instituted History, the preparation for it.

Hence it is needless to expatiate on the radical unfitness of the Greeks for looking at history philosophically. There the Romans were to excel them. The national life of the latter—as soon as their destiny had become fully manifest—gave them a

better chance of understanding the past, though they never rose to a really theoretic view of history. In that field the ancients were throughout restricted to the task of collecting materials indispensable to modern thinkers, materials however which unfortunately for us related to our Western ancestors alone. Now the Greeks worthily commenced that long work of preparation. It was literary rather than scientific, as when Herodotus described their principal collective resistance, or even when Thucydides depicted the deplorable conflict which ensued. Though these two noble historians do not indeed exemplify the true character of the theorician, I have no hesitation in placing them together with their Roman successors among the philosophers entitled to lasting gratitude. For without any affectation of being systematic, their spontaneous intuitions, however unmethodical and limited in scope, prove that they reflected more about social phenomena than the majority of those who, among ancients or moderns, have been specially denoted thinkers. Therefore the credit of having instituted this important preparation belongs to the Greeks. The characteristic independence of their minds, a result of the general conditions of their environment, was calculated to admit of, and even to call forth, an examination of history which in the theocratic era would not have been possible. The priestly rulers pronounced personal judgments as to political chiefs intended for a particular section of the public, but they could not produce any popular exposition of the succession of social events.

(3) Scientific movement (Post-Aristotelian), pp. 262-277.

Such then is the estimate I have formed of the principal portion of the Greek evolution. The theoricians to whom it is due, at once *savants* and philosophers, ever strove to unite reality of view with generality of conception. But the very success with which they performed a work so worthily begun by Thales and finally personified in Aristotle, was to excite a profound division among their apparent disciples. Of this I have yet to speak in order to complete and correct the account of Condorcet.[1] The philosophy special to Greece really ended with Aristotle. After him there came a line of mere rhetoricians or simple commentators, not to mention the numerous literary mountebanks bred of different sects which sprang from the original stock of Greek Philosophy but added nothing to it. Greek Science, on the contrary, in the eyes of

Greek hilosophy ended with Aristotle; but Mathematics and Astronomy continued to progress.

[1] Esquisse des Progrès de l'Esprit Humain, Cinquième Epoque.

those whom the narrow specialism now prevalent blinds to the previous conquests of the scientific spirit, seems to be then just beginning. This is of course a mischievous exaggeration. Still it must be granted that the discoveries of Archimedes, Apollonius, and Hipparchus were not only more brilliant and numerous than those of their common father Thales, but also of greater consequence to the whole future of the race.

The higher sciences not carried further by the Greeks after Aristotle.

My special examination of the encyclopedic reaction exerted by the best marked developement of the Abstract genius, has just proved that its philosophic influence was necessarily exhausted when once the Greek mind had sketched out all departments of the theoretic hierarchy then accessible. There remained, thenceforth, for Ontology no appropriate field except the speculative dreams and social Utopias produced in an ever thickening crop by a too hasty impulse towards Monotheism, which I described below as being incompatible, until it received the practical impulse of Rome, with anything higher than mere literary work. But Science—though unable as yet to advance beyond the domain of mathematics and astronomy—succeeded in wonderfully enlarging this twofold field, too circumscribed though it was. This it did under the inspiration of the decisive though partial relations which united it permanently to the whole system of abstract inquiry. The continued working out of these encyclopedic links had everywhere made it manifest how much more complete they would have been, had their scientific basis been laid more deeply in these fundamental studies, which were as necessary for doctrine as for method. Everything pointed then to the cultivation of that domain. The same considerations which made manifest its importance also revealed the threefold imperfection I have already set forth (p. 254).

Noble philosophical spirit of the Mathematicians and Astronomers.

And thus the true philosophers came to be succeeded by theoricians still more abstract, who, under the simple and now so justly discredited name of *savants*, were to construct the objective basis of a sound philosophy, though that philosophy itself was denied to the ancient world. But the increasing exclusiveness with which the worthy organs of this construction devoted themselves to their special work never prevented them from feeling that the general purpose of all their researches was to prepare for mankind a regeneration of an intellectual and even of a social nature. The noble synthetic aspirations which

spontaneously prompted their zeal for analysis, have only come to an entire end under the academical anarchy of the present century, and at the very time which the whole course of human developement had assigned for their systematic realisation.

The speciality of their studies long enabled them to avoid direct collision with religion.

Thenceforward partly owing to antipathy, partly to impotence, metaphysical speculation became detached from the scientific investigations which alone had sustained it, and being thus reduced to its inherent hollowness became, as we see it now, destitute of all theoretic coherence. But in that day there yet remained for it a last social office which can never be renewed now that Ontologism has grown purely subversive. That final organic function of Greek metaphysics was to aid in instituting the monotheistic transition by making common cause with Theology. This task it could not perform save at the cost of becoming intellectually retrogressive. Science, on the contrary, spontaneously pursued a path of unbroken progress, and it was allowed to do so without interference, because, in consequence of its necessary specialism, it long remained free from all tendency to negativism, at least of a direct and voluntary kind (p. 281). This is the Scientific evolution, in the stricter sense of the word, which I must now consider, in order to furnish an adequate idea of the whole Greek elaboration, although its reaction upon Philosophy could be of real avail only to the modern synthesis.

The Museum of Alexandria.

Before directly examining that intellectual developement, it will be well to discuss an intervention of a social kind specially intended to promote it, I mean the foundation of the celebrated Museum of Alexandria. Far more to science, in truth, than to literature, did the worthiest of Alexander's successors consecrate that noble establishment, the rise of which was in itself sufficient to show how deeply the previous scientific movement had interested the Greek people. Mathematics and Astronomy were already especially valued as being indispensably bound up with the general course of industrial progress, and even with the improvement, which had become very active, of military operations.

Ptolemy I.

But although both the public and the government ever regarded its scientific objects as of first importance, the Alexandrian Museum nevertheless soon became more and more invaded by grammarians, rhetoricians, and sophists, and did not prove of much use to the true *savants*. Even in the case of

these latter, it showed greater favour to industrious mediocrities, than to original thinkers, therein following the ordinary tendency of such establishments. To Archimedes and Apollonius it was of no service whatever, and the principal labours of Hipparchus were accomplished elsewhere, so that this institution did nothing essential for the three great constructions of Greek science. But it very much facilitated their general diffusion, both by a continuous course of instruction, and by preserving the results obtained. It must be credited too with having produced some respectable *savants*, of the second order, among whom Eratosthenes and Ptolemy are most prominent.

The real utility of the Alexandrian Museum, then, has been greatly exaggerated, owing to the influence of the metaphysical movement, of which it at last became the principal centre. Nevertheless its foundation will always mark the separation between the two scientific evolutions of Greece, as being a result of the first, and an auxiliary of the second.

Eudoxus the last important *savant* who devoted himself equally to Geometry and Astronomy.

The latter, however, with all its characteristic features had, strictly speaking, begun a generation earlier than the era of the Museum, originating with a much undervalued *savant*, in whom may be seen the normal transition between the two great phases of scientific theory, each of which comprised about three centuries. Though in no way a philosopher, Eudoxus of Cnidus was the last theorician who embraced every form of speculation accessible to the mathematical spirit with equal success. He rendered as much service to geometry as to astronomy; while soon after his time specialism had reached such a pitch that these two sciences could no longer in any noteworthy degree be improved by the same individuals. In the former, Eudoxus discovered the cubature of the pyramid, which led to that of polyhedrons in general, and enabled him to measure not only cones but likewise the sphere, in terms at least of its surface, the quadrature of which was reserved for the genius of Archimedes. Astronomy is indebted to Eudoxus for the exact determination of the obliquity of the ecliptic, the fundamental datum of the whole solar theory.

The Mathematicians and Astronomers were Aristotelians. Plato and

I have now to consider the double series of more special efforts which, by separating the two elements of the first encyclopedic couple, adequately developed their true character. Without pretending to any philosophic tendency, all these

the other Metaphysicians were anti-Mathematical.

various labours spontaneously underwent the systematic influence of Aristotle, in whom the whole of the previous scientific movement was summed up. Archimedes and even Hipparchus intellectually emanated from Aristotle, as did Leibnitz, and even Newton, from Descartes. The other schools, not excepting those that made the greatest noise, never shared in the great scientific discoveries the reaction of which on Methods of reasoning was thoroughly repugnant to them. The bent of Plato's talent--his pompous inscription notwithstanding [1]—was just as emphatically anti-geometrical as, on the contrary, the character of Aristotle's genius was mathematical. This contrast between the two men became more and more marked in the two paths of speculation of which they were the respective inaugurators.

Euclid.

At the opening of the second developement of abstract thought a conspicuous place will always belong to a theorician who, though devoid of originality, is yet invested with a certain historical importance, from having become spontaneously the type of this field of positivity. The mere appearance of a didactic treatise on geometry, the creditable first fruits of the Alexandrian Museum, sufficiently proves both the definite coherence already attained by that science, and the general esteem in which it was even then held. But the plan of Euclid's work at the same time indicates what serious difficulties true thinkers had to contend against, forced as they then were to evolve science in the midst of a profoundly sophistical environment. It was in order to protect the purity of geometrical reasoning from the subtleties of the dialecticians that this estimable teacher employed those too minute precautions, the irrational imitation of which soon grew inexcusable. A more eminent man indeed, might have fulfilled the conditions of the case without damaging the true spirit of discoveries the natural sequence of which it was at that time easier to exhibit than to disguise.

Archimedes and Apollonius.

The second evolution of Greek geometry is mainly composed of the two great achievements of Archimedes and Apollonius. The first of them conformed rather to the earlier nature of geometrical research. The other tended to open up a new order of speculation.

During its first evolution the theoretic genius had more

[1] Μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω.

particularly striven to pursue and complete the labours to which theocratic wisdom had limited itself, namely, the measurement of extension, which, in fact, constitutes the final object of all geometry. But among abstract forms those only had been considered which can be derived—and that with tolerable ease—from the two elements spontaneously furnished by concrete observation, namely, the straight line and the circle. Nevertheless, the intersection of the surfaces conceived as generated in this way introduced, towards the end of this first phase, and without going beyond the range of plane figures, three really new curves, essentially different from one another notwithstanding their common origin. These curves opened up that inexhaustible field of geometrical elements, in regard to which subjective construction long precedes objective contemplation, the latter in fact being in the majority of cases, never capable of realisation. The earliest influence of these new curves upon theory was to extend in a very marked manner the ancient geometrical researches, by at once setting new problems of rectification, quadrature, and cubature, many of which will ever remain insoluble.

Point reached by Geometry during the Philosophical period.

It was in regard to the questions of measurement thus raised for the five simplest lines that the genius of Archimedes succeeded in admirably developing the fundamental scope of Geometry. It must indeed not be forgotten that he also enlarged the domain of the science by establishing the theory of the Spiral, and what is more by advancing beyond the range of plane curves through the introduction of the Helix. Still his characteristic labours are mainly to be found in the measurement of those figures whose elements result from the various sections of the ordinary cone by a plane. In rectifying the Circle and quadrating the Sphere, he overcame the difficulties, which at that time were presented by the abstract deduction in the former case, and by the concrete construction in the latter.[1] The second problem furnished the decisive type of the transformations peculiar to the Infinitesimal Method for avoiding the natural indeterminateness of the final limits. In his cubature of the simplest round bodies generated by the Parabola and the Ellipse, he gave superabundant proofs of his genius for deduction, though without striking out any really

Archimedes greatest of pure geometers ancient or modern.

[1] Phil. Pos. i. 133. Synthèse Subjective, pp. 302, 312.

new path for the Logic of Geometry. Wholly different must be the estimate formed of his theory of the Centre of Gravity, by which he established direct relations between Geometry and Mechanics.

We must not, however, mistake the real nature of this conception, which, though originating in Statics, is essentially Geometrical when stripped of all the extraneous attributes with which its applications to the study of motion and equilibrium still invest it. In the case of any Geometrical form whatever it gives rise to problems necessarily analogous to those which result from the various measurements of the form. The labours of Archimedes taken as a whole render such an analogy at once perceptible, whence we infer that this conception enlarged the general domain of Geometry by effecting a radical transformation, which, though not directly extending the science, exerted upon it a considerable logical influence.

His attempts in Mechanics and Hydrostatics.

And this leads us to the endeavours of Archimedes to fill up the principal gap in the mathematical system, by founding the abstract theory of equilibrium. But for want of any rational conceptions of a positive kind in regard to motion, his labour in this field was not connected with its philosophical source, so that his discoveries remained mere isolated inductions. The show, however, that the intellect of the incomparable geometer was as powerful for induction as for deduction. His principl of the lever met only certain partial cases, and his hydrostati induction led no further than to raise a new order of geometrical problems regarding the equilibrium of a floating body. Nevertheless, attempts such as these sufficed constantly to keep in view the already recognised gap in the mathematical system and by doing so elucidated the direct relations of this necessary complement with the whole body of Natural Philosophy. A this premature effort had not proved altogether abortive theoricians could still draw from it the hope of ultimately supplying this encyclopedic link, the decisive importance of which was being more and more manifested by the developement of Astronomy.

His Arithmetic.

Although Archimedes did not busy himself very deeply with Arithmetic, it is necessary to estimate his theory of geometrical progression. Combined with that of arithmetical progression which had been reached under Theocracy even in its Astrolatric phase, possibly even under pure Fetichism, it constituted the

first and principal type of an immense numerical domain that will never either receive or need cultivation. It is remarkable chiefly as the significant starting point of the summation of infinite series, no subsequent examples of which could ever possess equal logical or scientific importance.[1]

It was thus that the greatest of the pure geometers of either ancient or modern times worthily devoted himself to the general programme bequeathed by the earlier phase of science. That programme indicated three deficiencies in the mathematical system. It needed that Geometry and Arithmetic should be brought into closer connection, that each of them should be more fully developed, and that Mechanics should be founded. All these deficiencies Archimedes tried to supply, even the last. Though in none of these efforts could he achieve complete success, he yet pursued them far enough to manifest definitively their true nature which had been too inadequately characterised by the geometry of the Philosophical School.

Apollonius of Perga's Initiation opens a new order of Mathematical Speculation by his study of Conic Sections.

I must dwell less fully on the merits of Apollonius, who ranks second among the geometers entitled to be associated with the Human Initiation as a whole. Notwithstanding the eminence of his genius, the worthy successor of Archimedes could not exercise so profound an influence even in his own science as his precursor. Still his two laws of the Ellipse, and as a consequence of the Hyperbola, will always attest his deductive power, especially when due weight is given to the difficulties arising at that time from the imperfection of Algebra, limited as it still was to the theory of Proportion as coordinated by Euclid. What ought chiefly to be recognised is, how this decisive study of the three subjective curves tended to fix and establish that which, if not the most important, is at least the most fruitful destination of the Geometrical spirit, and one which up to that time had been too feebly characterised.[2] The deserved predominance of problems directly relating to the measurement of extension had previously concealed the inexhaustible class of researches which any form gives rise to when we simply seek to determine the various ways in which it may be generated. Apollonius thus opened up to the Geometric spirit new paths both inductive and deductive, and even his use-

[1] Synthèse Subjective, p. 239.

[2] Phil. Pos., i. 358 and 372. Synthèse Subjective, pp. 248 and 251.

less speculations made it felt how important it was to discipline the genius of specialism which was already tending to waste itself in frivolous efforts. But the very nature of the scientific evil revealed also that of the philosophic remedy, by disclosing the uniformity of each investigation in the case of the various kinds of figures. Herein lay the germ of the impulse that led to the foundation of general geometry by Descartes.

Mutual influence of Mathematics and Astronomy.

From this judgment of the two great geometers, I must now proceed to estimate the developement of Greek Astronomy under the spontaneous and combined influence of the various constructions I have been characterising. The reaction exercised by them upon Astronomy was necessarily in the main logical; but they had also with it certain special connections of a scientific kind. Among these direct relations between the two elements of the first encyclopedic couple (Mathematics and Astronomy) the institution of epicycles by Apollonius is most noteworthy. He used them even thus early to explain what appear to be the retrograde motions and stationary positions of the planets. But more important still is it to notice inversely how greatly Astronomy increased the coherence and dignity of Geometry by giving it a general destination which directly connected it with the whole body of Natural Philosophy. Thenceforth it could be seen that Mathematics is concerned with abstract existence, confined to the only phenomena that are necessarily universal, Number, Extension, and Motion; while Astronomy deals with their concrete realisation in the bodies which offer us no other attributes.

Hipparchus greatest of ancient astronomers robbed of his fame by Ptolemy. Reinstated by Delambre.

As considered historically, this decisive constitution of Celestial Science was due entirely to the great Hipparchus, whose glory for a long time remained eclipsed by the exceptional success of a skilful usurper. But the reparation, though accomplished only at the beginning of the present century, was effectual in proportion to the length of time that the injustice had lasted. The genius of Hipparchus is as highly venerated now by the whole of the Western public as if it had never been neglected. This striking rectification of an error prolonged through fifteen centuries should inspire full confidence in the wisdom of the Great Being, ever watchful to see full justice done to her worthy servants. No culpable artifice —however it may delay the final verdict—will eventually deprive those servants of their rightful meed of glory. Putting

this case and that of Aristotle together, one feels that nothing can hinder Humanity from assigning to her organs who have become subjective the rank they are entitled to hold. She will do so even before it is possible for her judgments to result from a complete synthesis, the accurate application of which when once it is established, will either prevent or promptly redress all these anomalies.

Preceded by Eratosthenes and Aristarchus of Samos.

Before directly characterising the great work of Hipparchus, I must summarily consider two preliminary steps which made fitting preparation for it. His immediate precursor, Eratosthenes, had added useful complements to the Astronomy of the previous period, particularly by his general measurement of the Earth's circumference, and by improving the special description of its surface with the aid of the theorem of Apollonius concerning charts. But he himself was preceded by a theorician of greater eminence,—Aristarchus of Samos, who even then displayed the character of the new Astronomy, by constructing the logical type of all exact comparisons of the Planetary distances, though he confined himself to the most favourable case. These labours taken together completed the constitution of the fundamental theory of the local variations in the celestial spectacle, by adding to the influence due to Latitude the complementary influence due to Longitude, which latter as being less marked was necessarily the latest to be understood. Henceforth, the inroad which science had long ere this begun upon the absolute system in regard to the direction of weight, became decisive, since the diversity of the seasons, the contrast between day and night, and the division of time into hours, became relative notions devoid of all arbitrary tendency.

Twofold work of Hipparchus.

To estimate the whole work of Hipparchus rightly, we must distinguish in it two main constructions, necessarily in close connection—one logical, the other scientific; the decisive outline of trigonometry, and the law of the precession of the equinoxes.

He founds Trigonometry.

Preparation had spontaneously been made for the former, when the studies of Archimedes concerning the rectification of the circle originated a table of chords easily capable of extension, though it long remained inadequate. But the main difficulty lay in discovering the law by which the chords of any two arcs are connected with the chord of their sum or of their difference. This problem, the one essential difficulty of

trigonometry, was resolved by the theorem of Hipparchus on the relation between the diagonals and the sides of any quadrilateral described within a circle.

This equation—a direct result of the second law of Thales—naturally absorbs the law of the three squares, when the angles are right angles. But Positivist teaching ought, on the contrary, to connect it with the system of relations between the mutual distances of any number of points arbitrarily arranged, as derived from this theocratic law (p. 183). These relations, which are multiplied when the points are more than four in number, do not cease till the points are reduced to four. If, however, the four points are then included in the same plane, their six distances still retain a mutual dependence, specially indicated by the resolution of the quadrilateral into two triangles. It is sufficient to simplify the relation when the opposite angles are supplemental, in order to deduce from it the theorem of Hipparchus, which thus becomes one of the corollaries of the law which it originally included, in accordance with the circular character so remarkable in all abstract truths, and necessarily more perceptible in Geometry than elsewhere.

This Greek foundation of Trigonometry, though remaining for a long time imperfect, secured thereafter for Astronomy its ultimate general constitution, in which calculations took the place of diagrams, as these latter were at an earlier period substituted for mechanical apparatus in determining the ordinary problems. Over and above the direct improvement thus effected in celestial science, from the greater accuracy and facility simultaneously imparted to its habitual operations, the changes so wrought reacted favourably on the whole field of Mathematics. Not only did the latter science grow more intimately connected with that subject which was its most perfect sphere of application, but its two elements—the one abstract and the other concrete—were better combined in consequence of their active concurrence to their common end, a concurrence which was especially calculated to develop Algebra.

Discovers Precession of the Equinoxes.

Turning now to astronomy, the principal fruit of the logical renovation just described consisted in the discovery of the precession of the equinoxes, which Hipparchus could not have made, unless he had first founded trigonometry. For the

angular or spherical coordinates of the stars presented to him, after the lapse of two centuries, marked variations; and no law for these would ever have been discovered if men had persisted in referring them to the equator, to which, however, the observations themselves must be referred. The law by which they are regulated is discernible only when they are referred to the ecliptic, and then it is immediately seen that the latitudes of all the stars remain unchanged, while their longitudes are increased equally. Thus the difficulty of this discovery is essentially confined to the transformation of the natural coordinates into artificial ones; and this is a simple problem in trigonometry, the general data of which were in existence from the time of Eudoxus. When it is solved, the formulæ obtained enable us also to transfer to the elements given by *observation* the law of variation determined by the aid of the elements deduced from *calculation*, in accordance with relations that became common to every astronomical investigation, so soon as Hipparchus had instituted their type.

This twofold construction is spontaneously connected with the basis previously laid by the incomparable astronomer for the exact determination of positions, angular for the heavens, and spherical for the earth. He was thus enabled to complete the rough outline sketched by Thales of the general relations between Astronomical studies and their application to Geography and Navigation. Till then it was only with reference to latitude, as determined by processes the most simple, that the existence of such elementary relations had been recognised. In extending them to longitude, Hipparchus already discerned the important distinction between the two essential cases of the land and the sea. His appreciation of the latter case even enabled him to point out with sufficient clearness how fundamentally any improvement in astronomical prevision would be certain to react on the necessary developement of navigation. Having moreover indissolubly connected astronomy with geometry, Hipparchus established, in respect to the only case then accessible, that relation between the concrete and the abstract which it now remains to systematise throughout all science. Thus it was that the second Greek elaboration of astronomy placed that science on a foundation so rational that in all essential points it had thenceforth but to consolidate and perfect itself by gradual developement.

It is needless here specially to consider Hipparchus' variou investigations of the principal planetary movements. Tha study, sketched out during the theocratic and philosophi phases of astronomy, could not, until the scientific phase, res on an adequate basis. It revealed, in regard to the sun, th earth, and more particularly the moon, anomalies comple enough to awaken even so early a conviction that the circula hypothesis would ultimately prove insufficient. That hypo thesis could no longer be retained save by combining th artifice of the epicycle with the expedient of eccentricity But, notwithstanding these encumbrances, which were lon to go on increasing, mathematical astronomy was by this tim able creditably to stand its crucial test. It was capable, tha is, of a *rational* prevision of such compound events a eclipses, which till then had only been susceptible of *empirica* prediction.

Moral unworthiness of Ptolemy. His scientific rank.

Although this specialised and minute study had to all in tents and purposes been instituted by Hipparchus, it did no notably develope until the time of the unworthy successor wh attempted to usurp his glory. The chief merit of Ptolemy indeed, reduces itself to his having detected and formulated th greater number of these anomalies, especially the lunar ones But for this, the inexorable verdict of posterity would hav pronounced him merely an industrious compiler, as inferior t Euclid in reasoning as in honesty.

Why did not Hipparchus anticipate discoveries of Kepler?

The labours of Hipparchus, as a whole, raise a proble already stated in the preceding volume (ii. 313), of much momen to the philosophy of history. It is this: to explain satis factorily the interval of fifteen centuries which separated hi great work from the final renovation of astronomical scienc due to Kepler.

Not because of imperfect observations, or rude instruments, or insufficient Mathematical knowledge, or intellectual inferiority.

The radical imperfection of even the best ancient observa tions, consequent on the neglect of all the refractions an most of the parallaxes, is not an argument that meets th difficulty, even if to that shortcoming be superadded the ex traordinary rudeness of Greek instruments. We are still le to ask why the time was not ripe for the decisive inspiration of modern science. For Kepler set out from data in the mai little more accurate than those possessed by Hipparchus; an all the improvements made in regard to artificial vision followe instead of preceding the regeneration of celestial geometr

Still less can a solution be found in the diversity of mathematical conceptions and methods, as both cases, notwithstanding that trigonometry had slowly arisen, were in this point essentially on a level, even in respect to the theory of the ellipse. A profounder difference might seem to result from the circumstance that Kepler, in instituting the first law of motion, founded Dynamics. But that discovery could in no way have affected his renovation of Astronomy, of which it indeed indirectly presupposed the accomplishment. Nor can the inequality of their success be referred to a corresponding inequality of genius in the two men, since the deductive superiority of Hipparchus assuredly counterbalanced the inductive preeminence of Kepler. Thus neither the historical situations nor the personal gifts of these two great theoricians can adequately account for the difference in the results which they obtained; and the earlier philosopher lived long enough to have been able to undertake worthily the second portion of the work that had to be done.

General Intellectual and Socia conditions compelled Science to stand still for fifteen centuries.

Such a problem must remain insoluble as long as the scientific evolution continues to be considered apart from the general intellectual evolution, and even unless it is studied in connection with the whole indivisible developement of Humanity. But I venture to pronounce it easy of solution from the synthetic point of view which characterises Positivism, more particularly as set forth in this treatise. For the bearing upon Philosophy of the whole work of Hipparchus must have made him feel deeply how utterly incompatible was the growth of Science with the ascendency of Theology, even though the latter had already been attenuated by the corrosive action of Metaphysics. Astronomy, which had opened up to theory the first passage from Fetichism to Theologism, was, and indeed for several centuries had been, impelling the human mind to emerge from Causality, and concentrate its meditations upon Laws as opposed to Wills. This inevitable conflict had already begun during the philosophic phase, and had again brought into prominence the theocratic hypothesis which, by pointing to the double movement of the earth, had from the very first prepared the regeneration of astronomical science (p. 185). But the struggle would be more thoroughly developed during the scientific phase. This is indicated at the very origin of that phase, in the attempt of Aristarchus, to whose mind

the Pythagorean doctrines under every other aspect were foreign.

Double motion of the Earth struck at the root of Theology.

Thus, when we examine the position of Hipparchus, we see that the intellectually retrograde *social* influences at that time urging the Greek mind to prepare the transition to Monotheism, alone prevented him from effecting the revolution in Astronomy which was reserved for Kepler. For this social obstacle, which was already very marked, was to become ever greater till the end of the Middle Age, when as theoretic needs recovered their spontaneous energy the precursors of Positivism began to prevail more and more over the supporters of Monotheism. There is, in truth, an intimate connection, not less social than intellectual, between the doctrine of terrestrial movement and the Keplerian renovation of celestial geometry, a connection inseparable even from a decisive developement of abstract dynamics. The attention of theoricians having already been directed to the retrogradation of the planets, Hipparchus, after discovering the precession of the equinoxes, was in a position to frame the hypothesis of the double motion of the earth, inasmuch as these two classes of phenomena supplied the basis of the principal arguments of Copernicus.[1] The latter was as little acquainted as the former with the third mathematical science (i. 376). That he succeeded in filling up the gap which had been left by a genius so far superior to his own, merely proves how unequally circumstances favoured the efforts of the two men. The first was hampered because he preceded the Monotheistic Transition then required by our moral necessities. The second had the advantage of living when the social efficacy of that exceptional and thenceforth wholly retrograde doctrine had entirely exhausted itself. Without arguing this question further, I have, I believe, advanced sufficient reasons to make it certain that the perplexing silence of the greatest of astronomical thinkers was consciously determined by the incompatibility between science and theology, to which in his day the former would have to yield (i. 407).

Analogous reason for the late discovery of Algebra by Diophantus.

Thus are we driven by the indivisibility of the Western evolution to refer to social influences mainly the solution of an otherwise incomprehensible intellectual anomaly. As regards the partial synthesis attempted by the mathematical spirit, (p. 254), an analogous correlation, less deep-reaching but better

[1] 'Traité d'Astronomie Populaire,' p. 306.

marked, can alone explain why the developement of Algebra was abnormally retarded even after the two sciences from which it springs, Arithmetic and Geometry, had definitely begun to be studied side by side. This concert had been instituted during the philosophic phase, and it continued to be developed during the scientific phase. And yet it was not until the end of the latter that the mathematical spirit—by means of the isolated and profoundly original work of Diophantus—gave distinct shape to its principal instrument of deduction. But the explanation in this accessory and complementary case not only follows philosophically from the fundamental explanation given above for the astronomical case, but is also connected with it scientifically. For the same obstacles which repressed the developement of astronomy would also impede the separate formation of algebra; since algebra had been directly connected with astronomy by the foundation of trigonometry.

Synthetical Conclusion, pp. 277–289.

The sociological question thus raised and solved naturally leads me back from the special examinations accomplished in this chapter to the completely synthetic point of view, which I must maintain while bringing this historical estimate of the Intellectual Evolution to a conclusion.

Greek Science could only make Intellectual preparation for Positivism. Social preparation had to be made by Monotheism.

When Greek science separated from philosophy, it aimed at the better developement of their common tendency towards a demonstrable synthesis, by establishing those simplest and most general laws whereon all others were to rest, in accordance with the subordination which had already become manifest (p. 243). The developement of science proper, indeed, in time grew to be so directly incompatible with Theologism as a whole, that all essential progress was brought to a standstill, until the definite arrival of the true reign of reason. But every partial synthesis being self-contradictory, the needed intellectual renewal was necessarily bound up with a social regeneration, of which poetry had from the very outset of Greek evolution evinced a presentiment, by proclaiming the ultimate ascendency of peaceful activity. Now, before this necessary term of the Human Initiation could be reached, one condition had still to be realised, namely, a fundamental preparation which should distinctly call into prominence the two principal elements of the normal order—the affective sex and the labouring class, by the domestic emancipation of the one, and the civil emancipation of the other. To direct such a transition was altogether

beyond the power of the positive spirit, at that time restricted to a sphere of thought quite remote from human interests. Ontology was impotent to organise anything. The change had, therefore, to be carried out by a last intervention of theology, the power of which as a social influence was not yet entirely exhausted. But that final office could be performed only by Monotheism, since the whole tendency of intellectual activity, both esthetic and theoretic, had long been utterly to discredit Polytheism.

Pseudo-Philosophers elaborated Monotheism prematurely and mostly from unworthy motives.

From the very first, Greek philosophy had been alive to the weakness of Theologism. An environment which deprived that system of all social utility disclosed the intellectual shortcomings elsewhere concealed by theocratic wisdom or military activity. True thinkers soon passed from the rejection of Polytheism to that of Monotheism. Yet even when the intellectual evolution of Greece was at its best, the habit of undisciplined speculation, introduced amidst the philosophers a multitude of mere debaters, incapable of creating anything. Now these men ardently rallied round Monotheism because the vagueness of its synthesis suited their mental debility. They beheld a final faith in what was but a transitional belief, a mere concentration of Polytheism. This latter became thenceforward the object of a blind criticism which was one day to be extended to other doctrines less capable of resisting it. But their monotheistic convictions were rarely unmixed with selfish motives. For their view of man's future destiny offered an unlimited scope to their ambition, which was always both temporal and spiritual. Their intellectual and moral inability to form a conception of sociocracy caused them ever to dream of replacing the theocratic regime by a preposterous pedantocracy.

Monotheism did not become opportune till the work of Rome was done.

After having been long mischievous by the barren agitation they kept up, these spurious philosophers at last found a useful work to do when the right time came for directly carrying out the Monotheistic Transition. I shall conclude the present chapter by specially considering this tendency, common to them all, though the complete judgment of it will be reserved for the next. There it will be shown that the provisional institution of Monotheism was due to social needs alone. But I have first to sum up and conclude my comprehensive examination of the genuine Greek philosophy. This true philosophy never separated itself from Science, and the analytical develope-

ment of the latter followed, as I have just explained, from the synthetic impulse given by the former.

These fathers of Western speculation always owned a joint allegiance to Philosophy and Science, and therefore they must finally be pronounced the first systematic precursors of Positivism, a spontaneous presentiment of which had already inspired their worthy predecessors the poets. For the true philosophers kept constantly in view the ultimate construction of a synthesis which should be at once real and complete, a subjective structure resting on an objective foundation. Gradually to develope the latter was their primary business. But they did not underrate the need for the former. They even conceived it as needing to be social, not personal (p. 288), in order to substitute the relative for the absolute; and as they could not directly frame the social synthesis, for want of its scientific groundwork, they filled its place provisionally by making the mental point of view predominate universally. Their systematic attention was thus unequally divided between special science, towards whose enlargement their efforts were principally directed, and general logic, wherein their instinct dimly saw the promise of Sociology, which alone can reveal the true laws of the Intellect (p. 39). Without cherishing any illusion as to the real value of metaphysical conceptions, they were yet obliged to have recourse to them for thus provisionally instituting a subjective doctrine, which was at that time necessarily destitute of its objective basis. Nevertheless they restricted metaphysics to the indispensable though merely temporary function of connecting the various Scientific theories, in the elaboration of which they made the developement of Philosophy chiefly to consist.

(1) General estimate of genuine Greek Philosophy (scientific) concluded, pp. 279-284.

Scientific Philosophers used Metaphysics as a provisional Subjective Synthesis.

Then, as now, ontology was the principal food of none but perverted or ill-trained minds, readier at exposition than at original thought, which, while aspiring to a universal coordination, are content with an illusory but easy synthesis. The final struggle, during the Middle Age, between nominalism and realism (p. 32) did but bring out systematically the separation that must always have existed instinctively between coherent thinkers and vague debaters. Intellects vigorous enough to have a proper sense of the unreality of Gods could never fail to see through the emptiness of Entities, the theoretic impotence of which is not even disguised by any kind of practical efficacy.

Only pseudo-philosophers cultivated metaphysics for its own sake.

Other second-rate thinkers aimed at an Objective Synthesis founded on Mathematics. From this Aristotle and best scientific thinkers abstained.

Some thinkers nevertheless, abstract to excess, were able at the outset to gain credence for an Objective Synthesis (p. 254), which ever since its commencement under Astrolatry had been striving gradually to explain all phenomena by laws already established in regard to mathematical forms of existence, the necessary basis of all other laws. But, as with the moderns, this materialistic systematisation (i. 39) soon became the refuge of minds incapable of an attitude of expectation and doubt. Its necessary insufficiency was for the most part recognised by the real leaders of the scientific and philosophic movement. They felt at once that by the widest extension conceivable it could never embrace the Human Order, that it would fail in attempting to deal with even vital phenomena, and that it would remain limited to the inorganic world, in which department indeed it long continued to preponderate with some measure of usefulness. Under the growing impulse of the first pair of sciences in the encyclopedic series, they strove to prepare the future advent of the other sciences by striking out some decisive conception in each of them, as I have before explained. But between these several isolated conceptions they did not attempt to institute any objective connection, feeling that it would be frivolous. This wise abstention is especially marked in the most universal of all thinkers, who did not try even to combine in that way his three principal doctrines respecting the World, Life, and Society, but connected them only by his provisional system of Logic.

Wisdom and moral dignity of these genuine Philosophers.

True philosophers can never be wholly blind to the necessary hollowness of every partial synthesis, even if it wears a semblance of embracing the entire domain of speculative thought. Now the Greek situation, from its marked shortcomings with regard to Feeling and Activity, particularly to collective Activity, was altogether unfavourable to a complete systematisation. Nevertheless the natural consequence of such a situation was that men were constantly reminded how much such a synthesis was wanted to overcome the deep-seated anarchy of a polytheistic society, which had ceased to be theocratic without becoming military. The true Greek thinkers were all impelled to emerge completely from Theologism; but by the only decisive path, that is to say, by preparing for Positivism, the remote advent of which they dimly foresaw, and looking on the Greek nation as a people sacrificed to the general interests of Humanity.

The moral dignity of these men was ever in harmony with their intellectual sagacity, for they steadily refused not only greatness but even wealth. Thus they furnished the best types of a true spiritual power, though they well knew how distant was still the day when that power should come to be intellectually and socially established. Respecting polytheistic doctrine, and sometimes defending it against monotheistic attacks, they perseveringly aimed at securing the final recognition of the abstract classification founded on individual merit (p. 230). Yet they never abetted the subversive tendencies of demagogy and pedantocracy.

They are only to be found in the schools of Thales, Pythagoras, and Aristotle.

All these characteristics, both in respect to theory and to practice, were essentially common to the three schools of Thales, Pythagoras, and Aristotle, to which the real evolution of Greek Philosophy must be, once for all, exclusively attributed. Conformably with the spirit of their respective founders, the first throughout remained the most abstract, the second the most social, and the third the most systematic. The first and the last have already been specially dealt with above, from the point of view of their decisive participation in the Scientific evolution. With regard to the former, I have here only to notice how the noble Thales, by his persistent indifference to wealth, after he had during a brief space given proof of his aptitude for honourably acquiring it, furnished even thus early the true moral type of the contemplative life. With regard to the third school, I have to add that the encyclopedic genius of Aristotle was far-reaching enough to embrace Esthetic conceptions, and would even have applied itself to the Practical problems of industry, but for lack of a scientific basis. The worth of the Affective part of his nature is attested by his incomparable maxim respecting women.[1]

Pythagoras aimed at social regeneration within Polytheism.

The intermediate school stood too much apart from the principal intellectual movement to allow of its examination being combined with that of the first and third (p. 252). By placing our estimate of it here, it will form a natural transition from the precursors of Positivism to the propagators of Monotheism. For the wise Pythagoras, while retaining Polytheism, distinctly aimed at social regeneration, which, when taken up by ambitious dreamers, soon caused them to busy themselves

[1] 'Positivist Catechism,' p. 330 of Dr. Congreve's Translation. The allusion is probably to Aristotle, Pol. I., xiii. 9.

intellectually about the Monotheistic Transition before the time was ripe for it, as I shall presently explain.

His services to science are his least title to fame.

In considering such an intellect as that of Pythagoras, it would be out of place to assign prominence to the secondary scientific developements due to his school. His deductive investigations with regard to regular polyhedrons, his inductive establishment of the elementary laws of sound, his geometrical rule of the reflection of light, could add lustre only to a name less eminent. Pythagoras even deserves honour for having chosen to limit his scientific office essentially to a worthy propagation of previously attained theories, by continuously and systematically applying them. He did not deem it beneath him to continue the speculations of Fetichism concerning numbers, particularly the sacred ones (p. 248). He employed them for the better discipline of thought, so turning them to a happy subjective use, not inconsistent with their objective foundation, in accordance with the freedom often left to the intellect by the sound institution of abstract theory (p. 80). In like manner he became the principal upholder of the theocratic conception of the earth's motion. For he had a sagacious presentiment that it would ultimately tend to bring about an enduring regeneration, first of speculation, and afterwards of society; the preparation for Sociocracy having thus begun even under Astrolatry.

His systematic discipline of life.

Nevertheless, save as natural links in the chain of philosophic developement, such minor titles to honour must here be put out of sight when we estimate the principal quality of this misjudged sage, which was that he devoted himself deeply to bringing about the decisive rise of the universal religion. Feeling how far off must be the realisation of such an aim, his school had to leave the intellectual preparation for it to the schools of Thales and Aristotle. They in their turn had to reserve for the Pythagoreans the task on which the latter concentrated their energy, of developing the social element of the future religion under all its essential aspects. Pythagoras admirably accomplished this great design by instituting a systematic discipline of life, both private and public, which, being as voluntary (p. 247) as it was complete, soon formed a significant contrast with the uncontrolled character of monotheistic aspirations. This spiritual government of humanity was extended in a right spirit to our relations with the animal,

and even with the whole material world, whereby the impulse originally received from Fetichism was turned to good account. Thus arose for the first time on a restricted, but decisive scale, the direct *systematisation* of human life, physical, intellectual, and moral, which Theocracy, for want of an adequately theoretical standpoint, had only regulated *empirically*.

His moral greatness. His school a type of the true Spiritual Power.

In the application of this reform to society, the wisdom and self-renunciation characteristic of the founder are ever apparent. Though surrounded by monotheistic influences, at a time when Buddha, Confucius, and Zoroaster were striving to reorganise the three great theocracies, Pythagoras steadily resisted the vulgar ambition of figuring among the seeming reformers who, to ameliorate the present, were preparing trouble for the future. He disdained so cheap an apotheosis, for he felt that its monotheistic foundation was but the modification of a synthesis, the total dissolution of which the Greek thinkers had already foreseen. He recognised the impossibility of avoiding the Monotheistic Transition, but his genius always looked beyond it, and his sagacity perceived the danger of beginning the preparation for it before social conditions had rendered such a change opportune. In common with the true theocrats, he would have wished the practical ascendency of Polytheism to be prolonged till the establishment of Positivism. His last successor, the eminent Apollonius of Tyana, whom the Christians so greatly calumniated, displayed the persistence characteristic of the school in defending polytheistic doctrines against Monotheism, while quietly introducing into them some minor improvements. The Pythagoreans practically realised the true ideal of spiritual power by organising without compulsion, and with constant respect for the real conditions of society, such cities as spontaneously asked their advice, while always declining to share in the magistracies which they established.

Apollonius of Tyana.

Pythagoras a link between Thales and Aristotle.

By a law of logic, of which frequent application has been made in the present treatise (p. 52), this judgment of the intermediate school completes my previous appreciation of the two systems that preceded and followed it, by bringing out the general connection between them. Desiring to systematise society, Pythagoras had to sanction the developement of abstract thought due to Thales. For it had laid the first foundation of the only philosophy capable of ultimately embracing a domain inaccessible to any Causality (p. 243). And in thus

giving the authority of *reason* to the preponderance which the theocrats had by *instinct* assigned to Morals (p. 175), his influence must have contributed to make Aristotle extend his encyclopedic inquiries even to the Human Order.

(2) The Spurious Philosophy (Monotheistic), pp. 284-289.

This complementary review of the true Philosophy essentially identified with the office of Greece, by contrast paves the way for my concluding judgment concerning the spurious philosophers who, even before Pythagoras, and still more after him, in spite of all the efforts of his school, strove in various ways to work out Monotheism as a theory. Being incapable of constructing a new doctrine, they all confined themselves to breaking up and modifying his, which, from its direct moral tendency, served their common purpose better than any other. But the nature of their influence, both theoretic and practical, soon proved how unworthy they were to affiliate themselves to that noble stock.

Why the Monotheistic Transition was necessary.

However severely it may be necessary to judge these dangerous debaters, I am bound in the first place to explain the general social need, to a faulty appreciation of which they are entirely indebted for the reputation they have so long enjoyed. When I have assigned the reason for the monotheistic transition, I shall be able to show more clearly how necessarily disastrous would be the influence of their premature preparation for it. It would be hard otherwise to understand how the true thinkers came to be replaced by mere *littérateurs*, while all vigorous intellects were absorbed in the purely scientific evolution.

Constant tendency towards a Universal Religion. Fetichism and Polytheism had failed to found one.

Human developement always tended more and more toward the universal religion, at first spontaneously under Fetichism and afterwards systematically under Theocracy. But both these rudimentary religions in succession pointed to a goal they could not reach. For fetichist beliefs, in spite of their natural resemblance to each other, were essentially restricted to the domestic sphere; while sacerdotal Polytheism, although it prepared the way for civic life, could not suffice for any regime but that of castes. The noble aspirations of the theocrats after a complete catholicity merely made manifest how greatly such an aim exceeded the capabilities of any Fictitious Synthesis. Indeed, with regard to a considerable portion of the human race, the passage from Fetichism to Polytheism had for ever destroyed the only unity of which the absolute religion ad

mitted. It was impossible even to hope for a real and enduring fusion between the various polytheistic nations, some of whom were theocratic, others military, though their divergence in doctrine was chiefly occasioned by difference of regime. The three leading cases of Fetichism, Theocratic Polytheism, and Military Polytheism, when looked at side by side, were sufficient to show the impossibility of finding any other general rallying-point than that of a Positive Synthesis. This was always felt by the genuine philosophers.

Monotheism afforded a spontaneous issue from what seemed to be a vicious circle.

But the religion towards which progress always tended, the only religion susceptible of catholicity, was to be summed up in the central dogma of Humanity, which is a condensation of the entire conception of the Real Order, and subordinates Intellect and Activity to Feeling. Now that doctrine could not arise sufficiently to command general assent, until the construction of the Great Being had proceeded far enough to enable us to regard all its elements as capable of ultimate assimilation. On the other hand, such an assimilation would be unattainable without an adequate community of belief. We appear then to be involved in a circle from which there is no issue; since the union seems to be needed to prepare for the faith, while the faith is needed to found the union. To afford a spontaneous outlet from this difficulty was the last office which devolved on Theologism, and is to be regarded as the sole reason for the Monotheistic Transition.

Although narrower in its scope, and shorter in its duration, this final service of the theological philosophy is analogous to the earliest use of the Fictitious Synthesis in awaking us by means of Fetichism out of the torpor in which we were kept by two opposite, but inseparable, necessities (p. 25). It may also be compared with the service performed by War, in supplying an outlet for the developement of man's activity, which was naturally paralysed by an antagonism of a similar nature (p. 49). In each of these instances the solution of the difficulty resulted from the thorough spontaneity characterising every side of the provisional regime, which could thus always dispense with the process of gradual elaboration required by the definitive state.

Seemed capable of universality, though it never really

In this third case, which is less fundamental and more special than the other two, the issue from the deadlock was to be furnished by Monotheism, the immediate precursor of Western

extended as widely as Theocratic Polytheism.

Positivism. Feeling, as its nature is, had been beforehan with Reason in anticipating a moral and intellectual catholicity of which the father of emancipated poetry had already sun (p. 238). But the impulse thus instinctively communicated wa not enough, and there was a deliberate tendency towards a direc teaching, which might seem likely to be accepted everywhere Now Polytheism being unavailable, since it consecrated the prin ciple of nationality (p. 216), this office was necessarily reserved fo Monotheism, which, from its spontaneous generality, long seeme as if it ought to be adequate. That hope was utterly belied b the event; for Monotheistic community of belief never sprea as widely as that of Theocratic Polytheism had done. Th philosophers who disdained the attempt were already in position to foresee that it must be essentially a failure. Fo fetichist beliefs had proved an insufficient bond of union. An yet their spontaneous resemblance to each other was bette suited to such an end than any artificial assimilation of th various modes of concentrating the gods could be. Apart fron this decisive example, the philosophers had a direct sense o the impossibility of making all men converge by means of an other opinions than those capable of being fully demonstrated.

Its attempt at Universality was useful, and during the Middle Age partially successful.

But though the universality of Monotheism was to remai illusory, the assiduous endeavour after it nevertheless becam alike indispensable and inevitable when the moment had reall come for completing the Western Initiation. For it was no necessary that the end should be completely realised, in orde adequately to accomplish the essential purpose of such an effort The mere growth among the whole population of the West o this hope of union had a direct tendency to fulfil the principa condition of it; for in holding out a plausible though unrea prospect of a universal faith, it allowed the conception o Humanity to arise. That this intellectual tendency might b sufficient for its true purpose, monotheistic belief had furthe to give proof of its efficacy by uniting peoples politically in dependent of each other. Now that complementary object wa realised throughout the Middle Age among the various nation of the West, although their cohesion was so precarious, ever within that narrow area, that it already proved Theologism to be necessarily powerless for the foundation of the tru catholicity.

This is not the place for an appreciation of the Monotheisti

Transition. Its institution and its course will respectively be dealt with in the two following chapters. All that was needed at present was a preliminary statement of its fundamental principle, in order to explain how it happened that intellectual preparation for it began during the decline of Greek philosophy. Now to understand the nature of the provisional office assigned to Western Monotheism is also to see clearly the radical mistake of attempting to establish it as an intellectual tenet four centuries before its advent as a social force. For a doctrine long familiar to the sacerdotal castes, and already propagated among the population of Greece by the initiation of numbers into the Mysteries, was in no danger of perishing, though it were left without cultivation until it could be applied practically. Besides that its essential idea would easily have arisen in most minds, its continuous preservation was spontaneously guaranteed by an exceptional people with whom the Greeks had been in intercourse since the time of Alexander.

But the intellectual elaboration of Monotheism four centuries before it was socially opportune was mischievous.

The Jews.

Vagrant Greek Speculation had, therefore, no excuse for taking this inopportune direction. The fact is only to be accounted for by the natural combination of mistake in theory and misconduct in practice. These debaters imagined a simple transition, and one even limited to the West, to be the true regeneration of the race. They further failed to recognise the necessity of the prior incorporation which was to unite under a common rule the various peoples susceptible of partaking in that transition. To this twofold error of judgment was superadded a special form of moral perversion, from which alone tendencies so conflicting as were here at work could have derived persistence and homogeneity enough to prevent them from neutralising each other. The monotheistic state, being thus conceived as devoid of any social aim, promised its founders the glory of an incomparable apotheosis. It did so through the need of a revelation which is characteristic of this faith (p. 343), and which allows each of its promoters to hope that he may become its supreme arbiter. This ambition, and the charlatanism that goes along with it, may be detected even in the case of the most ancient of these spurious philosophers, and the only estimable one—dreaming, as they always did, of a universal theocracy though they could never get beyond their own local pedantocracy.

Mental error and moral inferiority of the Monotheistic Philosophers.

The consequences of a Monotheism so instituted were gene-

They considered only the 'Wise Man,' neglecting Feeling and Activity.

rally what might be expected from the twofold vice of its origin. They continued until the influence of Rome controlled the rambling speculations of Greece and turned them to some useful purpose, when the time was really ripe for Monotheism. The grand conceptions of Pythagoras had degenerated into idle disconnected conclusions in the hands of these *littérateurs*, the very type of those of our own day. They took special possession of the field of Morals, in handling which they treated Man as a purely Intellectual being, always leaving Feeling out of sight and often Activity. Their attempts to regulate life, when they had thus deprived it of its principle and its purpose, merely resulted in dissertations breathing a spirit as selfish as it was absolute, and which soon began to react disastrously on the Heart by sanctioning everywhere the preponderance of the personal instincts. Any one who at the present time may be unable to form a direct judgment of their general tendencies should estimate them indirectly by looking at the results, and by contrasting these pseudo-philosophers personally with their theocratic forerunners and their catholic successors. Even comparing them only with their Western contemporaries, we easily see how inferior they were in morality as well as intellect, both to the highminded theoricians whom they had the pretension to replace and to the noble practicians of Rome who superseded them. With regard to their private life, it is sufficient to notice their sacrifice of the Heart to the Intellect, whence resulted a contempt for women and too often a monstrous type of love, both which unnatural tendencies were always distinctive of the purely literary class, a class as unfit for art as for science. But they disturbed public order yet more deeply in another way. Failing to understand the sociological theories which had already been in some measure sketched out, they preached up then, as they still do now, and with no greater claim to originality, Utopian schemes subversive of the Family and of Property.

Socrates, estimable and sensible, but the chief originator of the spurious philosophy.

We can thus understand the civic motives of the sentence which ultimately consolidated the revolutionary influence of Socrates, whose old age would have ended peacefully had the magistrates been wiser. Notwithstanding his good sense and honesty that estimable debater undeniably shared in the various aberrations peculiar to the unsound school of thought I have been describing. The institution of it was indeed

chiefly due to his narrow genius which blindly rejected the scientific movement on the vague plea of exclusive devotion to Morals. But the reprobation ultimately in store for such a phase of thought must chiefly fall on his brilliant successor, who, for all the glorification temporarily conferred upon him by the Monotheistic Transition, has down to our own day exercised an intellectual and social influence of a disastrous kind. Nevertheless, the organic character which the theological nature of his retrogression imparted to his rambling ontology will always render his school superior to the sect of arrogant egoists who from the stand-point of their vain deism attempted at once to govern theology and science. Had not the influence of Rome ennobled their purely restrictive discipline by at last communicating to it a social impulse, these metaphysicians, of all their tribe the most absolute, would never have produced the exceptional types whose names have made the school memorable.

Disastrous influence of Plato.

The Stoics.

Upon an exclusively Intellectual Elaboration, as was that of Greece, no definite judgment can be passed, until by its necessary combination with the Active Evolution it becomes possible to estimate their final resultant (p. 351). For the present, however, I have adequately characterised the Intellectual Evolution, at first Esthetic and afterwards more specially Theoretic, to which the Greek people was devoted, and I have dwelt enough for my purpose on the Political episode naturally annexed thereto. This judgment of Intellectual Polytheism cannot be completed until Social Polytheism has received due examination, a task to which I shall devote the following chapter.

CHAPTER V.

POSITIVE THEORY OF THE ROMAN INCORPORATION, OR GENERAL ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL POLYTHEISM.

Prefatory Remarks. pp. 290–296.

Office of Fetichism.

The foundations of Human Order as a whole were laid by the spontaneous action of the age of Fetichism, when it instituted on the one hand the preponderance of Feeling over Intellec and Activity, and on the other the subordination of Man to the World. This twofold basis of our real unity did not lack depth but it was unavoidably narrow. Accordingly, the success o Fetichism in establishing the Family did not extend to the organisation of the City; though by instituting the Priesthood and rendering Sedentary existence possible, it furnished the permanent foundations, spiritual as well as temporal, on which the City must rest.

Office of Conservative or Theocratic Polytheism.

This failure of Fetichism in respect of public life is reall shared by the Theocratic state, notwithstanding the decisiv impulse given by the latter to our social sympathies. To thi second regime we owe the permanent developement of Venera tion, the necessary basis of all human discipline. Moreover i introduced a radical improvement into the social hierarchy, b transferring to hereditary rank the authority conceded unde Fetichism to age (p. 199). Its failure in the attempt to or ganise civic existence resulted from its want of aptitude for th only form of human activity which is *spontaneously* collectiv (p. 46). It failed, although it actually foreshadowed the ulti mate form of social organisation by developing industrial lif the character of which, however, it was unable to transfor (p. 177). It created a speculative class; and yet it could no institute the normal distinction between Theory and Practice for it directed the mind too exclusively to the immediate appl cation of abstract principles, thus dwarfing the growth of th purely speculative powers.

Office of Progressive Polytheism. Its division into Intellectual and Social.

Notwithstanding the failure of Conservative Polytheism in these two directions, it prepared the theocratic populations for the final advent of Positivism, without allowing them, however, to take any part in the initiatory changes, temporal and spiritual, through which it was to be reached. The progressive form of Polytheism, peculiar to warlike nations, could alone furnish the necessary complement of the human Initiation; by giving a decisive start to both Abstract Speculation and Collective Activity. To achieve this double aim, the military principle had to originate successively, and in distinct populations, two different tendencies; one of these, indirectly derived from war (p. 220), resulted in the Intellectual Polytheism discussed in the foregoing chapter; the other, directly connected with war, issued in that Social form of Polytheism which we are now about to consider.

Analysed in this way, the complementary Initiation, restricted to Western Europe, is seen to link the Theocratic with the Sociocratic period by a stage of Transition which is necessarily revolutionary, since what basis of Order it possesses is furnished by the sacerdotal system, while the conditions of Progress are hostile thereto. The play of these conflicting forces is more and more apparent in each successive stage of the transitional movement: the struggle being constantly renewed by premature attempts to substitute Merit for Birth as a criterion of rank, while the framework of society as a whole continues to rest on the hereditary principle (p. 230).

Social Polytheism divided into Aristocratic and Dictatorial Periods. The latter assimilated the Intellectual results of Greece.

The task of intellectual and that of social Preparation could not be satisfactorily accomplished by the same people (p. 221). Each was undertaken and carried through by one exceptional nation out of all those which fulfilled the requisite conditions. Nevertheless the second preparatory stage necessarily became capable of assimilating the principal results of the first, in which the scientific elaboration, achieved by men of genius, was never destined for the masses. These were sacrificed in the natural course of things to the needs of the human Initiation. But as Social Polytheism was not to develope its aptitude for speculative culture till after its proper mission was fulfilled, the two phases of its growth form a natural division of the subject. They will be treated successively in the present chapter, in which alone does it become possible to estimate Progressive Polytheism as a whole (p. 289).

Before, however, proceeding to examine these two stages of military civilisation, it is necessary to pass its essential features in review.

All the essential characteristics of Social Polytheism proceeded from its tendency to found Civic life on a Military basis.

These features are all results of its necessary tendency to complete the human Initiation by establishing civic life on a basis of a really collective activity. Fetichism having organised the Family, Theocracy laid the foundations of civil society; but it could not allow sufficient play to the theoretic and the practical faculties. This twofold developement of Intellect and Activity, without which the Universal Religion could never have arisen, was reserved for two military nations. When the warlike principle, though strong enough to check sacerdotal ascendency, was unable to realise its own purpose, its latent influence spontaneously brought about the rise of speculation. As was shown in the foregoing chapter, the intellectual basis of the Universal Religion was directly laid by a free movement, esthetic in its beginnings, and subsequently theoretic. Western Europe was thus impelled towards a synthesis based on demonstrable truths, and capable of guiding a peaceful form of activity by a complete study of the Real Order. For such a Synthesis, the Greeks, our first Special Ancestors, had laid the speculative foundation. But this step would have had no real value, even of a mental kind, if our second Special Ancestors, the Romans, had not accomplished their work of social preparation. Had the order of their succession been inverted, had the warlike preceded the speculative impulse, the latter would have been crushed. As it happened, however, warlike activity eventually served to propagate scientific truth throughout the West, having first fulfilled its proper mission—that of gradually but irresistibly incorporating all nations living under a progressive form of Polytheism into a single body.

First and chief characteristic: it placed Action above Speculation, thus recalling us from a false route.

This Social Transition is chiefly marked by its spontaneous aptitude for bringing us nearer to the real Unity, which had been completely ignored during the Intellectual phase. Fetichism alone had laid down the fundamental principle of this Unity, when it proclaimed the universal supremacy of the Heart (p. 77). But this primitive Order did not admit of being adequately reconciled with ulterior Progress; and the latter did not succeed in reestablishing this sole basis of every synthesis till after a long series of preparatory changes. Theocracy, indeed, embraced all aspects of human life in an un-

systematic way, maintaining the true subordination of its three elements; but from the mistaken position which it assigned to Intellect, the nature of the government was a contradiction to the sacerdotal teaching. Still, notwithstanding that it was thus seriously impaired, the fetichist principle of the preponderance of the Heart was not directly ignored until the Greek Elaboration, when the speculative faculty was systematically set up as the prime motor of human life; Feeling, and even Activity, being insufficiently exercised.

Although it did not place Feeling above Activity, it strengthened and trained the former.

Roman civilisation, with a true instinct, repaired this enormous blunder by establishing once for all the supremacy of Action over Contemplation. But this step was not sufficient to reestablish the true principle of Unity in such a way as to be compatible with human progress as a *whole*. Feeling had still to be put above Activity, as Activity had been put above Intellect. But the social system of Rome did more than merely begin the work of regeneration by correcting the primitive error alluded to above; for if the preponderance of Feeling was not proclaimed, it was by no means ignored. Although the tendency of practical life is always to attach great importance to acts, and little to inclinations (p. 311), this abstract defect was in great measure compensated among the Romans by the thoroughly civic character of the prevailing mode of activity. Combined and continuous efforts for the public good developed the principal sympathetic instincts, so as to make it everywhere clear how great was their spontaneous ascendency over all sides of an existence in which personal desires had always to give way to public ends. Roman civilisation thus paved the way for the third Transition, without in any way superseding it. It was reserved for the Middle Age to complete, as regards the Affections, the preparation which had been already accomplished, first for Speculation, and then for Action, by the two previous movements of Western progress.

Second characteristic: It instituted love of Country, the stepping-stone to love of Humanity.

By virtue of its fundamental conformity with our nature, and its intrinsic coherence, the social organisation of Rome took the most decisive step towards the final advent of the Universal Religion by working out, so far as was then possible, the sentiment, and even the conception, of Humanity. It did much to regenerate the principle of Fetichism, by bringing it into lasting harmony with order and progress. Moreover, it was above all to develope and consolidate that sole basis of our

real Unity, giving it all the extension of which it was then capable, by a decisive inauguration of Public Life which had been out of the question under Fetichism. Although the Family relation naturally calls forth the instinct, and even the idea of Composite Existence, yet in this, its earliest form, it is too restricted, and even too much tainted with egoism, to adequately awaken direct aspirations towards the Great Being. Between Family and Humanity a stepping-stone is needed, and this can only be found in Country, which must lead to *religious* Unity. This necessary link, necessary to the Intellect no less than to the Heart, which had remained indefinite during the age of Fetichism, inadequate under the Theocratic system, and barren during the Greek period, was settled on a lasting basis by the Roman movement, taken as a whole. The gradual incorporation of such nations as were really susceptible of being assimilated steadily widened its limits; until its extent suggested to far-seeing minds the approach of an association which should be really universal.

Vindication of Roman war.

This general outline will give some idea of the necessary superiority of Social to Intellectual Polytheism. Before, however, I pass to my abstract examination of its essential properties, some preliminary remarks are needed to dispel certain scruples as to such an examination due to a feeling in itself worthy of respect, but here worked upon by the blind impulse of Christian animosity.

It differed from other forms of War by it object, which was Peace.

Although the better sort of thinkers are already beginning to recognise the salutary influence exerted by the Roman incorporation, declamation against war still hinders any just appreciation of the System of Conquest. And yet it was this system which checked the ravages of the warlike instinct, and at the same time turned it into useful channels. For it not only always tended to limit conflict to the efforts necessary for obtaining dominion, but led to a preference of peaceful means whenever these sufficed to attain the end in view (p. 332). A comparison of the wars of Rome with those of Greece decisively confirms what I have said: the former actually cost less, in bloodshed and oppression, than the aggregate of the latter, which were even more sanguinary than the conflicts of the Fetichist period, and quite as fruitless. The same conclusion would be arrived at if we compared wars waged by Rome with those deplorable struggles which have ravaged Western Europe

ever since the close of the mediæval period. In placing to the credit of Roman conquest the wars which it *prevented*, we feel that the gain realised was all the greater, because it was precisely the military nations which were thus bridled, as I shall presently explain. And so the natural fatality which subordinates human progress during our whole Initiation to the destructive instinct, affords striking evidence of the power of the social Sympathies. They were strong enough to purify the worst impulses of human nature by making them contribute to a noble end (pp. 47–50).

Organic character of Roman civilisation special and temporary.

By duly developing the only mode of activity which could at first take a collective character, Roman civilisation put the vanguard of our race once for all on the right road to true Unity. The completely organic part of the human Initiation belonged mainly to the theocratic East; its maintenance there being essential for the direct connection of the final with the preliminary form of social order, in virtue of their necessary affinity. The work of conservation having been thus provided for, the warlike West was free to carry out the series of partial (p. 222) and revolutionary Transitions through which alone the preparation of the human race could be completed, and its final tendency marked out. The intellectual phase was necessarily the first in point of time; hence its great fruits in the domains of art and science were obtained at the cost of the utter degradation of the people among whom it was accomplished, and who were led to subordinate everything to Speculation. The task of starting Western Europe on its onward course was thus reserved for Rome. By establishing the ascendency of Action over Contemplation, she corrected the aberration of Greece, and paved the way for the Affective Transition.

Its *Revolutionary* tendency, general and ultimate.

Although deriving a certain organic character from its continuously social purpose, Roman civilisation showed deep traces of the revolutionary tendency common to all phases of the immense movement by which Humanity passes from Theocracy to Sociocracy. The Roman constitution rested on an essentially theocratic basis; yet it outran even the anarchy of Greece in its hostility to priestly government, giving full vent to the antipathy specially distinctive of military activity. If the Romans approached nearer to sociocracy than did the Greeks, they moved further from the theocratic order, notwithstanding all they borrowed from it. Although their inroads on

the authority of birth were less seditious than those of the Greeks, they were more radical, because warlike activity has a special tendency to make personal merit the qualification for command. In this way they were speedily led to extend the elective method, the thoroughly subversive tendency of which rapidly dissolved their social system, the theocratic principle having been profoundly shaken, without there being any fit substitute to take its place. The whole scheme of Roman life was spontaneously bound up with the activity to which it had to minister; hence it could not but endure, in spite of heavy shocks, until that activity had reached its culminating point. But the time necessarily came when the work of conquest could go no further; and when the purpose ceased to exist the dissolution of the regime could not be long delayed. The second Western Transition, in fact, had a shorter history than the first.

ABSTRACT APPRECIATION, pp. 296–316.

These general observations are chiefly designed to determine more precisely the point of view appropriate to the present chapter. I must now proceed without further preface to the Abstract Examination promised above. To be satisfactory, it must constantly keep in view first, the temporary purpose peculiar to the Roman Transition; secondly, such lasting effects as that Transition produced while running its course. This twofold examination must, moreover, be successively applied to the three aspects of human existence, and must take them in the order adopted in the treatment of Fetichism and Theocracy.

(1) Intellectual Properties, pp. 296–301.

(α) Philosophic and Scientific Aptitude.

Why this examination must still have precedence even in this chapter.

This rule obliges us to begin with the intellectual, nay with the speculative properties. At the first glance, such a procedure might seem to confirm the disdain inspired by all our literary and scientific prejudices for a mode of life in which Activity appears to absorb all other faculties. But this pedantic objection is readily disposed of by applying the positive theory of human nature to elucidate the true constitution of our intellectual powers.

Intellectual and Practical capacity fundamentally identical, differing only in their products.

What is needed is to draw a systematic distinction between faculties and their products. But this is not done by the theoricians by whom the analysis of the mental functions is always conducted; and, therefore, even the best of them are radically unjust in their estimate of practicians. But I have shown (ii. 263) that all the mental functions are radically

identical in the speculative and the practical order of mind; which differ only in the relative intensity of meditation as compared with contemplation, or of deduction as opposed to induction. Their outward contrast is mainly due to a diversity of habits determined by a difference of aim. Speculative and Practical ends cannot long be pursued together without manifesting their mutual incompatibility; and this comes to be wrongly attributed to personal inequalities. So much for this error of judgment on its intellectual side. We must further consider, from the social point of view, that the speculative function must always remain exceptional, though all minds require and admit of a certain degree of speculative culture. Accordingly, when the philosopher meets with a people, habitually preoccupied by a noble activity, and whose social atmosphere is for a long period hostile rather than favourable to any striking achievement in the domain of abstract thought, he cannot justly conclude that their intellectual faculties are inert, merely because they are otherwise employed. I have so thoroughly established the intellectual aptitude and efficacy of Fetichism, that the reader will not be surprised at my taking this opportunity of vindicating Roman thinkers from an ignorant reproach, which our own pedants have copied from those of Greece. The fundamental similarity between the theoretic and the practical reason is never so clearly shown as in relation to a mode of activity which incessantly calls for the most vigorous concentration of inductive and deductive operations of every kind.

Fetichist, Theocratic, and Greek situations less favourable to a healthy Intellectual state.

It is especially important that we should form a correct idea of the intellectual state of the Romans; for, apart from the differences incidental to diversity of belief and of occupations, it furnishes us with a prototype of our normal state. To aid in arriving at a just estimate, let us first of all compare it with former situations of the human reason, which, having at no other time been set in motion by a stimulus of the same sort, had never presented a similar spectacle. During the age of Fetichism, public life did not exist; accordingly, men's thoughts could not be concentrated, as at Rome, upon a continuous public aim. The Theocratic system laboured under the same defect; every form of activity was limited to a corresponding caste; so that society was held together only by the bond of a common worship, regulated by the

priesthood. In the case of Intellectual Polytheism, as it was incompatible with discipline of any sort, the utter lack of any social aim could not but stir up a vague and fruitless intellectual agitation among a people which took no active part in the elaboration carried out in its midst by a few chosen minds.

Especially the latter.

The last case, nearer and less unlike than the rest, furnishes the most instructive contrast. The Greeks, like the Romans, were preserved from theocracy by their warlike manners. Now when we see the former taken up with philosophic subtleties and esthetic trifling, we realise how vain, or rather how fatal, the exercise of the mental faculties may become, when they do not minister to any noble end. Nothing is more calculated to make us appreciate the intellectual and moral worth of Roman thought, which was always directed, even in the meanest citizen, towards the form of activity common to all.

Roman subordination of Intellect to Activity (and implicitly to Feeling) came nearer than Catholicism did to the Final Unity.

The Final attitude of the human mind will only differ from this earlier type, in being directed towards a more permanent and universal object connected with a truer and completer doctrine. Although human Unity must ultimately rest on Feeling, and not on Activity, the deficiency of the Roman synthesis in this respect was more apparent than real. The social sympathies were actively stimulated by the eminently civic character of Roman life, and thus became implicitly the principle of daily conduct, as if the normal preponderance of the Affections had been explicitly recognised. When the new stimulus of Catholicism came proclaiming at last after its fashion this supreme rule, its influence on practical life tended to lead us away from our real *Human* Unity, which was more nearly approached by the Roman synthesis,—as nearly, indeed, as during our Initiation was possible. For the very doctrine which provisionally inculcated the supremacy of the Feelings, completely neutralised its effects, by turning men away from public life, the only immediate stimulus to universal love. The West would thus have actually retrograded, had it not been for its Roman antecedents and the influence of feudal manners.

Accordingly, the advance made by the human mind under the Roman system was more decided than any which had occurred since the foundations of our intellectual order were laid by Fetichism. A mode of collective activity suited to

develope and consolidate the harmonious working of our faculties had at last arisen. Late as was its rise, it flowed almost immediately from the earliest phase of human organisation; for it was inaugurated by a people which being little subjected to theocratic influences, and having been preserved from the intellectual form of polytheism, would be mainly swayed by its Fetichist antecedents. The permanent subordination of Speculation to Action was thus the first step taken by the West on the direct road to its final Unity. True, this subordination rested on a mode of Activity which did not admit of either unlimited duration or indefinite extension. But this unavoidable defect was compensated by the thoroughly social character of the Active life, in virtue of which it was implicitly controlled by the Affective instincts. Before the latter can assume their final primacy, the regeneration of Industry must be accomplished.

Rome assimilated and propagated, but did not add to the results of Greek speculation.

Apart from the main current of its influence felt, if unconsciously, by all free members of the community alike, the Roman synthesis continually prompted the men of the finest civic qualities to seek for theoretic culture, although they had less leisure to bestow upon it than the statesmen of Greece. If, even after the dominant activity of Rome had done its work, she did not show any decided bent for scientific conquest, this must be chiefly ascribed to a wise reserve, not to any lack of ability. Indeed, the most important fruits of speculative effort had been garnered before the Roman mind was at liberty to enter on the field of abstract science; a coincidence which to those who have taken pains to master my historical theory will not appear in any way fortuitous. Roman thinkers were thus not tempted to forsake the consideration of social problems for the pursuit of speculative aims which had already lost their interest for minds of the highest order. Long engaged in duties of the most ennobling kind which gave an encyclopedic breadth to their judgment, they soon became aware of the unavoidable barrenness of all further attempts at philosophical developement. They wisely contented themselves with profiting by and diffusing the chief results which had already been attained.

Roman Thought concentrated on Social problems.

As long as their own peculiar form of activity continued paramount, it wholly absorbed their constructive powers. The concentration of the faculties thus produced will never be

surpassed; for our divers powers—of the Heart, the Intellect and the Character—were all combined in the steady pursuit o a common social aim. Accordingly, the reaction of the Roma synthesis upon speculation was chiefly directed to the genera structure of its polytheistic basis, with the view of adapting i better to a civic purpose. The hierarchical subordination o the various deities at last took a pronounced form, superedin both the loose organisation of Olympus, which reflected th anarchy of Greek politics, and the indeterminateness of divin rank, which in Theocratic societies was necessary in order t prevent mutual oppression on the part of the chief orders o the priesthood. We should also notice the gradual develope ment of apotheosis, the use of which had, under the Greek an Theocratic regimes, been confined to primitive times. W must not judge of this institution by the abuse it underwen during the period of Rome's decline; we might as well judg of the Catholic practice of canonisation by its degeneracy i our own day.

Organisation of Divine Hierarchy.

Apotheosis.

In default of separation of Spiritual and Temporal powers the ascendency of the latter preferable.

A general view of Roman Polytheism shows that of th two alternatives available during the primitive confusion o spiritual with temporal power, the better one consists i granting absolute supremacy to the temporal, which alon is capable of exerting a direct and complete ascendency. It superiority over spiritual government is quite as real on th intellectual as on the social side. It furnishes the only mean for remedying, to some extent, the radical weakness of a theology—curbing its speculative vagaries by the exigencie of practical life (p. 175). The more synthetic character o temporal sovereignty compensates more fully for the un reality of supernatural beliefs, while increasing their aptitud for generalising our conceptions. This order of things di not prevail until the last but one of the three Organic Trans tions (p. 6); its late arrival furnishing another proof of th precarious nature of Theologism, less homogeneous than tha of Fetichism. Notwithstanding the esthetic charm of th Polytheism of Greece, the philosophical superiority of Roma Polytheism will always command admiration; for it presente supernatural beliefs under their most reasonable form, whil turning them to the best use. For it is in a social rather tha in an intellectual direction that Theologism is fitted to b useful, and, therefore, it shows to greater advantage in aidin political organisation than in guiding speculative research.

(b) Esthetic Aptitude.

After the judgment of the Theoretic properties of Roman Polytheism, it is unnecessary for me to examine separately its Esthetic properties. Its productions, which are often meritorious, without ever standing in the first rank, prove that the Romans would not have shown themselves less apt for art than for science, had they been able to cultivate the former before its chief resources had been exhausted by Greece. Late comers in the field, they did their best to cultivate these noble faculties, and so prepared the matchless artistic developement reserved for their natural heirs.

(2) Practical Properties.

As for the Practical properties of Roman Polytheism a separate appreciation of them would be superfluous in dealing with a civilisation of which they were the leading feature. This remark applies, not only to the military activity which is thoroughly interwoven with every question, whether abstract or concrete, bearing upon Roman life. It applies equally to industrial progress; the childish disdain for which, exhibited by the Greeks, was never shared by this noble people.

Industrial achievements.

The industrial arts were cultivated side by side with those of conquest even in the earliest times of Roman history, and finally showed a tendency to take their place. The connection between the various modes of practical activity is so intimate that they may easily be carried on together, or in succession, specially if the first in order of time be war, to which, in virtue of its superior complexity and generality, all the rest most naturally link themselves. The military West was thus enabled to construct works fully equal to those of the theocratic East, often indeed surpassing them both in difficulty and in usefulness.

(3) Affective or Social Properties, pp. 301–316.

Our general survey of the Intellectual constitution of Roman civilisation is now complete; we have examined it in relation to Science, to Art, and to Practical activity. We may now proceed, on the same principle, to review its Social constitution, by inquiring into its Affective aptitude.

(a) Domestic Aptitude, pp. 301–305.

First, we must consider the happy influence exerted on all the Family relations by the continuous developement of collective activity. This influence is most marked in relation to the fundamental, or conjugal, tie.

Treatment of Women.

The origin of Monogamy from the military principle (p. 219) accounts for its being strengthened and improved in proportion as that principle acquired greater force. The general superiority of marriage among the Romans to the same tie among the

Greeks is incontestable, from whatever side we look at i
Without ever transgressing the limits of decorum (often ove
stepped at Sparta) the Roman matron, while concentrating h
energies upon her home, took an active interest in public lif
being well aware of its favourable reaction upon private lif
She has not yet become the true companion of a husband fro
whom she is so often separated; but he already looks to her f
relief and consolation amid the labours and the agitation
public life. To her care the education of his children is con
mitted in the fullest manner, without distinction of sex; the
special instruction being left to subordinate agents who are ofte
slaves. This second form of monogamy approaches the norm
type as nearly as the nature of a citizen's duties at that tim
allowed. It would not have been safe to abolish the customa
restrictions on the domestic freedom of women, or the arbitra
divorce to which they were liable, until a peaceful mode of life ha
brought the two sexes into daily intercourse with one another

Treatment of Aged.

The influence of public upon private life was quite as marke
in reference to ties of Continuity as to those of Solidarit
Devoting itself to the systematic culture of the feeling
reverence in all its branches, Roman life could not but e
hance the respect paid to old age, without requiring any
the unavailing ordinances to which Greek anarchy gave occasio
This forward step deserves all the more praise, that it coincid
with the growth of the influence given to hereditary rank by t
exigencies of political life. These two principles of ancie
social classification were spontaneously reconciled in the boso
of each family; in public life, however, they often can
into collision with each other, the authority of old age succes
fully vindicating its just ascendency. Contrasting Roma
manners with those of Greece, we readily perceive that th
improvement was due to the collective activity which prevail
among the former people. For a vigorous developement
public life is calculated to enhance the twofold claim of ag
a claim resting on past services and on accumulated experienc
Respect for old age was thus revived by the same causes
which its first beginnings, in Fetichist times, were due; wi
the added energy derived from their operation in a publ
sphere, necessarily wider than that of the Family. Wh
once our modern confusion between intelligence and instructi
has been cleared up by Positivism, practical life will tend

restore the Fetichist and theocratic sentiment towards old age, as it did at Rome after the anarchy of the Greek period.

Treatment of Children.

The ties of continuity at Rome, as compared with Greece, were no less improved in relation to the incoming than to the outgoing generation. It is quite true that neither the authority of the father nor that of the husband was yet ripe for those checks which can only become compatible with domestic order, when the separation between the temporal and the spiritual power, attempted during the Middle Age, is finally accomplished. Nevertheless, although the despotism of the head of the family had still to remain exempt from any special or direct control, it was generally and indirectly tempered by the influence of political life to an extent which had never before been possible. This influence perfected every one of the family relations, and none more than the government of children. This was exercised in a worthier and less arbitrary spirit when it became by implication a social function, the purpose of which was to form worthy citizens, or even women fitted to train such citizens. The importance of the object, and the responsibility it entailed, made the authority of the father less tyrannical, the obedience of the son less servile, and thus contributed to foster their mutual affection. The spontaneous reaction of the idea of Country thus paved the way for the systematic influence which that of Humanity is destined to exert upon the Family.

Treatment of Slaves.

To complete this summary view of the organisation of the Roman family, we must notice the decisive introduction of the supplementary element which till then had not been sufficiently marked. It grew out of slavery, an institution the capacities of which had never been developed, owing to the lack of any truly social aim. As the individual basis of the collective activity, it now became thoroughly blent with the structure of Roman society. It claimed the respect of every citizen, as securing his private existence, and so enabling him to devote himself to public life; and the slave on his side felt honoured by taking this indirect part in the business of the commonwealth. The functions of master and slave being quite distinct, there was no risk of rivalry; accordingly, mutual ties were formed, foreign to theocratic manners, and even to the anarchical society of Greece, where war was purposeless. The condition of the slave at Rome was thus, in general, superior

to any that had been possible before; it would be superfluous to compare it with its anomalous counterpart in modern times. An integral member of the family, as the very name *familia* would sufficiently remind us, the slave occupied a position analogous to that of the children of the house, who were not less than himself subject to its head. Thus his position naturally prepared for the institution of domestic service in the shape it will finally take.

These manners were not imposed by law, but resulted spontaneously from the situation.

All the improvements which I have enumerated, were genuine products of Roman civilisation; they all grew out of the spontaneous action of its social system, without any real help from official injunction. Rules of conduct emanating from an authority which was in its essence temporal, and whose spiritual attributes were never more than accessory, were futile in comparison with those by which, during the theocratic period, the priesthood regulated private life. Thus, though the magistrates did not meddle in the matter, Roman marriages were seldom troubled by libertinage with slaves; habitual respect for their mutual relation—too equivocal among the Greeks—being adequately fostered, in the superior and the inferior alike, by the social atmosphere. On the other hand, several vices might be mentioned, which no official intervention availed to modify, because the spontaneous feeling of society had no special tendency to check them. But the fact is, that theocratic antecedents counted for much in Roman manners; and therefore this powerlessness in relation to morality, exhibited by an authority incompetent for spiritual functions, must not blind us to the importance of systematic discipline without which the best of our instinctive and empirical impulses must ever remain inadequate.

Institution of Family Names.

The aptitude of Roman civilisation for the growth of family life has been shown by the foregoing considerations, and they may be usefully summed up by an allusion to a general feature which marked it from its outset. I refer to the institution of family names, previously unknown, but developed during the Middle Age, and respected even by the anarchy of modern times. Due to a wiser estimate of the domestic affections, this institution reacted beneficially on all the elementary ties whether of continuity or of solidarity. Moreover, it led to a closer interconnection of different families by rendering adoption easier and more perfect; the decisive extension of this practice

Adoption.

among the Romans foreshadowing its position in the final state of society. The same aptitude for domestic organisation was shown in relation to the new families founded by freedmen; the freedman assuming the special name of his former master who thus fell naturally into the place of patron. Though a direct outcome of the increased authority of birth, the introduction of family names was indirectly due to the collective activity which embraced all sides of Roman life. That activity, gradually developed under a hereditary corporation, must soon have inspired its chiefs with a desire to perpetuate the memory of the services continuously rendered to the state by each family, by stamping it with a special name.

Freedmen assume *nomen gentilicium* of Patron.

I have said enough to show how great were the improvements introduced into family life by the Roman type of Sociability. It exercised an influence even more decided on the wider relations of the state, whether at home or abroad; and to this our attention must now be turned.

(*b*) Politica Aptitude.

And first, under both these aspects, we must understand how the idea of Fatherland—alike the necessary forerunner and the permanent support of the idea of Humanity—came to grow out of the civilisation of Rome. This institution, which had heretofore been incomplete, was perfected by a happy alliance of Feeling with Activity, based on a comprehensive Intellectual developement.

(*a*) Internal Organisation. Roman conception of Fatherland.

The name itself is enough to show that the conception was primitively limited to the Home. But even in this, its rudimentary form, it presents an essential feature, the importance of which waxes with its growth; I mean the intimate connection between man and his environment; a connection already defined, from the statical point of view, in the preceding volume (ii. 237). This bond between the individual and his surroundings precedes, and tends to hasten the change from nomadic to sedentary life, and thus to work out its own completeness. When a settled existence became the rule (towards the close of the Fetichist period) it furnished the chief basis for the idea and the feeling now under consideration. From that time forward the notion of Fatherland came to apply only in a secondary sense to the aggregate of moveable objects among which a man is born, or among which his life is spent. It came primarily to denote the permanent seat of all those

Fatherland, like Home, consists in a connection of Man with his Environment.

moral and intellectual impressions, by whose unbroken influen the individual destiny is moulded.

But Fatherland is more extended than Home, and implies a Collective Activity.

Defined in this way, the idea of Fatherland widens in pr portion as human growth accustoms each individual to a wid sphere of relations. During the infancy, whether of the i dividual or of the race, the idea is limited to the connecti between the family and its dwelling-place; any wider relatio are too feeble to be adequately felt. This initial limitati corresponds to an existence based immediately on Affectio and mainly characterised by Attachment, in the strict sense the term (p. 156). But though the name must always pe petuate the narrow sphere from which it had its origin, t idea does not find its full expression until that sphere widened. Otherwise the idea of Fatherland would simply alternative to that of Home, and would denote no more th the spontaneous attachment of the Family to a correspondi spot of earth. To this purely affective stage must succeed period essentially characterised by action. The latter tends foster union of a more comprehensive kind, always restricte however, within the limits of personal intimacy, and based a conscious sense of cooperation. These two conditions c only meet in Civic life, properly so called; the true institution Fatherland must always be associated with such a mode of li in which activity and reverence unite round a permanent centr But to *institute* Fatherland is not enough; if it is to becor fully developed, its active life must have a necessarily collecti character. Without this, the continued cooperation of a numb of families would be illusory.

Hence Rome affords the best type of Fatherland. Danger of Cosmopolitan tendencies.

Thus it is that Humanity will always remain indebted Roman civilisation for the permanent institution of Fatherlan the first decisive step taken by Western Europe towar Sociocracy. For I have already pointed out that the grad developement of a system of Conquest, and this alone, cou give birth to an activity truly social, and capable of combini all individual effort. Even at the present day, the o organisation called forth by industrial life is that of clas imperfectly connected with one another, in default of a impulse sufficiently comprehensive to coordinate everythi while disturbing nothing; which is the chief problem modern civilisation. It is a problem susceptible of only o solution; and that solution must be based on the politi

cohesion inaugurated by the warlike activity of Rome. Till this be done, even the idea and feeling of patriotism, which are being more and more impaired by the revolutionary tendencies of our time, must be maintained by continual reference to their Roman origin. The conception of Fatherland, at one time coextensive with that of Home, is now in danger of being swallowed up in that of Humanity; and this error can only be remedied by Positivism, when it ultimately controls all aspirations after universal association, which are too vague to be practicable. Meanwhile, these dangerous aberrations of the Heart and Intellect may be moderated by a just appreciation of Roman life; especially if we bear in mind that for those noble rulers of the West the idea of Fatherland was necessarily limited to the sacred precincts of their incomparable city.

Importance of an objective centre for every degree of human association.

Nothing is so well adapted to consolidate social ties as their habitual concentration about a material seat, which is equally appropriate to relations of Continuity as to those of Solidarity. Thus only can our Feelings and our Thoughts acquire a real permanence, of which the world outside us, in virtue of its greater simplicity, offers the only type. When a sufficient number of hearts and minds are animated by devotion to the same environment, its synthetic power over each is increased by their mutual interconnections; and these, in their turn, are strengthened and confirmed by it.

City is to Fatherland, what Home is to Family, and Earth to Humanity.

Every degree of human association is susceptible of being thus concentrated; the locality forming an abiding symbol of the aggregate phenomena of which it is the seat. One condition only is indispensable; the material seat must always be coextensive with the habitual relations which it symbolises. Family is thus represented by the Home; Fatherland by the City; Humanity by the Planet, according as the fundamental bond in each case is affective, practical, or intellectual. As regards Humanity, the bond, owing to its universality, must always be mainly of an intellectual kind; and yet its material seat may exercise a really associative influence over us, notwithstanding its extent. For a bond of this sort can only be forged by a thoroughly Positive faith, which will familiarise all men with the general conception of their common dwelling-places, wisely contrasted with the other members of our planetary system. Still, however vivid and complete our notion of the Earth—first in its cosmic, then in its human relations—may

become, our feelings will never be able to connect it with t evolution of the race, unless they are previously habituated closer and narrower relations. This will always be the moral a intellectual function of the Fatherland, whose normal symb is the City, strictly so called; for this is the largest organis tion, in which every one of the members can fully realise the operation of his fellows.

To constitute Fatherland in the highest sense there must also be a common aim pursued continuously by successive generations.

But this decisive institution cannot be introduced at wi Its adequate realisation demands a set of conditions whi were never found together save at Rome. A seat witho phenomena is as ineffectual as phenomena without a seat. O native place—even if we were brought up in it—leaves dominant impression either on the heart or on the mind, unl all our life, subjective (ii. 54) as well as objective, is bound with it by the closest domestic and civic ties. It is above things needful that our memories of the past, our feelings regards the present, our wishes for the future, should be centr in that place by the consciousness of common efforts for object worthy of reverence. Now this implies the subordinati of all individual effort to a public activity capable of bei carried on by successive generations. Without this, the fix place where this common work proceeds, cannot serve as symbol to the mind and heart. This is why Roman civilisati alone succeeded in adequately realising the institution of Fath land, which will always have to be studied at this its founta head. Its success in this typical instance should have rendered subsequent reproduction easier. But it was never adequat reproduced, even in the Middle Age. Its universal extensi is necessarily reserved for the Final Regime; till then it m remain an object of fruitless aspirations.

Rome fulfilled this dynamical condition, and it is the key to her history.

The importance of the dynamical complement which I ha just added to the statical theory laid down in the foregoi volume, is now apparent (ii. 235–238). It furnishes the k note to the political organisation of Rome, in its relation home affairs on the one hand, to foreign policy on the oth For the tendency of its internal economy was to consolid the institution of Fatherland, that of its foreign policy to ext it; until—in harmony with its normal purpose—it came foreshadow Humanity. From whichever side we look at it, perceive that this active bond between man and his envir ment, while completing sedentary existence, spontaneou

prepared the way for Sociocracy, and became incompatible with Theocracy, owing to the gradual substitution of Earth for Heaven. Directly subordinated to its social aim, Polytheism could not thenceforward maintain those aspirations after the supernatural, which it excited under the sacerdotal system, and which Monotheism has vainly endeavoured to revive in Western Europe.

Close connection between Fatherland and Property.

In judging of the internal policy of Rome, I am led in the first place to notice the decisive change which it wrought in the tenure of real property. The possession of land, intimately associated with the idea of Fatherland, became its best support. Notwithstanding the vague comparisons excited by our present revolutionary state, personal property can never stand on a level with the ownership of the soil. However much it may be modified, the personal appropriation of any part of our planet must always confer a more lasting and effectual authority, than the power inherent in any of the functions that are performed upon its surface.

At Rome Property gradually superseded Birth as title to power.

When Rome broke with the theocratic system by definitively establishing the political ascendency of the temporal power, this step was confirmed by the institution of territorial wealth. This has ever since remained the chief basis of material supremacy. It soon developed a revolutionary character, weakening the authority of Birth, and so striking at the very root of ancient civilisation. Only in a theocratic society could the hereditary transmission of public offices be rigorously carried out; its incompatibility with warlike enterprise becoming more and more apparent. As the strength of the hereditary principle diminished, the principle of wealth, especially of territorial wealth, not being liable to impairment, gradually brought the dominant caste into persistent rivalry with the new owners of the soil. At bottom, neither age, nor birth, nor merit—the three successive principles of social rank—have any place as such outside the Spiritual order (p. 246), since Temporal power invariably goes along with material superiority. Hence it follows, that the supremacy of birth is only suited to a theocratic society, where it derives its sanction from supernatural sources. From these flow both sovereignty and wealth; since great possessions have their origin in gifts bestowed upon the representatives of the gods (p. 201). We thus perceive the logical flaw which underlay the internal organisation of the

Roman period,—an endeavour to harmonise the theocratic prin ciple of classification with an activity which undermined it in proportion as fortunes independent of Birth were created by conquest.

Roman Knights, or Middle Class.

To meet this source of political decomposition, the wisdom of Roman statesmen early introduced a happy expedient, which stayed the break-up of the system for several generations. The equestrian order was not instituted merely to moderate the shock of the frequent collisions between nobles and com mons. Its main purpose was to furnish a natural opening fo wealth, and so to turn it aside from any direct struggle with hereditary rank, whose ascendency, indeed, it even helped t maintain, by a gradual affiliation of its members to the ruling caste. But the Knights, being allowed to follow industrial o financial pursuits from which the senators were debarred, and enjoying an equal share of the benefits of military service came ultimately to be the chief holders of property. From tha time forward the temporal power of Birth was more and mor supplanted by that of Wealth; the foundations of Sociocracy, a regards its material constitution, were thus laid, in harmon with a continuous tendency, manifested even during the Middl Age, notwithstanding the necessary revival of the hereditar principle which then took place.

Sociocratic institution of Confiscation makes its appearance.

The general organisation of property at Rome presents on decided novelty, illustrative of the sociocratic tone by whic the political situation was pervaded. Confiscation, in the stric sense of the term, was impossible under a Theocracy; it wa barred by the supernatural origin of all great possessions. Th priestly domains might be, and often were, subjected to spolia tion at the hands of the warrior caste: they were never legall susceptible of undergoing an expropriation which would neces sarily have appeared sacrilegious in the eyes of all. Accordingly the introduction of confiscation, at an early period of Roma history, was a sign that property had ceased to be held b divine right; that it was henceforward to be viewed as a purel human institution,—especially property acquired by war, continually increasing proportion of the whole. Still it wa needful that the absolute character of ownership should be mai tained and even more distinctly asserted, until the time whe all its conditions should be systematised by the final advent Sociocracy; otherwise the most effectual guarantee of its ind

pendence would have been lost. While assuming the right of confiscating a domain the tenure of which was implicitly derived from the community, the state did not hold itself competent to regulate its management. But the right of social intervention having thus been asserted against the claim of ownership, the latter has, ever since the Middle Age, been undergoing further modifications due to the principle which is finally destined to regenerate its character.

Sociocratic character of Roman Law.

Having drawn attention to this fundamental innovation, I must next notice another of a more general kind, eminently characteristic of the sociocratic tendency of the Roman system; I mean its admirable judicial institutions. One special object of these, which we have chiefly to attend to here, was to base public and even private morality on a foundation not directly dependent upon supernatural beliefs, though deriving from them an indirect, general, and essentially accessory sanction. In a theocratic society, where all decisions necessarily emanate from the priesthood, it was impossible for any conflict to arise between human motives and divine commands; since the two were spontaneously balanced in the mind of their common organs. But the essentially temporal authority of the magistrate under a military form of civilisation, no longer allowed him to invoke supernatural sanctions either alone or principally. Compelled to give reasons for his decisions before the bar of a free public opinion, to which they owed their surest sanction, he soon found himself obliged to base them on an immediate consideration of the personal, domestic, or public consequences appertaining to each case. Thus by degrees was formed an outline of Morality, strictly so called, empirical indeed, but never again to be lost sight of; a Morality no longer resting on any theological inspiration though still deriving an additional sanction from it. It is clear that a doctrine of this sort could only concern itself directly with actions, never with the feelings by which the actions were prompted (p. 293). Still it spontaneously paved the way for the more thorough attempt reserved for the Middle Age when the most enlightened thinkers were ready to acknowledge the efficacy of the Roman system (p. 379).

Corpus Juris of Justinian.

Roman law, as represented by a digest in which the special decisions of ten centuries are embodied, still holds its ground among us. It illustrates the sociocratic character of the Roman

Transition, which will continue to regulate the social life of the West until the advent of the Final Faith. The mere existence of a judicial system outside the bounds of the official theologism affords sufficient proof that the latter was confessedly inadequate for the direction of human society; since earthly rewards and punishments would be superfluous, if heavenly ones sufficed. But this implied admission, masked during the theocratic period by an all-powerful priesthood, is rendered yet more manifest by the long series of edicts which rest on an examination, positive in spirit though empirical in method, into the real springs of conduct, whether public or private.

(β) External Action.

Such were the principal effects of the mode of Sociability prevailing at Rome upon her internal organisation. To complete this Abstract Appreciation I have still to examine her foreign policy, to which all other aims were subordinated in this Transition.

This inquiry has two sides, according as the dominant mode of activity is considered in relation to those who exercised it, or those on whom it was exercised.

Effect of military activity on the conquerors individually.

Under the first aspect, what we have here to determine is the influence of military life on the individual character; its influence on domestic and public relations having already been considered. Habits of obedience and of command profoundly modified the moral dispositions of the persons exercising those functions; showing the great importance of a common and abiding aim for the establishment of our true Unity. For although the common aim in this case could exert a direct influence only upon actions, it tended indirectly to improve the feelings by which actions are inspired.

Cultivation of Veneration.

The developement of Veneration—the chief basis of military discipline—was the principal fruit, in the domain of morals, of the warlike activity of Rome. Limited under Fetichism to family relations, this sentiment which is the foundation of order received from Theocracy the full extension appropriate to its high social office. The systematic culture of Veneration was the best result of the sacerdotal system. Still, it continued to labour under two essential imperfections, both of which were spontaneously remedied by military civilisation in virtue of a twofold influence of its distinctive mode of activity. The theocratic type of veneration lacked precision, owing to the absence of any Practical object;

it lacked solidity, owing to its too exclusive connection with supernatural beliefs.

The public activity of Rome, and it alone, was capable of completing the moral training of the race in these two directions, so as to pave the way for the disposition which will finally prevail. Veneration thus acquired a definite and ever-present object, and lost the vagueness inherited from our theocratic education. On the other hand, it became connected with purely human motives, and was thus enabled to survive the decay of theological belief. Amid the revolutionary anarchy of modern times, our Western form of Veneration is still distinguished by these two attributes from that which prevails in the East. They afford direct proof of the general tendency of Roman civilisation to draw further away from Theocracy and nearer to Sociocracy.

It was connected with a noble purpose and with Human motives.

It must be admitted, however, that in the Roman military system, the authority of the chiefs was at first doubly theocratic. This is shown by their sacerdotal attributes; it was usual for them to hold pontifical offices as a preliminary to military commands, and they often exercised priestly functions at the head of their armies. In a yet more immediate way, the obedience of the Roman had a decidedly theocratic tinge: it was given to birth: he reverenced his leaders as personal descendants of the gods. This was the mainstay of the military patriciat, and it was independent of any priestly office: it continued to hold good so long as aristocratic manners maintained their ascendency; an ascendency which naturally declined as the fulfilment of Rome's mission of conquest brought low-born merit, backed by adequate wealth, into notice. Then Roman Veneration tends to lose its theocratic character and to become more and more sociocratic, human motives taking the place of divine right. Notwithstanding the progressive weakening of old beliefs and prejudices, discipline maintained itself so long as the dominant activity prevailed. For daily life brought new lessons of the value of subordination, new instances of the merit of the chiefs.

Its character therefore gradually became less Theocratic and more Sociocratic.

While developing obedience in the governed, the exigencies of practical life fostered a corresponding feeling of Benevolence in the ruling class, so that command no less than obedience was invested with a moral character. This immediate effect of practical life on the former is all the more striking as

Cultivation of Benevolence.

its results were independent of any theological ordinances. Throughout antiquity, these ordinances could only inculcate submission; they could not regulate authority; hence whatever merit the latter may have shown must always have been spontaneous (p. 198). The laws of human nature might not be understood; nevertheless, they produced their normal effects, by virtue of which veneration on the part of the weak calls forth a corresponding devotion on the part of the strong. The power of hereditary rank was circumscribed by the needs of practical life; it might ensure the ascendency of the nobility as a whole; but the credit of each individual member of that class depended on his own conduct. The privilege of birth did but shape the noble's personal character to social ends; it did not of itself endow him with lasting authority. Under such influences, there occurred many heroic examples of self-devotion, the purity of which was most unmixed when aristocratic ascendency was most respected.

Reaction of public on private life promoted habits of self-restraint.

It would be superfluous to say more about the extent to which the natural connection of our two highest instincts (i. 567) was fostered by Roman life. But, apart from this main current of its influence, the collective activity of Rome spontaneously improved individual morality both among the rulers and the ruled. The continuous sway of a common aim brought home to every man the need for keeping his private conduct in harmony with his social office. It is undoubtedly true that such a culture as this was of necessity limited to the three practical qualities of Courage, Prudence, and Firmness, the importance of which is most habitually marked in military life. Accordingly, it could not in any way forestall the proper business of the mediæval period—the direct cultivation of the feelings from which our actions ultimately spring, and upon which the chief efficacy of character, strictly so called, depends; for the three qualities embraced under that term may be turned to good or to evil purposes (i. 585). Though this action of practical life upon morality was rude and inadequate, it was nevertheless a needful step in our Preparation; for it diffused everywhere a settled habit of self-restraint. The daily exercise of this habit was ennobled by its social purpose which thus supplied, as far as was then possible, the place of a direct culture of the Feelings: the latter being incompatible with a mode of life in which attention was necessarily concentrated on Acts.

Treatment of the conquered.

We have next to regard Roman Activity in its relation to the conquered populations; and here also we are struck by a no less important improvement which it wrought in Man's disposition. Under pure Fetichism, the relations between a tribe and its neighbours were exceedingly limited, and only led to conflicts barren of all result. The theocratic system had noble aspirations after religious universality; and yet the developement of the arts of peace did not save its representatives from an isolation judged to be necessary for the maintenance of the corresponding life and manners. But a proselytising spirit is inherent in the military principle; it made itself felt even under Intellectual Polytheism, as shown by the colonial diffusion of the Greeks (p. 231). But no true policy towards foreign nations could be matured amid the vague anarchy of a situation incapable of any social aim. The relations of the Greeks with their allies or their tributaries were habitually capricious and tyrannical; quite incompatible, therefore, with any genuine incorporation. We are indebted to Rome alone for the rise of the manners requisite for the compulsory aggregation of distinct nationalities, preparatory to their voluntary convergence.

The moralising influence of the public activity of Rome is even more manifest in its effect on foreign than on internal affairs; indeed it formed an indispensable condition of such success as habitually attended the Roman arms. We cannot therefore be surprised to find this noble people spontaneously developing, in its relations with its neighbours, feelings indispensable to the success of its system of conquests. Virgil's admirable line—

Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos—

summarily expresses their attitude with just so much of exaggeration as properly belongs to poetry.

Attitude towards foreign religions and usages.

But the Empire of the West would not have fallen to those whose mission it became to prepare the world for its final civilisation, had not enlightened views of policy usually gone hand in hand with liberal intentions. Never had Polytheism so fully developed its characteristic aptitude for facilitating incorporation while respecting the sacredness of nationality. Nothing in history can rival the august prudence of the Roman senate, offering a respectful welcome to the deities, of whatever order, worshipped by subject nations, and even to pure fetiches. And

yet this attitude would not have been sufficient, had any contempt on the part of the soldiers neutralised the wisdom of their chiefs. To give this conciliatory tendency its full effect, it was necessary that the whole people should spontaneously cooperate with the ruling class; quite as necessary as in the case of warlike enterprise. From whatever side we look at it, we cannot but acknowledge the preeminent aptitude of such a policy for consolidating military success by civil government; respecting the usages of the conquered, so as to bring them to take part more fully in the civilisation of their conquerors. The true spirit of incorporation was so characteristic of this unrivalled people that it displayed itself even in its most unworthy chiefs; an ignoble tyrant issuing the decree never afterwards recalled which gave the right of citizenship to every inhabitant of his immense empire.

Edict of Caracalla.

CONCRETE RESULTS, pp. 316–351.

My abstract view of the foreign policy of Rome in its relation to the Roman people on the one hand, to the subject nations on the other, is now complete. The internal organisation, public as well as private, of Social Polytheism, has already been discussed. I must now proceed to a concrete examination of its chief results, as regards first the fulfilment of its own mission, and then the preparation of Western Europe for the next stage in its progress. To give precision to my views on this subject, it is necessary to indicate the exact limits within which the action of Rome was confined.

(1) Aristocratic Period of Conquest and Incorporation, pp. 316–329.

Restriction of Conquest to settled populations.

In the first place, the process of incorporation by conquest is only applicable to settled populations. Why this is so was explained in the third chapter (p. 154). Only settled populations are capable of being really conquered, or of effectually conquering others. Although a nomadic mode of life may allow the Feelings and even the Intellect to reach a high degree of developement, a fixed abode is indispensable for the lasting success of any kind of Activity,—more especially of any collective Activity. Nevertheless, although tribes of hunters or of shepherds cannot be *directly* reached by conquest, it may exercise a powerful *indirect* influence upon them by narrowing the area which belongs to each. Carried far enough, this compression from without induces nomads to adopt a settled mode of life sooner than they might otherwise do. This first limit to the scheme of Roman incorporation is especially important in its bearings on the decline of the Empire; it indi

cates the source of the *external* influences which put the finishing stroke, as I shall hereafter explain (p. 393), to the *internal* decomposition of that compulsory aggregate.

Restriction of real Incorporation to military populations of Western Europe.

Again, even among settled populations, those which were fully theocratic, and among which the mode of life established by the sacerdotal caste was adequately developed, could not be really included in this scheme of conquest. Their peaceful habits render such populations an easy prey; but so far from undergoing assimilation, they continually tend to modify their conquerors by the power of an invincible inertia together with the charm of a more desirable existence. Hence the social aim of conquest is frustrated in their case; easily vanquished, they resist any genuine incorporation. If any well-marked theocracies were absorbed by Rome they were numerically weak; as for instance, Etruria, perhaps the only decided case of the kind. The incorporation of Gaul succeeded only on account of the feeble hold of the theocratic system on that vast region, where the warrior class was already beginning to prevail over the priesthood when the conquest took place.

Taking these two general restrictions together, we are forced to conclude that the gradual extension of Roman dominion was of necessity limited to populations essentially like their conquerors. Neither fetichist nor theocratic, these countries, like Rome herself, had spontaneously reached Progressive Polytheism, by a similar operation of the military instinct in a sphere suited to its growth. We must observe, further, that where the warlike impulse had proved abortive, and Progressive Polytheism had assumed a primarily Intellectual character, the resulting difference was enough to make the incorporation imperfect, or rather ambiguous. Rome conquered Greece with ease; she never succeeded in thoroughly assimilating her; and that too although nothing could have been more friendly than her disposition towards all the results of Hellenic culture. We must, therefore, finally limit the domain of Rome to the purely military nations, every one of which was aspiring to become the centre of the Western system; of that system which was to prepare the way among progressive polytheists for the direct elaboration of the Great Being. While explaining the success of Roman incorporation by the radical similarity of the vanquished to their victors, my theory justifies the process, by showing that Rome, conquering, that she might not be

conquered, obtained an empire analogous to that to which she must herself have submitted. It was necessary that a succession of barren conflicts should be arrested, once for all, by the union of all warlike nations under a single head; but why this headship should have fallen to Rome still remains to be explained.

Conditions determining the social Centre of the West.

The concrete character of this question renders it foreign to Social Dynamics. Moreover, it is less important than is generally supposed. The whole of the abstract survey which I have just completed shows how the actual accomplishment of the business of incorporation was itself the principal source of the distinctive attributes of the nation which accomplished it. Whatever special influences there may have been, they could only affect the first beginnings of an enterprise in which but one nation could succeed, and which spontaneously gathered force as it advanced towards fulfilment. Thus it is far less important to explain the natural selection of Rome than that of Greece; yet we may reasonably desire to know the chief circumstances which made Rome the Social centre of the Western system. Here, therefore, I may fairly introduce a brief outline of the considerations bearing most closely on this point.

Geographical conditions.

To begin with, the present inquiry will be indirectly helped by the direct elucidation of the similar question with regard to the intellectual centre, which had a special place in the preceding chapter (p. 221). It was clearly necessary that the two centres of evolution—one intellectual, the other social—should neither be too near each other, nor too far apart; so as to ensure their primitive independence and their subsequent coalescence. These two conditions were indispensable to the fulfilment of their joint mission; all the more so, since the two movements had for a long time to go on side by side, notwithstanding the necessary priority of the intellectual one. Accordingly, the geographical relation between Athens and Rome was well suited for the mutual interaction of their respective functions. This reason, however, is not sufficiently precise to enable us to infer the actual position of the second centre from that of the first, even granting, as we must, that the seat of the social movement must lie to the west of that devoted to intellectual progress.

Looking at the matter more narrowly, we see why the nucleus of military incorporation must be near the sea and yet

upon the mainland, so as to render it less accessible, and to concentrate its activity. For the same reasons, it must lie on the southern confines of the European system, though forming an integral part of the West. Again, it follows from the explanation given above, that this centre of compulsory aggregation must be environed on all sides by settled populations, without being too near any great theocratic state. Further, the ruling nation must be within reach of the sea to enable it to assume a maritime activity when this becomes necessary to its progress, without ever ceasing to bestow its chief attention on continental expeditions, the only sure basis of permanent conquest. Finally, its territory must suffice to feed its citizens, while prompting them to overflow its limits instead of retaining them by the attractions of an existence too exclusively industrial. Taking all these considerations together, we might build up *à priori* the respective destinies of Athens, Rome, and Carthage, as was stated in my fundamental treatise (Phil. Pos. v. 268). Any more elaborate details would not accord with the essentially abstract character which the Philosophy of History ought to maintain.

Social conditions.

A brief review of the social influences which helped, in concert with geographical conditions, to fix the special centre of incorporation for the West, forms a natural starting-point for the task on which I am about to enter, the Concrete Appreciation of the work done by Rome. The main point to be noticed is the need for a certain admixture of a theocratic population with the warlike element, so as to facilitate the initial organisation of the latter. Even some fetichist tribes were added which were disposed to settle down with a view to conquest. Without the priestly element, military discipline would have lacked a sufficient basis of veneration, and this, in its turn, might have degenerated into a pacific tendency but for the impulse given by Fetichism.

Aristocratic period divided into three phases of Conquest; answering to first three nations of modern West.

Sociological analysis breaks up the period of Roman incorporation into three principal phases. The first includes the absorption of the whole of Italy; the second that of Spain; the third, the incorporation of Gaul. The middle term—that which, here as elsewhere, characterises the series (p. 52)—is ushered in by the struggle with Carthage, and is, indeed, the purpose of that struggle. It is closed by the conquest of Greece, leading to that of Asia Minor and that of Egypt. But these

two appendages to the incorporation of Spain were never capable of an assimilation that could be compared with that of the West proper. On the other hand, the intermediate geographical position of Gaul shows that its full incorporation was indispensable to complete the Roman system which could not otherwise have attained a sufficient degree of coherence. Accordingly, the decisive aggregation of the progressive polytheists was chiefly to consist in the union with Italy of the two contiguous regions which separated her from the Atlantic.

Two remaining nations of the West imperfectly incorporated later.

Such were the three elements of which the civilised West, in ancient as in modern times, is necessarily built up. Any extension of conquest beyond these limits is rendered imperfect by an insufficient conformity of language, of worship, and of manners. This Southern group was considerably augmented during the Middle Age, by its permanent combination with the northern pair of nations, Germany and Britain, the annexation of which had already been begun by the Romans. But although the normal conditions of incorporation with the West were fairly fulfilled in the case of this invaluable extension, the inherent diversity of North and South is a leading fact throughout the whole of modern history, notwithstanding the noble efforts made by the Catholic priesthood for their intellectual and social fusion. Their complete union will soon afford the first illustration of the necessary aptitude of Positivism for harmonising all forms of civilisation. Nevertheless, the general unlikeness between the Northern and Southern divisions of the Western system will continue to make itself felt even in this final period of human unity. In my next volume I shall bring evidence to prove that the regeneration of Europe must begin in the South, notwithstanding the tendency of the last three centuries to change the order of evolution determined by the whole of our past history.

Why Spain was conquered before Gaul.

To complete my general outline of the order followed by the Roman incorporation, I must here explain an exception to the laws of Sociology which that outline appears to present. We can readily perceive why the work of assimilation should have begun with Italy,—especially continental Italy. But geographical contiguity would seem to require that Gaul should have been conquered before Spain.

Two general reasons may be given why matters followed an

inverse order. First, the attractions offered by Spain; secondly, the difficulty of invading Gaul. The Iberian peninsula tempted the future masters of the West by a more genial climate, and offered them free access to the Atlantic, the future boundary of their empire. Moreover, the path of conquest was smoothed by the existing divisions among the inhabitants and by previous colonisation. On the other hand, the invasion of Gaul (if we except its southern shores) offered hardly any prospect of immediate advantage. At the same time it bristled with difficulties. The nation was warlike and united by theocratic ties; the priestly influence, far from opposing military expeditions, was obliged to stimulate them, in order to delay the imminent preponderance of the warrior over the sacerdotal caste. Accordingly, the conquest of Gaul naturally became the closing scene of the main work of incorporation; it could not be accomplished till the power of Rome had reached its full maturity. But long before it actually took place, the propinquity of Gaul exerted an indirect influence upon the destinies of Rome; for the Gaulish colonies which were originally supreme in Northern Italy tended to turn the course of incorporation in the opposite direction.

First Aristocratic Phase. Conquest of Italy.

Although in the first phase of Roman conquest the general purpose is less distinctly marked than in the second, the fundamental aptitude for accomplishing that purpose is more decisively shown. It lasted longer than the other two taken together, and thus enabled the Romans to develope, both at home and abroad, those qualities which assured their supremacy. I have already laid down, as an abstract principle, that the social efficacy of the collective activity of Rome was intimately bound up with the gradual way in which that activity was developed. If, in the quick march of Alexander's conquests, we see their ephemeral character foretold, we may read a sure guarantee of stability in the slow progress of the Roman movement. But it was to the reaction of the external policy on the internal organisation, whether of the family or of the state, that the gradual character of the conquests was most advantageous; and it was the internal organisation which became the principal result of the system of conquest.

The Regal and early Aristocratic periods.

A monarchy was needed to guide the movement at its outset; only by a concentration of authority could the heterogeneous elements of which the population was made up, be sufficiently

amalgamated. Nevertheless, the expulsion of the kings speedi became the first condition of continued military success; career of conquest could only be carried on under a heredita oligarchy, in which the sacerdotal element was subordinated the military one; for the monarchy was prone to assume a priest character. The power of the aristocracy was consolidated the slow progress of the earlier conquests, which disposed th nobles to make needful concessions, and the commons yield suitable obedience. Military successes so much dispute and won at such risk of total ruin, served to unite the tw classes by making each keenly sensible of the other's impor ance. At the same time, the restriction of warlike enterpri within narrow geographical limits, and the short duration the campaigns, never allowed military commanders to emanc pate themselves from civil authority. Although the influen of Birth was already being sapped by the inroads of the Electi tendency, the choice of the people was confined, during th first period, to the nobility; individual zeal was thus stimu lated without any impairment of corporate ascendency. Th slowness of these initial stages of Rome's progress was so im portant, that Dante, in his rapid ideal survey of her care of conquest, devotes a line to its commemoration:

Vincendo intorno le genti vicine.[1]

Civic feeling was formed during the period when the normal limits of Civic union were not exceeded.

Between Devotedness and Veneration there is a natur reciprocity (p. 212); and this was sure to be most mark when the public activity was wide enough to excite ad quate interest without being too wide to be easily grasp During the long period devoted to the conquest of Italy, th general movement could be felt and shared by all; furnishi to all classes, and even to women, a habitual bond betwe the interests of private and those of public life. At that tim more than ever before or since, these two aspects of huma existence were in perfect harmony; a harmony which is t chief source of human dignity and happiness. Never ha there been so many instances of heroic devotion and of genero obedience, both shedding equal honour on the Roman nam The slow progress of the movement exerted as favourable influence on foreign as on home relations; the ruling peop

[1] 'Paradiso,' vi. 42.

during its hard struggle with the nations most like itself, gradually acquiring an appropriate tone of feeling towards those which resembled it less. The conquest of Italy laid down, from the very first, the lines along which the action of Rome should travel. It foreshadowed, in the North, the final struggle with Gaul; it announced, in the South, the absorption of Greece, whose Italian colonies occasioned the latest conflicts of this fundamental phase.

Second Aristocratic Phase. Conquest of Spain Punic wars.

A struggle with the Carthaginian settlements, first in Sicily, then in Spain, served to connect the decisive beginning with the full maturity of the Roman movement. Spain was the great battle-field on which the fate of Western Europe was determined. This second phase affords less material for the sociologist than the first; the conquest of Italy saw the main lines of the Roman constitution, both in its domestic and its foreign relations, laid down; while the conquest of Spain only paved the way for the necessary change of that constitution. Nevertheless, the long struggle between Rome and Carthage offers a high degree of intrinsic interest; for it confirmed the truth of the natural law, that incorporation resting on an essentially maritime basis can never be successful.

Instability of Maritime as compared with Continental Supremacy.

My whole theory of the system of conquest points to the conclusion that its social purpose, whether internal or external, no less than its success from a military point of view, depends entirely on a habitual preference of continental to maritime expeditions. The former alone can be sufficiently continuous. Although the sovereignty of the sea might seem to be a natural privilege of Carthage, the Romans were not long in wresting it from her; and this without ever looking on their fleet as more than ancillary to their armies. Here we have a law complementary to that which makes sedentary existence a necessary condition of success for any decisive exercise of collective activity; it is this: that settlements which were the fruit of conquest, were precarious when founded on maritime, stable when on continental enterprise.

Practical statesmen must have instinctively perceived these natural tendencies long before they were formulated by science. They enable us easily to see that there could be but one issue to the conflict in which the leading feature was the splendid contrast between Scipio and Hannibal. But certain as that issue was

from the beginning, it required prolonged and stupendous efforts during which the Roman character matured the three Activ qualities. Moreover, the importance of the object—the posses sion of Spain—justified the elder Cato in his instinctive jealous of Rome's only rival.

Gradual modification of the Constitution.

During this second phase, mainly taken up by the struggl with Carthage—though it was, after all, but a means to an en —the Roman constitution retained its aristocratic character not, however, without undergoing some modifications suggestiv of coming change. The extent and difficulty of the expedition undertaken, developed the pretensions of the lower class and furnished them with constant support; first, by allowing the growth of acquired, as opposed to inherited, wealth; secondly by inducing generals, even thus early, to seek popularity by assuming an attitude of antagonism towards their own order Compelled to throw open the chief civil and military offices o the state to the people, the senate (now, more than ever before had recourse to artifices based on its priestly attributes, in orde to elude, for a few generations, this decisive concession, the firs symptom of its declining power.

Conquest properly extended to Greece, but improperly to Asia,

Had the policy of Rome been guided by a prearranged scheme instead of an instinct of expediency, the incorporatio of Gaul would have immediately followed that of Spain. There was an exceptional pause between the two operations, notwith standing their natural connection; and this pause was not du solely to the intrinsic difficulty of the task. Its chief caus must be sought in the spontaneous impulse which carried th Romans eastward after the fall of Carthage. This tendenc would not have been abnormal, had the conquest of Greec been its only object. The connection of Greece with Italy b way of Sicily and Epirus made the absorption of the former necessary consequence of that of the latter; but it was mor than this; it was indispensable if the system of conquests wa to bear all its destined fruits. The intellectual and the socia evolutions, the union of which was needed to prepare Wester Europe for its final state, could not otherwise have inte penetrated each other sufficiently for the complete realisatio of their respective purposes. These motives for pushin eastward apply, however, only to Greece, strictly so called they ought not to have postponed the incorporation of Gau to the invasion of Asia, where the Romans rushed blindl

on the footsteps of Alexander, whose traces, however, they never succeeded in obliterating.

And to Africa.

A like empirical error led them, after destroying Carthage, to take up and even to extend her authority over the neighbouring nomadic tribes. Thus, both in the South and in the East, the two great limits imposed by sociology on systematic conquest were violated by a futile attempt to incorporate nomadic or theocratic populations. These errors were empirical; but there were other and deeper sources of disturbance which helped to delay the assimilation of Gaul. The latter was not accomplished till just at the close of the third phase, to which it nevertheless gives its distinctive character.

Third Aristocratic Phase. Conquest of Gaul. Revolutionary tendencies;

The various intestine troubles by which the structure of Social Polytheism was spontaneously broken up, may be explained by developing more fully the theory of the collective activity proper to the second Transition lying between Theocracy and Sociocracy. For although military supremacy is as incapable of perpetuity as of universality, the spontaneous decay of the corresponding social system can never take place suddenly. Before its final dissolution, and during the period of its greatest splendour, it was being undermined by subtle changes connected with its foreign action.

Resulting from the element of Independence in Military manners.

In order to grasp their origin and progress, we need only complete our survey of the social properties of the military form of activity, by examining it in relation to Independence. Hitherto we have studied it only in reference to Co-operation. Its spontaneously collective character renders it equally apt to fulfil either of these two general conditions of true sociability (ii. 242). For the developement of a system of conquests excludes servility as much as insubordination. So long as its chief aim is unfulfilled, it sways superiors and inferiors alike and so fosters a habit of honourable obedience. But when conquest has once reached a point which removes all fear of retrogression, its further progress modifies, in an equal degree, the disposition both of the one and of the other. The respect originally paid to hereditary rank, and speedily modified by its extension to acquired renown, tends to disappear in consequence of the false pretensions with which pride and cupidity inspire the chiefs. Then there is resistance on the part of the soldiers, and so it gradually comes to be recognised that military life surpasses industrial pursuits as much in respect of Independence

as of Co-operation. This follows naturally from the collectiv character of the former, as contrasted with the more individua character of the latter.

Misgovernment of the Senate.

Applying this theory to the special case of Rome, we are n longer surprised to find the Roman constitution, which had bee already modified during the second phase, undergoing radica changes during the third. The aristocracy which, during the lon struggle for Italian supremacy, had nobly identified itself wit the destinies of the Republic, was led astray, after the ruin o Carthage, by personal ambition; its members came more an more to seek the acquisition of great domains in far-off countries or the government of wealthy provinces. At the same time, th senate, proud of a national power which it looked upon as veste mainly in itself, became less and less disposed to yield to th demands of the people, even when most just; the latter graduall became hostile, and exercised the right, won in earlier struggles of electing men of low birth to various offices. This growing discord did much to retard the great incorporation which was t distinguish the closing phase of the Roman movement. Instea of conquering Gaul, as the people wished, the senate preferre to undertake distant expeditions, more flattering to its pride more tempting to its greed; and this notwithstanding th dangerous facilities offered to commanders for weaning th attachment of their troops from the state to their own persons Again, the selfishness of the senate prevented it from listenin in time to the just claims of the Italian provinces to full incor poration by admission to citizenship. The senate was deterre from carrying out this decisive assimilation by the fear o seeing new families arise, with which it would have to shar its aristocratic supremacy; and the concession was not mad till after a short but disgraceful war,—the first sign of the spon taneous decay which was at hand.

Commencement of the Revolution; the Gracchi;

Thus it was that Rome came to be torn by civil strife o a scale hitherto unparalleled, beginning with the significan troubles stirred up by the Gracchi about the conquere territory. From this beginning, the final triumph of th popular cause might have been foreseen; a cause which ha already found devoted champions among noble families. Er

Marius.

long, however, Marius rose up from among the people itself, hero whose appearance more surely foretokened the inevitabl issue of the coming crisis. Nor are we to regard it as a mer

accidental coincidence that it was a nephew of Marius who afterwards brought that crisis to a close. Cæsar.

The impartiality required by the philosophy of history must not prevent us, at the present day, from drawing attention to the general superiority of the popular movement over the resistance offered by the senate. For the popular impulse, at that time, promoted such changes in the constitution as were calculated to give to the evolution of the West the prolongation which was necessary. That impulse, like the opposition of the senate, was doubtless instinctive; yet it sprang from more disinterested motives and wiser presentiments. With Greek demagogy the Romans had nothing in common. Their chief aim was to concentrate republican authority by subordinating the power of the senate to a permanent dictator. Some such concentration had become indispensable to the cause of order no less than to that of progress, now that the dominion of Rome had grown so vast as to make men anxious at once about its preservation against aggression from without, and about the policy needed for its internal management. This twofold urgency must have continually tended to induce all statesmen of real merit, whether moral or intellectual, to devote themselves unreservedly to the popular cause, whatever their social position. The noble conqueror of Gaul soon appeared and confirmed its honourable triumph by his unrivalled superiority, which will for ever mark him as the highest type of the military civilisation peculiar to Social Polytheism. Popular instinct leans to the Dictatorship.

There is nothing accidental about this coincidence. The dictatorial transformation of the Roman order would naturally be wrought by the leader who had just extended Rome's military supremacy to its normal limit. Henceforward, conservation takes precedence of extension. The need of attaining this natural limit had been strongly felt ever since the decisive victory won, half a century before, by the worthy forerunner of Cæsar, over a German invader. This triumph dispelled all immediate fears; but it drew public attention to the permanent incorporation of Gaul as the only bulwark against a danger liable to incessant renewal—that of aggression from the nomad tribes of the North-West of Europe. We see how exceptionally this indispensable adjunct was delayed by a concourse of circumstances, partly voluntary and partly involuntary, which have already been explained. Connection between conquest of Gaul and the Dictatorship. Defeat of Cimbri and Teutoni by Marius.

The assimilation of Gaul, together with the partially

Incomparable qualities and career of Cæsar.

executed plan for the incorporation of Germany and even of Britain, thus determined the distinctive character both of the last phase of the Roman movement, and of the principal change in the corresponding regime. In completing the Western State system, it gave birth to the permanent dictatorship under which alone its further developement could proceed. The incomparable organ of this twofold advance proved, more than any other representative man in history, equal to his great mission. Wholly emancipated from theologism, Cæsar foresaw and felt in a manner worthy of him the necessary approach of the reign of Humanity, which had already floated dimly before the eyes of Scipio. Although the extent of the Roman incorporation was wide enough to enable intellects and hearts of the highest order to form some conception of the Great Being they had instinctively served, yet they were also aware of the impossibility of carrying out that conception by the aid of the same activity which had sketched its outline. Hence the Dictator of the West, whose powers seemed fitted only for success in arms, was preparing to substitute industrial for military enterprise. The admirable works which he achieved, and those, still greater, which he only planned, some of them remaining unfinished at this day, form a lasting monument of his intentions. An infamous murder, as senseless as it was odious, prompted by metaphysical fanaticism, as well as aristocratic fury, soon furnished an instance of the vast effect which the assassination of an individual may exert on the destinies of society.

Murder of Cæsar the greatest crime in history. Impossibility of restoring Aristocracy.

Nevertheless, this unparalleled crime, which even Dante's prejudices did not prevent him from stigmatising worthily, failed wholly to revive a hopelessly rotten regime. Its sole result was to raise up, after much needless bloodshed, another dictator, less eminent than the first, though really meritorious. The Roman constitution had necessarily maintained its aristocratic character so long as warlike enterprise was in the ascendant; it inevitably assumed a dictatorial form as soon as a policy of conservation became more urgent than one of extension. However unworthy were some of the leaders into whose hands the supreme power subsequently fell, the authority of the senate could never be restored; there never was even a serious attempt to restore it, though it continued to be an object of impotent regrets. Notwithstanding our classical prejudices to the con-

trary, dictators wholly ignoble often gained a genuine popularity which sometimes outlived their fall, simply because they shared and satisfied the implacable resentment of the people against the nobility.

Un-Roman character of the armies vanquished at Pharsalia, Philippi, and Actium.

The mode in which this decisive Revolution was accomplished is worth noting as furnishing a special illustration of my abstract theory concerning the normal limits of Roman incorporation. I need only draw attention to the habitual tendency of the reactionary party to lean by preference on the African and still more on the Oriental populations which were incapable of being really assimilated owing to their lack of adequate social and intellectual conformity. In the three great struggles which mark the successive steps of this mighty crisis, the vanquished army was entirely foreign to Roman manners; whereas it was these that gave the victors their chief strength, by making them instinctively aware of the opportune character of their exertions.

(2) Dictatorial Period, pp. 329–351.

The constitution of the Empire must be carefully distinguished from that of the Monarchy which preceded the aristocratic regime, in spite of the interested efforts of the party of the nobility to confound them by exaggerating their apparent points of similarity. The title of permanent Dictator, the first that was assigned to the chief of the state, is the one which most exactly defines his office. For it was, in the main, but a permanent form of the exceptional supremacy conferred, in times of republican crisis, on the magistrate known by that name. The need of a special connection with the army soon led to the adoption of another title; but this, already familiar as a reward for success in the field, did not present any more real analogy to the early Kingship than the title of Dictator. The Empire never succeeded in becoming really hereditary; it always continued to rest on an essentially elective basis, save when the character of the ruler inspired such confidence that he was entrusted with the choice of a successor, who was often drawn from outside his own family. Moreover repeated catastrophes furnished conclusive proof of the substantial difference between the new rulers of Rome and her ancient Kings.

Nature of the Dictatorship; elective or selective.

Title of *Imperator*.

Looking deeper into the contrast between them, we find that it consists chiefly in the growing substitution of a sociocratic for a theocratic character. Hereditary power, being incompatible with the continuous exercise of collective activity,

Dictatorship rested on a Sociocratic rather than a Theocratic basis.

had undergone one modification after another; and the elective method which replaced it was gradually freed from all restrictions and had now been long in use. Although election is, in itself, a purely revolutionary principle, its aim is always to favour merit, which really does govern the choice, when it is sufficiently obvious, especially in the case of a chief magistrate. Apart from the abuses which crept in latterly, the imperial elections were, notwithstanding their seemingly tumultuous character, better carried out, as a rule, than the consular nominations had been before them. This was due to the social superiority of the army over the mass of the people. Moreover no importance ought to be attached to the attempts made to give the imperial power a theocratic character, which was radically neutralised beforehand by its elective origin. A complimentary title conferred by law, and often pushed as far as apotheosis, sometimes even before death, proves no more than the servility of the senate, and the vanity of individual dictators. Polytheistic beliefs were too much shaken among all classes for these official titles to add any strength to a real authority.

Title of *Divus*.

If we look at its practical working, we shall see that the imperial dictatorship, as exercised by all its nobler types, showed a disposition to break for ever with Theocracy and directly establish Sociocracy. The empirical tendency of Roman jurist towards a social doctrine wholly independent of theological beliefs manifested itself more strikingly when their influence waxing as the military impulse waned, was concentrated by the supreme representative of universal justice. All statesmen perceived, as Scipio and Cæsar had dimly foreseen, that military activity could serve none but a provisional end; and that, this end attained, it should be subordinated to industry. This growing conviction—a natural result of the irrevocable supremacy which Roman civilisation had always assigned to practical life—tended more and more to substitute defensive for aggressive warfare, in harmony with the new situation of the West. It led the dictators to foresee, and even to prepare the way for the final abolition of slavery, by facilitating individual emancipation, by protecting slaves against their masters, and above all by conferring honours upon freedmen. But their chief care was necessarily directed to the developement and propagation of the benefits of civilisation by an habitual culture of both an active and a speculative kind. Although Affective progress

Sociocratic tendencies;

Jurisprudence;

Defensive War;

Mitigation of Slavery;

Diffusion of Culture;

could not then be appreciated as fully as were the Speculative and Practical evolutions; still, its approaching preponderance was foreshadowed by a spontaneous improvement in the liberty of women, the growth of which, within the domestic sphere, soon came to require moral discipline.

Progress of Women.

This second moiety of the Roman Transition was thus engrossed by defensive warfare and the developement of civil institutions; further, it led the way to the last of the Organic Transitions included in the Western Initiation. Although this office was naturally intermingled with the other two, its importance entitles it to separate treatment. I reserve the discussion of it till the close of the present chapter, where the subject may be treated consecutively and without interruption. I shall begin therefore by describing the double work of conservation and of progress, which the dictators directed worthily. I shall then pass to the complementary movement towards which, necessary though it was, they became fatally hostile; a mistake as unfortunate as it was excusable.

Dictatorial Period to be treated under two heads.

To help the reader in carrying this inquiry further than befits the present occasion, it may be well to point out the main divisions of this second period. And first, we must set aside the century which connects it with the Middle Age. For with the official substitution of Byzantium for Rome, and the formal subordination of Polytheism to Monotheism, the Roman system had really ceased to exist, although the social organisation which was to take its place had not yet been definitely established. This reduces the entire period to three centuries, to each of which its share in the Western transformation is naturally assignable. Proceeding as we did in the case of the principal period we may say that they were characterised, the first by a prolongation of the conquering movement, the second by an efficient protection of the Empire against invasion, and the third by spontaneous decomposition.

(*a*) Military conservation and Civil progress, pp. 331–336.

Three phases embracing first three centuries of our era.

During the first of these three fresh phases, the previously subsisting military impulse, though radically spent, continues to carry on the great work of incorporation in reference to certain accessory elements, especially in the North. The assimilation of Germany and Britain is prosecuted on the lines laid down by Cæsar. A long time had still to elapse before this necessary completion of the Western system was adequately accomplished; still, even the beginning of the process furnishes

First Dictatorial Phase. Continuation of Conquest.

an illustration of an essential feature of Roman policy which had previously been eclipsed by the splendour of conquest. I refer to the really admirable union of military with diplomatic measures. It stands out more vividly at this juncture, owing to the lesser intensity of the conflicts; but it may be distinctly traced throughout all the three ascending phases of the military movement.

Roman Incorporation at no time entirely due to force.

The Roman's sole desire was to prevail. He had no childish love of warlike measures, and never hesitated to prefer negotiation when this was sufficient for the end in view. This is why the incorporating process soon began to be met half-way by many peoples. For it invariably gave them a direct share in the benefits of the most advanced civilisation then existing, while at the same time it withdrew them from a military activity that only caused disturbance. It was only in Italy that Rome met with any real opposition; this was offered by nations, any one of which might originally have had a seeming claim to the dominion of the West, in virtue of its natural likeness to Rome. In Spain, the native tribes yielded without much resistance; a striking contrast to the energetic national feeling aroused during the Middle Age by an invasion which was out of place and mischievous. The chief struggle in Spain was between Rome and Carthage, for the possession of the country. As regards Gaul, its conquest would not have been definitively completed by Cæsar in ten years, but for the spontaneous aid given by tribes which were no longer swayed by druidical fanaticism and the ambition of local chiefs. The same natural disposition reappeared once more during the occupation of Germany and Britain, so long as Rome wisely refrained from attempting to incorporate tribes which were still nomadic. Just as compulsory assimilation became impossible or precarious when stretched beyond its normal limits, so it approached the character of a voluntary adhesion in the case of populations which were ready for it; their chiefs alone rejecting the salutary rule of Rome.

Esthetic culture during this phase.

On its civil side, this phase worthily inaugurated the dictatorial system. There was a decided advance in esthetic culture, the impulse to which was given by closer contact with Greek civilisation. Poetry, indeed, the *fundamental* art, can show no name to rival that of Homer or Æschylus; still, its cultivation yielded a larger harvest of estimable works, and brough

about a more uniform standard of taste than had been possible under Intellectual Polytheism. As regards the *special* arts of Music and Form, the Romans had to content themselves with appreciating the works of Greece. Even this passive attitude, however, is enough to show how much the predominance of public over private aims disposes men to be sensitive to whatever can improve Humanity.

Sociocratic spirit of Augustus and Tiberius.

This first phase of the dictatorship was worthily inaugurated by two distinguished types, who deserve to be commemorated here by name. Augustus, the wise heir of the generous Cæsar, nobly overcame the bent he would naturally acquire during his long struggle for power, and governed the West with a single eye to social welfare, seeking anxiously to make all classes co-operate, in their respective measures, for the public good. This general tendency was vigorously developed by Tiberius. A comprehensive estimate of his intellectual and moral qualities will soon efface the stigma attached to his memory by aristocratic rancour, notwithstanding the foulness of his private life during his later years.

Second Dictatorial Phase. Nerva.

The second period was wisely inaugurated by a noble old man, who introduced the system of adoptive succession which will always remain its distinguishing feature. The example he set was followed for a long term of years. It is to this system that the dictatorship of the West owes its noblest type.

Admirable results of Adoption. Trajan.

Besides his admirable qualities of heart, intellect and character, Trajan is further remarkable for his Spanish origin. This vividly illustrates the thoroughness of an incorporation which allowed a Roman emperor to choose a successor of alien blood. The dictatorship which thus arose during the first half-generation of the second century was indeed unrivalled; still, Trajan was succeeded by a series of men, all chosen by adoption, and all worthy of their high office. It is a pity that the last of this noble line of chiefs should have been induced by a pedantic vanity to set aside the wholesome principle to which he owed his own position, in favour of an unworthy son. Notwithstanding this blunder—all the more indeed, because of the contrast it provoked—the application to the supreme magistracy of the custom which had been spontaneously adopted, ever since the days of fetichism, in the various functions of private life, was never allowed to fall into oblivion. This extension of the adoptive method was *empirical*: but it will always be appealed

Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, M. Aurelius.

to as affording a decisive confirmation of the *systematic* wi dom, which before long will erect it into a principle. For will be an essential complement of the sociocratic mode of su cession, which is determined by the free choice of each organ society, with no other intervention.

Defensive warfare.

During this second phase, anxiety to preserve the existin limits of the Empire prevails so completely over any attem to extend them, that the very expeditions, few and brief as th were, which were seemingly undertaken for aggressive object have rather a defensive than an offensive character. Practic life is on the threshold of its transformation; the arts of pea prevail more and more over those of war; immense work public as well as private, already attest their supremacy.

Natural transition from warlike to industrial activity.

The readiness with which even the more warlike of t Romans accepted this decisive change must be ascribed to t close natural affinity which subsists between the various mod of practical life, and especially to the protracted sway of t most complete of those modes. From the outset of the Weste incorporation, the art of war, in virtue of its greater generali and more social character (p. 47), disposed men's minds to s a just value upon agriculture, and all other forms of industry succession, of which agriculture is the common basis. T arts of peace were never despised save by the vanity of Greec where a vague activity without any public aim went on in thoroughly anarchical sphere. To have their hands free f conquest, the Romans were obliged to entrust their industr undertakings to slaves; still, the wealthier citizens—especial among the knights—furnished many honourable chiefs to co mercial and even to manufacturing enterprise. As soon, the fore, as public attention turned naturally, in virtue of t political situation, to industrial pursuits, the manners of t people were found ready for the change; a change which dive the mind from the most difficult to the easiest of conquests.

The best Greek Philosophy and Science assimilated and propagated.

My abstract survey has sufficiently explained the seeming i difference of the Romans to speculative progress; hence I ne not now proceed to justify their necessary non-cooperation in movement which had long since spent itself, and which was n really renewed till modern times. They were preeminent fitted for synthetic views by their noble public activity; th could not therefore but look down upon philosophical exerci tions which the wise scepticism of Cicero had already d

credited. Nevertheless, they were always able to distinguish between the real thinkers and the mere debaters, at whose contests they were content to look on. Thales, Pythagoras, and Aristotle were better appreciated at Rome than by the Greeks, with whom empty sophists often enjoyed more credit. As regards science proper, especially mathematical science, the taste for it was now stronger and more widely diffused than ever before, although Roman thinkers, for reasons already assigned, could not devote themselves actively to its cultivation.

Developement of Historical writing from Polybius to Tacitus.

Their chief efforts turned spontaneously to the improvement of History. The time was not yet ripe for any true historical philosophy; but the materials needed by sociology could be, and were being, prepared. History was first instituted, under Theocracy, in the form of biography; in the freer atmosphere of Greece it improved by assuming a collective instead of an individual character; on the other hand it lost by becoming a simple narrative, less fraught with moral significance than the biography which it displaced, owing to the lack of any social purpose. Roman thought, trained in the arena of public life, gave it, once for all, a decided though empirical tendency to grasp the true filiation of events affecting humanity. The connecting link between the two methods is furnished by the great Polybius. He was the last organ of Greek sociology, but his qualities were developed under the ascendency of Rome, with which he nobly identified himself, and from which he acquired the universality which is his distinguishing feature. Nevertheless, the second or dictatorial period, furnishing men's minds with views at once more complete and more connected, raised up a still better type—the incomparable Tacitus. He deserves the epithet, notwithstanding that his profound insight is often seriously impaired by his aristocratic prejudices.

Third Dictatorial Phase. Alexander Severus.

I have still to speak of the third century. This opens admirably under the auspices of the young chief who was the last dictator endowed with really eminent moral and intellectual qualities. As regards civil progress, this final phase was simply an extension of the previous one, with a gradual enfeeblement of its theoretic and practical impulse by intestine discord and alarms from abroad. Its sole distinctive feature was a decisive change—indicative of approaching ruin—that occurred in the military preservation of the frontiers. Military expeditions, whether

Defence of frontiers entrusted to barbarians.

offensive or defensive, are no longer a bar to the repeated en croachments of various nomadic tribes, to whose demands th dictators yield in perpetuity vast tracts of land, more an more near the centre of Western civilisation. These concession were always accompanied by the stipulation that the recipient should honestly defend the Empire. But this obligation wa often eluded. We shall see hereafter that such concessions wer among the essential signs of the spontaneous tendency of th Romans towards the political situation which brought about th temporal organisation of the Middle Age.

Germs of Feudalism.

Dictators for the most part men of merit.

The personal character of the dictators, looked at in th aggregate, suggests an important reflection, due to Georg Leroy, on the innate character of the benevolent instincts. For notwithstanding the denunciations of Christian writers, we do no find, during these three centuries, more than a very small pro portion of really odious rulers, though they were placed in a posi tion especially suited to afford free scope to their propensities whatever these might be. The great majority were men o thoroughly estimable character; and this is at once a proof o the innate goodness of the human heart, and of the special tend ency of high responsibilities to bring out the nobler element of our nature.

(*b*) Preparation for Third or Catholic-feudal Transition, pp. 336–351.

Shortness of that Transition.

In accordance with my plan, the last portion of the presen chapter must estimate the decisive movement by which, during the three dictatorial centuries, Western Europe was born along towards the direct achievement of the last of the Transition lying between Theocracy and Sociocracy. Because it is the last its official supremacy must endure until the Normal State i sufficiently prepared; and hence it seems to continue eve now. Such an appearance is delusive; for this was really th shortest of the three Western Transitions. Those which wer accomplished under the Intellectual and the Social forms o Polytheism respectively, lasted, the former thirteen, the latte eleven centuries. Now the period devoted to Monotheism an Defensive Warfare required only nine centuries for its com pletion; for it was wholly worked out by the Catholic-feuda regime of the Middle Age. During the five centuries whic have elapsed since its close, the West has really been a prey t growing anarchy. The maintenance of order has been left t reactionists bent upon an impossible restoration of the las regime. This therefore, though in a state of radical decom

position ever since the thirteenth century, will appear to have lasted until the revolutionary agitation of the West is for ever quieted by the direct advent of Sociocracy.

The last of our Transitions is chiefly characterised by a decisive separation between the temporal and the spiritual power; it should therefore be analysed, from the very outset, into two simultaneous but perfectly distinct transformations, the one spiritual, the other temporal. Both were Social rather than Intellectual; hence both are essentially derived from the civilisation of Rome, whose influence, even as regards the spiritual movement, threw that of Greece into the shade. In studying the common origin of this twofold change, our first attention must be given to the filiation of Catholicism, which long continued to be more sharply marked than that of Feudalism, and so formed the principal link between antiquity and the mediæval period. (a) Spiritual Transformation, pp. 337–350.

The parentage of Catholicism cannot be satisfactorily judged without examining the general purpose of the third Western Transition, looked at as the necessary complement of the two which preceded it, and mainly as the natural outcome of the second one.

The speculative progress made by Greece, and the scheme of incorporation worked out by Rome, were respectively destined to communicate a decisive impulse to our Intellectual and our Active powers. They failed sufficiently to develope our Emotional nature, which is, after all, the sole basis of human unity. This immense defect is most manifest in Intellectual Polytheism, which by its tendency to put contemplation above action led straight to disdain of the affections. Social Polytheism, on the other hand, as it constantly subordinated the speculative to the active powers, approached more nearly to the Normal State. The spontaneously collective character of the activity which it developed, led it even to cultivate, however indirectly, the nobler instincts of man's nature, by giving opportunities for their concerted and continuous exercise. Still, even the second Transition at last showed its need of some preparation specially devoted to the Feelings; the only difference between the two cases being that the Romans were always more disposed to undergo this complementary initiation—which chiefly originated among them—than were the Greeks. Purpose of Third Transition was to develope Feeling.

The need of some such preparation springs, broadly speaking, Necessity for Moral disci-

pline increased by developement of Intellect and Activity.

from a growing sense of the urgency of discipline for the specu lative and practical energies, in proportion as they are mo mature, and consequently more liable to abuse if left witho control. The spontaneous degeneracy of the Greek Intelle has been adequately shown in the foregoing chapter. I tendency to set discourse above thought led to a profound an widespread degradation, mental no less than moral. Althoug Roman Activity was not liable to any abuse of equal gravit I must explain how its natural exhaustion came to develop certain vices, which were likewise sufficient to furnish reason for the Affective Transition.

The indirect moral discipline resulting from Military Activity ceased when this became stationary.

Even had that activity been able to endure for ever, it influence on man's moral nature was not such as would hav dispensed it from having recourse, sooner or later, to the aid some direct culture of Feeling; for of that nothing can eve supply the place. So long as Roman activity was still in cours of developement, the importance of its results, and the difficult of attaining them, absorbed the chief attention of the citizens This could not be adequately devoted to the correspondin affections, the indirect stimulation of which was even hindered b these practical exigencies. But the inherent weakness of th military impulse lies in its transient and partial character. B its greater permanence and universality, industrial life wi finally redeem its provisional inferiority to war as a spontaneou bond of social union. As soon as the martial impulse ha become finally stationary, its moral action would cease, unti the natural course of events substituted defensive for aggressiv war and, during an appropriate interval, Activity agai stimulated Feeling. Such is the inevitable weakness of an system which allows human unity to rest on any but its tr foundation. No sooner do its indirect supports give way, tha it undergoes spontaneous decomposition. This could not occu if Feeling exercised its normal supremacy.

Want of a Universal Morality thus became felt,

During the three centuries of the dictatorship, the com pletion of the conquest of the West led to a gradual weakenin of the civic impulse, which was the mainstay of the moralit whether public or private, of Roman civilisation. At the sam time, the vast accumulation of material wealth disposed th great to yield habitually to the various irregularities fostere by an idle life, freed as it was then from all systematic chec in consequence of the irreparable decline of polytheistic belief

The moral efficacy of these had always been subordinate to their practical utility, and now had entirely disappeared. A vague scepticism, thinly veiled by official hypocrisy, had taken the place of belief in the gods. The demoralisation was much less advanced among the lower orders. Still the national idleness gradually corrupted the bulk of free citizens, whom the rich were commonly obliged to amuse, and even to feed, so as to obtain toleration for their own sloth. The mass of the incorporated populations were thus subjected to a growing oppression from both sections of the ruling people. They came to feel the want of some universal morality which should regulate the speculative and practical forces, whose uncontrolled play was rapidly becoming unbearable.

Which should regenerate every department of practical life.

Spiritual control was needed not only because military civilisation was exhausted, but because industrial life was about to arise. This life alone is capable of indefinite extension and duration; its sole inherent fault being that its spontaneous character is individual rather than collective (p. 48). To prepare for its final transformation, a special Transition was necessary, devoted to a direct culture of Feeling. Positivism could never have undertaken to regenerate labour, if this preparation had not been made in the Middle Age, though unfortunately the work then done has since been much spoilt. All the moral needs relating to practical life, whether of the old or of the new mode, would combine under the Roman dictatorship to prompt men to work out a universal religion. Such an undertaking was premature, and could not but be provisional, its intellectual and social foundations not yet having been laid; but its urgency has been already shown in the preceding chapter. Nothing but the semblance of uniformity which it created could have enabled men to grasp decisively the conception of that principle on which the final synthesis was to be based.

The Affective Transition was destined to continue till two results were achieved;

To gain a precise notion of this general need, we must observe that the transformation of Roman Society, which was to be directed by the moral renovation, was of two kinds. This must be our main guide in determining how long a time was required for the Affective Transition. The Speculative transition lasted long enough to embrace all such positive conceptions as were tolerably compatible with the official supremacy of theological belief; stopping short of those scientific

theories which were too directly in contradiction with t
fictions of the existing synthesis (p. 276). So too the Acti
Transition continued, until all the various populations whi
combined a settled mode of life with the absence of theocrat
organisation were adequately incorporated into the ruling stat
Some equivalent condition of limitation must be assigned
the third Transition, in accordance with the general laws
human progress.

Namely, Domestic Emancipation of Women, and personal emancipation of Slaves.

To do this we need only reflect that the preponderance
peaceful activity, and the advent of the universal religio
demand two prior conditions: the emancipation of women
the domestic sphere, and the personal freedom of the worki
class. These two conditions were as indispensable to the fin
regime as their opposites had been to the provisional ord
Without domestic freedom, the affective sex could not adequate
fulfil its fundamental task in relation to the moral life of t
active and speculative sex. Again, the gradual abolition
slavery in all its forms, was essential for the developement of t
industrial life; for this was the principal preliminary st
towards investing industry with a social character. But wi
the adequate fulfilment of these two correlated conditions, t
third Western Transition would naturally be at an end. F
the Final State, at least in its more general features, is thenc
forward capable of being worked out directly.

Intellectual nature of Third Transition.

Having thus defined the social aim of the Affective Tran
ition, I now proceed to describe its intellectual constitution.

This could only be Monotheistic.

I have already shown (p. 284) that it must necessarily re
in Monotheism, towards which Western Europe, during t
century immediately preceding the dictatorial period, w
being gradually impelled by the spontaneous decay of the c
beliefs. The incorporation had then reached a point at whi
the need of some universal faith was generally felt by t
various populations to whom Polytheism was no more than
symbol of their extinct nationality (p. 286), and an obstacle
the progress of their common civilisation. Social impul
cooperating thus with intellectual tendencies, the Roman wo
was led to the last transformation of the Fictitious Synthes
under which Humanity was destined to accomplish the last
the Transitions lying between Theocracy and Sociocracy. Mo
over, under Monotheism alone could the theological coordi
tion of universal morality, which had become indispensable

Western life, be effected. A plurality of gods could never have allowed of any such provisional organisation, which involved the establishment of direct relations between each individual and omnipotence, with the sole view of ensuring personal salvation.

Idea of Fate assists the condensation of many gods into one.

The state of the Roman world at once necessitated a transformation such as this, and prepared men's minds to receive the corresponding doctrine. Even apart from its intellectual decay, due to the progress of the theoretic evolution, Polytheism was so bound up with the military movement, that it could not but follow in its steady decline. For its reduction to Monotheism, all it wanted was concentration; and this the majority of minds can accomplish more or less adequately for themselves, when their attention is turned that way by moral and social needs. For in every form of Polytheism the place of a central power is naturally taken by Fate, whose attributes modify every one of the departments of divine authority (p. 134). By making such an influence more complete and active, it becomes easy to subordinate the various special gods to this general deity, whose ministers they finally become. For true Monotheism always implies such a subordination rather than strict unity (p. 31).

Secondary influence of the spurious philosophers of Greece.

This spontaneous concentration was seconded by the Greek debaters, who, ever since Socrates and Plato, were vaguely busied in preparing the Monotheistic Transition which they looked on as the final state of human religion. It was not until the state of the Roman world rendered the last transformation of theology opportune that they became of any use; and then only in a secondary way. But, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter (p. 287), it was far from necessary that Greek thought should, during four centuries, have been continually engaged upon a problem so very simple, the solution of which might easily have been deferred until the moment when it was required. The intellectual inferiority and moral inadequacy of these pretended philosophers can alone explain their tendency to take possession of the doctrines of divine unity and a future life, as though they had originated instead of merely developing them. Had those schools never arisen at all, the reason of the general public would have spontaneously accomplished the transformation which they hastened; and the initiatory stage would then have shown clearer traces of the special elaboration

which was rather hindered than helped by their desultory and incoherent efforts (p. 361).

The rise of Monotheism under a hostile regime was the starting-point of the separation between the Spiritual and Temporal powers.

Not only did the state of the Roman world from the outset of the dictatorial period, render the final reduction of Polytheism to Monotheism a necessary step; it also determined the mode of organisation and propagation best suited to the social purpose of the new faith. For in obliging Monotheism to grow up under the empire of Polytheism, it set up at the very outset, and for the first time in history, the separation between the spiritual and the temporal powers; a separation, I may add, which was only maintained during the Middle Age by a similar situation, namely, by the pressure of outward circumstances upon a theology ever aiming at Theocracy. Reduced in this way, during three centuries, to a consultative office, the new priesthood could not assume command even after its doctrine had become legally supreme. The civilisation of Rome had so effectually subordinated speculation to action, that the new priesthood found even the most orthodox among the temporal rulers more disposed to absorb the spiritual authority than to resign the reins of temporal government into its hands.

Restriction to the spiritual domain exalted religion;

This continued antagonism, the sole basis of the separation which naturally grew up during the Middle Age between the functions of counsel and command, was also the chief source of the real superiority of Western Monotheism. To it was due the essentially affective character of the third Transition. The wisdom of Theocracy was well aware that human actions are invariably determined by corresponding feelings (p. 311). But the power wielded by the priestly caste tempted it to assume the immediate control of the former, and to neglect the special culture of the latter. This tendency is so inherent in theocratic institutions—quite apart from polytheistic belief—that we find its leading features reproduced in the Hebrew theocracy, notwithstanding its exceptional Monotheism.

Compelling it to address itself to wills rather than deeds.

No power whatever, especially if it be theological, cares to modify the will unless it finds itself powerless to control action (p. 379). Now this was the inevitable position of the monotheistic priesthood, which arose under the Roman dominion; and thus spite of the absolute nature of its doctrine, it was driven to assume the true attitude of a spiritual power, of which the genuine philosophers of Greece had long been giving an example (pp. 281, 283). Thus there grew up that admirable organisation which

throughout the Middle Age, investigated profoundly, though without scientific method, the whole range of human Feelings.

All Monotheisms need a Revelation; Catholicism needed also an Incarnation,

We are now in a position to understand the nature of the dogma by which Western Monotheism was to be adapted for its moral and social office. Though it had arisen out of the discussions which shattered Polytheism, its philosophical incoherence rendered it incapable of resisting similar attacks upon itself. Hence it required, to begin with, a supernatural revelation. But the need of a revelation is common to all forms of Monotheism, and is only ignored by the vain Deism of our modern anarchy. Something more is wanted to define the attempt then made by the West to found the universal religion without any further preparation, under the name of Catholicism, the only name which adequately expresses its significance. This form of Monotheism, justly termed Roman, is chiefly distinguished from its fellows by its consecrating the broad division of human power into Spiritual and Temporal. The character therefore of its doctrine might be expected to correspond to this distinctive attribute, and to institute such a form of revelation as should be best fitted to ensure the independence of the priesthood. It was no longer enough that communications from above, meant to serve as the groundwork of a belief beyond the reach of discussion, should be transmitted through a spokesman specially entrusted with the function of imparting them to the body of the faithful. Such communications had now to be direct; they had to be made by means of an incarnation of the deity, sufficiently prolonged to enable the main foundations of the doctrine, the worship, and even the life, to be laid by the personal authority of the divine author.

In order to obtain respect for Spiritual power.

It would be out of place to say more at present about this necessary condition, which will be more fully explained in the ensuing chapter, where its connection with the chief articles of the Catholic creed will be shown. But it was necessary to point out here how Western Monotheism, rising under a government profoundly hostile to it, was able to secure from that government respectful treatment for its priesthood, by placing it under a divine head instead of representing it as the creation of a mere prophet. The priestly dignity was thus raised to quite a theocratic level; and the result attained would even have overshot the mark, had not the tendencies of the doctrine been always limited by the situation. Throughout the whole

of the Monotheistic Transition, the priesthood repeatedly made the government feel the impropriety of imposing human commands on men who were under the immediate direction of the divine will. But the situation always proved so thoroughly antagonistic to any usurpation on the part of the spiritual power, that its conflict with the temporal authority never did more than protect its own reasonable independence, and hardly even that. These brief hints are enough to indicate the perpetual antagonism, which was the keynote of Western history during the Middle Age.

Two accessory influences aided the rise of Catholicism.

The spontaneous fulfilment of the special conditions necessary for the rise of Catholicism amid the existing conditions of the Roman world was aided by two influences, one collective, the other individual. They are both worthy of mention.

First accessory influence: Jewish antecedents.

The source of the former was pointed out in the Third Chapter, where I adverted to the exceptionally monotheistic character of the Jewish theocracy (p. 202). This did not form a part of the Empire till the close of the military period; but it had been familiar to the Greeks ever since the foundation of Alexandria. The common aspirations of the West after universal Monotheism naturally, among the Jews, took the form of a complete extension of their nationality, which had always been singularly isolated by its peculiar creed, and had long waited for the unconditional triumph announced by its prophets and now, as it seemed, coming to pass. Jewish enthusiasm was better suited than Greek philosophy to promote the establishment of Western Monotheism. The latter was enabled to link its own revelation to the Mosaic, which rested on a majestic basis of historic memories, and the sanction of Scriptures already regarded as divine.

Catholicism reaped two advantages from this connection; it was able to elude discussions as to the source of its authority, and it was spared the trouble of working out an independent concentration of Polytheism; that task having already been accomplished by the Jews. The Hebrew Scriptures will always furnish the philosophic historian with the best materials for studying the transformation of gods into angels; because the latter, in their new position of ministers, retain an importance showing what their rank had once been. There is yet a third advantage to be mentioned. The elaboration of the Catholic ritual was facilitated by its connection with Judaism. Its chief

festivals were borrowed from Mosaism, as well as the institution of the week. The latter, it is true, sprang up spontaneously everywhere (p. 108); but it was nowhere truly complete, except in Judæa. Moreover, the whole course of Jewish history was a preparation for the monotheistic separation between the spiritual and temporal powers; dating from the time when the warrior class obtained a decided supremacy over the priesthood, that is to say, about six centuries after the foundation of that exceptional theocracy. For in the prophets who arose under the kingly power, the Catholic priesthood found a theoretic type on which it could model its attitude more closely than on the pattern furnished by the Greek philosophers; though in these latter the normal features of the true priesthood were better prefigured.

Jewish nation, like Greek, sacrificed for the good of Humanity.

These remarks suggest a historic parallel between the Jewish and the Greek nationalities. It was fated that both should be sacrificed to the fundamental evolution of Humanity; the former by its premature adoption of Monotheism, the latter by its exaggerated devotion to the Intellect. The precocious Monotheism of the Jews caused various moral and intellectual irregularities which may still be traced in the members of that exceptional body. But the degeneracy of the Jews was really less profound, and therefore more easily remedied, than the degradation of Greece. On the other hand, the latter did more service to Humanity; it will always be associated with our scientific developement; while the former only modified a special Transition, which might have been accomplished otherwise. Nevertheless, Catholicism owes a debt of gratitude to Judaism which it has never paid; Positivism alone can discharge it, as the systematic organ of the gratitude of the Great Being to all her servants collective as well as individual.

Second accessory influence: St. Paul, the real founder of Catholicism.

The service rendered by this nationality to the Monotheistic Transition, is nobly personified in its true founder. His public mission was fitly crowned by his personal abnegation. The tendency of the Positive spirit to unmask sooner or later all the frauds of history has already been exemplified in the last chapter by the rehabilitation of Hipparchus, whose fame had been eclipsed during fifteen centuries by that of a clever usurper. I must here furnish a still more decided instance of this normal aptitude by tracing Western Monotheism, wrongly termed *Christianity*, to its real source.

It will not appear surprising to any intelligent thinker that this error should have maintained its ground so long, when he reflects that there were neither principles nor organs for its correction, and that the religion is one which has always been admired or cursed, never judged. My readers are already aware[1] that I regard the incomparable St. Paul as the real founder of Catholicism; so that here I need only point out the preeminent value of the services he rendered, and explain the sublime devotion which led him to attribute them to another.

Preeminence of his services; he sketched all the principal doctrines.

Though he wrote nothing but letters, these are enough to prove decisively that he alone among his contemporaries grasped the doctrine as a whole. But neither then nor at any other time has it borne being *treated of* as a whole; for it was seen to abound in contradictions whenever its inherent intellectual weakness was not corrected by its social purpose. All the essential conceptions of Catholicism, whether as regards the doctrine, the worship, or the life, are distinctly, though not systematically, laid down in these little treatises. Their merits contrast forcibly with the moral and intellectual vagueness of the more highly venerated books among which they are placed. I need only particularise his theory of man's nature, in which the human problem is at last directly propounded in terms of a permanent antagonism between Nature and Grace,—a contrast which Positivism expresses as a continuous struggle between Egoism and Altruism.

His reason for putting forward Christ as founder.

To explain the self-abnegation of St. Paul it is only necessary to expand the principle already enunciated—that for the construction of Western Monotheism a divine revealer was specially required, in order to secure the adequate separation of the spiritual from the temporal power.

This necessary condition seems to imply in the founder of the new religion a mixture of hypocrisy and fascination, which must always remain incompatible with true greatness, whether of the Heart or the Intellect. From this difficulty there was only one issue—that the true author should voluntarily subordinate himself to one of the many adventurers who would at that time be constantly making efforts to inaugurate Monotheism, aspiring, like their Greek forerunners, to the honours of personal apotheosis. St. Paul was soon led to single out from

[1] 'Positivist Catechism,' p. 400 of Dr. Congreve's translation.

among this army of prophets the one who sustained such a character most perfectly.

Of Hebrew origin, but educated under Greek influences, and already a Roman citizen, St. Paul began by feeling contempt for a man of this type. But in meditating on the establishment of Monotheism, he soon perceived the useful purpose to which this dawning success might be turned. St. Paul was thus saved from the necessity of any personal degradation, and enabled freely to develope his real mission. The progress of the movement soon furnished evidence of the value of the solution he had found, and filled him with a deep and real veneration for a type henceforward to remain ideal.

Hostility of best Romans to Catholicism during first three centuries natural and excusable.

My explanation of the origin of Western Monotheism would be imperfect without some attempt to solve the historic paradox of the fatal antipathy felt towards the movement by all the noblest representatives, whether speculative or practical, of Roman sociability. For this aversion became the chief source of the exceptional obstacles which beset the rise of the Catholic Transition, although the dictatorial situation as a whole had spontaneously prepared the way for it. There is no instance better fitted to impress us with the importance of never judging any moral and social doctrine without taking surrounding circumstances into account (p. 84).

We might have anticipated that the Romans, accustomed as they were, ever since the establishment of the dictatorship, to regard their own evolution as a necessary step towards the final organisation of Humanity, would have found it easy to grasp the meaning of the new Transition, and to see that it was the natural continuation of that which went before it. But they had no historical theory to guide them; hence the normal order of things seemed to them to be at hand. The Christians fell into the same error, although their notion of the normal order was a different one. Accordingly, so far from recognising the necessary character of the Monotheistic Transition, Roman thinkers viewed it as directly hostile to the general destiny of the race. Their error was lamentably great, but it was unavoidable. It was due to the intellectual and moral defects of the new doctrine; and no one could at that time calculate the degree in which these would be subsequently neutralised by the situation of Western Europe. Tacitus and Trajan may well be excused for having looked on the rising faith as the

enemy of the human race; for they could not foresee that it would be modified by the Social Environment in a way which is even now misunderstood by all except advanced thinkers (p. 384).

For the *doctrine* was directly injurious to all parts of our nature;

Looked at in the abstract, without reference to the social sphere in which they were applied, the doctrines of Catholicism must needs have been intensely repugnant to thinkers and statesmen, whose intellects were on the very threshold of the positive stage, while their hearts had been already stirred by anticipations of the reign of Humanity. For these doctrines are inevitably opposed to the continuous progress of Feeling, Intellect, and Activity; as will be shown when they come to be directly estimated in the next chapter. This threefold antagonism is common to all forms of Monotheism; but it was exceptionally prominent under Catholicism, which laid most stress on the prospect of eternal salvation of the individual whereas among the Romans, and even among the Jews, that incentive had always been secondary to motives of a purely human order.

The immediate effect of putting personal salvation in the foremost place, was to create an unparalleled selfishness; a selfishness rendering all social influences nugatory, and thus tending to dissolve public life, to which practical wisdom rightly looked for the broad regulation of real existence. Hostile as it thus was to Solidarity, the new faith conflicted even more directly with Continuity. For it taught its votaries to condemn the whole of their historic antecedents, especially those connected with Rome. It was as unfavourable to Intellect as it was to Feeling; in consequence of its tendency to bury speculation under the stupid uniformity which the consolidation of divine agencies gives to all theological explanation of phenomena, thus making them more absolute (p. 144). The optimism, which was a necessary corollary of these views, was equally incompatible with any developement of Industry, while a vague sense of fraternity tended to condemn all Warlike activity. These various defects, which I cannot now discuss in detail, have become only too apparent since the state of Western civilisation has outgrown this transitory form of belief. And yet its official supremacy must continue until the direct rise of the Final Religion.

While the *discipline* which it

The above criticism is accurate so far as it goes. But the next chapter will show that the doctrines of Christianity, whe

subjected to the pressure of a suitable Social Environment and applied by a priesthood worthy of its office, did really exert an influence as salutary as it might, on *à priori* grounds, have been expected to be disastrous. The exceptional preoccupation of men's minds with their eternal salvation confirmed the separation between the temporal and spiritual powers, by appropriating to the priests a domain exclusively their own, and one which, in virtue of its supremacy, gave them the means of continually intervening in the concerns of all believers. To check self-interest of a real and mundane kind, Catholic discipline called in the aid of an imaginary interest (p. 378). In doing this it seconded the spontaneous energy of the sympathetic instincts, although the Christian creed denied their very existence. But none of these compensations could have been foreseen by Roman statesmen, who could not but be shocked by the antisocial tone of the new opinions.

made possible was not then appreciable.

They are further reproached with having been blind to the moral perfection supposed to have been exhibited by certain representatives of these opinions. It is easy to explain their attitude, at all events towards the personage for whom this claim is principally set up. The forgiveness of injuries had been largely practised, especially by Alexander and by Cæsar, before the Christians claimed this virtue as exclusively their own; a claim they themselves solemnly belied in the case of their divine model, when they proscribed the whole Jewish nation for ever to avenge the death of a single victim. Again, men who had been used for centuries to admire the real devotion of Curtius or of Decius, could not but feel contempt for the childish fiction of a self-sacrifice, which consisted in submitting to death with the certainty of resurrection on the third day.

Moreover, Christ himself was not an extraordinary type of moral perfection.

Such was the inevitable impression produced on Roman polytheists by the Monotheistic Transition at its first appearance; and it quite accounts for their obstinate hostility. The personal difficulties which thus stood in the way of the pioneers of the new faith were easily overcome by the heroic perseverance of men who felt themselves charged with the moral future of the human race, as the Greeks had previously been with its intellectual destinies.

This hostility, however, did not prove a serious obstacle to spread of Catholicism.

But nascent Catholicism had to contend against impedi-

Pernicious alliance of Greek meta-

physicians a greater embarrassment.

disengaging itself. I allude to the sham philosophy to which our learned men unscientifically attribute its intellectual preparation (p. 284). As a fact, its chief adversaries were furnished by Greek culture which surrounded it, with a swarm of sophists and rhetoricians even more dangerous in their friendship than they were in their enmity. This was the chief source of the many subtle heresies, among which the social impulses derived from Roman civilisation had to make their way. Throughout its whole career, Catholicism had to contend against these metaphysical tendencies, which ultimately wrought its dissolution when it ceased to be in adequate harmony with the situation of Western Europe. A heavy price was thus paid for the secondary cooperation of the Greek intellect, with which the third Transition might have always dispensed, as it did at first; and this notwithstanding the eminent worth of several exceptional types, though even these were the worse for their origin.

Origen, Athanasius, Chrysostom, &c.

(β) Temporal Transformation.

I have yet to speak of the new organisation of the West in its temporal aspect, so as to complete my general view of its connection with the main current of Roman civilisation. This second division of the subject may here be treated more briefly than the first; for the political filiation, though less consciously felt, is really more easy to be traced if we put ourselves at the right point of view, than the continuity of speculative thought. It will be for the next chapter to reduce to its right proportions the exaggerated influence ascribed, in reference to the present matter, to the invasions of nomadic tribes; invasions, be it also observed, which were not at all fortuitous.

Influence of barbarian element comparatively small.

Substitution of Defence for Conquest.

From whatever side we approach the temporal organisation of mediæval Europe, we cannot but recognise that it was the natural outcome of the growing changes which affected the social system of Rome during the three centuries of the dictatorship. Its leading feature—the substitution of defensive for aggressive warfare—was incontestably due to the fact that the scheme of conquest had reached its normal limits. From the same source were to proceed the two other general tendencies which essentially distinguish the Feudal from the Roman order.

Whence resulted substitution of Serfage for Slavery, and rise of the Small State system.

In the first place, ancient slavery was necessarily reduced to serfage, strictly so called, in proportion as the military movement waned before the advance of industry. The historical theory of this decisive change is indicated in the judicious

remark of Gibbon[1] on the spontaneous restriction of the slave-trade to the interior of the Empire, after conquest had reached its natural limits. Such a tendency as this could not but lead to the attachment of the enslaved families to the soil, and their removal was thus rendered less arbitrary. Again, the decomposition of the West into a number of independent States, growing progressively smaller, was another necessary consequence of the gradual predominance of defensive over aggressive warfare. The political situation of Rome was already inclining so strongly in this direction, that the dispersive tendency may even be traced in the Byzantine Empire, notwithstanding its recent concentration. It would be easy to extend a similar view to the less striking differences between Feudal and Roman civilisation. But a special inquiry into their political filiation belongs properly to the next chapter; my present object being merely to point out its general outlines.

Final estimate of Progressive Polytheism in both its branches.

My abstract survey of Social Polytheism, which took up the earlier part of the present chapter, was followed by a survey of its concrete results; and this has now been completed by an adequate explanation of its tendency to issue finally in Defensive Monotheism. The historical connection of these two stages of human developement is peculiarly important to us at the present day; for it is the direct link between ancient and modern times. Henceforward it ought to be considered as established; moreover, the sequel of this volume will set at rest whatever uncertainty might still remain upon the subject. In conclusion, I shall briefly recapitulate my view of Progressive Polytheism as a whole. My complete judgment of it had to be reserved till after its constituent factors had been independently examined, as was pointed out in the closing words of the preceding chapter.

The office of Progressive Polytheism in the grand human evolution was briefly this: to guide the Western world through its principal Transition from Theocracy to Sociocracy. In order to accomplish this task, it was necessary to divide it into two successive operations, the one intellectual, the other social; and Progressive Polytheism had to adapt itself spontaneously to the respective exigencies of each case. Hence there arose the

[1] 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,' chap. ii.

two essential forms of Military Polytheism, the one in Greec the other at Rome. The former guided the intellectual mov ment, esthetic in its beginnings, and finally theoretic, whi was to prepare the Speculative basis of the Normal State. Th function was performed by a decisive developement of abstra thought, which had been incompatible with Theocracy. Aft the foundations of this first movement had been securely lai the second led the way directly towards the Final constitutio of society by irrevocably subordinating Intellect to Activit This it did by adequately developing the only form of civ life then possible, and so giving a higher character to th Veneration already cultivated by Theocracy. Man's spec lative and active faculties having thus been *drawn out*, th Western Initiation had to be completed by an attempt *regulate* their spontaneous exercise during a third Transitio specially devoted to Feeling, as the other two had been Intellect and Activity respectively. This Affective Transitio which will be discussed in the next chapter, was necessarily closer connection with the Active than with the Speculati phase. The latter, indeed, was rather a hindrance to it tha a help, and did not find room for usefulness till the close the Middle Age. Then the inevitable exhaustion of Defensi Monotheism brought once more into the foremost place th question of intellectual regeneration, which had long been ke out of sight by social exigencies.

CHAPTER VI.

POSITIVE THEORY OF THE CATHOLIC-FEUDAL TRANSITION, OR GENERAL ACCOUNT OF DEFENSIVE MONOTHEISM.

Prefatory Remarks, pp. 353–359.

The distinguishing feature of mediæval civilisation was the twofold nature of the aim in view, and the combination of two heterogeneous elements for its attainment. In the two previous Transitions our intellectual and our active powers had been largely developed. The necessity for controlling them now became paramount, and the establishment of such control formed the *general* object of the succeeding period: a period consecrated to the great motor force of human life, Feeling. But another and a more *special* advance towards the final state was also effected. It set women free within the family, and it gave personal independence to the working class. This special result was at once a symptom of the larger movement, and a means of furthering it. It showed that some organisation of life had really been effected, and it was the best guarantee for its efficiency. In the pursuit of these objects the two elements of this third historical phase spontaneously concurred—Catholicism contributing, however, more largely to the general object, Feudalism more to the special.

(1) Point of view from which Affective Transition should be regarded.

Catholicism and Feudalism: their *general* purpose to systematise life; their *special* purpose to emancipate women and labourers.

Comparing these two simultaneous movements, we see that the circumstances of the time and the doctrine employed rendered a satisfactory issue impossible, except in the second instance. The first object failed for two reasons. The forces which it was sought to control had not yet assumed their true character; moreover the accepted creed was both intellectually and morally insufficient for the task. What was essentially required was to control the two great constituents of the Final State, that is to say, Positive thought and Industrial activity; and yet neither of them at that time had become sufficiently prominent. Moreover the Catholic dogma, holding as it did no relation to public life, was obviously incapable of organising

Special purpose (chiefly connected with Feudalism) realised: *general* purpose (chiefly connected with Catholicism) fails.

it. Yet, inevitable as the failure was, the mediæval attempt systematise man's life will remain for ever admirable. T aim was true; and though it was missed, yet the conditions attaining it were indicated; and thus the plan requisite the true regeneration of society was unmistakably mark out. I shall even show that, under most important aspec especially those of social life, Feudal Catholicism inaugurat the normal state of society, so far as the doctrine and t environment rendered it possible to do so.

Catholicism could only direct the Transition.

To judge Western Monotheism fairly, it is necessary bear in mind that its mission was simply that of directing t moral or affective phase of progress. When its adherer blindly and persistently put it forward as the permane organisation of society, its incompetence becomes obvio And, as this empirical mode of regarding it is a bar to t formation of any just judgment, it is desirable to show d tinctly the radical incapacity of theological doctrine for a true coordination of human affairs.

As Theologism grew more systematic, its incapacity for Synthesis became clearer.

The essential value of the Fictitious Synthesis, as the wh of this volume will have shown, lay in its perfect spontaneo ness (p. 98). But it is only the primitive stage of Fetichism th can be called spontaneous in the strict sense of the word. brought out in the simplest way the two aspects, subjecti and objective, of all true systematisation, the subordination Man to the External World, and the predominance of Feeli over Thought. No construction was possible till long aft wards, and none was attempted. Theological belief, on t contrary, as seen in its most characteristic phase, Theocra was essentially systematic. And in its more concentrated for Monotheism, this tendency was of course developed to the fu But the result was simply to show the total incapacity of t method based upon Causes to effect the coordination destin ultimately for the method of Laws.

Results of all three Transitions due to *situation* rather than to corresponding *doctrine*.

The incapacity of theology in this respect is a necessa consequence of its fictitious nature. To systematise partia being impossible (p. 254), Positivism alone can construct a t Synthesis, because it alone covers the complete circle of fa A doctrine inapplicable to any one of the three essential pa of human nature is *ipso facto* incapable of systematising rest. Now of the three successive phases of the Absol Philosophy, Fetichism alone kept emotional life directly

iew. Polytheism was more favourable to the intellectual and ractical sides of our nature. But this was due far more to ie instinctive efforts of its founders than to the character of ie doctrine itself; and it was, moreover, effected at the sacri-ce of Feeling. Monotheism, it is true, seemed in the West restore the Heart to its proper position. But this was the sult of external influences; for in the East, where the situa-on was different, we find Monotheism sanctioning the warlike fe. Neither of these results had any relation to the doctrine question. They are simple consequences of the Social Envi-nment, which in the one case tended to encourage, in the other obliterate, the distinction between the temporal and the iritual power.

Monotheism, though always in collision with Intellect, was vourable alternately to Feeling and to Activity, as the varying ternal influences might determine; though it had no direct otitude in this respect comparable to that of Fetichism in the ie case, or Polytheism in the other. Now, as we know, through is indirect channel great results were attained even in the main of Intellect, so long as the priesthood of Western Europe mained worthy of its mission. This concentrated form of theo-gy makes its feebleness in construction singularly apparent; nce just where the motive for coordinating is strongest, it pears unable to reconcile its own self-contradictions. Feti-ism is the only consistent phase of Absolute Religion, because takes its stand upon emotion solely, and wholly disregards any asoning process; whereas theology, and monotheistic theology pecially, gave a strong stimulus to argument. None but the elative Religion animated by the Positive Spirit can stand the st of rigorous examination; a test which, far from encouraging epticism, leads to permanent and systematic construction.

The most that can be said for the Monotheistic doctrine is that it lent itself to the situation.

But if we seek in Monotheism for that only which it was ally capable of effecting—the guidance of the last Western ansition—we shall find that its allotted task was well per-rmed. This successful result must not, indeed, be ascribed the monotheistic doctrine, but to the wisdom of the priest-od and the influence of the situation naturally and concur-ntly reacting upon it (p. 349). Still it was necessary that e doctrine should be not incompatible with such reaction; a ndition satisfied by the elastic character of all fictitious faith. nd the persistence of such elasticity even in Monotheism was

but too clearly shown by the abundant growth of heresy within its borders.

(2) General purpose of Affective Transition more precisely determined.

With these few remarks upon the proper point of view from which the study of the Affective Transition should be approached, I now proceed to the more distinct consideration of the general purpose aimed at, availing myself of the principles laid down in the third chapter (p. 156, &c.).

It had an Intellectual office and a Moral office, both in harmony with its special form of Activity.

I there stated that, in addition to the moral results proposed in this Final Transition, there was also an intellectual purpose and one equally accordant with the temporary mode of activity which this phase was to stimulate. I must now explain the mutual adjustment of these two aims, which at first sight seem hardly reconcilable. It is a point important to clear up whether we look at this Transition from the abstract or the concrete side; for on it depends our comprehension of the intimate connection between Catholicism and Feudalism, which never ought to be regarded separately.

Intellectual and Moral offices converged to a social end: Discipline.

When speaking of the part which each of the three phases of Absolute Religion had taken in the Human Initiation looked at as a whole, I observed that Fetichism gave the great stimulus to our emotional, Polytheism to our practical, Monotheism to our intellectual powers (p. 158). But in considering more specially the course followed in our *moral* developement I pointed out that Monotheism was directed principally towards the culture of Benevolence; Fetichism and Polytheism having educated the instincts of Attachment and Veneration (p. 157). It does not seem at first sight clear what there is in common between these two points of view. It is this. The two Polytheistic Transitions had evolved the forces of man's nature. To Monotheism fell the task of attempting to control them.

Connection of Intellectual office with Discipline.

To make my meaning clearer, I may contrast the discipline attempted by Monotheism with that instituted under Theocratic systems. The difference lies in the fact that Theocracy controlled forces that were as yet insufficiently developed. Monotheism undertook the task when their growth was far advanced. The consequence was that, whereas the former succeeded, the latter failed. But the failure of the mediæval attempt should never hinder us from acknowledging the loftier nature of its aim. For the first time in history the great problem of human nature, destined ultimately to be solved by Positivism, was approached with a full conception

its arduousness. Theocratic discipline attained its object because all it attempted was the consolidation of Order: Progress being left untouched. Monotheism, on the other hand, failed, precisely because, following on the recent stimulus given to intellectual and to active life, it endeavoured to satisfy the opposed conditions of reformation and conservation, which Positivism alone can reconcile. Hence Theocracy was able for a time to maintain itself empirically, through the power *spontaneously* acquired by the theocratic caste. But the discipline at which Monotheism aimed was complete and *systematic*, although the doctrine on which it was founded was inadequate.

And thus it came about that Monotheism especially in Western Europe stimulated intellectual life from the very fact of having to deal with the most comprehensive and arduous of all problems, that to which every other is ultimately subordinate. To solve the problem was no doubt impossible: but the mere endeavour to solve it was fertile in results, intellectual as well as moral. And the training imparted was of the greater value that it reached every class in society, owing to the spontaneous division between the temporal and the spiritual power. The priesthood having no longer the compulsory power possessed by the old theocracies, its authority resting almost entirely on the unforced assent of its adherents, it had the strongest motive for rendering every one capable of comprehending the doctrine. The mental training which resulted differed profoundly from that which was elicited in Greek civilisation. The latter was limited to a few select minds. It laid down the theoretic basis on which the final state of society must rest; but the general body of the people was of course unconcerned, except in the esthetic productions by which the scientific movement was accompanied (p. 226). Consequently the Greek movement, being a preparation for a future far distant, inevitably ended in degrading the population in the midst of which it took place. The Catholic movement, on the contrary, being an attempt at a consistent system of morals, provoked a spirit of rational discussion amongst every class of Western society.

Connection of Moral office with Discipline.

Looking now at the moral aspect of mediæval history, we shall find the foregoing tendencies resulting in a special impulse to the instinct of universal Benevolence. The first sources of

this were the aspirations to spiritual universality from which Catholic doctrine derived its name. But it was afterwards aided by the restraining influence exercised by Catholicism on the higher classes, who had hitherto never acknowledged any compulsory obligation (p. 198). The task set before Monotheism being to regulate human forces, its efforts were concentrated on the more prominent agents, until it fell into decline and the sphere of its operation was limited to the lower ranks. But, during the time when the control of the governing classes was the main consideration, a special impulse was given to Benevolence, properly so called, distinguished from other social instincts, by affecting our conduct towards all who are subordinate to us. Hitherto this highest of all the instincts had never been stimulated except in such indirect ways as the circumstances of the time might have suggested (p. 313). For the first time, under Monotheism, it was held up as a normal obligation, specially binding on all who held positions of authority.

Connection of both offices with Defensive War.

Thus it was that the moral and the intellectual operations of the third Transition, which at first sight seemed divergent, are perfectly harmonious, because concentrated on a common social purpose. This object gave, on the one hand, an intellectual stimulus to the whole Western population, while at the same time rousing and sustaining the benevolent sympathies of its leaders. Such a result could not, it is true, be fully realised in any but the Final State of society. But it was helped forward by the character which public life assumed in the Middle Age. The substitution of defensive for aggressive war, though incompatible with the full developement of industrial activity, yet rendered military activity intermittent. Governmental action, becoming discontinuous, was made more amenable to discussion (p. 53), more dependent upon voluntary adhesion, and therefore more susceptible of moral influences. We come back thus to the twofold source from which the moral and intellectual character of the Middle Age has issued: the separation of the temporal from the spiritual power, and the preponderance of defensive over aggressive warfare. To these it was due that a doctrine, the direct tendency of which was anti-social and hostile to free inquiry—as many instances have shown where it has not been accompanied by a compensating *system*—had for several centuries the effect of

diffusing intellectual life, and of stimulating the noblest of our sympathies.

Having thus defined the general signification, and cleared up the seeming incoherencies of this period, I now proceed to its more detailed consideration; dealing first, as in previous cases, with the abstract, secondly with the concrete aspect; or, in other words, first with the characteristic features, secondly with the results attained. The distinction is in the present case exceptionally definite, owing to the constant opposition between the spiritual and temporal elements, a contrast less striking in the older and less unstable phases of Western Society. And though both elements must be kept in view throughout, it is still true that in our abstract estimate we shall dwell more upon Catholic thought; in our concrete estimate, upon Feudal action. So shifting and transitory was this latter, that I shall be obliged to consider separately the three phases of which the Middle Age consists, and to apportion the results specially due to each.

Abstract treatment will relate chiefly to Catholicism; Concrete chiefly to Feudalism.

Beginning then with the abstract point of view, and following the course adopted in previous chapters, we may consider first the Philosophical and Scientific features of the period, secondly its bearing on Art and Industry, and finally its Moral and Political aspects. It will be well, however, to begin by examining more closely the attributes common to all forms of Monotheistic belief. Its seeming want of pliancy is apt to prevent us from recognising how complex and many-sided its influence really was, and how fully it was capable, under suitable circumstances and in the hands of a properly qualified priesthood, of conciliating, and ultimately of incorporating the various tendencies of the time. Resulting from a condensation of Theologism, it led Western Europe on towards complete emancipation from all supernatural conceptions. That very concentration, which seemed at first sight likely to strengthen them, served only to set their absolute nature in a clearer light. A few remarks upon this point, which is most essential for any clear comprehension of the mediæval period.

ABSTRACT APPRECIATION, pp. 359–390.

(1) Preliminary inquiry into essential nature of Monotheism, pp. 359–364.

In Monotheism, as in Polytheism, two distinct modes of belief existed side by side, the one specially adapted to cultivated minds, the other to the general body of adherents. The former, though it could never become widely popular, yet was ever extending with the growth of knowledge, under the

Monotheism took two forms;

favouring circumstances of the time. Therefore the inevitable mixture of these two modes, which admit of many intermediate degrees, comes to be in this case of more importance than in the case of polytheistic religions.

The one more Intellectual, the other more Social;

The distinction is not quite identical, however, with that which we remarked in Polytheism as dependent on its two modes of evolution from Fetichism: namely, the spontaneous developement of the abstracting faculties, and the systematic institution of Astrolatry (p. 139). It was the spontaneous form of Polytheism, as adopted by military populations, untrammelled by theocratic government, in which Western Monotheism invariably originated. To the systematic Polytheism of the sacerdotal castes we owe only that exceptional form of Monotheism adopted by the Jewish theocracy. Issuing, however, as it always does from the progressive, and not from the conservative phase of Polytheism, Normal Monotheism nevertheless falls naturally into two distinct divisions. The distinction, less marked than that of the two polytheistic modes, corresponds to the subdivision of military Polytheism into its two branches the intellectual and the social.

Corresponding to the Greek and Roman churches.

I have already explained the way in which the philosophical discussions of Greek thinkers and the political action of Roman statesmen combined in preparing the way for Western Monotheism (p. 341). The influence of Rome was undoubtedly of greater moment; but that of Greece had a marked though far from beneficial effect in hastening the advent of Catholicism and even in the formation of its doctrine. From these different sources two kinds of Monotheism sprang up simultaneously, to which we may apply the same epithets as to the two forms of military Polytheism, being in fact their reproduction in a condensed form. For Catholicism took an intellectual or a social direction according as the influence of Greece or of Rome predominated. Indeed we may go back to the two fundamental divisions of Polytheism, and call the first phase of Western Monotheism the systematic, the second the spontaneous phase.

The latter clung to revelation; the former, influenced by the metaphysicians, insisted on reasoning.

By whatever name designated, the essential distinction lies in the different degrees in which each of the two constituent of Monotheistic faith, Reason and Revelation, entered into combination; their adjustment being in every case imperfect and precarious. Revelation was of course the source of any in

fluence, whether intellectual or moral, that such a doctrine could possess (p. 343); and Revelation was the prominent element in the Catholicism of the people, governed as it was by the social impulse due to Roman civilisation. Where faith is not amenable to proof, practical wisdom always suggests the limitation of thought within the conditions which the real purpose of the faith requires; reserving the reasoning faculty for consequences, rather than for principles. But the systematic form of Monotheism, created chiefly by Greek thinkers, is marked by the opposite tendency. Most of the heresies can be traced to this source. Revelation was not indeed excluded, but it was made to rest on Reason. The very existence of God was brought within the scope of argument, and all his essential attributes were determined in like manner. It is striking to notice how different was the attitude of the earliest Catholics towards Jewish Monotheism, according as they were Greek or Roman. The Roman tendency was to accept the connection with Judaism as a check upon error and as a solid foundation for Christian institutions. Whereas by the Greek mind it was accepted with difficulty, as seeming inconsistent with its own competence in matters of faith.

The genuine Greek Philosophy contributed a healthier element.

A more attentive scrutiny of the play of these historical forces will, however, reveal a third element—one to which the word *intellectual* may be applied with greater justice. In speaking of Greek Monotheism I have dealt as yet only with that more diffuse form which originated with Socrates and Plato, when Philosophy had begun to degenerate, and debaters had taken precedence of thinkers. But the succession of the three great schools, described in the fourth chapter (p. 281), had placed Greek philosophy on a firm basis before these fatal signs of decay had appeared. For three centuries there was a noble array of thinkers who in practical wisdom were worthy inheritors of the old theocracies, and who distinctly foreshadowed the sociocratic priesthood of the future. Absorbed as they were, and rightly so, in framing their theories, they all foresaw the intellectual and moral necessity for a Monotheistic phase of progress. To initiate it was not their task; but the greatest of them, Aristotle, moulded the doctrine into the shape which, when the social utility of Monotheism was exhausted, was best calculated to promote the reviving claims of Intellect. He supplied a new conception, calculated to reduce

theology to its narrowest limits: the combination of a Supreme Will with immutable Laws.

Aristotle laid intellectual foundation of Western Monotheism.

Regarded historically, the Monotheism of Aristotle, systematic in the truest sense, was evolved from the analogous form of Polytheism originating, as we have seen, in Astrolatry (p. 139). Astrolatry invariably implies Astrology; and this leads at once to a fusion of the faith in Law with the faith in Will, and to a gradual restriction of this latter (p. 127). The form of Polytheism deduced from Astrolatry never failed under priestly direction to exhibit the same tendency. The incomparable Aristotle, to whom Theocracy had bequeathed its best traditions, gave a systematic form to this concluding phase of supernatural faith. Instinctively he foresaw the intellectual requirements of Western Europe; and the peculiar circumstances of Greek society left him perfectly unfettered. His scheme was this. There was a Supreme Power regarded as a general arranger of the Laws of the Universe, the sole responsibility being thrown on his two ministers, Nature and Fortune; metaphysical abstractions, of which the first represented known Laws, the second the unknown.

His Monotheism has an affinity with that of the Jews,

At the same time there was nothing in this conception incompatible with the belief that there might be intermediate beings concerning themselves with terrestrial and human affairs. It could also adapt itself to any Revelation that might hereafter be called for. Its relation to Astrolatry is shown by the implicit sanction spontaneously given to this mode in the Monotheistic Theocracy (p. 344); a fact only to be explained by community of origin. But this solitary exception, in a nation so peculiar and a polity so artificial, is enough to show that a doctrine of this kind could never become really popular. For, although there was nothing in it to sap the vitality of Monotheism, it was yet too abstract to affect any but cultivated minds, so long at least as Catholicism retained any real power. Nor were the subsequent attempts of Deism to popularise it of much efficacy.

And is substantially adopted by St. Paul.

Yet, restricted though its sphere was, the systematic Monotheism of Aristotle exercised a real and increasing influence over the whole mediæval period. It was adopted in principle by St. Paul, the true founder of Catholicism, who was deeply imbued with the best products of Greek thought, and understood their bearing upon his scheme of social reorganisation.

No one can fail to see the obvious connection between this conception of Aristotle and St. Paul's theory of the antagonism of Nature and Grace. There was, however, a deficiency in the groundwork of the Greek thinker which would have rendered Monotheism unavailable as a moral agency; and this the superstructure of the Roman supplied. In St. Paul's scheme it was only the outer world, vital or physical, that was left under the dominion of Aristotle's metaphysical abstractions: the government of human affections was entrusted exclusively to the Supreme Power. As for the social order, regarded as distinct from the physical and from the moral order, it could not enter into theological systems, absorbed as they were with individual considerations, and incapable of rising to the collective point of view. The sphere of Intellect, the connecting link between the inner and the outer world, was not precisely apportioned during the mediæval period, though there was an increasing tendency to substitute the conception of Heaven for that of God (p. 141), as indicated by the steady growth of Astrology.

Yet, notwithstanding this important difference, the Monotheism of St. Paul was never brought into antagonism with that of Aristotle. For although, owing to the circumstances of his time, the prince of philosophers was more concerned with the intellectual than with the moral conditions of the last preparatory phase, and therefore was not sensible of the deficiency in his scheme, yet room was allowed for supplying it. Under this aspect, as under others already noticed, his doctrine was left in exactly that degree of indetermination which admitted of satisfying at some future time conditions that for the moment could not be kept in view.

The Church found room for both Aristotelian and Pauline modes of Monotheism.

The result therefore at which we arrive is this. Eliminating from consideration the obtrusive but not really important participation of the Greek debaters, we may distinguish in Western Monotheism two essential constituents: the one social, the other intellectual; the one spontaneous, the other systematic; the one adapted to ordinary minds, the other to the cultivated few. And at the same time we find the possibility for wise men, animated with a due sense of practical necessities, of fusing these two elements into one. True, the tendency of the first kind of Monotheism was towards complete Supernaturalism, of the second towards complete Positivism. But both subserved a common social purpose; and this, so long as the

priesthood remained worthy of its mission, was enough to allow of their harmonious adjustment. Supernatural explanations were accepted simply from the lack of scientific knowledge, and while they satisfied a real want, no one thought of rejecting them. The fact is that untrained minds are more anxious than men of learning to substitute, as far as possible, fixed Laws for arbitrary Wills; not merely from the pleasure taken in contemplating them, but for the practical reason that, by permitting prevision, they facilitate action. And at the same time intellectual extravagances, if connected provisionally with moral necessities, commend themselves to systematic thinkers even more forcibly than to ordinary people. Thus it was that every section of Western society was led into the course of which the Affective Transition was the issue. They accepted Monotheism as the instrument of social reorganisation, restricting its intellectual scope to the domain of undiscovered laws, a domain constantly decreasing with the growth of knowledge.

The true type of Catholicism involves therefore a fusion of the intellectual Monotheism of Aristotle with the social Monotheism of St. Paul; these being condensations respectively of spontaneous Polytheism, as based upon Abstract Contemplation, and of systematic Polytheism, derived from Astrolatry (p. 139). In the hands of a wise priesthood the combination of these two aspects was found adequate for the requirements, which were already beginning to conflict, of the Heart and the Intellect, by bringing reason and revelation alternately into prominence. From this leading thought, which will be found to underlie the whole chapter, I pass naturally to the consideration of Western Monotheism as a philosophical system.

(2) Intellectual Properties, pp. 364–375.

(α) Philosophic Aptitude, pp. 364–370.

Philosophically, as I have said, it owes everything to the wisdom of its priesthood working under the stimulus of a peculiar situation. Note, first, that its fundamental principle was necessarily incoherent. The fictitious nature of Theology, as I have before shown, is a bar to systematisation, since consistency can only exist in such thoughts as are based upon fact.

This was due to Clergy and Situation, not to Doctrine, which was incoherent.

Polytheistic systems had evaded the difficulty by allowing imagination free play and by not attempting rational explanations. Monotheism however could not thus ignore reason; and yet, since the absolute Synthesis rested not upon reason but upon feeling, the concentration which resulted was inevitably self-contradictory. It necessarily invested the Supreme Power

with an attribute inconsistent with his other moral and intellectual endowments, the attribute of omnipotence.

For omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection are irreconcilable.

In a religion of many gods, no one of them could claim to be All-powerful; and imperfections, moral or intellectual, did not interfere with the supernatural character. The attribute of immortality was here the principal distinguishing feature. In other respects Man was the type: a type only so far idealised that the limit of his ordinary faculties was overstepped; a thing easy to men ignorant of natural laws, then conceived of vaguely as Destiny. It was only in power that these creatures of Imagination surpassed ourselves; their greatness, though adequate to the results attributed to them, was yet relative, not absolute. But the conception of a single God involves a type of absolute perfection, complete in each of the three aspects of human nature, affection, thought, and action. Now such a conception unavoidably contradicts itself. Infinite power, on the one hand, and infinite wisdom and goodness, on the other, are qualities that cannot be reconciled. For either this all-powerful being must be inferior to ourselves, morally or intellectually, or else the world which he created must be free from those radical imperfections which, in spite of monotheistic sophistry, have been always but too evident. And even, were this second alternative admissible, there would remain, on the principles laid down in the first volume (i. 331), a yet deeper inconsistency. Man's moral and mental faculties have for their object to subserve practical necessities. But an omnipotent being can have no occasion either for wisdom or for goodness.

Manichæan heresy.

From these contradictions there is no escape except by supposing the material power of this Being neutralised by moral and intellectual weakness. But as this hypothesis at once destroys those moral and social qualities of theological faith which form its principal value, I only mention it to show the impossibility of maintaining so incoherent a belief apart from its special and transient purpose. A confused sense of these inconsistencies gave rise to the Manichæan heresy which, by arresting the concentration of Polytheism at the stage of Dualism, that is, of two divine principles, Good and Evil, did more than any other to retard the progress of Catholicism. But this expedient, though intended to meet intellectual difficulties, was never so satisfactory as the free division of labour under Polytheism; for which, if viewed as a systematic scheme

adequately representing the vast diversity of phenomena, an even larger number of divinities would be found requisite (p. 143). And, while it could not satisfy the intellect, Dualism would have been wholly antagonistic to the social requirements of the time. The coordination of Morals provisionally effected by Monotheism would have been impossible. Manichæism therefore was ultimately rejected by the Western instinct, although it always retained sufficient defenders to enable us to appreciate its injurious moral influence. The absolute point of view from which modern anarchy regards Monotheism was not taken in the Middle Age. Mediæval Catholicism was regarded by contemporaries simply as a means of guiding the West through its last Transition. What the ultimate issue should be men were content to leave uncertain.

Albigenses.

And if we resume in our systematic review the same attitude that our ancestors took spontaneously, we shall see clearly that the philosophical character of Western Monotheism, despite its radical imperfections, was sufficiently in keeping with the provisional purpose which it served.

Three negative influences of Catholic Philosophy. It restricted Miracles.

On the negative side, a philosophic mind can see in it now, what its adherents could hardly appreciate, a very remarkable tendency to undermine theological conceptions to the full extent compatible with the vitality of those that were to be retained. The contrast with Polytheism will render this tendency more evident. Note in the first place the wise restrictions placed by Catholicism on miracles. The very notion of miracle was foreign to Polytheism, because in a world where everything was marvellous, nothing could be miraculous. This alone shows the extent to which, in the elaboration of Western Monotheism, the conception of Aristotle preponderated over that of St. Paul. The belief that the laws of nature are occasionally suspended implies the belief in their existence on ordinary occasions; and this was favoured by the overwhelming pressure of practical necessities, under which Catholicism was introduced and applied. And, independently of their own inclinations, the priesthood, and especially their chief, would feel it necessary to maintain a constant check upon the exercise of miraculous powers which, if allowed free play, would have been a constant source of danger to the government of the Church. To suppress it entirely was beyond their power; bound up as it was with the whole Monotheistic doctrine, which regarded

the fixed order of nature simply as a result of a Superhuman Will. But instinctively miracles were restricted to the domain with which inductive reason is more concerned than deductive —the domain of physical laws. The sphere of human nature was left untouched. No one ventured to emancipate God from the exigencies of Logic.

It restricted new Revelations.

Note in the second place the stringent limitations imposed by Catholicism upon oracles and revelations: a restriction enforced alike on intellectual and on social grounds. These supernatural communications were less difficult to restrain than miracles, because entering less directly into the principle of Monotheism. Their extreme frequency under Polytheism, and even under Judaism, would have been in Catholicism a disturbing element fatal to its true purpose. The oracular power was therefore concentrated in the visible Head of the Church. Recognised as the permanent interpreter of the divine will, he was thus made the supreme judge for Western Europe. Revelations were still occasionally made, but were never allowed to proceed to an extent injurious to the power of the priesthood. They were limited to secondary questions; the original Revelation being upheld as adequate to supply explanations for all ordinary cases.

It restricted Life to *present* and *future*, abolishing *previous* existence and metempsychosis.

A yet further illustration of the true spirit of Catholicism is the restriction of theological existence to the minimum of duration. By making the creation of a soul dependent on the formation of a body, it suppressed a vast series of extravagant fictions relating to the antecedents of each individual existence, which had arisen under Polytheism (p. 180), especially since the Buddhist reformation of Brahminism. The Monotheistic doctrine on this point, especially in the West, fixed men's thoughts more firmly on what was now the basis of the spiritual power, the future life. Had not Roman civilisation prepared the way for this change, the complete erasure of each man's past life might have been a real hindrance to the sense of social filiation. But in the Middle Age it had the reverse effect. It preserved the memory of real events from competition with imaginary fancies.

Positive influences of Catholic Philosophy.

The positive aspects of Catholic Philosophy are less striking than the three negative aspects here indicated. Yet it directly helped the human mind forward towards maturity, and it also hastened the close of its provisional phase. I shall limit

myself to its principal feature, first as to method, secondly as to doctrine.

As to Method, it developed Logic of Signs.

First, then, it completed the preparatory framework of logical procedure, by developing the last of its three elements. The first step had been taken spontaneously by Fetichism, where the reasoning process was subjected to the constant sway of Feeling (p. 99). Thoughts were linked together by the affections which gave rise to them. But this mode of association, though strictly in accordance with the general arrangement of the cerebral organs, whether in man or other animals, must always be too vague, and can never be sufficiently within our own control, to satisfy the requisite conditions, either of inductive or of deductive reasoning. Polytheism therefore introduced a second and more available instrument, the use of Images (p. 142), which formed so striking a part of its system, and which under Fetichism had been too limited. Images act as intermediaries between feelings and ideas, bearing an equal relation to both, so that the combination which results is more definite, though attained by a less direct process. Still, even images are not always available; and this is one reason why the logic of animals, limited as it is to the use of this instrument, is essentially inferior to our own. In man the reasoning powers are intrinsically superior; but their further developement is largely due to the employment of artificial Signs, which complete the connection of images with thoughts, and also with feelings; and which facilitate the meditative process, especially when abstraction is needed.

The value of signs depends on their being completely under control, so that the relations instituted by them are precise, though at the risk of indirectness and uncertainty. We can well understand the empirical exaggeration of their value, which, till the rise of Positivism, led to the belief that signs were the sole material of Logic (ii. 202); whereas their function is simply a more perfect association of the two previous elements, which are possessed by animals equally with ourselves, but which in them are disconnected from signs. Their importance, however, though unreasonably exaggerated by metaphysical conceit, is nevertheless very great; and it is one source of the superiority of Man to the species standing nearest to him. The logic of signs is more perfectible than the others, because more amenable to volition; it therefore expands more rapidly with

the progress of Civilisation. Its origin dates from the most primitive times. Still, under Fetichism, and even under Polytheism, its distinctive character was never exhibited. Monotheism for the first time developed its full powers. Independently of the erroneous tendency in Monotheism to discourage or restrict the use of images, the attempt to reduce the doctrine to system gave rise everywhere to a series of deductive efforts, in which the use of signs became indispensable. I am speaking principally of Western Monotheism, which, by its separation of temporal from spiritual power, stimulated both in public and private life constant examination of the practical results following from the accepted creed.

As to Doctrine, Monotheism would be the death of Speculation

Passing from Method to Doctrine, the influence of Catholicism upon thought would have been disastrous but for the antecedent influence of Polytheism. The uniformity of the explanations offered by Monotheism is enough to crush all speculative efforts in minds that have received no other training (p. 144). But with Greek and Roman civilisation to preserve the West from this danger, Catholicism was of service to the intellectual movement, by its combination of wholesome discipline with loftiness of purpose.

But for its effort to form a Synthesis.

During the childhood of our race the intellectual faculties called into play were specially those of Contemplation: concrete contemplation in the first stage, abstract in the second (p. 123). It was for the period of our adolescence to complete our mental training by stimulating Meditation. Now the influence of Monotheism upon our reflective faculties was not less than that of Fetichism upon Observation of Things, and of Polytheism on Observation of Facts. The inductive faculty, connected as it is with that of abstract observation, having been partially aroused by Polytheism, Monotheism was eminently calculated to stimulate deduction. Under its influence there was a constant effort on the part of all minds to establish a complete Synthesis based on Revelation, requiring, therefore, for the time, no objective basis. And this unanimous effort was consecrated by the two results aimed at: Moral Purification and Contemplation of the Divine Essence, the one being real, the other imaginary, but both alike efficacious so long as the Monotheistic Transition lasted. It was the object of Meditation to attain the second of these results by means of the first; thus giving the highest

possible sanction to the theocratic rule that every other study should be subordinated to the study of Man (p. 175).

The separation of Church and State led Catholic Monotheism to found its Synthesis on Feeling.

The various forms of Monotheism were alike in this synthetic tendency. But in none was it so striking as in the Monotheism of the West, where, owing to the separation of temporal from spiritual power, the guidance and the growth of Feeling became all-important; so that priesthood and public were alike brought to the true source from which alone the coordination of human life can issue. And although the coordination then attempted could only be provisional, for want of a scientific basis, yet it brought deeper knowledge of Man than could be attained under theocracy, the empirical precepts of which, being enforced by government, needed no systematisation. Until the rise of Positivism, there was no conception of human nature so comprehensive and adequate as that of Catholicism. The work of governing souls preserved it spontaneously from the unnatural separation of heart and intellect, due originally to Greek Metaphysics, and fostered by the anarchy of modern thought.

(*b*) Scientific Aptitude.

Examined more in detail, the Philosophical influence of Monotheism leads to the consideration of its Scientific tendencies. To these I now pass, reserving, however, certain points for the concrete review of the subject.

Polytheism incompatible with the growth of any sciences but the two simplest.

The influence of Polytheism upon intellectual progress was in the first place favourable. It brought knowledge of facts, and suggested modes of correlating them (pp. 142-144). But ultimately the too great speciality of its supernatural machinery became an obstacle both to the discovery and to the propagation of truth. The science of antiquity was limited by the general course of social evolution to Mathematics and Astronomy. But independently of this, the Polytheistic faith, with its universal introduction of divine agency and exclusion of human thought, would have interposed fatal obstacles to the progress of Physics or Chemistry. Even in the field of Astronomy the conflict became apparent. It would have been impossible for the Alexandrian school to complete and propagate the discoveries of Thales, had Polytheism retained its vitality.

Monotheism, reserving to itself the master-science, encouraged study of the others up to end of Middle Age.

But the social atmosphere resulting from Monotheism especially in the West, was, up to the end of the mediæval period, more favourable to scientific progress. The tendency to regard all phenomena as linked together, vague always and chimerical very often as the links might be, prepared the

public mind for the acceptance of scientific theories, and placed Thought in its true position—hitherto only recognised empirically—of superiority to Expression. Meanwhile cultivated minds were stimulated to such further researches in Natural Philosophy as were compatible with the recognition of Divine Supremacy, and the concentration of the Divine influence on human affairs left a wide field open for the study of inorganic and even of organic nature. The general results of Greek Astronomy were at once incorporated by Catholicism, and their connection with its ritual ensured the speedy recognition of their importance. True, the connection was not nearly so close as it had been under the old theocracies; but it was strengthened by the influence of Hebrew Monotheism, so deeply imbued with Astrolatry. In other departments of Natural Philosophy nothing could be done except to accumulate materials. The rise of Chemistry was specially favoured by the industrial tendencies, which now began to assert their final supremacy. And greater attention was paid not merely to Medicine but to Biology, so soon as burial of the dead became again the universal custom. It had been practised by the peaceful theocratic societies; but warlike nations had been obliged to burn their dead, otherwise no relics of them could have been preserved.

In fact, it may be said generally that the position occupied by Science in the Catholic system was compatible with greater results than could be realised in the Middle Age even under the most favourable circumstances. The priesthood, absorbed, and rightly so, in moral questions theoretical and practical, could not but feel spontaneously their connection with the whole subject of Natural Philosophy; and though unable to devote sufficient attention to it, were disposed to favour its progress. So long as its real power lasted, Catholicism looked favourably on Astrologers and alchemists who in those times were the only students of inorganic Science. While insisting that there should be no attack on the received faith, it yet interposed no obstacle to progress. The collective tradition of the race was placed in its true position relatively to individual thought; as pointed out in the admirable sentence of the *Imitation: Omnis ratio et naturalis investigatio fidem sequi debet, non precedere, nec infringere*—'All reasoning and inquiry by natural methods ought to follow faith, not to precede

or weaken it.' We may regret, indeed, that so salutary a check could not have been longer preserved. It would have been well if the philosophical study of human nature could have been left to theological influences till it had become really ripe for Positive treatment; so that the disastrous interregnum of metaphysical ambition might have been avoided. The domain of Theory was indeed insufficiently separated in Catholicism from that of Practice. For this an encyclopedic doctrine was necessary, complete materials for which have but recently been worked out. But the best possible preparation for such a doctrine was made by definitely setting apart the contemplative class; and by depriving it of the governmental authority which had been so fatal to it under Theocracy, hankered after as such authority has always been by pedantocracy, whether ancient or modern.

Temporal element co-operated to the same end.

The negative and positive features of mediæval thought here described are due to the spiritual rather than the temporal order. There was, however, a constant intervention of political and popular influences, too important to be overlooked, which went far to prevent or to remedy the aberrations innate in theological doctrine, and which, in some instances, gave a special direction to the Catholic movement. But the important modification introduced by the Feudal spirit into the faith and worship of the Western Republic may be reserved for the concrete division of the subject.

(c) Esthetic Aptitude.

Still more prominent were these secular influences in the artistic movement of the Middle Age. And to this I now pass, indicating merely its more general aspects, and reserving its most important results for the concrete examination.

Further development of Subjective Life.

Mark, in the first place, that the Affective Transition was eminently calculated to strengthen and systematise subjective life. The sense of ideal existence had arisen under Polytheism when every one held constant intercourse with beings of fictitious origin (p. 241). But the influence of these familiar relations both on minds and character was weakened by their incoherence, their want of concentration upon a definite object. This defect was supplied by Monotheism. All thoughts upon the unseen world had now a common centre, and were directed towards Eternal Salvation, which consisted chiefly in contemplation of the Supreme Source of power. The imaginative faculties of the Western world were prepared for that constant

and unanimous action which alone can enable us in the Final State to realise our bond of union with the generations before and after us.

Language acquired a more rational character.

Secondly: The esthetic character of the Middle Age is shown in the recasting, which now took place, of European language. Fetichism had based language on Feeling (p. 110). In its further developements under Polytheism, Imagination had been the dominant influence (ii. 80). Monotheism supplied what had hitherto been wanting, by increasing its capacities as a reasoning instrument. For this is the principal feature of the change undergone by language when reconstructed on the Latin basis, and modified by contact with Germanic races, in a state of society which had already begun to assert its rational and pacific character. Entrusted as it was with the old languages and also with the general conduct of life, the Catholic priesthood took a prominent part in these changes, common though they were to all classes. They were limited to the three associated populations of Italy, Spain, and France, which alone were ripe for them. Could the spiritual unity of the West have been maintained, this threefold nationality might have been enlarged, the northern dialects have been absorbed, and uniformity of language established throughout the West. Modern anarchy has postponed this result. But the Middle Age admirably foreshadowed and, by so doing, helped forward its future realisation.

Mediæval *Situation* favourable to Poetry;

With regard to Art strictly so called, the condition most essential to its growth, a standard of life admitting of idealisation, was uniformly and spontaneously fulfilled during the Affective Transition. The mediæval doctrine was, no doubt, unfavourable to Art. Imagination was repelled alike by Christian reasoning and Christian Revelation. Except the Apocalyptic vision of the Last Judgment and a few admirable hymns Mediæval Christianity produced no poetry. But what was wanting in the spiritual influences of the time was amply compensated by the political influences. War had now assumed its defensive aspect; and the great military expeditions of the Middle Age were nobler subjects for the poet than all the combats of ancient history. The developement of home life was another and a most favourable condition. Lastly, Poetry could now enter upon what will finally be its most important field, the field of History. The succession of modern

life to the life of antiquity furnished sufficient scope; and the future was so far manifest as to admit of idealisation.

Notwithstanding its instability and the rudeness of the new languages.

But these tendencies were almost neutralised, or rather their result was long deferred, by the unsettled character of the time. Art, I have said, requires a standard of life capable of being idealised. But it also requires that this standard shall be maintained long enough for the poet to depict it worthily; and this was incompatible with the rapidity of the Defensive Transition, each phase in which had passed before men were fully aware of its coming. The slow formation of the new language was also an impediment to Poetry, which never tolerates a dead language; although the mistrust of the Italian, until Dante had proved its power, was such that Dante himself began by composing in Latin.

Poems of Chivalry. Rhyme.

Yet the beautiful though unfinished poems of Chivalry which appeared in every part of the West towards the end of this period prove the esthetic tendencies of a civilisation which indeed, in receptiveness of Art, was superior to that of Antiquity. Moreover, the more rational structure of Modern language, involving as it did some phonic defects, led to the compensation of those defects by rhyme, and thereby brought a general improvement of poetic style. This device was at once adopted in Latin hymns, where, pedantic prejudices notwithstanding, it is an evident improvement; and it is equally suitable to the most musical languages, even at their very origin

Music and Architecture.

In those of the Special arts, which, from being less definite than the General art, were more compatible with mediæval worship, the progress effected in the Middle Age is incontestable In music, both instrumental and vocal, great results were effected In Architecture, the least ideal of the plastic arts, we must go back to the old theocracies for anything comparable in esthetic power to those sublime cathedrals in which Monotheism showed that religious expression did not lose in majesty by gaining in concentration and distinctness. By a natural process these buildings became sanctuaries for all the arts, and were specially favourable to Sculpture, which, in spite of technical deficiency and imperfect materials, produced works of a very high order and well worthy of their sacred purpose. And apart from these results the position of Art in the social fabric should be specially noted. Substituting the tradition of Theocracy for that of Greek disorder, it became again a sacerdotal function

(p. 189), foreshadowing in this respect the Sociocracy of the future. True, this, like so many other mediæval tendencies, was imperfectly developed. But the function was sufficiently performed to prove its value to those who can so far divest themselves of modern prejudices, as to reject the erroneous explanations of the triumphs achieved by Art in the last three centuries.

(3) Practical Properties.

The foregoing remarks will suffice to indicate the esthetic character of Defensive Monotheism. I pass now to its influence on practical life. Here it owed everything to the environment: the doctrine of itself was incapable of giving sanction to activity of any kind. The same incapacity is indeed found in every phase of the absolute Synthesis: but the concentration of theology into Monotheism exhibits it in the strongest light. Fetichism, inapplicable though it was to the active faculties, had yet proved on the whole favourable to their developement. Polytheism, both in its conservative and in its progressive form, had been of service both to the industrial energies of the individual, and to our collective energies as employed in war. But the sole object of Monotheism being to unite each man to God, man's material existence, in which social cooperation plays so prominent a part, was completely set aside. True, there was a vague tendency to encourage the transformation of War from its aggressive to its defensive form; there were even some aspirations towards the general establishment of Peace. But most of this was due to the wise direction impressed upon the common faith by the priesthood. The true type of Christian life is a distinct sanction of inactivity. This is specially illustrated in the curse of God upon Labour, and in the absolute condemnation of War.

These belonged to the *situation*, not the *doctrine*.

Defensive war and Industrial developement.

But obstructive as the creed might be, the circumstances of the time invariably stimulated the twofold action, industrial and military, by which Man and Society were to be trained for the normal type of life. I reserve for the concrete division of the subject my judgment of the great defensive expeditions of the Middle Age; the last great result remaining for War to accomplish. My explanation of the industrial movement will fall under the same head. It may be remarked, however, generally that all the essential conditions of pacific activity were here satisfied; so that the social transformation of industry could now begin.

Three stages in emancipation of Labour. Organisation of industry. Machines.

In the first place, the working class was gradually elevated, first by the change of slavery into serfage; then by the abolition of personal servitude; lastly, by securing free citizenship. This result attained, industrial life began spontaneously to assume its proper organisation. A distinct separation appeared between the employers and the workmen; and the different orders of Capitalists began to be recognised. Lastly, rapid though the Mediæval Transition was, pacific activity had time to display itself in those useful arts which naturally illustrate its social character. The final abolition of Western slavery led, even then, to the substitution of external agencies for human force.

(4) Affective or Social Properties, pp. 376–387.

In this abstract review of Defensive Monotheism, we have hitherto been considering its intellectual aspects, theoretical, esthetic, and practical. Before passing to the concrete division of the subject, we have to speak of what constitutes its principal value, its moral and political qualities.

Obstacles presented by the *Doctrine*.

To appreciate them rightly I must explain, as I have done before when speaking of the philosophical character of Catholicism, the difficulties offered by the doctrine: difficulties only to be surmounted by the practical wisdom of the priesthood, or by the stimulus of external influences.

Doctrine of Omnipotence consecrated egoism.

Intrinsically, the Catholic creed is even more anti-social than anti-philosophical. Let us again examine the consequences of its central dogma. The principle of Omnipotence involves egoism both in the Deity and in his worshippers even more certainly than it involves unwisdom. For since the principal purpose of human affections is to supply the force required for surmounting the practical and theoretical difficulties of human life, there can be no proper sphere for their exercise in a being for whom no such difficulties exist. As he can always supersede the reasoning process by direct inspection of each special case, true Meditation is for him out of the question. Of this Dante was deeply conscious even in the case of the angels.[1] So too, his desires being gratified as soon as formed, they can consist in nothing but pure caprices; there can be no appreciable motive either from within or from without. And, above all, these obscure caprices must of necessity be purely personal; so that the metaphysical formula To live in Self for Self, would be alike applicable to the two extreme

[1] Paradiso xxix. 71, &c.

grades of the vital scale. The type of divinity thus approximates to the lowest stage of animality, the only shape in which life is purely individual, because it is reduced to the one function of nutrition.

Doctrine of Future Life discouraged Altruism, and led to denial of benevolent instincts.

This apotheosis of absolute egoism tends directly to check the growth of Sympathy in the Monotheistic believer. His future existence, if he is saved, is to consist in contemplation of this Being, and his earthly life is intended to prepare him for it. And further, since life on earth is to be thus absorbed in celestial objects, sympathy for others becomes a dangerous distraction, in which the true believer is warned not to indulge, lest he should imperil his highest interests, those relating to his own salvation. Under none of its forms is Theologism adequate to represent the social point of view; but under the Monotheistic form there is thus a special reason for denying the spontaneousness of benevolent affections, whereas it had been quite consistent with Polytheism. The Christian theory of our 'life of pilgrimage' could not recognise these affections. It regarded man as isolated from his fellows, as Corneille puts it:

Où tous les hommes vont, aucuns ne vont ensemble.

All men go there, but none go together.

During its decline, Catholicism made an effort to retain individual adherents, women especially, by dwelling on the perpetuity which it gave to our dearest ties, ignoring the fact that of two friends one might have failed to satisfy the conditions under which alone Salvation was granted. As Morality was more and more sacrificed for the sake of preserving Faith, this sophism gained ground rapidly; and much use has been made of it by Protestants and Deists, who do not consider the inconsistency which results from its general applications. For, supposing it to be only with his nearest friends that the believer is encouraged to hope for eternal union, yet, the promise being held out to the majority of families, we arrive at once at universal Salvation; disregarding the doctrine that Salvation is uncertain, and limited to the few.

But these doctrinal vices were remedied by the wisdom of the Priesthood.

Yet, notwithstanding the absolute egoism of the Divine type, the formal denial of disinterested Love, and the direct sanction given to utter absorption in Self, the influence of Catholicism on the moral life of the Middle Age was of the

greatest value. Our altruistic instincts, stimulated as they were by the practical movements of the time, were strong enough to overcome the disadvantages of the Western creed, so long as its moral dangers and its intellectual weakness were compensated by the existence of a worthy priesthood. For *personal* morality, indeed, Catholicism did more than Feudalism. In *domestic* life both were alike efficacious. But it is to the temporal rather than to the spiritual power that we must attribute the elevation which took place in *social* life.

Compensating doctrine of Grace. Love of God useful indirectly.

Further, though the systematic denial of benevolent propensities could not fail to be attended with pernicious results, yet the effect of Theology in this matter is not to be confounded with that of Metaphysics. The utter baseness of the doctrine did not show itself, theoretically or practically, until the period of modern anarchy had set in. In the Middle Age, there was a compensation, however imperfect, for the lack of spontaneous affection, namely Supernatural Grace, which Thomas à Kempis admirably defines as the equivalent of Love—*Gratia sive dilectio*—Divine inspiration being substituted for human impulse (p. 346). Moreover the control steadily maintained over man's selfish passions, based on the preponderance of heavenly over earthly interests (p. 349), was indirectly favourable to the growth of the higher sympathies, though their existence was denied. Lastly, the Love of God, though it could never become really disinterested, supplied a vent for these feelings; and any kind of exercise is calculated to strengthen them (p. 28). All these compensating considerations disappeared when the theological dogma became a metaphysical theory; the mischief wrought by it in modern times, which nothing but Positivism can repair, is therefore no measure of its influence in the Middle Age.

Influence on Individual life. Motives regarded rather than acts.

It is only in the field of personal life that Theological discipline can establish itself fully. This is especially true of Monotheism, which is distinctly opposed in doctrine to the idea of collective existence, and from which no immediate or systematic action upon society can ever be expected. But the results effected by Catholicism in this elementary region of Morality were admirable. True, the personal character of motives for action was retained and even strengthened: their transformation in a social sense was reserved for Positivism. But the

great result, which so few appreciate rightly, lay in the preponderating importance given to the training of Feelings as compared with the performance of Actions (p. 342). This followed from the separation of the advising from the governing power, which was not consciously aimed at, but arose spontaneously from the circumstances of the time. So long as the priesthood retained a direct control over action, no attempt was made to control the desires by which action was prompted; although the paramount importance of these was not unrecognised, as theocratic writings, especially those of Judæa, will testify. And this state of things, grateful alike to man's pride and indolence, even the Positivist theory of human nature would be powerless to rectify, without the complete restriction of the contemplative class to its proper sphere. But when priests find themselves unable to prescribe actions, they, like women, set themselves to modify motives. And this is what took place in the Middle Age. The political situation, making it impossible for the priesthood to determine results, induced them to control tendencies.

Whatever its historical source, the time for this fundamental change being fully ripe, the effects of it remained constant through all the disturbing forces of later times. It marks the first step of Western Society towards a sound system of Ethical principles and practice; because it involves a definite recognition of the preponderating importance of Feeling; a truth which Fetichism spontaneously proclaimed, but which under the various forms of Polytheism had remained too much in the background. The elevation of character which took place in the Middle Age has at last trained us to an ethical standard, by which the outward results of action are thought of less consequence than the inward tendencies which it had displayed or stimulated.

Regulation of sexual instinct.

The special aspect of personal life in which Catholic discipline was so effective, was the regulation of sexual desire, the most turbulent of all our instincts. In controlling the nutritive instinct Catholicism was inferior to Theocracy, notwithstanding the personal value and the indirect social action of its system of fasts. And the same must be said of other matters relating to bodily health, especially in all that concerned cleanliness, whether personal or public (p. 195). Progress in this direction for which men were well prepared,

was put back by the indifference of Catholicism. Concentrated too exclusively upon moral purity, men forgot that physical purity must always be the first stage of personal discipline, and passed it by as useless for the salvation of the soul. But the sexual instinct, influenced as it is more by cerebral than by bodily conditions, had never yet undergone any adequate restraint, and here the superiority of the Affective Transition was unquestionable.

The requirements to which this instinct relates can be so easily reduced, that it is more susceptible of modification than any other. But this very fact renders it peculiarly liable to morbid persistence; the adjustment between propensities and results being generally imperfect in human nature, and specially so in this case. To control it efficiently has, therefore, always been, and ever will be, regarded as the highest test of human wisdom. In no other field is there the same combination of importance in the end with difficulty in the means. The task was reserved for Catholicism, requiring as it did that culture of our innermost nature which till the Middle Age had been neglected. A celibate priesthood experiencing the need of controlling indulgence among its own members was naturally disposed to make such control its chief care. It is to priests even more than to women that we owe the importance attached to sexual purity as an agent not merely of moral but of intellectual and even physical progress; a step which, in spite of the anarchy that followed, has left an ineffaceable stamp on all subsequent history.

Condemnation of Pride and Vanity.

Next in order to this great achievement we may rank the regulation of the nobler personal instincts of Pride and Vanity which, from the fact of being higher, are more dangerous and less amenable to discipline. Hitherto they had never been placed under special restraint; and indeed men usually thought better of themselves for possessing these feelings, though often disapproving their exhibition in others. But Catholicism, in its task of disciplining human forces, could not but take account of instincts which, though originally they had stimulated our energies, were now their principal means of perversion. By a spontaneous anticipation of positive principles it rose to the point of regarding these potent instincts as radical infirmities of human nature. Its rule of humility has become discredited like the doctrine from which it issued. But Positivism adopts

and confirms it; since the very conception of moral progress presupposes the constant sense of actual imperfection.

Interdiction of Suicide.

A third contribution of Catholicism to personal morality is its stringent prohibition of suicide. Though based on egoistic grounds and stated too absolutely, this reform, which modern anarchy has unduly depreciated, paved the way for the Sociocratic view of the subject, namely, that of all our powers life is that of which Humanity can least allow her children to dispose arbitrarily. A rule so alien to former standards could never have been established, but for a doctrine which isolated each individual before the Supreme Power, and held him guilty for breaking the bonds providentially assigned to him.

Influence on Family Life.

In domestic life two decisive steps were taken during the Affective Transition, due alike to its Catholic and its Feudal element—the emancipation within due limits of women, and a rational restriction of the authority of the father and the husband.

Improvement of position of Women.

As to the first of these results, Catholicism was not, as is generally supposed, the exclusive agent; but the inculcation of purity already spoken of rendered the result possible. The manners of Roman society during the empire had shown clearly enough that, without this condition, the removal of restraints upon women, so far from favouring the growth of affection, would have resulted in general disorder. Starting from this basis, it is Feudalism which is to be credited with the principal improvements in monogamic marriage, which by Catholicism was regarded as a state inferior to celibacy, though necessary as a concession to human frailty. But the feudal chiefs, partly from the moralising influences of public occupations (p. 302), partly from their stationary life and the intermittent nature of their activity, were more disposed to recognise the true position of woman, and the value of domestic ties. This was the principal source of the indissolubility of marriage, and of the freedom of woman—two conditions gradually felt to be necessary for the influence of the one sex upon the happiness and moral progress of the other. A celibate priesthood could have no experience of these all-important feelings, though it might sufficiently understand the satisfaction of desire. In the relatively small importance which it attached to widowhood as compared with virginity Catholicism was indeed inferior to previous systems.

For the internal arrangements of the Family, Catholicism

Limitation of marital and paternal power.

did more than Feudalism, without however achieving any result of such paramount importance as those just mentioned. The action of the priesthood on domestic life was for the most part unconnected with doctrine, and due simply to the spontaneous separation of the two powers; it became enfeebled, therefore, as soon as that premature division of functions was brought to an end by the usurpations of the civil power. Yet Defensive Monotheism lasted long enough to strike a fatal blow at the despotic authority of the head of the family, which had been sanctioned by Roman civilisation, especially with regard to children. Here the priesthood showed itself true to its original mission of regulating human forces, and proved a worthy exponent of the general tendency of the West towards Sociocracy; since the ultimate discipline of man's powers would be impossible were the most precious of his possessions, the family, left to arbitrary caprice. Feudalism, in spite of its exaggerated views of personal independence, was animated by the same feelings. Its public spirit which had already shown itself in a less favourable instance, that of material property, prompted it to this reform.

Influence on Public life. Obstacles presented by *Doctrine*.

From the private aspects of mediæval morality, whether individual or domestic, I pass now to its public aspect, with reference first to internal, secondly to foreign questions. Here it is that the priests and statesmen of Catholicism found their principal field. But in order to estimate their work aright, I must first point out the obstacles created for them by their doctrine. Otherwise we shall fail to understand the anomalous position of a priesthood compelled to systematise a social state incompatible with its dogma, so that whatever results were obtained were due mainly to the promptings of practical wisdom.

Antisocial bearing of care for individual Salvation.

The only principles of which human life can be really regulated is this: Universal Love inspiring collective activity to effect wise modifications in the established order. Now the doctrine of Monotheism was wholly inconsistent with this programme. Anxiety for salvation and zeal for the public good remained to the end irreconcilable; for devotion to God was impossible without isolation from the world. Social Continuity was even more alien to Catholicism than Solidarity, since all our polytheistic and fetichistic predecessors fell necessarily under its ban. Its connection with Judaism might have com-

pensated the evils of this rupture with the past, had not the ingratitude of Christendom towards the Jewish population broken this artificial tie. Respect even for individual ancestors, which had been carefully inculcated by Polytheism (p. 197), was seriously weakened by Catholicism, since there was nothing to prevent the believer in his zeal for his own salvation, from imagining the damnation of every one else. The restoration of theocratic burial, which had been temporarily suspended during the military phase of Polytheism, must be attributed to the reverential feeling not of Catholicism but of Feudalism. Catholicism would have restricted it to saints.

But clergy with wise inconsistency maintained secular duties and penalties;

As in such a faith there could be no real consistency, the flexibility common to all theology, even in its concentrated monotheistic form, enabled the priesthood, so long as it remained worthy of its mission, to reconcile theory with practice. No sooner had Christianity triumphed, than two contradictory principles which proved the groundwork for yet further concessions, were generally accepted, save by a few fanatics. First, the Christian type of life was never fully realised, except by the hermits of the Thebaid. These men by narrowing their wants to the lowest standard were able to concentrate their thoughts without remorse or distraction on the attainment of salvation. But absorption in the affairs of heaven was soon seen to be morally as well as physically incompatible with active life, since the world, which the ascetic in his pious indolence was striving to forget, was all the while gratuitously maintaining him. But this tendency, though frequently indulged during the decline of Catholicism, especially under the disturbing influences of Protestantism, was held in tolerable check during the Middle Age, the priesthood with instinctive wisdom consecrating the practical duties of each adherent. The second fact is that eternal damnation, with all its tremendous influence, never induced men to abandon their criminal law, inferior though it was in precision and completeness to the discipline of the church. Indeed in the struggle between the two powers a special sanction was given to this inconsistency. The domain of criminal law was claimed by the ecclesiastical courts, on the ground that the denouncer of sin must be the best judge of crime.

And it is not merely that Monotheism was flexible, as all

And even bent the *doctrines* to social uses.

its heresies abundantly prove. Wisely interpreted, its principle of Divine Love and its exhortation to moral progress became a twofold though indirect source of social inspiration.

The Incarnation. The Trinity. The Eucharist. Worship of Saints. Personal holiness.

Polytheism had gone very far towards humanising supernatural types. But the incarnation of the supreme power was a still more striking evidence of the growing tendency towards complete identity between the adorer and the adored. And when this was supplemented, first, by the institution of the Trinity, which perpetuated the relation effected during the temporary incarnation, and secondly, by the mystery in which each believer repeatedly incorporated the Divinity into his own substance, men had before them in the God of the Middle Age a foreshadowing of the Humanity of the future. Still more effective did the connection become when the invocation of saints had superseded the worship of angels; thus diminishing the objections inherent in the absolute nature of the divinity, and also affording an imperfect compensation for the apotheosis of Polytheism. Again, social results of a less comprehensive but most direct and definite kind flowed from the steady and energetic concentration of all Monotheists, especially in the West, upon moral progress. This result is in fact connected with that last mentioned; since ultimately the regulation of our highest aspirations was recognised as the sole sphere in which the Deity could intervene (p. 371). Thus in one way or other, the culture of the heart becoming the central object, the whole extent of its proper field was rapidly opened, and the obstacles originally interposed by the doctrine were removed. A social purpose being absolutely essential to the developement or even to the maintenance of a higher moral standard, the failure of Monotheism in this respect, while a striking proof of its inconsistency, was no bar to the continuance of a work so opportunely begun.

But the temporal situation alone made these doctrines efficacious.

But all these influences were too vague and indirect to create the political qualities to which the great results of the Affective Transition, whether temporary or permanent, were due. The work would not have been done, or would have been done inadequately, but for the impulse of the social environment (p. 348). On it depended in great measure these developements of doctrine; and by constantly supplying them with new life, it saved them from the danger, always imminent with such a faith, of degenerating into mysticism. The standard of daily

life, itself a product of the Western situation, gave it a preponderating share in the education of public morality. For in this Feudalism was more concerned than Catholicism.

Idea and standard of Duty Feudal rather than Catholic; as shown by the Duel.

The political character of the Middle Age is embodied in Chivalry. The chivalric rule of life, *Fais ce que dois, advienne que pourra* (*Do thy duty, come what may*), though it was left for Bayard, its latest representative, to utter it, sums up in one incomparable sentence the whole of feudal civilisation. Those words will ever remain as the first direct evidence of man's progress towards the substitution of altruistic for egoistic life. Their meaning may be found condensed in a word dear to our forefathers—and still surviving, officially at least, in those Western countries where Feudalism has been least altered—the word *Loyalty*, which admirably combines the two essential qualities of the Middle Age: Devotion and Sincerity. I may remark too that the ethics of Chivalry, as thus expressed, indicate a higher degree of intellectual emancipation than is commonly supposed. The rule of duty is set forth regardless of consequences—even of those in a future state. Public opinion was even then the basis of the system; the hope of heaven had less weight than that of living in men's memories; and thus the certainty of eternal suffering was no bar to the performance of social obligation. The best illustration of this frame of mind, as Condorcet has justly remarked, is the case of duelling. Here we find the most orthodox believers disregarding the threats of their religion during a course of centuries; whereas the substitution of industrial for military life in our own day is rapidly abolishing the custom.

The Sociocratic tendencies of the Middle Age were due to Feudalism;

In all these respects the ethics of Chivalry were largely influenced by the political situation, the main feature of which was the conversion of offensive into defensive war. Military life, before its final disappearance from Western Europe, spontaneously put forth its noblest influence on the feelings. Becoming defensive, without losing its collective character, it was compatible with the highest morality, a thing impossible in antiquity, when the intense desire and the urgent necessity for victory left little room for scrupulousness as to how it was attained; and thus attention was called to acts rather than to motives (p. 311). Not till the Middle Age do we find constant reverence for truth, the fulfilment of promises once made, and abhorrence of treachery, prevailing as the

standard of conduct; forming, in fact, the basis of sociocratic morality, as expressed in the Positivist rule of Living without Concealment. When I pass to the concrete branch of the inquiry, I shall bring forward unmistakable evidence of the tendency of the Middle Age towards Sociocracy: a tendency which, amid all the obstacles of Christian doctrine, was more distinct and continuous than in the Roman period. All that Catholicism contributed in this respect was the negative rather than positive influence of its complete abolition of hereditary priesthood, the last important trace, as it had been the first, beginning, of the institution of Caste.

Catholicism contributing nothing but abolition of Hereditary Priesthood.

In spite of appearances Wealth rather than Birth was the source of power.

Tendencies such as these, to which the institution of ecclesiastical celibacy is in great part due, enable us to explain the apparent anomaly, that the influence of Birth gained apparently new vigour during the Middle Age (p. 310). The fact was that as selection by Merit was still premature, though priests and statesmen might desire and forecast its advent, the revival of the authority of Birth was as important for progress as for order, at a time when elective succession would have developed all its subversive tendencies to the full. Succession by Birth was in perfect keeping with the defensive and intermittent character of the collective activity; and it was an essential guarantee of both the results attained by the Affective Transition (p. 353), especially of the emancipation of the labouring class. In truth it was wealth rather than birth that was the source of power. The influence of birth was chiefly of a moral kind, and conferred less political ascendency than in Græco-Roman times. The increasing obligations imposed by feudalism on territorial property, which yet was more aristocratic than any other, furnish convincing proofs of the sociocratic character which inheritance had already assumed, and of its wide divergence from the theocratic type.

Influence on International relations.

A few remarks on mediævalism in its widest relation will complete our abstract analysis of its social characteristics. In binding together the strictly Western nations, Catholicism directly assisted Feudalism. The one furnished a common faith and the guidance of a common priesthood; while the other, by its united defensive action and similarity of manners, made the practical life of the various peoples homogeneous. The principal result of Defensive Monotheism, namely the substitution, in the five advanced nations, of fr

aggregation for the forced incorporation of Rome, was thus rendered possible. But for promoting convergence with populations outside the limits of the West, the temporal influence once more (p. 315) showed itself superior to the spiritual; a superiority which will be reversed in the Normal State. The truth was that, with all the pretensions of Catholicism to universality, the exclusive character of its creed never failed to inspire hatred and contempt for populations which refused to accept it. These empirical pretensions became absurd as well as mischievous when a second Monotheism, equally absolute, had arisen and had divided what was once the Roman world between two irreconcilable religions. Whereas the simultaneous rise of Chivalry in both quarters was a proof that the similitude in social environment, imperfect though it was, contributed more than any theological belief, Mussulman or Catholic, towards the universal union ultimately to be attained by man.

(5) Summary review of Catholic-Feudal regime, pp. 387–390.

Before passing from the abstract to the concrete point of view, it may be well to sum up the foregoing remarks in a synthetic review of the feudo-catholic constitution, and thus to place the great results which I am about to describe in a clearer light.

Its two fundamental principles: Separation of Powers and Transformation of War.

Under whatever aspect we regard the mediæval regime we can always trace it either to the separation of powers, or to the transformation of war from aggression to defence. To the first of these two fundamental characters we owe the whole structure of Catholicism; to the second, that of Feudalism. Each, thus proceeding from a single source, was, therefore, strictly homogeneous; and the spontaneous connection of the two fundamental principles led to harmonious adjustment of the results.

All the distinctive doctrines of Catholicism sprang from Separation of Powers, to the end of Morality.

In the case of Catholicism, this filiation of principles is observable, not merely in its regime, in the strict sense of that word, but in its ritual and even in its doctrine. From the first origin of Occidental Monotheism, as I showed in the preceding chapter (p. 343), the separation of powers, recognised as a necessary condition of a systematic and comprehensive basis for morality, suggested the primary dogma of the Incarnation. Other supplementary doctrines naturally followed: first, the Fall and the Redemption of man; secondly, the Trinity and the mystery of the Eucharist. These five doctrines taken together form an indivisible whole; inexplicable till Sociology had

pointed out the temporary purpose, first of the entire synthesis, then of each part separately; for each contributed to the great social result. A similar estimate may be formed of various secondary institutions, such as Purgatory, the Adoration of Saints, Confession and Absolution, and many others. The ground for them will always be discovered either in the moral purpose of the system, or in the necessity of fortifying its spiritual independence. The Damnation of all unbelievers, which ultimately became so utterly revolting to men's feelings even more than to their intellect, was yet necessary for consolidating faith, on which the whole coherency of the monotheistic system depended.

Damnation of unbelievers an indispensable doctrine.

When we find the great Mahomet weeping over his mother's tomb, because he felt that he could not pray for her, we feel how indispensable was the doctrine of Damnation for the permanency of an undemonstrable creed. But for this painful exclusiveness—which has continued long after its value has passed away—the spirit of discussion inherent in Monotheism, especially in its Western branch, would have thwarted all the moral aims of Catholicism, by giving free play to doubt. The Positivist, though he too is bound to press his own creed, is the only religionist who can respect all other creeds, either on the ground that they converge towards his own, or that his theory of human nature prevents him from exaggerating the influence of convictions upon conduct.

Catholicism undermined by the Elective principle.

Within itself, the constitution of the priesthood was always weakened by the antagonism between the principle of Birth, which Catholicism was bound to discard, and that of Merit, for which the time was hardly ripe, the result being to leave too much scope for Election. This revolutionary tendency once sanctioned was inevitably extended, and it often weakened the authority of the popes, who found it hard to surmount an influence to which their own position was due. Councils were in fact always a source of difficulty for the popes; and the various questions arising with reference to faith and discipline would have been dealt with more effectually without them. Positivism will, for the first time, exhibit a full developement of spiritual authority, dispensing as it does with all official assemblies, and taking its stand on a doctrine that can always be demonstrated, and therefore that can never admit of an appeal to majorities as the final resource against doubt. Celibacy of

the clergy, again, was a radical defect in the constitution of the priesthood; necessary for the suppression of sacerdotal caste, and a valuable guarantee of independence, but inconsistent with the moral purpose of mediæval society. The working of the sacerdotal system was impaired by these defects, due, it will be remarked, to its doctrine or to external circumstances; whereas the better side of the system is to be traced to the wisdom of the popes. The time not being ripe for the establishment of the permanent priesthood, it was only to be expected that the internal organisation of Catholicism should fail through want of adaptation to the world around it.

All the distinctive institutions of Feudalism sprang from Transformation of War, to the end of Free Labour.

Feudalism, on the other hand, was spontaneously adjusted to the political conditions of the time. We find, accordingly, modern prejudices to the contrary notwithstanding, that its leading institutions were more in keeping with its fundamental principle. Its basis being the substitution of defensive for aggressive warfare, its destination the gradual emancipation of the labourer, its action was always opportune, and therefore always coherent. These two general aspects of Feudalism are, as I have shown, no less intimately correlated than those of Catholicism; and they suffice for its complete explanation. The mode in which they resulted in the two essential features, the substitution of serfdom for slavery, and the hierarchic subdivision of authority, has been already pointed out (p. 376), and will be more fully illustrated in the concrete examination of the subject. In this place I subjoin merely a brief review of the political principles and social purpose of the regime.

Law of Temporal hierarchy: Reciprocity of Protection and Obedience.

Feudalism inaugurated, and for a short time practically carried out, the true principles on which political authority should be organised. The theocratic influences which hitherto had complicated men's notions on the subject began now to clear themselves away, and government, properly so called, was seen to consist in the spontaneous arrangement of material forces, subject ultimately to the systematising influence of the priesthood. The simplest distribution of temporal authority is that based on the greater or less intensity of the powers of action, and for this the progressive scale of feudal functions was well adapted. To recognise obedience and protection as reciprocal duties was to proclaim the true law of the political hierarchy, which had, indeed, been empirically applied before, but, owing to the insufficient separation of the elementary

powers, had not admitted of distinct enunciation. And thus Feudalism solved, in the transitory mediæval system, the grand problem of adjusting cooperation with independence, an adjustment which has now to be introduced into the Final Order.

Chivalry, the highest expression of this law, will accord even better with industrial manners.

The feudal solution was well and strikingly illustrated in the institution of Chivalry, where the extreme of devotion and the extreme of freedom are reached simultaneously. The practice of voluntary unpaid protection had doubtless always existed; but never, till then, had it been embodied in a special institution. War had to reach its defensive, and therefore intermittent, phase, before its nobler representatives could have either the leisure or the will to devote their powers, individually or collectively, to the suppression and reparation of social injustice. The absence of political centralisation created no doubt a special necessity for chivalry; this defect, however, had been compensated by the influence of the Church, and would of itself have been wholly insufficient to bring about the supply of a want which exists in every civilisation alike. Chivalry in its origin inevitably partook of the military character which belonged then to all collective action. But Industry is far more congenial to its nature, and, when once adequately organised, can alone bring it to full maturity.

CONCRETE APPRECIATION, pp. 390–420.

Up to this point, I have been examining the two aspects of Defensive Monotheism from the abstract point of view. I pass now to the concrete branch of the subject, commencing with the study of the fourth century, the doubtful borderland which links or separates the Middle Age and Antiquity. Here we naturally find all the essential elements of Catholic Feudalism assuming a definite shape. Roman history then being regarded as closing with the third century, and Mediæval history as beginning with the fifth, the fourth is to be looked on as an interval during which the imperial dictatorship was paralysed, and, as a direct consequence, Catholic feudalism, though not yet actually established, was ready to appear.

(1) Fourth (or exceptional) century, pp. 390–393.

Lies between Ancient and Mediæval history.

Spiritual revolution: Catholicism becomes state-religion, and Dictator retires to Constantinople.

The two facts which mark the beginning of the century—the official adoption of Monotheism, and the removal of the seat of government—were the final and decisive issue, though their bearing was unperceived, of the spontaneous renovation for which the West since Cæsar's time had been preparing. The connection between these two procedures was understood in the

Middle Age even by men who regretted it, as the line of Dante shows—

Per cedere al Pastor si fece Greco.

Giving way to the Shepherd he made himself a Greek.

The Catholic system, as embodied in the structure of its priesthood, of which the Papacy was the corner-stone, could not reach maturity until the new faith had been protected by legal sanction from the dangers of discussion, against which it was always powerless. The three previous centuries having sufficiently elaborated the doctrine as a whole, that is, not merely the dogma and the ritual, but also the rule of life for the priesthood as well as for the people, the principal institutions of Catholicism could now begin to arise, though of course subject to further developement. In substituting a new education for that previously supplied in Western Europe by Polytheism, it was necessary for Monotheism to provide, within as well as without the sacerdotal class, an organisation commensurate with its claims to systematise human life. For this purpose the principal Jewish traditions presented themselves most opportunely; and they were most skilfully blended with much that was naturally borrowed from the Roman synthesis, although little gratitude was shown by Catholicism for either of these very definite services. Still the splendid *prestige* attaching to the name of Rome descended, as was their due, to the Western Christians, who now became the true heirs of Social Polytheism; and the more so that their practical tendencies gradually separated them from the degenerate tradition of Greece, henceforth to be appropriated by their Byzantine rivals.

Temporal revolution: Division of Empire; the first step towards Feudal disintegration.

Viewed politically, the revolution of the fourth century laid the foundations of Feudalism, by bringing about that very political decomposition which was to form the distinctive feature of the defensive regime. The formal division of the Empire was reserved for the close of the century, centralisation of power being still necessary for the legal organisation of Catholicism, a task accomplished by the great Theodosius, the first statesman who entirely effaced the traces of the mad reaction attempted by a crowned sophist. But in reality the partition, which had taken place at intervals during the previous century, had become permanent as soon as the true centre of

dictatorial government had been abandoned. The barbarian invasions, which previously it had been possible to commute into voluntary compacts, now became simply violent seizures of Western territory. The first consequence was the irrevocable separation of the East from the West—a developement of the old discrepancies which, even in Cæsar's time, had been so marked that Poetry had traced them back to the days of Troy. The second result was that the true Roman world split up into States which became more and more independent, and the spiritual centre of which was finally to be changed. The commencement of a feudal hierarchy, and even the first germs of chivalry, became now sufficiently distinct to admit of personal exemplifications, as in Aetius, for instance, who was a striking illustration of both tendencies.

Alliance of Spiritual and Temporal powers.

While these important movements were proceeding, the ecclesiastical and civil power, in addition to their own internal developement, were spontaneously concerting their action. The priesthood, as the only authority that was fully recognised, gave an efficient sanction to social progress, Teutonic as well as Roman. Of Roman civilisation it was a better representative than the Magistrature; and yet it was sufficiently sympathetic with the barbarian world. Foreseeing the forces at work in this quarter, it sought to restrain them beforehand by missions conducted with great wisdom and often at personal risk.

Affective Transition divided into Three Phases;

Starting from the close of this preparatory century, I now proceed with my concrete review of Defensive Monotheism. The period of its duration may be divided into three phases, each lasting about three centuries. In the first phase, beginning with the fifth century and ending with the seventh, we have the formation in its outlines of the new Occidental state system, as a general result of contending forces in Church and State. In the second, ending with the tenth century, the consolidation and growth of this aggregate is effected by a series of defensive wars against polytheistic populations who alone were susceptible of incorporation into Catholicism. In the third phase, ending with the thirteenth century, the Western Republic is finally completed and knit together by common action against Mahometan invasion, a struggle admitting of no assimilation on either side. This division is guided, as in Roman history, by political not spiritual changes, the former being here of

greater importance. We shall find, however, on the spiritual side, correlated characters less prominent but equally definite.

Corresponding to the three French dynasties.

Following this plan, which coincides, and not accidentally, with the succession of the three French dynasties, I have first to speak of the inevitable barbarian invasions, which it was the political aim of mediæval society to bring under sufficient control.

(2) First (or Fundamental) Phase (A.D. 400–700), pp. 393–398.

The preceding chapter has shown that there were two sorts of populations over which Roman civilisation had no real power: the theocratic, which it could not assimilate; and the nomad, which were unsusceptible even of conquest. The first of these were not likely to offer any direct resistance to Roman rule, however oppressive it might become. But the others, whose mode of life demanded vast areas of territory, were gradually confined to a narrower space by the extension of the Empire, and were thus forced into sedentary life before their own developement had spontaneously prompted it. The demands of agriculture soon tempted them to leave the unfavourable ground to which they had been driven by the pressure of Roman conquest, and to secure, whether peacefully or by force, a less intractable and better cultivated soil further West. Military organisation in the true sense was never developed, but increasing success was gained in this hitherto unknown process of invasion, the result being not so much conquest as colonisation. Thus the first step towards the military type of existence was taken; but all further progress in this direction was stopped, first, by the pressure of these tribes upon one another, and, secondly, by the necessity of combined resistance to the competitors who were following them. Their energies were then diverted from conquest, and concentrated on the defence of their colonial settlements. Military aspirations were not however crushed, but being turned aside from their normal course (p. 220), they produced exceptional disturbances during the Middle Age; and of these certain traces even yet remain.

Barbarian settlements;

Favoured growth of Catholicism and Feudalism;

This inevitable struggle, ramifying as it did more and more widely, and fusing to a large extent the yellow and the white races, must be regarded in its ultimate results as favourable to the Affective Transition in both its aspects. Both spiritually and temporally it rendered it easier and more rapid. Several of the invading tribes were already converted to the religion of the West, and those who were not so previous

to their settlement, offered but little resistance to Catholic missionaries. Their polytheism was in fact recent, and free from all theocratic tendencies; and it was now seen to be wholly unadapted to their altered circumstances. No faith but that of Monotheism could consecrate their new mode of life; and the resistance of their priesthood, whose influence had never become firmly established, proved wholly unavailing.

Did not introduce the latter;

The erroneous view that Feudalism originated with the German tribes is an exaggeration of the fact that they showed a spontaneous affinity for its principal features, such as the change from slavery to serfage, and the hierarchic subdivision of authority: institutions easier to accept for those who have never aimed at conquest than for those who are abandoning it.

Introduced nothing but the Duel.

But the only mediæval institution really traceable to a Germanic origin is the practice of duelling, springing from an incomplete suppression of the military phase, and holding its ground more tenaciously in the districts last invaded, as is indirectly shown by the taste for litigation in one of the provinces of France.

Litigious tastes of Normandy.

Feudal type of society already discernible in Fifth century.

We need not therefore be surprised to find, even at this early date, and before the successive waves of invasion had ceased, the feudal type of character clearly traceable. The century which began with the sack of Rome by Alaric ended with the noble government of Theodoric, the first great representative of the mediæval period. In spite of the spirit of independence roused by the excessive centralisation of the Empire, the sociocratic tendencies of the new European system were so strong, even with respect to questions of property, that powerful chieftains would deign to accept, sometimes even to solicit, land held upon limited tenure. The prevalent inclination for rural life was favourable to the emancipation both of women and of labourers. It brought the moral characteristics of women into prominence, and it facilitated the transformation of slavery into serfage. Three types of womanly influence, rightly canonised by the Church, mark this period: the admirable wife of the founder of the French Monarchy; the peasant maid who stayed the progress of a powerful invader; and the noble slave who was not prevented by the prejudices of the time from ascending the first throne of the West. The true importance of this phase will be better appreciated when it is contrasted with the exceptional century which preceded it; although

Theodoric the Great.

St. Clotilde.

St. Geneviève.

St. Bathilde.

Monotheism had then won its victory, and had already modified Roman society. From this point of view a philosophic historian will find much truth in the poetical exaggeration which carries back the institution of chivalry to the time when its principal features became manifest, though as yet necessarily in an incomplete form.

Knights of the Round Table.

Unquestionably from this period we may date the origin of Industrial life, its first step being the transformation of slavery into serfdom, which was effected in the earlier part of the Middle Age. The slavery of Greece and Rome, where the workman was an article of sale, had no domestic ties, and was excluded from the national religion, was an institution no less durable than the aggressive military system, of which it formed the domestic basis. Serfdom, on the contrary, was essentially a transitional state. Closely bound to the soil, admitted to every family relation, joining in the national worship, the serf needed but a slight advance of public opinion and morality to pass into the state of complete freedom. The first mediæval phase did all that was needed towards a general apprenticeship in industrial life by means of this intermediate condition of serfdom; the stimulus of independence counterbalancing the antipathy to labour which all men at first feel. In the case of agricultural serfs, however, the further delay of the next step is to be specially accounted for, not merely by the less active and less social character of their employment, but by the residence of their chiefs amongst them, which rendered their emancipation at once more difficult and less urgent. But, looking at Western civilisation as a whole, the evil was more than compensated by the consequences which this seigniorial life entailed on the city populations. It had the effect of clearing out from them that mass of idle plebeians whom the Roman patriciate were obliged to amuse and feed, but who now, when they were not reduced to serfdom, became the armed retainers of feudal lords: a most valuable result, which, but for the barbarian invasions, could never have been accomplished.

Change from slavery to serfage.

This first mediæval phase offered most favourable opportunities for spiritual influence; not, throughout the whole subsequent developement of the church, was that influence ever displayed in a more noble, pure, or indeed effective form. It was not merely that the clergy, being at that time always Roman, had a strong inducement to protect subjects of their

Growth of spiritual power. Best age of Monasticism.

own race from the violence of foreign rulers. It was that these rulers were penetrated with the sense of the superiority of Roman civilisation, and of respect for its consecrated organs. Women were favourable to a religion which dealt with inward feeling rather than outward observance (p. 379); and they were specially attached to monastic institutions, by which each castle was brought into connection with some religious house. The ascetic mode of life, purposeless and unregulated in the hermit, proved, in the organising hands of Saint Benedict, of the greatest value morally, intellectually, and even materially although subsequently to the seventh century the evils of convents became greater than their usefulness. At this time however, they formed an excellent school for the secular clergy as illustrated in the case of the eminent Bishop of Seville; and they initiated the admirable series of foreign missions by which the great Pope who so nobly recognised the true worth of Trajan[1] prepared for the extension of the Roman world of the West to its normal limits (p. 320).

St. Benedict.

St. Isidore.

Gregory the Great.

We find, moreover, in the monasteries of this period, voluntary poverty practised precisely to the extent most favourable to spiritual independence, which subsequently became undermined by the wealth of the priesthood, especially by their territorial possessions. Palliate this degeneration as we may, by remembering how unripe the age was for the separation of Church and State, we cannot but regret that the priesthood should not have continued to depend, as was the case in primitive times and, with few exceptions, during the whole of this early period, on free donations, principally from private sources. A reasonable measure of independence was all that was wanting for the clergy to effect a reformation in family life more important and more difficult than any political triumph. They prevailed on the new rulers of Europe, in spite of the difficulties caused by their Arian tendencies (p. 205), to accept the essential conditions of Occidental marriage. We shall appreciate the full magnitude of their success by contrasting it with the impotence of the Byzantine clergy, who, though dealing with nominally orthodox chiefs, found them inflexible in maintaining the Roman principle of temporal ascendency. Yet, though the separation of Church and State was never effected in the East the Greek clergy were of use in maintaining the intellectual

Western priesthood superior in influence to Eastern.

[1] Dante Purg. x. 74.

tradition, which in the West was justifiably postponed to social necessities.

Rise of Mahometanism in seventh century;

In the last century of this first phase a revolution burst forth in the East which exercised a profound influence on the whole course of mediæval history. I refer to the rise of Mahometanism, of which the general principle may be here indicated.

A Monotheism in which Spiritual power is subordinate to Temporal.

This revolution was the work of a man who combined in a unique degree high qualities of heart with those of mind and character. Unprecedented, but well-timed, it exhibited, in their fullest light, the two characteristic features of the Middle Age: the aspiration for universality in religion, and the establishment of a new nation. The Monotheism of Mahomet was a new and not inadequate solution of the great problem which pressed as strongly on the East as on the West. With admirable instinct he felt, though obscurely, the inconsistency of the theological principle with the separation of Church and State; an inconsistency manifested by the nullity of the Greek priesthood, and the inadequacy of the Western Church. The alternative was the concentration of the two powers as practised by Polytheism; and this he adopted, though he would have recognised the moral and political advantages of such a real separation of them as Positive religion will effect. He was thus brought back in the direction of Hebrew Monotheism, of which he might have proved the true Messiah. But his warrior life kept him clear of theocratic tendencies; the simplicity of his doctrine was suited to the life, and was calculated indeed ultimately to lead to entire emancipation. The combination of the two satisfied the aspirations of his followers, to whom universal dominion had been the goal in view. But the principles of the new faith limited their ambition; and they were content to settle down, like Germanic invaders, rather than as Roman conquerors. After the failure of this empirical attempt to incorporate the West, Islamism finally abandoned it altogether to Catholicism, and confined its aim to the Empire of the East till the mutual antagonism of the two Monotheisms, under modern revolutionary influences, should result in their simultaneous decay.

Convergence of races during this phase.

Such then were the results of this important period. Outwardly all seemed disorder and decay; but in reality the establishment of Western unity was proceeding more surely than

before, by the close contact into which all the non-theocrat populations were being forced. This mixture of races, inclu ing all except the black, was most favourable to the growt and acceptance of the conception of Humanity, showing as did how each separate movement was spontaneously convergin to a common centre. It became more easy than it had bee during the compulsory unity of Rome to see how Western in tiative was paving the way for universal regeneration, destine ultimately to include the great theocracies which, passive they might seem, were patiently abiding the issue.

(3) Second Phase (A.D. 700–1000), pp. 398–405.

We come now to the second period of Defensive Monotheism It will be remembered that social developement by the gener law established in the first chapter of this volume, has thre degrees: it is first civic, then collective, ultimately univers (p. 57). The second of these degrees is that specially distinc tive of the Middle Age, as the first is of Greece and Rom and as the last will be of Modern life when systematicall organised. In the eighth century this collective life become first clearly visible. The previous period had destroyed th compulsory unity of the Empire, while maintaining the result of Roman civilisation; but the voluntary union to be subst tuted for it had not been yet established.

Brings out Collective Sociability characteristic of Middle Age.

Temporal power concentrated in new Dictators, and spiritual power in Popes.

To understand the Western system, we must regard it a resulting from a spontaneous combination of two condition the one spiritual, the other temporal, both connected with th circumstances of the time. First there was common action fo defence of the newly-acquired territory against new invasion which otherwise might have gone on indefinitely. Yet th collective activity would not of itself have sufficed to found a ne organisation of the West. The second condition necessary wa the moral bond of union established by the priesthood, whos influence, hitherto almost exclusively personal and domestic, w now extended to public life. In the second period, therefor we find a consolidation of the two powers which contrasts mos strikingly with their previous condition. Hitherto free an independent growth of each social element had been desirabl What was needed now was a dictatorship to concentrate ever effort against the constant peril of new invasions, and finall to put a stop to them altogether. And at the same time th Catholic hierarchy began to rally more closely round the Papac as the best means of giving coherence and continuity to it

Occidental action. The connection of these two simultaneous changes became apparent at the close of the great wars of this period, aggressive in form, but in reality defensive. The final check to polytheist invaders was effected by their conversion to Christianity. Only thus could they become members of the Western system.

Pope Zacharias sanctions election of Pepin.

Of these two movements the temporal was as yet the more prominent. But it is important to mark the first steps taken by Catholicism at this period in consecrating and controlling political life. We find the first example of this most legitimate extension of the spiritual power at the commencement of the second phase; when the French aristocracy, perceiving a dynastic change to be necessary to their defensive action, consulted the Papacy and obtained its sanction. No more striking proof could be given of the sociocratic character which Roman history had stamped on Western statesmanship. For the grounds of the Pope's reply[1] were as purely human as those of the nobility in consulting him. He, no less than they, declined to place the hereditary principle on a supernatural basis, and consecrated it, not as an absolute truth, but simply as a guarantee of good and peaceful government. From the wise counsel then given dates the direct political authority of the Popes. Catholicism had been already recognised as the supreme arbiter of disputed questions in private life. It was now entrusted with the moral control of political questions.

Temporal sovereignty of Popes in Italy a necessary evil.

But, natural as this result might seem, it implied the temporal power of the Popes: an institution calamitous in two ways, but rendered necessary by the unripeness of mediæval society for the separation of Church and State. The ethical principle of Catholicism, purely personal as it was, and logically excluding even domestic relations, was incapable of direct application to politics (p. 378). A forced construction of the principle was necessary, depending mainly on the position of the Pope as the head of European society. To maintain this position it was essential that he should be independent; and as the incompetence of the Christian dogma gave no warrant for his position, the only alternative lay in his acquisition of temporal power, to secure himself against being overwhelmed by the forces with the control of which he was entrusted. This is the

[1] That he who had the power of King should also have the title.

explanation of the 'States of the Church' settled upon the Popes by the Dictators of the West, whose wise instinct recognised the necessity of this permanent guarantee. Its ultimate dangers, which I have now to indicate, were not then expected.

The mischief resulting from the anomaly was that it contributed to the moral corruption of the clergy, and that it rendered the political unity of Italy impossible. In every bishopric, in every abbey, the example set by the papal principality was to some extent followed. The consequence was a rapid developement of the theocratic tendencies inherent in all Monotheism, and specially favoured by the consecration of the Jewish type. So long as the secular clergy were really worthy of their mission it was only in monastic institutions that the degeneracy was observed. These had already, by the middle of the ninth century, lost all civic value, and stood in need of a reformation which, when it came, was as fruitless as it was noble (p. 408). But before the end of the Middle Age the degradation had extended to the whole priesthood, and, as I shall point out presently, brought about its irreparable decline. In the second place, the Papal territory made it impossible to unite Italy under a single government. Of such a government the Popes must have been vassals: a position incompatible with the dignity of their Occidental office. Thus temporal as well as spiritual motives operated to prevent the rise of any Italian power capable of subduing the multiplicity of small states which there as everywhere else had been formed during the Middle Age. The collective nationality of Italy was thus irrevocably destroyed. It could not survive the decline of Roman power to which it owed existence; though it has left behind it vain regrets, and has often prompted unfortunate schemes, of which Positivism alone can show the hopelessness.

Growth of Worship of Saints; a useful modification of Monotheism.

Continuing the history of spiritual growth during this period, we find greater fulness given to the worship of saints for which hitherto the history of the Church, forced as she was to exclude all that sprang from an alien stock, had been too brief to supply sufficient types. As this defect, however, no longer existed, the institution was legitimately extended, and never was its value more felt than in this time of self-sacrificing usefulness. It acted favourably on the system of Catholic doctrine, by introducing the precise measure of Polytheism required for the popular acceptance of Monotheism, which now

could offer the right degree of speciality in the objects of worship, and in the mode of explaining events (p. 143). The irrational objections of Protestants and Deists on this head can but strengthen the admiration of philosophic minds for a religion which, by giving prominence to human types, was promoting Sociolatry, just as the organisation of society was tending towards Sociocracy. The contrast of Byzantine Monotheism with true Catholicism under both aspects should also be remarked. In the barrenness of Monotheistic dogma, the fairies of Arabian and Scandinavian story had been eagerly welcomed. The growth of Saint-worship supplied better moral and even intellectual food. And this the more, that the sphere of each saint became soon much more special than that of the pagan gods, who were never limited exclusively to single departments, since otherwise they would have been hardly distinguishable from the fetiches in which they originated (p. 208).

Educational value of Legends and Church history.

Apart from its moral value, Saint-worship, by its biographies and even by its legends, was of great use in diffusing the sense of historical tradition. The blind refusal of Catholicism to recognise any past but its own was no doubt incompatible with the true historical spirit. But the priesthood endeavoured to compensate this defect by connecting the history of the Church with its Jewish antecedents, and even with the Roman empire; thus enlarging and generalising the historical sense of Modern Europe as compared with that of Antiquity, whose records had been confined to matters of national interest. The full bearing of this change, which became more manifest in each century, could only be appreciated by the educated clerical class. Still, slight indications of the principle were conveyed in the course of common instruction; and these were rendered popular and palpable by the institution of saints-days, which familiarised the Western World with the principal phases of Catholicism.

Statesmen more eminent than Churchmen during Second Phase.

During the whole of this second period the temporal aspect of progress is far more remarkable than the spiritual. A glance at the principal characters of the time shows this clearly. Not a single name of the first rank is to be found in the priesthood; whereas among statesmen we find three men of remarkable though unequal power—Charlemagne, Alfred, and Otho. In the succeeding period the spiritual leaders are more prominent

than the temporal; the contrast, in either case, being due to the peculiar necessities of the time.

Conquest and incorporation of Northern and Eastern barbarians,

Throughout the first series of the defensive wars of the Middle Age, the great object was to complete the European system by the final amalgamation of the nomad polytheists. They were thus induced to fix themselves upon the particular portion of soil which they were then occupying; and their ultimate conversion to Christianity completed their incorporation. It needed an extraordinary combination of repressive with conciliatory measures to put an end to a series of invasions which seemed likely to prove an indefinite check to what was now the common object of all aspirations, temporal or spiritual, the growth of peaceful civilisation. Without proof of the force possessed by Western Europe, tribes to whom agricultural toil was irksome would never have made up their minds to settle within the unpromising regions to which previous struggles had confined them. But the full effect of this display of force was not reached till they had been thoroughly incorporated in the European system; and of this the one condition was that they should embrace the Catholic faith, the recognised symbol at that time of social progress. The value of this gift of civilisation was rapidly acknowledged, and Germany in turn, becoming the barrier of Christianity, repelled the subsequent invasions of northern and eastern polytheistic nomads, chiefly of the yellow race.

Instituted by France and completed by Germany.

Though no part of Western Europe was excluded from this series of events, yet, as we might expect from its nature and conditions, it was instituted by the central nation, none other being then sufficiently organised for the purpose. Italy was disabled by her fatal want of political concentration, of which we have already spoken: Germany was at first excluded, as being herself the object of the movement; though, in its subsequent stages under the great Otho, she did good service. The British constituent, though its incorporation had been irrevocably accomplished by its conversion during the first mediæval phase, was still too undeveloped for any external action. Spain, too, suffering from Mussulman invasion which was now threatening to involve the whole Western world in abject servitude, could only participate in the common work of defence by maintaining a heroic struggle against her own oppressors. Thus it was in France that Defensive Monotheism

first concentrated its efforts. Here the indispensable dictatorship of the incomparable Charlemagne met in a systematic way the necessities of the time both spiritual and temporal. As great almost as Cæsar, and in a better position, his dominion—as to the permanence of which he was under no illusion—founded the Western Republic, and thereby, in spite of the protests of Constantinople, gave the final blow to the Western Empire. His preference for the arts of peace was never lessened by his military achievements; and he thus stands out as the best type of the sociocratic tendencies of the time; a less pure type however than Alfred would have been had he occupied the same position.

Charlemagne founds the Occidental Republic;

With the establishment of the Western Republic the European system gradually changed its centre. This result did not it is true become thoroughly complete till the succeeding phase: but I note its commencement here, because it is obviously connected with the substitution of a voluntary association of states for compulsory unity. So long as the Empire lasted, the political centre of the system was, as I have previously explained, necessarily placed upon the territorial margin (p. 319). But in the free association of modern states the outlying members naturally group themselves round the central nation, recognising its moral leadership in the work of modifying the social order, without the least political subservience. Thus the whole result of the Middle Age is involved in the fact that Paris now became the final centre of the Occidental system, instead of Rome.

Of which the centre was to be transferred from Rome to Paris.

A few remarks on the intellectual movement will complete our review of this second mediæval period. Though still obscured by the pressure of social necessities its importance was now increasing. Modern language, of which the fundamental conditions had been already determined by the previous contacts of invaders and invaded, now began to assume its definite form; resulting, as in the old theocracies, from spontaneous popular growth systematised by the priesthood, who showed great skill in combining the two divisions of the Western world. The priesthood itself, as the depositary of the ancient language, derived advantage from the change. The use of Latin brought steadier direction and closer concentration of their work. It gave effect, too, to the wise restrictions previously placed on the general reading of the Hebrew Scriptures,

Intellectual movement; the old and new tongues.

which inevitably fostered retrograde aspirations towards monotheistic theocracy.

Theoretic and esthetic culture confined to Mahometans.

As to intellectual pursuits in the domain of philosophy and science or even of art, they necessarily remained still in abeyance, so far as the West was concerned; not that the public or its spiritual leaders were hostile to them, but simply from the extreme pressure of social exigencies. But Mahometanism compensated this defect more effectively than Byzantine Christianity had done during the previous period. Making no attempt to effect a separation of the two powers, it was spared the tedious struggles of the Western world to effect this result, irreconcilable as it really is with the whole principle of theology. I have shown how all the complications of Catholic doctrine and ritual connect themselves with this separation. The simplicity of Mahometan doctrine, when the two powers were united, corroborates my remarks. The Mahometan mind was thus free to develope its sociocratic tendencies in the direction of art and science, and rose at this time to its highest point in the two branches which then were accessible, sacred architecture and astronomy. The great name of Albategnius illustrates the sanction justly accorded by Islamism to Natural Philosophy, a sanction given quite spontaneously when it produced a young prince who helped to advance all branches of Cosmology. Before the end of the tenth century so high was the reputation of the schools of Seville and Cordova, that occidentals of note, even priests, overcoming their theological prejudices, resorted to them as the only means of completing their education.

Albategnius.

Abderrhaman III.

Industry and Commerce.

During the progress of the foregoing intellectual and political movements, the general features characteristic of the Final Order of society were coming more and more distinctly into view. Of the emancipation of women I need not speak in detail; this had begun under the preceding phase, and was now simply being consolidated and enlarged, so as to prepare the way for its ultimate developement in the institution of chivalry. But what is specially to be noted is the first appearance of the Industrial order; a fact due to the final abolition of serfage in cities and boroughs. The enfranchisement of the rural population, depending as it did upon freedom in towns, was still unaccomplished. But among the more crowded populations with whom it mainly rested to solve the problem of Western labour, the personal freedom of the workmen gave wider scope for

the essential characteristics of industrial activity whether in the individual or the community. Its full developement however required what was not brought about till the next phase, the distinction between employers and workmen. Manufacturing industry was still limited to what was required for the supply of immediate wants (p. 413), although Commerce was extending its operations, and availing itself of the conquest of Spain to connect the principal capitals of Europe with those of the Mahometan world. There was this compensation however in the narrow scope of manufacture, that its material security favoured the growth of industrial habits.

(4) Third (or Principal) Phase (A.D. 1000–1300), pp. 405–414,

I come now to the third, and principal phase of the Middle Age. And if my general theory of history should have failed as yet to prove satisfactorily the transitory nature and purpose of Feudal Monotheism, all doubt upon this point can hardly fail to be now set at rest. Of the three centuries embraced in this phase, the eleventh, the twelfth, and the thirteenth, the first was occupied in completing the structure of Catholic-Feudal Society, and the last showed signs of its irrevocable decay. Only in the twelfth century does it appear in its true splendour, with its short-lived powers called into full exercise.

Culminated in twelfth century.

Capetian kings were not dictators, but presidents of Feudal Hierarchy.

The first mediæval phase stimulated independence: the second cooperation. In the third phase the prominent feature was the tendency to bring these two fundamental conditions of social union into adjustment (ii. 242). The instrument for this end was the feudal hierarchy, the full establishment of which could not take place till the time came when both necessities were experienced in equal force. The Western Republic had required a dictatorship for its inauguration: but this soon became incompatible with its working, by suggesting a return to the compulsory system of imperialism. The so-called successors of Charlemagne made vain attempts to prolong a short-lived authority which had now became incompatible with social progress. In France where Feudalism was more distinctly developed than elsewhere, the third phase, like the second, began with a dynastic change, which reduced the monarchy to the mere presidency of the feudal hierarchy.

Graduated coordination of independent forces; a type of normal organisation.

Apart from its immediate value as a defensive system, Feudalism stands out as the first type of the right organisation of man's practical forces. Theoretical force, the supreme organ of human synthesis, admits of complete concentration. It

might be condensed within a single brain, could it dispens with the necessary agencies for disseminating its influence But in practical life the case is reversed. Here the capacitie are independent of each other; and the problem is to coordinat them in graduated succession. Of such an organisation the feuda hierarchy is as yet the sole example; presupposing always th division of the two powers, which in the Middle Age was bette appreciated by men of action than by men of thought. I was from a sense of the urgent importance of establishing Feudalism more promptly and thoroughly that England accepte so easily the substitution of a Norman for a Saxon aristocracy a corresponding change to that which France, on similar grounds had made in her line of kings a short time before.

Norman conquest of England.

Hereditary fiefs;

But Feudalism secured independence as well as cooperation Its hierarchical organisation established the latter: the forme was guaranteed by hereditary succession to fiefs, an institution a valuable to the vassal as to the lord. The gradual transforma tion in the tenure of military benefices, conferred at first fo fixed periods, afterwards for life, had prepared the way for thi change. This is enough to show that the motives for it were purely sociocratic, and quite disconnected from any theocratic conception of caste. It was a pledge at once of fitness and o permanence. Its true character is best shown in the rigorou obligations imposed upon the possession of land, under the penalty of confiscation (p. 310), which was frequently applied though not with the efficacy of that more perfect moral standard which the Final Synthesis will supply. The opportune ness of these new conditions appears from the fact that in many cases they were brought about by a voluntary substitution o feudal for alodial tenure, so as to exchange a dangerous and profitless isolation for a regular protective discipline. We find here spontaneously arising that principle of free choice which should ever guide our transition from the absolute to the relative conception of property, so soon as the general rules of Practical life have become sufficiently established.

Forfeiture;

Voluntary conversion of alodia into fiefs.

Influence of women.

Feudalism being now fully mature, two kindred influences, which had for some time been growing but of which the complete manifestation had hitherto been checked, now displayed themselves: the social power of Women, and the institution of Chivalry. The Castle dates from the first mediæval phase, the Court from the second: feminine influence therefore had

already begun to act on public as well as on private life. But its full force was not shown till the third phase, when through the fortunate aggregation of families, every feudal residence being both a castle and a court, public and private life were brought into combination. Meantime Chivalry, the tendencies to which had been steadily growing but as yet had only shown themselves in individuals, now became organised in a large and regularly appointed class, without however sacrificing the due independence of each member. This was a consequence of the feudal principle of primogeniture, which ensured the integrity of the fief and the performance of the services connected with it, but which left many members of noble families without either wealth or official duties: precisely the conditions which the life of chivalry required. The tie which bound them to their families meanwhile remained unbroken; and in the same way women, at the very time that their influence was growing, accepted a position of more complete subordination to their husbands, and substituted the marital for the paternal name, a practice which, however universal subsequently, was at first limited to the aristocratic class. Yet one more step was taken in perfecting the type of family life. The standard of domestic service, even before the complete abolition of serfage, was enlarged and elevated. The highest ranks took a part in it, either in the course of education, or indirectly through certain high functions which were assimilated to it.

Knighthood.

Domestic service.

The full developement of feudalism coincided with that of the central institution of Catholicism, the papal power. The popes now became the recognised chiefs of the Western Republic; the bond of union being simply the similarity of education, religion, and life, systematised by a common priesthood. The Empire, which the necessities of defence against barbarism had localised in Germany, was now merely a symbol of reaction, leading throughout this period to dangerous collisions; the new state of things being very imperfectly understood either in the papal or the imperial camp. Yet through these and other obstacles, springing from the prematurity of the division of powers, papal ascendency maintained itself with credit, so long as any useful function was left to it as the regulator of Western Society. In the three centuries of this period we find three great types; the incom-

Popes presidents of the Occidental Republic.

Eminent types of government:

Gregory VII. parable Gregory VII., to whom the efficient organisation of
Alexander III. the Papacy is principally due; Alexander III., who had the
good fortune to exercise it most beneficially; and the great
Innocent III. Innocent III., with whom the time of its public utility was
brought to an honourable close.

Eminent types of morality. Side by side with these three political organs of the spiritual power, we find corresponding representatives of its moral action; purer types of the priestly character, because entirely unaided by temporal force. The age of Hildebrand was also
Leo IX. reforms monasteries. that of the best attempt to reform monasteries, made by Saint Bruno; who struggled however in vain with the fact that these institutions no longer served the purpose to which their vitality during the first mediæval period had been due. Their chief value now lay in forwarding the views of the Papacy as to the celibacy of the clergy; the danger being lest the general tendency to hereditary succession should extend to the priesthood especially now that their wealth was constantly increasing. The twelfth century produced the man who was in every respect the most perfect type of Catholicism in its maturity, the in-
St. Bernard puts down Abélard. comparable St. Bernard, specially remarkable for his triumph over a dangerous sophist honoured by a love he ill deserved. The final century was nobly inaugurated by the great St.
St. Francis founds his mendicant order. Francis, who attempted, though in vain, the only reform of which Catholicism was capable, the substitution of compulsory poverty for the disastrous wealth with which the priesthood was now burdened.

Worship of the Virgin. To understand the full bearing of this noble reformation which, failing from its own weakness, showed the doom impending over the whole Catholic system, we must examine the influence which it exercised both on worship and on doctrine. In itself it was simply a matter of discipline; but from the first it was bound up with the tendencies towards the supremacy of the Virgin, so prevalent throughout the century of the Crusades, the combined result of womanly influence and of Chivalry. The Virgin was felt to be a better representative than God of the one final object of Western aspirations—Humanity. Saint Bernard had lent his full sanction to this phase of feeling, while endeavouring to regulate it by eliminating the mystical element which impaired its social efficacy. A more decisive step was taken in the thirteenth century initiated by the pious dreamer represented in Dante's Paradise

as endowed with the prophetic spirit,[1] and carried out by the worthy predecessor of St. Bonaventura in the generalship of the Franciscans. The aim of his book, which, though now unappreciated, was then the organ of the noblest aspirations, was to bring prominently forward the third person of the Trinity, and thus to inaugurate the reign of the Heart, eliminating a provisional law which represented the reign of Mind.

Abbot Joachim, John of Parma and the 'Introduction to the Everlasting Gospel.'

This beautiful idealisation of the Virgin, the one really poetic product of Catholicism (p. 373), is due to the collective Western mind, as may be seen by the contrast of the Byzantine type, the origin of which doctrinally was the same. Traceable in germ to the earliest phase of the mediæval period, it is in the third phase that it was first fully elaborated under the influences of Chivalry, prompting hearts unoccupied by earthly passion to adore the Queen of Heaven. And the encouragement given to such adoration repaired in some measure the fundamental defect of Catholic dogma, the omnipotence of the Supreme Power (p. 365). The influence now substituted had no direct action, it could only mediate; it was, therefore, the better adapted to call forth spontaneous emotions of love. And the halo thus thrown round the womanly type rendered it a far more effective precursor of Humanity than the divine ideal had been; failing, it is true, to express her energies of Thought and Action, but giving prominence to Feeling, to which these must ever be subordinate. And thus it has been that notwithstanding the inevitable failure of the reform attempted in the thirteenth century, the worship of the Virgin, foreshadowing the Sociolatry of the future, has always advanced through all the disturbances of modern times in those Western nations where the continuity of moral and social growth has been least broken.

Mariolatry a preparation for Sociolatry.

Let us now define what were the political, intellectual, and social results of this final phase of mediæval history.

Politically it brought about the completion of the Western Republic, the greatest result of the Middle Age, by calling into exercise its collective energies as organised in the feudal hierarchy. As Catholicism proved unsuccessful in checking the tide of Mussulman invasion by conversion, it became necessary to use repressive measures so soon as Europe was sufficiently

Political aspect of Third Phase: The Crusades.

[1] Dante, Par. xii. 140.

united for the purpose. Hence a second series of defensive measures of a very different character from those of an earlier period (p. 402). In the first series, war had only been carried into the enemies' territory with the view of forcing its polytheist occupants to settle there, and ally themselves with Western civilisation by a process of conversion through which other allied tribes had already passed. But in dealing with monotheist nations, defensive war necessarily approximated more nearly to a war of conquest: and fruitless attempts in this direction were made by ambitious leaders of inferior powers. On the whole, however, the crusades maintained their defensive character, in accordance with the wise views of Hildebrand, who even before his elevation to the Papacy had formed a systematic conception of them as a means of rallying Western Europe by the only bond of union, her common faith against the imminent danger of subjection.

Less advantageous to Church than to Western Republic.

Louis IX.

From this point of view they were undoubtedly successful. At the end of the twelfth century, the West had no longer any serious cause for alarm. Their further continuance was due to empirical impulses which, much as we may admire the moral and even the political character of the saint-king with whom they ended, were more and more alien to the tendencies of the times. Danger from within ceased simultaneously with that from without: the decisive victories of the Christians in Andalusia rendering the Mussulman cause in Spain hopeless. The result soon proved equally fatal to both these transitory systems. The crusades of the eleventh and twelfth centuries demonstrated the impossibility of conquest on either side, and their aspirations towards absolute universality of faith thus neutralised one another. But on the Western Republic the effect was profoundly invigorating. All its component parts had borne an honourable part in the struggle, and waiving national antipathies had freely recognised and confirmed the leadership of the central nation—France. And these expeditions were no less remarkable for the mode in which they were conducted than for their motives and their result. Nothing could be better calculated to foster the essential feature of Feudalism, the blending of independence with cooperation. Throughout these long struggles it was to voluntary service that the West owed its deliverance. And this was offered by all ranks, and by all ages in free subordination to the best leaders. Especially in

this true of the first crusade, which was indeed not merely the most spontaneous, but the most decisive.

Intellectual aspect, esthetic, philosophic and scientific.

As for intellectual culture, although, till the close of the Middle Age, it necessarily gave way before the pressure of social requirements, yet the growth of art, philosophy, and science during this final phase was very much more rapid than in the preceding one. Western language being now sufficiently formed for the purposes of Poetry, everything pointed to a decisive attempt to idealise the vigorous life of the time, had it not been for the fatal want of durability in the mediæval system. But what will always remain a conclusive testimony to the esthetic capacity of a faith which, transitory as it might be, was yet complete and universal, are its religious edifices. These belong essentially to the third phase, and especially to the century of the crusades, though, as they were the fruit of voluntary efforts, their completion was sometimes delayed. Of philosophic culture, I need only say that it showed a definite tendency to resume the march of speculation, which since the times of the Greek thinkers had been suspended by the legitimate claims of social progress. The eagerness in its prosecution, while it had the effect of strengthening the prominent position of Paris, could not lead to any speculative discovery. The metaphysical system on which such extraordinary enthusiasm was lavished was a poor copy of that which had long ago been worn out, and indeed condemned, though on empirical grounds. But with Science the case was different: for although no new conceptions of decisive importance were established, yet it stimulated three minds of the highest order in the ranks of the priesthood, Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon and the synthetic genius who forms their connecting link, the incomparable Thomas Aquinas, a man of equal intellectual and moral greatness. Following in the track opened by Mussulman thinkers, the Catholic mind now cultivated the various branches of Natural Philosophy, especially Astronomy and Biology; and began to enter on the new and intermediate science of Chemistry, which bore so directly on modern industrial life (p. 43).

Architecture.

Metaphysics.

Rise of Chemistry.

In this arrangement of the Sciences we see a first step towards the formation of their Encyclopedic classification, which, so long as there was no intermediate term between the study of the world and the study of life, was impossible. They were now seen to form parts of one whole; and the consequence

Thus was supplied the link between Cosmology and Biology.

was that the direction of scientific study passed gradually int the hands of the physicians who were at that time alchemist and often astrologers. The Mathematicians never entirel recovered their old ascendency. And this change was the mor striking that medicine throughout the Middle Age had bee monopolised by the regular Clergy. It corresponded with th fact that Philosophy and Science, separated in the degenerat days of Greek thought, were now permanently united.

Study of medicine by the clergy led to re-union of Philosophy and Science.

The harmony of these two aspects of the speculative mind which found expression in the honour now paid to Aristotle was the natural result of the social purpose which the priesthoo from the first days of Catholicism had kept in view, and whic predisposed them to all synthetic views. Their office of regu lating human life had early led them to feel the necessar relation of moral laws with the laws of matter and also wit the laws of mind. And such views were specially strengthene during the third mediæval phase by the rise and establishmen of modern industry; which, by making the importance of rationa prevision palpable to all, greatly contributed to the recognitio of Science as the basis of philosophy.

Controversy of Realists and Nominalists prepared for Subjective Synthesis.

These two influences brought about that fortunate crisis i mediæval controversy known as the contest of Nominalism wit Realism, which, though it led to the discovery of no new truth yet reduced the question of synthesis to a more satisfactory form (p. 279). During the whole of the final phase the discussio indicated the growing aspiration, dim as it might be, for subjec tive unity based on the substitution of Laws for Causes. In th thirteenth century Science was formally introduced into the cur riculum of ecclesiastical study framed at the time when th schools annexed to cathedrals were transformed into universities And although the scientific *quadrivium* was preceded by th literary and metaphysical *trivium*, yet the course of theo logical study was considered incomplete without it. Th knowledge acquired was indeed rudimentary, leaving out o sight the greatest results of Greek thought: still it was not ti after the Middle Age, when the priesthood had degenerated, tha it was entirely dropped from the course of clerical instruction.

Social aspect; Industrial corporations.

The social result of this third phase was the definite re cognition of industrial existence; the natural consequenc and complement of a series of events which had begun wit the institution of Serfage, and of which the principal featu

had been the emancipation of workmen in towns. These latter, when personally free, had not been slow in throwing off the shackles of a social system which had not been framed with a view to industrial activity, and which therefore could not control it. As far back as the eleventh century, industrial corporations obtained recognition as accessory members of the feudal hierarchy. In Italy indeed, where owing to an exceptional dispersion of forces (p. 400), the pressure of the feudal aristocracy was not felt, the political freedom of the towns was often injurious, by stimulating reactionary tendencies of a military kind (p. 50). But in every other case it was of great service, by giving free scope for the organisation and developement of industrial activity.

Rise of employer class.

The great step to be taken was to effect a definite separation between employers and workmen. The radical transformation of industrial life, from its purely individual to its collective phase, was impossible until the directors of industry had established their authority over the workmen. It is only by working for a future or distant purpose, not precisely determined in the present, that a true sense of the social dignity of labour is gained, and thus a personal occupation elevated into a civic function. The establishment of the employing class followed naturally from the previous emancipation of serfs in towns ; which allowed individuals in many cases to amass the requisite amount of capital. Commerce experienced this change before Manufacture; and thus by enlarging the scope of the latter, helped to solve the principal difficulty of industrial organisation ; manufactures, when fully developed, standing midway between the production of raw material and the distribution of the final result. Before the end of the Middle Age the new mode of activity had taken root in the Western Republic, and its growth in every branch was such as to survive the dissolution of those political and religious ties apart from which it could not have originated. Under the wise management of some remarkable traders, worthy types of the industrial chief of the future, Italian commerce was brought into contact with the Hanseatic league through the agency of the Flemish towns ; the marvellous creation of Holland having already been effected.

Emancipation of serfs.

But pacific organisation would never have become possible, if Agriculture, which is its basis, had not been able to rise from its condition of servitude. It might seem at first as if in this

case, contrary to the general rule, the employing class were in advance of the workmen: since in proportion as their military activity diminished, feudal chiefs tended to become directors of agriculture. But such a transformation was alien to their character and repugnant to the prejudices of the time: nor could it ever take place except in the case of those retarded populations, whose developement in the immediate future will be specially conducted by systematic agencies (p. 208). It was partly the general sense of this incompatibility that delayed the abolition of serfage. It seemed impossible to devise any mode of culture which, while bringing greater profit from the land, should renovate the condition of the labourers. Yet this vast remaining instalment of personal freedom was attained without effort by a combination of moral impulses and industrial conditions, as soon as the pecuniary equivalent for service could be exchanged for the products and merchandise of towns. Too much has been made of a bull on the universal abolition of Western slavery. It was merely the sanction of a revolution which had been already effected, and which was but little influenced by such vague motives, especially in the case of ecclesiastical domains where the serfs had been better treated. When we reflect that Christianity has done nothing to abolish serfage in Eastern Europe, we shall see that the share of Catholicism in its suppression during the Middle Age was due to the priesthood acting under the influence of the situation, and not to the doctrine.

Condemnation of slavery by Alexander III.

(5) Summary of Results, pp. 414–420.

This completes our view of the last phase of Defensive Monotheism, which has now been dealt with both from the concrete and the abstract point of view. I shall conclude by briefly summing up the total results of mediæval history, so far as may be necessary to account for the exceptional period of revolution which followed. It will be seen that Catholic Feudalism, so far from growing stronger during the process of developement, tended on the contrary towards dissolution in proportion as its transitory mission approached fulfilment.

These point to decline.

Failure of Catholicism to become a *universal* religion.

From whatever point we regard the Monotheistic synthesis the contradiction inherent in it is evident; so that any ascendency which for a time it may obtain, must be simply based upon social considerations. Its aspirations for universality were speedily proved hopeless by the appearance among its own followers of dissidences more insurmountable than those tha

separated it from Polytheism. The almost immediate schism of the Eastern and Western churches showed that even populations that had been brought under the same temporal system could not be spiritually united. And the final blow was given by the struggle with Islamism, utterly annihilating on either side the hope of arriving by theological methods at a common standard of faith and life, although the longing for it has been ever on the increase. The monotheistic portion of the white race was divided between two irreconcilable religions, while the yellow race adhered to Polytheism, and the black race to Fetichism.

It had pointed to the conception of Humanity without realising it.

The mixture of populations in the course of the Middle Age enabled Monotheism, both in its Eastern and Western forms, to accomplish its principal purpose—to prepare for the conception of Humanity, by spiritual communion on a sufficiently large scale to give distinctness and prominence to the problem of a universal faith. Unconsciously men's minds were led to seek, though for a long time vaguely, an intellectual and moral rallying-point capable of uniting those whom the absolute synthesis rendered more and more divided. Monotheism had afforded a clearer glimpse of Humanity than Polytheism or Fetichism could; but the contradictions inherent in it ultimately tended in the opposite direction, by creating insurmountable divergences, imperilling Continuity even more than Solidarity.

Its incoherence was both Intellectual and Moral.

We shall see its incoherence more clearly by separating its moral and its intellectual aspect. Its influence on the active energies we may disregard, these being always incompatible with a supernatural synthesis (p. 26).

Intellectual incoherence forced it to evade discussion and rest on its social services.

Itself the product of discussion in which it continued to be constantly plunged, Monotheism was yet never able to make head against the controversies of its own creating. The arguments which ruined Catholicism in after times had all arisen during its time of growth. It could only refute them provisionally, under cover of the social necessities which it satisfied; and this is the only direction in which a philosophical explanation of mediæval dogmas must be sought. So long as such an explanation was really valid, men were tolerant of the most contradictory propositions. Exceptional minds there were, most of them issuing from monasteries, who kept up the successions of heresy. But their best efforts found little response from the public, to whom the end was far more important than the

means: so that these unwise attempts were easily controlled suppressed.

When these had ceased to be important, speculation could not be restrained;

Far different was their reception when the elementa truths of morality had been generally disseminated, so that th humblest believers were on the level of the most learne doctors with regard to fundamental principles, and the onl difficulty consisted in their wise application. The proble then was to organise the new life of intellect and indust which Catholicism had helped to establish, though Cathol discipline could never become adapted to it. Its solutio required a synthetic scheme of the world, of life, and of societ It was necessary therefore to prosecute the objective invest gations instituted by Greek thinkers so far as might be needfu for the direct construction of the Positive Synthesis, whic alone was capable of systematising the life of Western Europe

And then the Church became hostile to intellectual progress.

As soon as the general instinct of this necessity began t stimulate thought, Catholicism, powerless to direct the move ment, became inevitably hostile to it; and thus roused all th impulses of heresy into decisive action. Industry was by thi time sufficiently developed to show itself incompatible, whethe morally or intellectually, with all kinds of Theologism, and espe cially with Monotheism. The tendencies which it fostered wer to neglect hopes of heaven for occupations on earth, and t replace arbitrary decrees by immutable laws, the only means o attaining certainty of prevision, and thus of regulating action.

Aristotelian Monotheism threatens to efface Pauline.

The new turn thus given to the Western mind was indicate in the thirteenth century by the ascendency of Aristotelia over Pauline Monotheism. The former acquired a sort of offi cial sanction from the respect accorded by the Schoolmen t the prince of philosophers who had never before received suc honours. The astrolatric origin of his Monotheistic schem then becomes evident in the increasing influence of astrology which indeed covered almost entirely the departments of th two metaphysical beings (p. 362), who in Aristotle's schem were the ministers of the supreme Mover. Even the mora attributes which St. Paul in his contrast of Nature and Grac (p. 363) had specially reserved for the Divine Action, wer seriously impaired by the influence of Astrology, as we may se throughout Dante's poem. Against these new tendencies which it was powerless to control, and of which no one coul foresee the issue, Catholicism with an instinct of incipien

decline, took violently repressive measures which speedily aroused irreconcilable hatred. Two generations after St. Bernard, who had presented spiritual discipline in its noblest form, the Papacy diverted the energies of the crusaders against heresy, and consecrated the monastic order which had been specially founded to preserve the Faith at any cost.

Church resorts to persecution;

The Dominicans.

And from the moral point of view the incoherencies of Monotheism, so soon as its social utility was exhausted, were equally incompatible with the maintenance of its power. It had successfully maintained continuous progress in purity of feeling; but its inevitable disregard of civic life had never been accepted outside the priesthood. In spite of its elementary precepts as to despising the world and public opinion, the most religious knights were not less anxious than the warriors of Rome to live again in the hearts and memories of others. At no time was there any hesitation in regarding public life as the best guarantee for the steadiness and dignity which private life demanded in return for the training which it gave in true social sympathy (p. 348). The non-existence of inherent propensities to good was, it is true, asserted theoretically; but practical instincts were already leading to a suspicion of the radical inconsistency of founding moral progress upon gigantic egoism. From the first it had been recognised as the problem of Western Europe how to regulate the sum of human forces, their separate developement having been carried far enough during the periods of their special culture (p. 356). Now the Catholic solution was only adequate in the personal sphere; it could hardly be made applicable systematically to domestic relations: and it failed entirely in the sphere of social life, which since the abolition of slavery was spontaneously growing in importance.

Moral incoherence of Catholicism in ignoring Public life and denying the Benevolent instincts.

A course of industrial and scientific growth, ending ultimately in the complete establishment of that universal moral standard which as yet was but vaguely indicated, such was the obvious programme arising from the changed condition of society. Catholicism, though it tended in the direction of this programme, yet was never able to comprehend it sufficiently to superintend its fulfilment. And as, apart from its moral resistance to anarchical tendencies, it could give no help to the intellectual and social movement, it became now irrevocably retrograde. But its opposition, aided though it was by the

Catholicism becomes retrograde.

temporal power, was neutralised beforehand. It was met by the unanswerable fact of the extreme simplicity of the Mahometan creed, which contained within itself the principal heresies of Western Europe.

Incoherence of Temporal regime not disputed; indeed often exaggerated.

These remarks on the necessary incoherence of Feudal Monotheism have referred to its spiritual side only. It was only on this side that its claims to completeness and permanence needed a definite judgment. As to the temporal organisation of the Middle Age the danger is rather that of underrating in our modern ingratitude the real coherence of the Feudal System, so often described as anarchic, though in reality it presented frequently a most admirable and complete type of Sociocracy.

Cessation of danger from Polytheists and Mahometans deprived Feudalism of its vigour.

Naturally the defensive period exhibited less coherence and durability than the period of Roman incorporation. After the second phase of mediæval history polytheist inroads had ceased to be formidable; and all anxiety as to Mahometan invasion, whether from within or without, was dispelled in the third phase. Most of the popes in the thirteenth century were exposed to the shallow and at last hackneyed reproach, that they were abandoning the holy places to unbelievers, the fact being that practical statesmen felt at that time perfectly secure. Thenceforward Feudalism ceased to have any defensive purpose, and being happily unadapted for wars of conquest, its action became desultory and objectless, losing all collective character, and very soon showing subversive tendencies. Still Western aristocracy preserved its superiority in manners. In personal dignity and social devotion it remained for a long time the pattern for the newer elements of society.

Feudal lords incapable of taking lead of new form of activity.

These qualities however were not enough to enable it to retain political ascendency, for which the principal condition is capacity to direct the activities of the time. And the feudal chiefs, as I have already shown, could not even make themselves agricultural employers, much less bankers, who are the only competent superintendents of industry. It was not merely that for a long time Western manners encouraged tendencies of an opposite kind, too plainly perceptible in the present day, but, as will be seen in the next chapter, war was kept up by kings, especially in England, with the view of prolonging their dictatorship. Thus the transformation of Feudalism into Industrialism became impossible: and the West was left as destitute

of practical as it was of spiritual leaders, until the new growth of thought and activity attained sufficiently large dimensions. Here then began the extraordinary revolutionary movement to be described in the concluding chapter, in which the new elements of society worked themselves out empirically, while the old authorities were undergoing spontaneous decay.

Theocratic pretensions of clergy repressed by kings, who try to absorb spiritual power.

And not merely were Catholicism and Feudalism each separately weakened. We find further illustration of the instability of the system in the discord which now broke out between its two elements. For this the reader will be prepared by what I have said before as to the incompatibility of the division of the two powers with the absolute tendencies of theology and warfare (p. 53). The systematic presidency which it was necessary that the mediæval priesthood should obtain, caused it to degenerate more and more in the direction of theocracy: and nothing could repress this tendency but the overpowering sense of its social mission, which proved strong enough to resist the specially corrupting influences resulting from its wealth. That mission sufficiently fulfilled, the papacy of the thirteenth century began at once to claim absolute rule, and backed its usurpations by a series of internal crusades. By common assent the temporal chiefs repressed these extravagances: but they in turn were led to excesses in the other direction, which, though less dangerous, lasted longer. A singular combination of both errors is seen in the famous order of the Templars, which had been instituted during the special pressure of the crusades with the view of allying, under the wise discipline of St. Bernard, military energy with the sacerdotal character. Their contact with Mahometanism had rendered them the earliest organs of theological scepticism; and, exposed as they were to moral corruption on both temporal and spiritual sides, they speedily developed in either direction a most lawless ambition, more subversive though less uncontrollable than that of the popes.

The Templars.

Thus the result of the Affective Transition was to place Western Europe in this unprecedented position, that while the old order of man's life was irrevocably destroyed, the Final State which could alone replace it still remained invisible. It followed that the spirit of generality and the sense of duty were inevitably overwhelmed for a long time by increasing anarchy;

Europe drifts into anarchy.

but for which the new elements, incompatible as they were with the official standard of life, could never have arisen. I close this volume with an account of this singular revolution, which in essential features was common to the whole West, and in which the theological and military system was necessarily maintained in appearance until sufficient preparation had been made for the Positive state.

CHAPTER VII.

POSITIVE THEORY OF THE WESTERN REVOLUTION; OR GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE TWOFOLD MODERN MOVEMENT.

RETROSPECTIVE SUMMARY, pp. 421–424.

UNDER Fetichism, as we have seen, the institution of the Family was established. Theocracy, which followed, organised Society upon the double foundation received from Fetichism, confirming the habit of sedentary life, and creating a dominant priestly class. Being however the earliest systematic form of the social community, Theocracy, after having presided over the initial developement of the various human energies, eventually became obstructive to their further decisive advance. The Speculative and Active faculties were unable to obtain sufficient scope except in populations where an ardour for conquest had at an early stage transformed Conservative into Progressive Polytheism. This indispensable evolution was accomplished in Antiquity by two successive Transitions, both mainly confined to the Western world: the intellectual career of Greece, and the practical career of Roman civilisation. By the first of these Transitions the West became disengaged from Theocracy, and by the second it received a powerful impulse towards Sociocracy. Eventually the two Transitions coalesced; and then in the Middle Age came Defensive Monotheism, to direct a concluding Transition, the special office of which was to institute the due supremacy of the Affections, and thereby to discipline both the practical and speculative energies, whose spontaneous growth had shown the need of control. In the course of these progressive changes the Absolute Synthesis came to the end of its resources both for intellectual and social guidance; for, its proper function having been to found Order, it proved unable to promote Progress except by suffering it to take a character

more and more revolutionary. A subversive tendency was in fact developed in all the three Transitions, as each in turn, pursuing its own exclusive object, helped to ruin Theocracy without being able to establish Sociocracy in its place. But most conspicuously was this apparent in the concluding Mediæval Transition. There a direct rupture of social continuity stood forth in profound contrast with a systematising aim.

The three Beliefs and their results.

Nevertheless by such partial instalments the human Initiation was completed, upon the general foundations which had been laid by Fetichism and Theocracy. Looking at this preparation as a whole, we see Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism, presiding respectively over the universal culture of Feeling, Activity, and Intellect (p. 356). Looking at our moral education during the same periods we find that these three systems specially developed, the first Attachment, the second Veneration, and the third Benevolence.

The Three Transitions and their results.

Of the three Transitions the first having been exclusively devoted to mental progress, had naturally tended to give entire preeminence to the Intellect. The second rectified this error by definitively subordinating Speculation to Action; the third completed the correction by assigning supreme importance to the culture of the Affections.

The Relative Spirit and Pacific Activity still remained to be developed.

It might have seemed that the West having passed through this threefold education, was competent to directly institute the Final Order, the general principle of which was to consist in developing a combination of the two later Transitions by carrying forward the intellectual methods which had originated in the first. But the third Transition having rejected continuity with the past, such a fusion remained necessarily impossible until the two elements of the Normal State—the relative spirit and pacific activity,—had each received a special culture and thereby attained a sufficient growth. For they alone could avail to combine the just ascendency of Feelings over Actions (p. 379), with the due subordination of private to public life (p. 382).

The old synthesis could not direct their developement; the final synthesis was still unformed.

At the close of the Middle Age military activity and the absolute spirit were spontaneously exhausted. Then pacific activity, and the relative spirit decisively arose, and the true nature of the human problem came fully into view. The old forces, which alone it had been possible hitherto to regulate were in truth purely provisional, and their office, necessary but

temporary, was now essentially fulfilled. The forces which henceforward were to prevail—the Relative Spirit and Industry—were eminently capable of discipline, their natural tendency being to recognise the controlling influence of affection over action, and the subordination of theory to practice. This twofold tendency, however, could not take shape until the new forces themselves were decisively developed; a condition equally necessary for the establishment of the rules suitable to their normal exercise. The preparatory course thus requisite had therefore to be in the main empirical, since the old regime, besides being worn out, was quite unfitted to conduct it, and yet from the *speciality* of the Relative Spirit (p. 244) and the *individuality* of Pacific Activity (p. 48) there was the greater need that their characteristic developement should take place under some stimulus of a *general* character. But such a stimulus could not at that time exist. The Final Synthesis therefore had to be founded upon a dispersive Analysis, and Industry, before it could become collective, had to be cultivated individually.

Hence the anarchical character of the Revolutionary Transition; during which however elements of new order were forming.

Hence it was that the series of the three Transitions, which had led the West from Theocracy step by step on the way to Sociocracy, was destined to be followed by an unexampled Revolution; a Revolution in which the decomposing process seems to be unaccompanied by any recomposition. Nevertheless both movements did go on together, and the only difference in this respect that distinguished the Revolutionary period from the preceding Transitions was that its destructive work, which is alone appreciated, concerned the entire system of the ancient order; while its constructive task, which is in the main ignored, was by the conditions of the case directed exclusively upon the special elements of the Final State. This difference necessarily resulted from the more profound nature of the renovation which was now to be accomplished: the regime of humanity was not to be merely modified, it was to be radically changed. When the West passed from Polytheism to Monotheism, the rise of the one had always accompanied the decline of the other, thereby preventing all anarchy, because the later synthesis emanated from the earlier one, which had long indicated the approach of its successor. Very different was the issue from Theologism towards Positivism. Society felt itself in a profoundly anarchical situation. The dissolution

of the ancient regime was palpable, but no sign of the new order could be descried. In fact the conception of the latter required the destruction of the former, as well as the direct and laborious construction of its own proper elements, the general convergence of which could not be observed so long as the opposing system seemed still to subsist. It was not therefore until the Western Revolution was approaching its close, that general conceptions and social aspirations could receive any really decisive impulse; the old organisation having become impotent, and the scattered rudiments of the new order being insufficient.

The previous Transitions though revolutionary had never been without a *partial* synthesis.

The three Transitions, each with its exclusive aim, had more and more threatened the destruction of the fundamental order of society; but their organic character had always saved them from such a catastrophe. Each, in developing one of the three general divisions of human nature, had unduly neglected the other two. Nevertheless, however excessive or even vicious might be the disproportion in each of these systems, it never went so far as to leave Western life deprived of all unity. The synthesis, inasmuch as it was partial, was necessarily always insufficient and precarious; still life, both private and public, at no time ceased to be concentrated more or less upon some definite aim. It was only at the close of the Mediæval period, when Theologism was worn out, that the West began to lose all general direction; which from that date failed more and more during the five centuries that were to elapse before the advent of Positivism.

ABSTRACT APPRECIATION, pp. 424–452.

(1) Nature and purpose of Modern Transition, pp. 424–434.

It was mainly Intellectual, though its ultimate purpose was Social.

To appreciate correctly such a Revolution, we must always conceive it as an intellectual more than a social one, although both these characteristics are necessarily to be found in a movement which was to issue in the total regeneration of Humanity. The Roman and Mediæval Transitions had sufficiently trained Sociability, but the cultivation of the Intellect had remained virtually suspended since its signal advance among the Greeks. And now, under the impulse of the Catholic-Feudal system, the West had just accomplished peacefully the most difficult of temporal revolutions, the irrevocable abolition of Slavery, which taken in conjunction with the emancipation of Women formed the general basis of the final civilisation. It remained only to solve the grand problem which these new conditions presented, namely, how to

organise rightly the life of the people. This was now left to individual efforts, neither the Family nor the State any longer caring for it after the cessation of serfdom. Such scattered attempts did indeed contribute to prepare the new social life. But the solution of the general problem depended principally upon the Intellect, as it consisted above all else in systematising universal morality upon a real, instead of upon a fictitious basis.

The passage from Polytheism to Monotheism is the only movement that admits of any points of comparison with the Modern Revolution; and there the difficulties on the contrary had been social rather than intellectual. For the principal requisite in that case was to prepare the two grand social changes—the emancipation of women and the abolition of slavery—which were destined to be accomplished by the Affective Transition. On the mental side the task was in the main confined to effecting the concentration of the previous polytheistic synthesis into a monotheistic one, with a view to the separation of the temporal and spiritual powers (p. 342). With this modification Theologism was adequate to frame the purely provisional coordination, which was all that general morality then required. But the final systematisation of morality was to depend upon a synthetic study of the Inorganic World, Life, and Society; and this could be attained only after long and severe labours. We must then regard the Revolution which commenced in the fourteenth century throughout the West as consisting principally in the renovation of the human understanding by the complete and final substitution of relative for absolute conceptions. It was thus, both in point of difficulty and importance, a movement incomparable with any other. The reconstitution of society, which will terminate it, will in truth consist only in a decisive application of the new religion.

Critical or Negative doctrine introduced.

These considerations may help us to a clearer idea of the essentially anarchical character of the Revolution. The intellectual regime, notwithstanding increasing modifications, had hitherto escaped radical changes: now it was to be recast. Such a transforming process necessarily continued to be for a long time *critical* before it could become *organic*, because the subjective synthesis could not be formed without the previous elaboration of its objective materials (p. 33). Losing its

ancient principles, without finding new ones, human reason was compelled to construct provisionally a negative doctrine of unexampled nature, which endeavoured to erect into a system the absence of all rule.

Contrast between Constructive and Destructive forms of the revolutionary spirit.

From its commencement the Revolution of the West displayed this exceptional character both in its intellectual and in its social efforts. Thus already in the popular insurrections of the fourteenth century we see the revolutionary instinct everywhere working in two principal forms antagonistic to one another: where its aim was reconstruction, the demand was for Liberty; and when its bent was destruction then the appeal was to Equality. A corresponding contrast is from that time observable in intellectual criticism: now it was the Metaphysical tendency which predominated, now the Positive principle;—the one leading to universal scepticism the other preparing an unalterable synthesis. As the Revolution was more mental than social, the anarchy in theory necessarily even surpassed the disorder in practice. The former was carried to the point of directly denying all spiritual authority and attempting to set up in its stead absolute individualism just as in science the doctrine of specialism was proclaimed and all encyclopedic subordination renounced.

The Destructive spirit was indispensable to reconstruction, no compromise with Theologism being possible.

Nevertheless, however extraordinary the license actually reached in this situation, where no complete discipline was possible, it is important to observe that a condition of Negativism had become not merely inevitable, but also indispensable especially with relation to the intellectual problem. We may respect the design of those who in the hope of averting anarchy would have prolonged the ascendency of Theologism till the advent of Positivism, but we must see that at bottom this was a utopia, as little desirable as it was practicable. For as Diderot has wisely remarked, incredulity is necessarily the first step towards a sound philosophy, though that philosophy itself in no wise consists in doubt. But further, a preliminary stage of Negativism was at the close of the Middle Age the more urgent, because the Intellect could then only escape total retrogression by *complete* emancipation. In truth, whatever sophisms metaphysicians might urge to the contrary Catholicism had reduced the theological principle to the simplest creed that the situation of the West admitted. In the East alone the Monotheistic faith had succeeded without

incoherence in adopting a yet simpler form, but that was possible only by reason of the social policy of Islamism, in which the spiritual power had remained combined with the temporal (p. 397). The mind of the West had, then, to choose between the entire maintenance of the Catholic system, and the irrevocable elimination of all Theologism, putting aside the vain compromises dreamed of by metaphysicians in their impotent ambition.

Before the Reformation Theologism was felt to be incompatible with Intellectual progress;

Now between these alternatives there could be no hesitation, so long as the anarchical character of the modern movement remained latent; that is, during the first two centuries of the Revolution; in a word, until the outbreak of Protestantism. For it was impossible that those who allowed their intellectual inquiries free scope should avoid feeling that Catholicism had become finally incompatible with speculative progress; for the extension of that progress, upon the scientific basis transmitted from the Greeks, was to be henceforth the principal task of the human mind. Science alone was competent to dissipate the indefinite doubts which Theologism was already exciting on every side, and so to institute a true discipline, first of the intellect and then of society. The exploration of the cosmic order was obviously important for the developement of industry; but what was more, all superior minds began to recognise that the time was ripe for founding on a demonstrable faith the direct reign of Humanity, which was now becoming not merely a powerful sentiment but a distinct conception (p. 438). This tendency was the general result of the aspirations of Catholicism combined with the reaction of Islamism. It required, however, of human reason to disengage itself equally from both monotheisms, in order to construct apart from all Theologism a complete and permanent synthesis, such as alone could obtain the universality always sought for, but never reached. Accordingly in the concluding century of the Middle Age we find that a disposition to dispense with Theologism had become common among the true thinkers of both the East and West.

And with Social progress.

Complete emancipation from Theologism, though in the first instance inspired by the demands of the intellect, was presently needed on social grounds. For Catholicism, in becoming retrograde, had lost its moral worth because it was unable to maintain its spiritual independence. It soon bartered that independence for material security, when the usurpations of the temporal power could no longer be resisted. Thenceforth

instead of controlling the strong, Catholic discipline tende only to keep the weak in blind subjection to their yoke, turnin its vague doctrines to the support of a general policy, th reverse of that which had so long been its special honou Such servility was at first exhibited only towards the greate powers of society, but in the end it extended to the least co siderable, so as to revolt generous hearts no less than superi intellects. Catholicism was in itself so repulsive to bot Intellect and Feeling (p. 348) that its proved value f social purposes had alone made men endure its dominio otherwise our pious and chivalrous ancestors would, like ou selves, have felt its intrinsic faults. When, therefore, its tru mission was exhausted, and it only prolonged an official e istence by obstructing not merely the intellectual movemer but social progress also, these latent antipathies followed free their normal course. In all minds of any vigour the emancip tion reached the point of discarding belief in God. For *tha* they felt, was the source from whence the irrationalities tha were beginning to shock even average intelligences dre their sanction: nothing, it seemed to them, could appe strange to the mind that admitted the idea of Omnipotence.

For it was hostile to Physical science,

Western Monotheism, having finally lost its moral an social efficacy, thenceforth deserved no respectful treatmer beyond the gratitude due to its ancient services. Its hollo domination had now become as hostile to Order as to Progres for it put under a ban every attempt directly aiming at th formation of the Relative Synthesis, which alone could institu a real general discipline. I have already shown in the fourt chapter of this volume how the progress of Greek science w arrested by Theologism, but for which Astronomy would ha then achieved those decisive steps which were in consequen postponed to modern times (p. 275). The spirit of oppositio in that case is to be chiefly attributed to the near advent Monotheism, which, having a more absolute doctrine tha Polytheism, repelled more energetically theories of a positi character. If then the Monotheistic belief had not suffere even the developement of physical laws, it would now interdi with special animosity the discovery of intellectual laws an the conception of moral laws.

To Sociological (or Mental)

For want of power to embrace any past but its ow Catholicism always hindered its believers from rising to th

true historic point of view, honourable as were the efforts in this direction of the priesthood during the Middle Age (p. 401). Now it is only by contemplating the entire course of the human Initiation, especially the fetichistic and polytheistic stages, that the real laws of our intellectual evolution can be perceived (pp. 38–40). As to moral laws, Catholicism forbade the very idea that a domain which the Deity had specially reserved to himself (p. 370) could be accessible to rational prevision. Besides, it denied the existence of the benevolent instincts, the primary basis of moral science. Yet it was on moral science that the direct construction of the Final Synthesis was to depend (p. 41). Thus the Catholic system stood in the way of each of the three essential divisions (p. 42) of that synthesis, obstructing physical, intellectual and moral laws alike. Its opposition, resting on inertia, and fortified by self-interest, became as repugnant to Feeling as it was to Intellect, and thus justified destructive tendencies.

science, and to Moral science.

Had the Critical movement confined itself, in accordance with the metaphysical spirit, to mere modifications of Catholicism, it would never have sufficed; or rather it would have raised new obstacles to the Western Revolution by turning it aside from the task of *complete* regeneration. As the foregoing explanation shows, the destruction of theological beliefs needed to be radical if it was to exercise a decisive influence, by permitting the intellectual and moral elements of the new Synthesis to be elaborated. Without such complete emancipation, which might be summed up in dropping the fundamental dogma of Theism, the West would have kept floating interminably between anarchy and retrogression, in a series of vain compromises as injurious to order as to progress. This was in effect felt by many energetic thinkers from the thirteenth century downwards, a century which was in all respects the direct precursor of the Western Revolution. Theological unbelief then developed itself: above all in the ranks of the regular clergy who were most disposed to speculation of a decisive character, and among the higher chiefs of the secular clergy, who were in the best position for appreciating the general direction of modern tendencies.

The destruction of Theologism therefore needed to be complete.

If the course of this revolution could have been systematic, these two centres of emancipation would have enabled it to escape its principal conflicts, and so to be more peaceful and

Imaginary picture of an Emancipation carried out by the

Monastic Orders.

rapid. Animated by a worthy spirit and guided by a sou education, the Monastic orders might have become the nurse of a philosophic priesthood, disseminating intellectual enfra chisement with a wise circumspection which need never ha been soiled by hypocrisy. The Franciscans were especial suited for a transformation of this kind. Under the conditio upon which their order had been instituted, they might easi have rendered themselves independent of the now degrad Papacy; and they had been always disposed, alike in heart a mind, to undertake a religious reformation. Acting in th manner, they might have guided the spontaneous tendenc already active in Women, to convert the prevailing adorati of the Virgin into a direct preparation for the Worship Humanity (p. 409). Thus systematised, the spiritual mov ment might have worthily assisted in the concentration of th temporal power then destined to take place, and have saved i at the same time, from the serious abuses which impaired i social efficacy.

Why such an issue was impossible.

This is of course a mere utopia. I offer it for considerati only for the purpose of showing more clearly the princip source of the fatalities which determined the actual course events. That such a policy was impossible was not chief due to the demoralisation of the clergy, whether regular secular, degraded as both were—even among the Mendica orders—by riches and idleness. The main reason lay in th mental contradiction involved in the institution of such systematic course, since it supposes as accomplished the ve revolution which it is intended to carry out. For the ide could only arise out of the true theory of history, th construction of which, on the contrary, was to be the ult mate product of the Western movement. If that theo could have appeared in the thirteenth century, it would soo have overcome the moral obstacles of the situation. For w see that these became aggravated principally in consequenc of there being no general dogmatic belief qualified to reanima the higher instincts of man, which had been dulled by th exhaustion of theology. The noble aspirations both of pries hood and people, which had just called forth so many effor to establish an effective spiritual government, would hav eagerly welcomed the doctrine which alone was destined t solve the inevitable problem raised by the Mediæval civilis

tion. In efforts renewed on such a basis, and certain not again to fail, the clergy would have found their safeguard against a corruption which was more the result of their impotence than the source of their degradation.

Complete Negativism of the scientific thinkers.

The modern Revolution being principally an intellectual one, it is not surprising that the chief perturbations which marked its career should at first have arisen out of the speculative interregnum which grew up after the failure of Theologism and lasted up to the advent of Positivism. According to the hypothesis just offered, this unavoidable lack of spiritual direction suffices to explain the increasing anarchy which characterised the movement of the West. We thus recognise how well suited to the time was the doctrine of Complete Negativism, which was inspired by the positive spirit, and was always ready to adopt whatever compromises were required by the social and political situation.

Incomplete Negativism of the Metaphysicians.

But though Complete Negativism was the main agent in the revolution it was not the most apparent one. The same fatality—the absence of the true theory of history—gave rise to the noisy career of Incomplete Negativism which was inspired by the metaphysical spirit and became the main spring of Western disorders. Its appearance was inevitable; for Ontology, having conducted the concentration of Polytheism into Monotheism, could remain subordinate to Theology so long only as the latter was able to maintain its ascendency by satisfying moral and political requirements. As soon as that social office of Theology was radically worn out, the natural consequence was that the Metaphysical spirit resumed systematically the pretensions which it had always kept alive spontaneously by originating various heresies. From the thirteenth century Metaphysic had held predominance in the educational course instituted in the first instance for the Priesthood (p. 412): it now aspired directly to the absolute government of Humanity, combining quite naturally Greek pedantocracy with papal usurpation. Such a vain scheme of domination required then, as now, that emancipation should always continue incomplete, in order to allow Ontology to set aside Positivism and Theologism alike. Thus the political ambition and the mental impotence of the Metaphysicians developed throughout the West a disastrous hesitation between the faith that was discredited, and the only faith that could

take its place. Such an ambiguous tendency, though full
dangers, nevertheless became the direct complement of t
true emancipation, and even served to assist its indirect pr
pagation by giving timid minds a bias in its favour.

Scientific Negativism would have sunk into hypocritical dilettanteism, but for popular earnestness.

Complete Negativism, being confined to the higher minc
might have soon degenerated into a system of hypocrisy,
which the general aim of the Western Revolution would ha
been neglected for the intellectual satisfaction of the few.
was necessary that the people should intervene in the struggl
not merely to overcome the political resistance which t
efforts for intellectual emancipation were sure to provok
but above all to continually reimpress upon the ment
movement its proper social destination, which was the mo
in danger of being overlooked because merely speculative d
ficulties were increasingly absorbing the attention of mode
thinkers. For the Middle Age had bequeathed to the We
two grand problems, both equally inevitable: the due i
corporation of the proletariat into industrial civilisation, a
the substitution of a demonstrable synthesis for the mon
theistic faith. These two questions were profoundly connecte
since the true theory of universal morality, which alone w
capable of ordering practical life, could only be reached by
positive systematisation. The people were incompetent
solve the united problems; but they looked with an increasi
interest to scientific inquiries, instinctively feeling, though
a confused manner, that *there* must lie the germ of soci
regeneration. On the other hand the thinkers, being engag
in objective researches, which of necessity could never atta
a unifying generalisation, would out of weakness and also i
difference have allowed these researches to degenerate in
rambling abstract speculations of no real use, had they not be
recalled to their proper social aim by the influence of t
proletariat which urged them to concentrate their scientif
labours upon the subjective synthesis, the only unity hencefor
possible.

Which however, at first, for want of enlightenment leant to Incomplete Negativism.

For such a cooperation it was necessary that the mass
the people in the West should participate sufficiently in t
modern emancipation. But Complete Negativism presuppos
a range of mental culture beyond that which had been univ
sally diffused by mediæval civilisation. Hence this consequenc
the peoples of the West during several centuries welcomed t

incoherent schemes of metaphysicians, who while pretending to consolidate the principles of Monotheism stripped it, piece by piece, of all the institutions relating to life, worship and even doctrine which had enabled it for the time to hold together. As long as this equivocal kind of emancipation remained purely *spontaneous*, it promoted the true enfranchisement. But a time came when metaphysicians, in pursuit of their own ambitious schemes, converted the resentments aroused by the resistance of the retrograde party into a rallying point, and so strove to *systematise* the Incomplete emancipation. Thenceforward it became directly hostile to Complete Enfranchisement.

Thus people were spared the disastrous consequences of being without a Synthesis.

Serious as were the dangers both intellectual and social of this incoherent system, it nevertheless preserved the reason of the West from the disorder inherent in the completely negative state. For in spite of hopes invariably deceived, each new curtailment of the indivisible theological synthesis was at first hailed as a conservative modification, when at most it was only a preservative against absolute scepticism. We may at the present day appreciate the service so rendered, when we observe how the best members of the proletariate often persistently cling to the last rags of Theologism, in order not to be left deprived of all faith whatsoever.

Some of the scientific men aimed at an Objective Synthesis.

In some minds that were fully emancipated, the same need sought satisfaction in doctrines of a different kind, not less illusory, and even more precarious, but essentially analogous. Such thinkers in renouncing Theologism did not renounce the Absolute problem, although Theologism furnished the only solution of it. Few intellects indeed, especially if cultivated, know how to wait patiently in doubt, and withal prepare, as did the true philosophers of antiquity. Hence the vain search after an Objective Synthesis, more absolute than any theology, was resumed in modern times in the West, on the old Greek foundations (p. 280), and with an ardour enhanced by the hope of discovering a substitute for all theories of supernatural causation. The result was to aggravate the general incoherence, which consisted in maintaining the ancient aim while abandoning the ancient and only possible means. By such a course, it is true, these speculative students found satisfaction for the need (more pressingly felt than in Greek times) of provisionally avoiding pure Negativism, which yet

their vain doctrines compelled them to set up under other forms as the true philosophy. The illusion of Causality in this its last stage became especially noticeable in minds devoted to the study of natural laws, then confined to the physicians who soon gave ground for the adage already a proverb in the sixteenth century, *Tres medici, quatuor athei*—'Three physicians, four atheists.'

(2) Organisation of Modern Transition, pp. 434–446.

In thus estimating the nature and office of the Modern Movement, I have in fact entered on the Abstract examination of it. This I have now to complete by describing its organisation and progress. I shall then pass to the Concrete view which I must treat at greater length than in former cases because this concluding chapter is exceptional, in that it deals not merely with the Past but with the Present and the immediate Future. On the other hand, the Abstract view will require comparatively less explanation.

Its various concurrent forces are to be described.

The very name of Organisation seems inapplicable to so exceptional a Transition, the nature of which, dispersive when it was not subversive, rejected anything like general harmony. Under this title, however, I must describe that spontaneous aggregate of various forces which habitually contributed to the Modern Movement. For that purpose I have first to determine the field of operation for the Negative and Positive evolutions through which the West was now to pass.

First Force (fundamental): Women. Modern Transition embraced Intellect and Activity, but neglected Sentiment.

As previously explained, the Modern Transition comprehended at the same time both Intellect and Activity, but always put aside Feeling. This broad statement directly sums up all the essential characteristics of the Western Revolution. Inasmuch as it was destined to develope the theoretical and practical elements of the final civilisation, the Revolution was obliged to neglect that part of our nature which exercises a general control over human existence. For as it was under the Mediæval system that the Affections had recently gained their predominant influence, they could not at this period inspire discipline except by appealing to doctrines now discredited, and henceforth hostile to the new forces, Industry and Science. Again these new forces, though they can now be regulated only by the influence of Feeling, needed in the first instance to develope themselves sufficiently. Morality also had at the same time to disengage itself from the damaging alliance with Catholicism, contracted during the period of its

decisive culture. On the negative side then the work of preparation required that the West should provisionally renounce the synthetic habits which had prevailed during the Middle Age. In short, the necessary break up of the Catholic-Feudal system, the last form of the theological and military civilisation, could not have been accomplished if the existing general views, which were all bound up with the ancient order, had maintained their ascendency.

Thus it discarded the only source of synthesis and broke with the Past.

This repudiation of Catholicism and Feudalism was in every respect the saddest necessity of the Modern Movement, which thus became self-contradictory. For though reorganisation was its goal, it was yet putting aside the synthetic instinct. The West was drawn on to misunderstand and even to reprobate the entire Mediæval civilisation, especially its fundamental institution, the separation of the temporal and spiritual powers. Nevertheless the final problem essentially consisted in combining that separation with the decisive predominance of public over private life which had been established in the Roman Transition. It is true that the continued developement of Intellect and Activity spontaneously produced a universal admiration for Antiquity, which had been falsely judged by Defensive Monotheism. But this reaction was merely empirical, and was due more to hatred of the Middle Age than to love of the earlier civilisations, as we see by the superior honour that was generally accorded to the Greeks over the Romans, in consequence of the modern revolution being more intellectual than social. The result was a more serious break in the chain of the Western past than even the discontinuity introduced by Catholicism. For now the only bond was sundered between modern and ancient civilisation, so as to render any theory of history impossible. Yet only by such a theory was the future of Humanity to be regulated, a juster presentiment of which had been attained during the Affective Transition than under either of the other two.

Women alone by their regret for the Middle Age prevented a complete break of Continuity.

An attitude so full of contradiction could not prevail universally: above all, it necessarily called forth resistance from the Heart. Accordingly, from the opening of the Modern Movement, Women, without either approving or condemning Antiquity, spontaneously regretted the Middle Age. They alone could sufficiently value Feeling, and duly honour the Catholic-Feudal system for having conferred upon it a just

ascendency over the Intellect and even over Activity. For the Western Revolution, therefore, they never felt any genuine sympathy comparable to that with which they had hailed the advent of Catholicism. But this holy resistance of the loving sex is far from deserving to be regarded as an obstruction: on the contrary, it ought to be put at the head of the organising forces of the Modern Movement, which thus was saved from a total rupture with the Middle Age, and Chivalry its sum and substance. The problem then before Humanity could never have been finally solved had that bond with the past been lost. Women preserved it. They thus took a profound part in the Western Revolution as a whole, notwithstanding their repugnance to its subversive and dispersive tendencies, which, though necessary as a preparation for the future, starved the Heart. By such antipathy, so constant and so legitimate, Women spontaneously indicated the final condition of the Modern Transition: which could not issue in the true regeneration of society, unless the loving sex cooperated by upholding the paramount claims of the Affections; claims which are at last satisfied by Positivism.

Thus the feminine influence was the condition *sine quâ non* of the Modern Transition.

The Middle Age, then, by emancipating Women, had laid the general basis for the organisation of the Modern Movement. By their profound influence, passive indeed but universal and constant, moral order was preserved from complete dissolution. With such a safeguard to Order, Progress could for a long time continue dispersive, and even finally become subversive, without irremediably compromising the civilisation of the West. Subject always to this fundamental influence of Women, the organisation of the Modern Transition proceeded chiefly under the general guidance of Science and Industry, the special forces which the Mediæval system had definitively introduced as elements of the Final Order.

Second Force (fundamental): Science. Mathematical and Astronomical studies resumed;

The scientific labours of Greece were now resumed. The earliest efforts were still concentrated on the first encyclopedic couple, Mathematics and Astronomy, until those decisive results were obtained, which had in Antiquity been prevented by Theologism (p. 275), but were now to form the theoretic basis for the intellectual regeneration. This basis being laid, modern reason rapidly initiated the remaining physical sciences, and then under the impulse of social exigencies proceeded to the direct culture of its principal domain the Human Order (p. 37).

True, this plan could not be systematically conceived until the present day; but it has been spontaneously followed since the fourteenth century: for though the necessary laws of the intellectual evolution were yet undiscovered, the course of mankind was empirically guided by them. The widespread zeal for abstract inquiry, which the West instinctively foresaw would be the principal outcome of the modern revolution, naturally called forth simultaneous efforts in all departments of science. These labours, however, so far as they attempted the higher subjects, proved in the main abortive, producing nothing but materials, often of doubtful value. On the other hand special researches, happily directed, led to definite results: these alone now remain.

And the other branches of Natural Philosophy pursued.

Although the successful cultivation of science necessarily continued for a long time restricted to the studies instituted by Antiquity, the mind of the West did not revert to the purely abstract regime of the Greek specialists (p. 263). For the Roman and Catholic-Feudal influences had irrevocably subordinated theory to practice, and shown that speculative labours must have a social purpose; thus discrediting vain researches. At the same time the decisive extension of the scientific domain by the full introduction of Chemistry and the steady progress in the elements of Anatomy, preserved Mathematical and Astronomical studies from their ancient isolation. The mental and moral degradation of our modern savants is apt to give us a false idea of the physicians of that time, who, succeeding the monks (p. 411) in the cultivation of natural philosophy, were at once alchymists, astrologers, and even algebraists. Engaged in carrying forward the work of Archimedes, Apollonius, and especially Hipparchus, with which they had become acquainted through Arabic channels, they were the better disposed to accept the philosophic discipline instituted by Thales and Pythagoras, and above all by Aristotle (p. 281).

Positive bearing of the Scientific movement.

Such impulses towards systematic conceptions were, indeed, inadequate. Nevertheless the thinkers of that date felt themselves charged with the fundamental destinies of Humanity; the decline of Monotheism making it evident that the construction of a truly positive philosophy must be the sole basis of Religion. The gradual study of the universal Order had now acquired an importance hitherto impossible; hence speculations of a too narrow aim were discouraged, and a disposition

arose to explore the lower scientific subjects with a view to ascend to the higher. At the same time there was a direct advance towards the reign of Humanity. The *Sentiment* of Humanity which had been familiar to the best of the Romans (p. 293), had under the influence of the Affective Transition, taken a purer and more complete form (p. 415). Under the same influence the corresponding *Conception* had also been empirically wrought into shape. Nothing but the scientific developement could content the Intellect, nothing but the conception of Humanity the Heart; and both seemed urgently needed now that Theologism was worn out. All true thinkers regretted no less than Women, though in a different manner, the loss of the admirable unity which had been given to Mediæval life by general concentration around the idea of God. Without wishing to return to that provisional condensation of polytheism, they aspired to replace it by a systematisation more durable and more complete, founded upon Humanity. But they felt that before such a solution could be reached, Science must be adequately extended, thereby spontaneously acquiring a noble spirit, and a discipline resulting from its destination although the connection between Science and Religion could only be instinctively grasped at that time.

Negative bearing.

In its negative aspect this theoretic developement reacted on the movement of decomposition, giving it both more consistency and more discretion. I have already shown that *complete* emancipation, which was the only mental condition decisively leading to either intellectual or social regeneration, was always inspired by scientific ideas. But it must also be observed that, had there not been such a firm basis in the background, the *incomplete* scepticism of the Metaphysicians would have produced no lasting impression. From its characteristic incoherence it was unable to hold its ground in the serious controversies undertaken by the true theologians, against whom Ontology never succeeded except by invoking popular passion to the aid of its sophistries. The pursuit of science also preserved modern reason from the degeneracy into which the Greek mind had fallen; a danger still real at this time, when the general condition of the West was giving a provisional ascendency to the Metaphysical spirit.

Third Force (fundamental): Indus-

On the temporal side, the principal directing force of the Exceptional Transition was the growing power of Industry

try. Its positive bearing.

although that new mode of life, like military activity in the past (p. 48), was without any regulation, save such as it struck out for itself in its working. But although Industry was far from having yet acquired a truly collective character, it had been steadily advancing in that direction ever since the decisive separation of its functionaries into Employers and Workmen (p. 413). The desire for organisation was on the increase: even from the outset it had ennobled many individual efforts, wherein the instinct of the West recognised the initiation of a concert more vast and durable than the union for warlike purposes, which was now worn out. Meanwhile the habits of public and even private order, which naturally belong to Industrial life, tended in some measure to regulate it. For this purpose, however, it was most essential that the productive class should concentrate their efforts on their proper social destination, and carefully avoid being led away into warlike schemes which, from old prejudice, naturally held for a long time the higher place in their estimation. In the case of the principal nations, this needful restriction was sufficiently secured by pressure on the part of the older powers of society, as I shall presently explain. The spontaneous discipline thus enforced upon the modern elements provisionally compensated for the fatality which would not allow them to become capable of systematic order, until they had gone through a long experience necessarily tentative and special. In Antiquity, on the contrary, the military principle had provided society at once with an appropriate organisation.

Urban industry alone to be considered.

To display clearly the continuous effect of the growth of Industry upon the general organisation of the Modern Movement, I will now separately examine, first the influence of the employers, and then that of the workmen. This investigation I shall confine to Urban Industry, after having explained how it necessarily came about that Rural Industry was disqualified from taking a share in the direction of the Western Revolution, and could do no more than passively accept its chief impulses.

Rural industry remained disorganised because the landlords were not an industrial class.

This isolated position of the rural population, which still forms a powerful obstacle to the real organisation of modern active life, did not result only from the comparative narrowness of view characteristic of agriculturists, and from the less social character of their daily habits. It was due above all to the fact that this the fundamental industry had been set on foot

under equivocal conditions, which prevented a sufficient harmon between employers and workmen. For the direction of agri culture belonged to the feudal lords, who long possessed th principal domains, and yet remained strangers to industria habits in consequence of their persistently military characte This they could never sufficiently throw off, notwithstandin that they had ceased to lead a martial life. Now although i is thoroughly normal that political power should accompan superior civil function, there must at the same time be du homogeneity between the general organs of practical life an its special agents. With this fundamental condition Rura Industry could not as yet adequately comply. The class c farmers which arose was insufficient to fill the gap, for eve with long tenures they never had the real superintendence c agriculture; and yet they helped to support the ambiguou attitude of the lords of the soil who played the part of offici directors.

Grand division of the industrial Class.

The institution in the West of two distinct classes, employe and workmen, was thus virtually confined to commercial, an more especially manufacturing industry. Nevertheless it becam the most important social instrument through which practica life contributed to the organisation of the Modern Movement.

The Employers.

A powerful directing class is essential, in order to rende operations on a great scale possible. Here then was th principal source of the decisive transformation, towards whic modern industry was tending more and more, as it rose fro a personal to a collective character (p. 192). The use c machinery, which, after the abolition of serfage, had bee gradually introduced, and was necessarily taking an importan place in the new constitution of industry, greatly strengthene this disposition: it contributed to develope the dignity of th workmen not less than the power of the masters. But, i proportion as pacific activity extended and took a more regula shape, the directing class felt their natural responsibility toward their agents enlarged likewise. They came to understand mo and more that the grand problem bequeathed by the Middl Age—the social incorporation of the proletariat—was mainl for them to undertake. Conscious of power and of a missio the best of them became animated by a sentiment of civi grandeur, which, far from proceeding solely from the person instincts, was mainly the result of social inspirations prompte

by their eminent position. They spontaneously aspired, it is true, to political authority; but in this there was nothing to blame, except when they fell into a blind imitation of feudal types, and showed a tendency to disdain their own class instead of a desire to act as its directors. For it was necessary that a proper ambition should be developed in these industrial leaders, in order that they might, as the laws of modern civilisation required, take the place of the ancient temporal chiefs, getting rid at the same time of the ambiguous intermediate class, to whom they indeed continued too long subordinate.

The Employed.

As regards the Workmen, their social influence was already, in conformity with its nature, more moral than political. They gave the Modern Movement the consistency which resulted from weight of numbers. Above all, they gave it dignity; for their position recalled continually the practical problem bequeathed by the Middle Age, the incorporation of the proletariat as the legitimate consequence of their enfranchisement from serfage. Nor was the force of this claim by any means destroyed by the vicious aspirations which made individual workmen often struggle to become employers in far greater numbers than were required to recruit the list of industrial chiefs. The deplorable frequency at a later time of such instances of personal ambition did indeed tend to conceal the true social question under a mere illusory solution; but the necessary failure of most of these attempts was sufficient of itself to maintain the unalterable programme of modern life. Thus, mainly, did the Revolution of the West, while developing an ever-increasing anarchy, acquire a character of moral grandeur unlike anything that had gone before, by pursuing the practical regeneration of the people, the larger portion of whom had hitherto been sacrificed.

Negative bearing of Industry. It stimulated Complete, and bridled Incomplete Emancipation.

Over the Negative movement Industry spontaneously exerted a consolidating and even a regulating influence. I have already shown how it disposed all the Western populations towards the Complete Emancipation, by gradually substituting Laws for Causes, and happiness on earth for salvation in heaven. It was the universal attraction inspired by the developement of pacific activity in the West, which more than anything else excited antagonism between the World and God; amid the vain regrets of Christian moralists, whose complaints already betokened that the final reign of Humanity

was at hand. Again, in the political conflicts which the Modern Transition called forth, the intervention of the industrial leaders, being determined by their natural predilection in favour of progress, generally tended to give the ascendency to the better side. At the same time, practical life restrained the subversive passions emanating from Incomplete Emancipation, which must have been widely destructive to social order amongst the idle populations of Antiquity, above all those of Greece. The fatal rupture with the Middle Age was considerably mitigated by the spontaneous gratitude of the industrial classes towards the Transition to which they owed their rise. Such sympathy, which supported the just regret felt by Women on this subject, was naturally developed especially amongst the Workmen. They were less forgetful of their ancient slavery than the Employers, who were absorbed in practical concerns, and even in the vain desire to ignore their own humble origin.

Mutual reaction of Scientific and Industrial movements.

Thus the two elements of modern civilisation, the theoretic and the practical, tended separately to direct the Revolution of the West. If now we consider their joint effect, we observe how each strengthened the proper action of the other, both in the Positive and in the Negative fields of operation. The natural affinity between the scientific spirit and industrial life (p. 53), manifested itself gradually during their simultaneous career, which was preparing and even announcing their normal cooperation. Whilst Science tended to systematise Industry, Industry gave to Science an assured object, in following which it gained a spontaneous discipline well qualified to check useless speculations. Further, in urging the practicians towards Complete Emancipation, the theoricians found in them the class of citizens that was most disposed to further the entire renovation of human reason.

Fundamental Forces, affective, intellectual, and practical.

In the organisation therefore of the Modern Movement positive as well as negative, the fundamental elements were three: the feminine resistance, which preserved morality, and the theoretic and practical forces which were thereby enabled to act freely on society without endangering Western civilisation. There was however a subsidiary but essential force which spontaneously aided the threefold principal force. This I will now briefly indicate.

Fourth Force (accessory): Art.

It consisted in the influence of Art. The esthetic faculties are of all our intellectual qualities the most prominent and

the most popular, since they are naturally related to the whole of our existence. Under the impulse which they had received from the Mediæval Civilisation, they put forth, during the five centuries of the Exceptional Transition, a brilliant activity, and reached a point of cultivation far in advance of any former period. For want however of general guidance and a social aim they produced no proportionate result upon the general movement. From the commencement their influence was essentially on the negative side, especially with respect to the intellectual evolution: the naturally organic and synthetic character of Art being overborne by the irresistible circumstances of the situation. Nevertheless modern Art modified both the materialistic tendencies of scientific studies and the selfish spirit incident to industrial occupations. If in each of these directions it was always less fruitful than the influence of Women or even than the action of the proletariat, yet in both it spontaneously helped those more important forces, in spite of the vicious organisation of the transitory class (p. 236) which still kept up functions destined in the future to revert to the Priesthood (p. 189).

Heterogeneous forces contributing to Modern Transition.

The Modern Revolution was thus ruled by a natural combination of the various forces, whose function was to prepare by both negative and positive operations, the final regeneration. If the forces emanating directly or even indirectly from the deposed Catholic-Feudal regime had held entirely aloof from this decisive movement, we see now that its course would have been essentially the same, under the sole impulse of its proper elements. But such a neutrality was not possible. I must now therefore complete the foregoing explanation by pointing out how these forces, though of heterogeneous origin, really cooperated in the new movement. We shall see that their imposing rank made them appear to preponderate in an evolution to which they could in truth be only ancillary.

Fifth Force (heterogeneous): the State.

Let us consider these forces, as we did the principal ones, in the order of decreasing importance. First, then, we must note the action of the Temporal power, which, at the close of the Middle Age, had finally reduced its Spiritual rival to a subaltern position. It now exercised both a repressive and a protective action over the whole field of the modern movement, and for the most part with salutary results, until it was forced by the violent outbreak of anarchical tendencies into a retro-

grade attitude, which for a long while had belonged only to the priesthood. Its contribution to the Revolution consisted chiefly in the shelter it gave to true liberty, a fundamental condition of such a Transition. For the disturbing speculations, being intellectual rather than social, at first threatened only the clergy, and occasioned little anxiety to political rulers, whether monarchical or aristocratic. But in the department of active life, the industrial classes were the first to provoke this protective power to assume another attitude. Being still under the sway of military prejudices, they were often carried away into courses essentially retrograde. This was especially true of the employers. For although the workmen continued to evince their instinctive dislike to military life, the ambition of their chiefs was constantly urging them into attempting vicious conquests; conquests that first aimed to bring the rural populations into subordination to the towns, but before long were directed against rival cities. This depraved militarism which was so baneful to Italy in her exceptionally dismembered state (p. 413), was in other parts of the West naturally bridled by the political compression steadily exerted by the older powers, now becoming more and more concentrated. Moreover whichever of the two feudal elements, the central or the local, became dependent, continued for a long time to exert over the general movement—and this is especially true of the local power—an influence more pure and not less useful than that of its successful rival, by furnishing representative types of nobility and social devotion. These displayed the now expiring virtue of the ancient hereditary principle.

Sixth Force (heterogeneous) :the Church.

The influence of Theology was necessarily less salutary because it could only take the form of resistance. Such resistance however proved of service in controlling the constantly dispersive and frequently subversive tendencies, incident to the process of emancipation, which were leading directly to moral degradation. We must even regret that Theology was not still more effective in restraining the metaphysical agitation which was doomed to be perpetually exciting popular passion against every kind of authority, above all spiritual authority, and was thereby threatening to prolong the Revolutionary Transition indefinitely. Again, in opposing Science, the action of Catholicism was for the most part beneficial rather than otherwise. Theorising minds were thereby warned off from social

and moral philosophy, which the ambitious spirit of ontology was tempting them to undertake, before their encyclopedic preparation had been carried far enough. Add to this that the old priesthood spontaneously exerted an elevating influence, by the supreme importance which it habitually assigned to moral culture, in contrast to the growing indifference to morality characterising the revolutionary classes. In this direction, however, the influence of Women was both more pure and more decisive.

Subordinate forces instrumental to the Modern Transition.

Having now pointed out how the fundamental organisation of the Modern Movement was spontaneously complemented by the two elements of the Catholic-Feudal system, I have yet to describe briefly two subordinate instruments of these, which by reason of their noisy self-assertion are still supposed to have had the principal directing power. I refer to the Metaphysicians and the Legists, two classes which, though distinct, were yet closely connected with one another, having both sprung from the final phase of Defensive Monotheism. They were equally ambiguous in character, and had equally transient functions, but they were of unequal utility. In appearance at least, and to some extent in reality, the Metaphysicians became the organ of the Spiritual authority in the Western Revolution, and the Legists the organ of its Temporal government. For the Revolution, though professing to deny it, practically accepted the separation of Church and State irrevocably commenced during the Middle Age.

Seventh Force (instrumental): the Legists.

Notwithstanding their intimate community of origin, education, and even manners, the Legists should always be distinguished from the Metaphysicians, above whom they were soon raised by their connection with active life. While the Metaphysicians had sprung from the clergy, the Legists had issued from Feudalism, and for a long time merited the confidence which, in virtue of the generality of their political views, the ancient Temporal power and the new Industrial element united in according to them. For command the legal class was unfitted, being merely the temporary organ of a hybrid function which mixed up the moral judgment appropriate to the Spiritual power with the coercion belonging to the Temporal power; but for that reason also it was the more disposed to act as a useful instrument of the scientific and industrial forces which were destined to obtain predominance. In the principal struggles of the period the

juridical corporations spontaneously supported the better cause until they were tempted by political successes to aim at a domination false in principle, and incapable of being worked. From the moral point of view the modern lawyers worthily carried on the great work which had been handed down to them across the Middle Age by their ancient predecessors: I mean that of empirically instituting rules for public and private conduct (p. 311), independent of all supernatural sanction.

Eighth Force (instrumental): the Metaphysicians.

With regard to the Metaphysicians, pedantic as was the form of their writings, they always belonged, as they do still, to the literary, rather than to the philosophic class, and their influence during the whole of the Modern Transition did more harm than good to both mind and heart. They were parasitical products of a passion for theorising, which was fatally in advance of its true destination. Debaters,—fit successors of the Greek Sophists,—they were capable of no other work than that of disseminating everywhere the Incomplete emancipation, in the manner I have described above. But as this was a necessary service,—for otherwise the people could not have borne their due part in the troubled movement of the West,—we are obliged to class the Metaphysicians, though in the lowest rank, among the spontaneous auxiliaries of the Revolution. We must also credit them with the diffusion of a Logic, which served for provisionally colligating our abstract conceptions.

(3) Course of the Modern Transition, pp. 446–452.

To conclude the Abstract Appreciation of the Western Revolution, I must describe the course it would necessarily follow; and in doing so I shall obtain the general plan to be observed in the Concrete Appreciation.

During the first two centuries it was spontaneous, not systematic.

We must first of all recognise, contrary to the irrational opinion which still prevails, that the Modern Transition necessarily continued for a long while spontaneous, before it could become systematic. The old theory of human nature, which always exaggerates the influence of the intellect over conduct, goes so far as to represent the Western Revolution as resulting from the advent of negative doctrines. The formation of those doctrines thus becomes inexplicable. This is why the great European agitation is generally supposed to have commenced only in the sixteeenth century; the two preceding centuries, notwithstanding their essentially revolutionary character, being classed as belonging to the Middle Age. This is an error of radical importance. When in my fundamental treatise I laid

the bases of the philosophy of history which has been built up in this volume, my principal difficulty, as regards modern times, consisted in decisively rectifying this radical error, which affected the view of the entire past. But since 1841, all persons of good judgment have adopted, more or less avowedly, my conclusion that the commencement of the fourteenth century forms the true point of departure of the Modern Movement, both negative and positive.

The Critical doctrine sprang from and did not originate the decay of the Catholic-Feudal regime.

Far from having originated the Western Revolution, the negative doctrine could not come into existence until the decomposition of the Catholic-Feudal system was sufficiently advanced; a decomposition essentially spontaneous, the chief component elements of that system having begun to clash with one another as early as the thirteenth century (pp. 414–420). For the several critical dogmas had all this characteristic: each claimed to consecrate a merely passing condition of non-government into a normal type for all time. Now this anarchy must necessarily have existed prior to the metaphysical attempt to systematise it, although that attempt contributed in turn to develope the anarchy. The remark obviously applies to the fundamental dogma of the Metaphysical creed, a dogma which could never have arisen, unless a long series of spontaneous discussions had previously extended step by step a spirit of Inquiry necessarily incompatible with complete Faith. The spontaneous disturbance, therefore, of beliefs came first; and then ensued a freedom which depends solely on the mental situation, no mere decree availing either to produce or hinder it. Invariably the accompaniment of an intellectual interregnum, it naturally arises when the principles that once ruled the mind have lost their ascendancy; and it necessarily ceases as soon as another system of doctrine prevails.

Private Judgment was exercised before it was claimed as a *Right*.

Catholic organisation broke down before Catholic doctrine.

When this fundamental error is corrected, we see that the first phase of the Western Revolution, comprising the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, consisted of the natural sequence of decisive conflicts between the principal elements of the Catholic-Feudal constitution, both temporal and spiritual. These contests were, from every point of view, only the prolongation of those which had preceded the close of the Middle Age; and they gradually brought on the final disintegration of the ancient system, without any help from dogmatic Negativism, the

agents in the work being indeed unconscious of what they were doing. This was especially true of the spiritual order; the Catholic regime was utterly breaking up of itself; though the worship and the doctrine remained intact, except that the movement towards Complete Emancipation was always gaining ground, as minds disposed in that direction were naturally drawn on by the general situation.

Rise of the three Absolute and Negative Dogmas: Right of Private Judgment, Sovereignty of People, and Equality.

This imperceptible decay made the Metaphysical doctrine alike inevitable and indispensable. Its office was to diffuse the Incomplete Emancipation, under the impulse of which the popular masses throughout the West were to take their part in the general agitation, and so ensure the Modern Revolution reaching its social goal. During this phase liberty of discussion was always confined to the authorities; but their constant exercise of it necessarily extended the habit to the entire public, who were often called in by one or other of the contending parties. As soon as this disposition became general and sufficiently pronounced, the metaphysical mode of thought exalted the existing fact of such liberty into an eternal dogma. Thus the fundamental principle of the negative doctrine was produced, ready to be solemnly announced at the first opportunity. During the two political crises which were its immediate consequences, it gave birth to its two complementary dogmas, the Sovereignty of the People, and Social Equality. Thus gradually arose a unique system of Absolute Negation, which under each of the three aspects of our nature set up the condition of non-government as the type of the regeneration of Humanity.

Revolt of Netherlands and English Rebellion.

These dogmas *directly* defeated retrogression, and *indirectly* led to substitution of Relative for Absolute.

Such a consecration of modern anarchy would necessarily become as antagonistic to the Final, as it was to the Provisional regime, when once the demolition of the latter had gone far enough to make a direct reconstruction possible, and even urgent. But up to that point, which was the proper issue of the general agitation of the West, the Revolutionary doctrine, in following its bent, fulfilled an indispensable office. It made manifest the hopeless dissolution of the ancient system, and indirectly prepared the true reorganisation, which was the only refuge against an entire subversion of society. Over and above the immediate services rendered by these anarchical dogmas in defeating retrograde tendencies, we are bound to own that, but for their temporary triumph, the West could never have been

moved irrevocably onwards towards the normal order of human existence, or have even clearly discovered its fundamental principle.

Spontaneous phase common to West.

Thus the Modern Revolution shows two modes, or rather two successive degrees: the one spontaneous, belonging to its first two centuries, the other systematic, which prevailed during the last three. The initial phase was necessarily common to the whole of the West. National varieties it might have; but such diversities were always mere transient results incident to the main process of disintegration; they never affected its substantial accomplishment, which was equally decisive everywhere. It is the spontaneity of this unperceived movement which has led to the unscientific confusion of the first two centuries with the Middle Age, of which they seemed to be a simple continuation; the process of dissolution not being noticed until the Protestant explosion, when it is evidently already consummated. No sooner, however, had Negativism arisen, than material disorder followed upon spiritual anarchy; and then, but too late, the dangers of the situation dawned upon those populations of the West which, in consequence of their previous incorporation into the Roman polity, had been sufficiently penetrated by the influences of the Affective Transition. Progress now became directly incompatible with Order; and the West naturally fell asunder into two opposite camps. In one of these the negative doctrine was welcomed in the interest of progress, in the other it was repudiated by instinctive fears for morality. The Northern couple took the former course, the Southern couple took the latter; and necessarily so; the result in either case being determined by a long chain of antecedent circumstances, commencing before the constitution of the Western republic (p. 403), which was now for the time dissolved. Amongst the central people, sympathies arising from geographical position enabled the retrograde principle to triumph officially over the anarchical movement, but only after a protracted struggle, the effect of which was to dispose this nation before long to the Complete Emancipation.

Attitude towards Systematic phase of England and Germany; of Italy and Spain;

Of France.

It was desirable that the Systematic phase should not prevail everywhere.

When we reflect upon it, this partition of the West will appear to have been just as necessary for the systematic, as the previous unanimity had been for the spontaneous decomposition. If the spontaneous movement had not taken place everywhere, the Republic of the West would now have been destroyed with-

out any power to reconstitute itself. On the other hand, the Incomplete Emancipation had universally prevailed, tha illusory solution would for an indefinite time have turne aside the Western peoples from the true regeneration, whil the chief dangers of anarchy would have continued to increas So also, had the Catholic policy of resistance succeeded through out Europe, it would have become the basis of a systemati reaction, directed above all against the Complete Emancipatio which had hitherto been unperceived and even tolerated. Ther was nothing fortuitous, then, in the division: on the contrar such division was the decisive mark of the second part of th Modern Revolution.

Systematic phase divided into Protestantism and Deism. The latter prevailed chiefly in France.

But if we compare this part of the Revolution with th first we soon observe that it consisted of two successive phase distinguished by different dogmatic conditions, which, again prevailed in different local areas. So long as the decompositio continued spontaneous, the process, as has been stated, wa essentially uniform everywhere. But when it became system atic, degrees appeared; the reason being that the negativ doctrine at first represented merely the Incomplete Emanci pation, which was disposed to go different lengths toward Completeness. In the two northern nations, this semi-enfran chisement, having officially triumphed, established a repressiv action more antagonistic to the Final regeneration than ever the policy of resistance, which obtained in the southern couple But the central people to which, ever since the foundation o the Western Republic, had belonged the freely accepted lead ership of the common movement, now assumed the initiativ in a radical negativism openly incompatible with every modi fication of the ancient system. Preserved from Protestantism the French nation was able to pass directly from Catholicism to Complete Emancipation, although at first it seemed inclined to stop at Deism, a vain scheme differing from the now decayed Christianity in nothing but the rejection of Revelation, which is the necessary basis of every practicable Monotheism (p. 361). I recently mentioned reasons for considering the first stage of negativism both inevitable and indispensable: the same reasons lead to the like conclusions with reference to this final stage; and I need not give here special explanations which belong more properly to the concrete appreciation. But if Deism was an essential step, without which the Western Revolution must

have failed entirely, we also see that such a condition was properly required only in the Central People, although it was afterwards empirically imitated in the surrounding countries where its presence was an evil.

Chronological determination of the Three Phases.

By combining this subdivision with the principal division we are able to construct the general plan of the Exceptional Transition which from the sociological point of view is mapped out into three successive phases, in which the decomposition is first Spontaneous, next Systematic but Incomplete, and lastly Systematic and Complete. The first phase comprises the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; the second carries us to the simultaneous triumph of Gallicanism and Anglicanism at the commencement of the last half-generation of the seventeenth century; the third brings us down to the advent of the revolutionary crisis in France. Though this distribution seems here determined by the movement of decomposition only, it will appear, when I come to examine the entire subject in its concrete aspect, to correspond no less with the movement of recomposition. But the character of the latter being less marked, it was better in the first instance to construct our plan without reference to it.

Gradual aggravation of anarchical symptoms;

The course of these three phases, the Spontaneous, the Protestant, and the Deistic, will be found to present a continuous developement of all the intellectual and social characteristics, whether positive or negative, which I have assigned to the Western Revolution. In proportion as the old creed dissolves away, we see mind isolating itself from mind and choosing a narrower range, while an increasing preference is given to study of detail over general views (pp. 31, 423). At the same time we observe intellectual anarchy gradually impairing established moral precepts: first those relating to public life, then those which concern the domestic relationships, and at last even those which regulate personal conduct. An increasing spirit of egoism tends to destroy the best traditions of the Middle Age, gradually bearing down the resistance of the female sex under the ambitious promptings of undisguised pride and vanity, and, too often, of transparent greed. All trace of the normal separation of the two powers disappearing before the usurpations of the State, polity becomes materialised, and everywhere there is a cry for *laws* to regulate what must depend solely on *manners*.

Accompanied by

On the other hand, notwithstanding the increasing speciality

growth of Positive and Industrial reconstruction.

of scientific investigations, speculation soon produced decisi results, which directly contributed to prepare the Final Synthes Already a larger knowledge of the order of external natu had given rise to a positive faith, which, as its ascenden extended, restricted metaphysical vagaries to the field in whic for want of Laws, Causality still bore sway. At the san time industrial progress, now drawn into closer connection wi the scientific spirit, was more and more tending to organi active life, by its institution of the hierarchical order of th productive classes (p. 440). Industrialism also exerted an i fluence which counteracted the metaphysical assaults on m rality, so that, in the midst of modern anarchy, increasi civilisation continues to involve a decreasing preponderance the personal instincts, especially the nutritive and the sexua Despite then the dissolution of the old bonds of union and th imperfection of the new, the movement of recomposition, co fined though it was to *special* departments of thought, w maintaining the Western Republic against the various influenc that were at work to subvert it, and so was already indicatin its future fitness to form the basis of a *general* reorganisation

CONCRETE APPRECIATION, pp. 452–509.

It is these two simultaneous movements which I have no to judge, following the plan just laid down. I shall carry on to the present time by adding the Positive estimate of th French Crisis, which was necessary to complete the Weste Revolution, and will be the direct source of Regeneration

(1) First or Spontaneous Phase, (A.D. 1300–1500), pp. 452–464.

During the first phase of the Modern Movement the vario contests which had been commenced in the Middle Age we carried on with marked aggravation, thus involving the irr vocable decomposition of the theological and military syste The priesthood throughout the West is reduced to subjectio by the government; and, concurrently, one of the two elemen of the feudal polity, in some countries the local, in others th central, is radically subordinated to its rival. Then, as th inevitable issue of this break up in Church and State, the appears a temporal Dictatorship, which maintains materi order in the midst of the intellectual and moral disorder, a thus provides the necessary security for constructive effor towards the final reorganisation.

(a) Negative movement, pp. 452–457.

The degradation of the Spiritual power belongs mainly the fourteenth century; the concentration of the Tempor power to the fifteenth.

(a) Spiritual decomposition. Popes at Avignon.

The sovereignty which the popes of the thirteenth century for a moment usurped over the sham empire of the West was soon outweighed by the decisive ascendency established by the head of the central nation over the degenerate occupants of the Holy See, the papacy being during two generations reduced to the most unequivocal dependence. How far it had fallen from its high authority throughout the West was then made clear by the total failure of the efforts, worthy as they were, made by the priesthood, to prevent the deplorable wars of that period, wars whose source was mere ambition that had no longer any systematic check. When the Holy See recovered its nominal liberty, the Popes were so conscious of the irretrievable decline of their authority that they henceforth directed their chief attention to their local dominion in Italy, which up to this time they had regarded as a matter of quite secondary interest.

National Churches resist authority of Pope. Great Councils.

This voluntary abdication on the part of the Papacy soon led to a dissolution of the ties which had kept the various national clergies in subordination to its central control. Each national church seeing the Pope powerless to direct the West, and finding itself dependent on the Temporal power for material existence, accepted the headship in things spiritual usurped by that power. The fifteenth century was from its commencement distinguished from the foregoing one by a decisive coalition of the national clergies against the central sacerdotal authority. They strove to make the Pope systematically submit to the periodical control of an insurrectionary assembly.

National churches become dependent on Governments; and corrupt.

Upon this break up of its organisation Catholicism everywhere fell into a state of incurable decay, although the creed still remained officially intact, if we except the steady progress of the Complete Emancipation, which such a condition of the ecclesiastical world naturally favoured. The Priesthood, having lost their general power over the West, proceeded next to cut away the root of their national authority, by renouncing their spiritual independence for the sake of preserving a mere material existence. The bargain thus irrevocably struck soon destroyed the credit of the body. Henceforth they were ready to make their doctrines give an absolute sanction to the usurpations of the Temporal power, regardless of the moral office which had formerly been the foundation of their ascendency (p. 395). Thus forsaking her social mission, the

Church in every country sank into irretrievable corruption such as Dante had long before indicated in the speech h assigns to St. Bonaventura[1] respecting the degeneracy of th monastic order, best qualified by the principles of its institu tion to renovate the clergy (p. 430). Hence arose the desire, s unanimously felt in the fifteenth century, for an empirica reform which was to regenerate the head and body of Catholic ism without altering its fundamental constitution.

(β) Temporal decomposition. Concentration of power.

Although the old system broke up as completely on its Tem poral as on its Spiritual side, yet the dissolution of Feudalism wore a very different form from that of Catholicism, since it con sisted in strengthening the forces which were alone then capabl of preserving the West from entire anarchy. Dictatorships wer established by a series of efforts prompted by ambition an not by any far-sighted purpose. This ambition was often retro grade in its tendencies, especially as regards war, which, no that the Popes were powerless, broke out with a mischievou vigour not possible in the Middle Age. Hume has wit justice represented the deplorable hostility of the English t France during this period as chiefly due to the culpable polic of their kings, who hoped so to find vent for the rebelliou pugnacity of their nobles. A similar policy can alone explai the singular fact that the dominion of the Arabs was allowe to linger on in Spain, although it had received its death-woun in the middle of the thirteenth century. However, notwith standing all such baneful instances of misdirection, the result o power having no longer either counsel or check, the tempora dictatorship for a long time maintained an influence whic was as favourable to progress as it was indispensable to order.

Two forms of Dictatorship.

To frame a proper conception of the nature and office o this dictatorship, we must in the first instance distinguish it two general forms: the monarchical and the aristocratic.

Monarchical (or normal) form exemplified in France.

The monarchical form was the only fully normal one because there was a spontaneous tendency in the feudal consti tution to give the central power ultimate predominance ove the local, as we see for example in the forfeitures incident t the regime of fiefs. The original tendency in this directio more and more prevailed as the anarchy in spiritual affair made the concentration of the temporal authority more urgent To that end everything now converged especially in France

[1] Paradiso xii. 112–126.

where, since the close of the Middle Age, the characteristic features of the Western movement had been most clearly marked. Under the eminent Louis XI., the best type of the modern dictator, the ancient system was broken up, and the elements of the new system developed, to an extent which contrasts strikingly with the backward conditions of the countries in which aristocracy tended to prevail over royalty.

Aristocratic (or incomplete) form in Venice and England.

In maritime nations, however, the temporal dictatorship took the aristocratic form. It suited them, because such populations were more exempt from war, and were also more addicted to commercial conquests, which made it possible for the leaders of industry to be incorporated with the ruling nobility. Venice was the earliest example of this exceptional polity. But the most remarkable developement of it was in England, where the Norman invasion had given rise to a special class intermediate between the nobles and the burghers. The artificial nature, however, of this incomplete form of the dictatorship was shown by the lateness and difficulty of its institution, which did not take place until the Modern Movement had reached the end of the Protestant phase; whereas both in Spain and in France the complete dictatorship had been established by the end of the earlier phase.

Moral office of Aristocracy, under Monarchies.

While, however, in most countries of the West the central or monarchical element of the Temporal power became paramount, the local element found compensation for political decadence in developing its moral dignity.

Especially of noble ladies.

During all this phase the nobility, especially in France, furnished the new classes of society with important models, both of sentiment and conduct—thus proving that hereditary wealth may have a salutary effect, even when unaccompanied by hereditary functions (p. 202). But such examples were chiefly to be found amongst the affective sex, the social mission of which lay at that time with its aristocratic members, they alone being sufficiently penetrated with the mediæval spirit to maintain a just resistance to modern anarchy. There was, however, an admirable exception which, even thus early, announced the final superiority of the proletarian woman, in the case of the incomparable heroine who devoted herself with such precious results to the independence of France.

The Maid of Orleans.

Paid armies, and Taxation.

The institution of mercenary troops expanding into standing armies was gradually developed during the whole course

of this phase, and is a broad proof both of the profound decay of military habits and of the decisive predominance of peaceful activity. For, except by the combined operation of these two general currents, we cannot explain how every nation in the West now came to adopt an innovation, which was so incompatible with the pride of the military character, that either the Roman or the feudal society must have rejected it with disdain. But, more than this, the moral degradation of the nobility commenced when they preferred to accept a function which converted them into passive instruments of the political authority, rather than place themselves at the head of the agricultural classes and superintend the cultivation of their domains (p. 414). Nevertheless, standing armies proved at this time a most useful support to the monarchical dictators, and for a while without inducing warlike excesses. They were at first employed as a means of order; thus announcing their final transformation into an engine of police, when the West shall have got rid of those anomalies which form the source of modern wars. Further, the expense which permanent armies entailed led to the introduction of continuous taxation, which had been an impossibility in the Middle Age. Such taxation had a tendency, which was soon shown, to institute a relation between private fortunes and public needs, and thus to initiate a special feature of the sociocratic regime.

Standing Army of Charles VII.

This phase should be considered the one most favourable to the useful action of the Legal class, especially the judges for as they then held in the political system a merely subordinate position, such as suited their true character, they were saved from a corrupting ambition. They rendered valuable assistance in concentrating the temporal authority: at the same time by means of their empirical rules they succeeded in putting a check upon the arbitrary tendencies of the dictatorial power which they generally supported. Their influence was chiefly developed in maintaining the security of Property. This fundamental institution, in consequence of the principle of confiscation being no longer guarded by the feudal rules, seemed threatened with an instability that must have proved directly incompatible with the free career of practical life. The only resource which the lawyers had to prevent or repair that danger was to reestablish the right of independent ownership sanctioned by the Roman regime, which, however

Lawyers check arbitrary government and secure property.

did not claim for property the inviolability now insisted upon (p. 310). This return to the absolute principle of Theocracy became, if we compare it with the mediæval practice, a real retrogression, of which the West now feels the effects in the subversive tendencies which it has provoked. At this time, however, it was rendered necessary by the exigencies of the situation, for no other guarantee for property was then possible.

Political immorality systematised.

So far as concerns the movement of decomposition, we may sum up the whole of this phase in the decisive advent of the temporal dictatorship. For this result represents both the mental anarchy and the moral corruption of the time in the increasing materiality of political aims. An avowed egoism in fact became more and more supreme in politics. We even find a writer erecting this low morality into a system and treating one who personified it as a type of statesmanship. And though it was only in Italy that such principles were avowed, where, owing to the exceptional disunion, base means could not be disguised under any great end, the disposition was universal.

Machiavelli and Cæsar Borgia.

(*b*) Positive movement. pp. 457–464.

In the Positive movement during the first phase of the Modern Transition, I have to estimate first the Theoretic, then the Esthetic, and lastly the Industrial developement.

(*a*) Philosophic and Scientific Results. These were only preparatory, the time not being even now come for the decisive step in Astronomy.

It was not at this time within the competence of abstract speculation to produce any decisive result in either Science or Philosophy, because Complete Emancipation was not sufficiently advanced to allow of the renovation of Astronomy, which was about to form the principal province of objective inquiry. Although the decline of Monotheism had brought into clearer view the importance of the Positive belief as being the only guarantee now possible against absolute scepticism, yet on the other hand that very decline, and all the more because it was spontaneous, showed with increasing plainness how serious was the final incompatibility of real science with all theology whatever. Accordingly intellectual emancipation had to become more general before mathematics could venture to proclaim irrevocably the double movement of the earth. Nevertheless, towards the end of this phase there was manifested, to a degree before unknown, a presentiment of this decisive step, and also of its reaction on Philosophy, in the writings of a remarkable though vague thinker whose moral integrity was not affected by his elevation to the highest ecclesiastical dignities. Not

Nicholas of Cusa.

to speak of the stimulus furnished by the developement of Chemistry and the advance in human anatomy, the final preparation that the new Astronomy required was now accomplished by the extension of algebra and trigonometry, each in close connection with the other. The Arabs had substituted sines for chords: the mathematicians of the West now introduced the tangent.

Still speculation was for a time encyclopedic.

In this phase we should especially remark the constitution of the theoretic movement, both as regards the speculations pursued, and the speculating class. It was founded on the conceptions, truly encyclopedic though necessarily imperfect, which prevailed during the thirteenth century (p. 411).

Healthy study of Astrology and Alchemy.

It is entirely summed up in the simultaneous culture of astrology and alchemy, carried on chiefly by the physicians. Such a scientific regime was very superior to that fostered by the Academies towards the close of the second phase, and still more during the third. In its scope it admitted of great results; it only failed to produce them in consequence of the general intellectual situation of the West.

Importance of Chemistry as a link in the scientific chain.

It has been too little observed how important from the encyclopedic point of view was the definitive introduction of Chemical conceptions into the system of Natural Philosophy. Chemistry, though it had made its appearance in the last phase of the Middle Age, did not show its decisive character until the first phase of the Modern Transition, when the physicians, who had succeeded to the place of the monks in scientific culture, spontaneously directed their researches towards the principal destination of Chemistry, the linking of Biology to Cosmology (p. 43). A further consequence was that the fundamental dogma of the invariability of natural laws underwent its most difficult transformation, in being extended to phenomena eminently modifiable. The scientific appreciation of such phenomena at last cleared true Fatalism of the absolute character (p. 134), which had been a bar to its complete generalisation.

Although Astronomy and Chemistry continued too much apart for want of the intermediate science of Physics, which was not formally instituted until the succeeding phase, yet the gap between them was more apparent than real, because Physics, properly so called, were then distributed in a confused manner between those two sciences. There was nothing therefore to

prevent thinkers from apprehending the principal encyclopedic relations, so far as the recognised range of science and philosophic aim permitted. Such comprehensiveness of theoretic views, which was afterwards lost until the advent of Positivism, became during this period familiar to physicians. They felt the importance of Chemistry, both in its abstract and its concrete relations, to the science of Biology and the art of Medicine; and they were unable to separate it from Astronomy. Natural Philosophy being thus united on the one side to its mathematical basis, on the other tended to advance towards the human province, which was to be its ultimate destination, and the necessarily indivisible life of Man began to be the subject of positive study in its most simple and general aspect, namely, the material one. The audacious projects which were at this time put forth, having for their aim to make humanity more perfect in its material conditions, have been too much misunderstood since scientific conceptions have suffered general dispersion. True philosophers, however, will always see in those speculations the power of the encyclopedic regime, which was afterwards dissolved in the anarchy of academic specialities.

Philosopher's stone: Elixir vitæ.

As regards philosophy, the tendency of such a regime was to modify the general system of human thought by carrying further than the Middle Age had done the ascendency of Nominalism over Realism. The success obtained in this direction constituted the most decisive step towards the direct advent of the sound philosophy, until Hume's stimulating inquiry and the results worked out by Kant. Not only did it announce the final substitution of Law for Cause, but it likewise indicated, in the midst of the preparatory objective investigation, the presentiment of a subjective synthesis: I refer to the importance claimed for artificial logic as the provisional bond of all our thoughts (p. 280). Although the organs of this reaction of science upon philosophy were more often monks than physicians, yet none the less was the movement essentially related to the encyclopedic studies peculiar to the latter. Doctrinal considerations lead us to such a conclusion; but there is also the historical fact that the study of medicine had an especial attraction for the monks, so much so that the popes had specially to forbid it to them by several bulls.

Reaction of Physical Science on Philosophy.

At the opening of this phase, under the unperceived

(β) Esthetic Results. The Divina Commedia; its modern spirit.

impulse derived from the Middle Age as a whole, the Modern spirit developed its esthetic side and produced the incomparable epic, which still forms the highest glory of human art. Although the aim of this characteristic poem was to idealise Catholicism, yet the predominant spirit is that of the Revolution. Not only does the sceptical tendency find special vent in occasional protests; we recognise it above all in the audacity of the general conception; for to subject religious beliefs to poetical judgment was to admit that they were decaying. Such treatment of such themes would in the foregoing century have been reprobated as sacrilege; and in the succeeding one would have seemed superfluous. Again, though Dante's disposition was to care only for the intellectual aspects of the mediæval civilisation, he unconsciously pictures its social character, admirably yielding himself to its moral influence, as in the cardinal instance of his abhorrent condemnation of treachery (p. 385). Lastly, his announcement, in vague but profound language, of the final regeneration completes the fitness of this poem to represent the Modern Revolution as a whole, and even to serve as a conspectus of human history, although his blind partiality for Classical Antiquity obscures the dependence of the present upon the whole range of the past.

Mystic compositions.

Great as was the impulse imparted by such a brilliant example, it was insufficient to enable Dante's successors to overcome those obstacles to Art which rapidly arose from the now shifting and confused character of the general situation (p. 374). Moreover, the fresh forces of inspiration were spoilt by the classical tendencies of the time, especially by the honour paid to the Greeks in preference to the Romans, whose superiority was felt by the legists alone. Nevertheless, in the fifteenth century, the poetic movement yielded an admirable fruit in the mystic compositions that issued from the monastic class, which had naturally escaped the special form of degeneracy just mentioned. These constitute the last product of Catholicism. Posterity will never cease to revere the rude but sublime outline of the systematic picture of human nature, the origin of which a vain erudition now dares to contest, robbing the humble author of his glory in order to assign it to the metaphysical spirit which is justly reprobated in his book. In reading it, we may, by merely substituting Humanity for God, continually recognise the spontaneous presentiment of the normal harmony of our existence,

The Imitatio Christi of Thomas à Kempis falsely attributed to Gerson.

even in the midst of a synthesis which, though necessarily imperfect, is yet always superior to the dispersive theories of the Revolution. In passages where such a substitution becomes impossible, we can easily verify to ourselves that the sole hindrance is the egoistic character inherent in the provisional system (p. 376). The compositions of this order, notwithstanding their speculative appearance, are essentially esthetic works; and they characterise, from the sociological point of view, the second century of the Western Revolution. In the previous century the genius of Catholicism had been devoted to the spiritual government of society; in that which followed it was to be absorbed in controversies for self-defence: in this century alone it could foster the mental and moral disposition required for the production of such mystic pictures, which were continued a little while longer by the other sex, and then ceased altogether. St. Theresa.

(γ) Practical or Industrial Results.

With regard to the developement of Industry during the initial phase of the Modern Movement, I have first to examine its nature, then its organisation, and lastly its result.

Nature of Industrial movement. Manufacture and inland trade predominate over foreign commerce.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries all the essential branches of material production received increased attention, but the chief care was bestowed on manufactures, in preference not only to agriculture, but also to commerce, at least to foreign commerce. For there could be no *moral* reconstruction of the Western Republic, to make up for its *political* dissolution, until the progress of industry should have inspired all the component populations with sympathies based on practical life, but strengthened also by agreement in intellectual, and even esthetic views. Till then every modern people was exclusively occupied with improving its own position, and would therefore pay chief attention to manufactures, together with the internal commerce incident thereto. The disadvantages of such restriction were naturally diminished, especially in France, and to a nearly equal extent in Spain, by the establishment at this period of the temporal dictatorship, which absorbed the industrial cities in the great nationalities then provisionally instituted. This superior importance acquired by manufacture, which of all industries is the most central and the most marked in character, favoured the general coordination of pacific activity, and at the same time brought that new mode of life into clearer contrast with the former warlike one.

Taking this direction, industrial life now spontaneously

Organisation of Industrial movement; relation of employers and employed; their political attitude.

advanced towards its normal constitution upon the bases which it had gained during the Mediæval Transition (p. 413). It was at this time that the cardinal division between employers and employed—the condition of all modern labour, but eminently of manufactures—received its decisive developement, in proportion as the permanence of hired armies was extinguishing military activity. Relieved from all feudal service, the popular masses of the West could now finally range themselves under the new directors of their practical life. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the ordinary conduct of such industrial chiefs towards the proletaries bore traces of their still recent fraternity, as is illustrated by the judicious remark of an English historian,[1] that wages were then more liberal than at a subsequent period. The solidarity of the two classes thus gradually acquired a civic character, and was further strengthened by their united action in the conflicts which from time to time occurred between the monarchical and aristocratic parties for political supremacy. For the industrial instinct led both employers and employed to support everywhere that party, whichever it might be, which, although originally the weaker, was destined eventually to prevail. Two eminent men of this period, one a Frenchman, the other an Italian, furnished even thus early a worthy type of the industrial patriciat. But they had no successors. Each of them showed by his conduct that pacific activity might go along with the completest social devotion, and even with profound aptitude for civic government.

Jacques Cœur and Cosmo de' Medici the Elder.

Results of Industrial movement.

I must now estimate the general results of this spontaneous developement of Industry, with the view of explaining its more systematic progress during the next phase of the Modern Movement.

The inventions of this phase to be explained by its general characteristics.

The simultaneous appearance in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of several admirable practical inventions must have always seemed fortuitous, until my fundamental treatise (Phil. Pos. vi. 106) furnished for the first time the proper explanation on sociological grounds. We cannot conceive the true filiation of these various discoveries except by appreciating the convergence of all the conditions, both positive and negative, of this phase: we then see that such improvements had always for their ultimate object the further developement or consolidation of Industrial life.

[1] Hallam, Europe during the Middle Ages, ch. ix. part ii.

Fire-arms

At first sight it might appear unreasonable to assign such an aim to the general change which took place during this period in the system of arms, principally those of offence, but eventually those of defence also. We may, however, easily satisfy ourselves on the point by remarking the evident tendency of the new method of warfare to reduce, if not to suppress, military apprenticeship among those nations in which pacific activity was becoming the ruling condition, and war exceptional. We cannot explain how it came to pass that the invention of fire-arms, which was very easy, and also very ancient, was not sooner introduced into the West, except by the fact that it was now required by the new mode of life among the more advanced populations.

Printing.

The same explanation applies even better to the more important and less easy discovery now made, which completed the fundamental institution of Writing by accelerating the production of copies, thus admirably connecting the developements of speculation and practice. The difficulties to overcome were considerable; but the special preliminary conditions having been realised (Phil. Pos. vi. 112), the invention was now accomplished, because it was called for by the general aspirations of the West; where since the twelfth century the universal demand for instruction had been continually prompting experiments to discover a mode of facilitating transcriptions. This art has an exceptional character: under the conditions of modern anarchy it has ministered chiefly to vicious tendencies: but a noble destination is reserved for it in the final regeneration of society, when it will be subjected to a wise moral control.

Discovery of America and of sea route to India.

To complete the special illustrations of the general view I am advocating, I would here assign a like sociological explanation to the two great feats of Navigation which form the industrial link between the first and second phases of the Modern Movement. Having regard to the knowledge attained during the scientific career of Greece (pp. 271, 273), and diffused throughout the West during the Middle Age, we shall see that the employment of the Compass and the consequent maritime progress came as soon as they were opportune. Commerce, after its internal developement, was everywhere seeking foreign outlets, and these, owing to the disturbed condition of the West, were necessarily distant: no wonder, then, that a century of such attempts, all made with a like aim, resulted in the discovery of America, and an Oceanic route to India.

Mariners' compass.

Arithmetical improvements.

We may confirm ourselves in this normal tendency to account for practical improvements by their social opportuneness if we consider the progress of Arithmetic in this phase. It consisted in the adoption for general use of the decimal calculus, and the Arabian, or rather Hindoo notation. Both these improvements had been familiar to the best minds since the commencement of the third phase of the Middle Age, yet neither could become popularised until three centuries afterwards, when their proper utility was brought into clear view by the extension of industrial life.

Positive movement spontaneous during the First Phase.

To link more closely together the positive and negative aspects of this initial phase of the modern revolution, we should now observe how the same spontaneous character, which we have already noticed in the process of decomposition, marked also that of reconstruction. It was in fact impossible that any systematic impulse should be applied to either science, or art, or industry, until they had acquired a developement capable of inspiring and guiding such intervention. Hence the foregoing explanations have in every case shown that the advance in each of these three provinces was essentially spontaneous. All influence derived from artificial encouragement was reserved for later times.

(2) Second or Protestant Phase (A.D. 1500–1685), pp. 464–492.

(a) Negative movement, pp. 464–478.

(a) Spiritual decomposition, pp. 464–473.

In entering upon the examination of the second Modern Phase, during which the negative movement was wholly dominated by the outbreak of Protestantism, I must offer a preliminary explanation in order to place my readers at the proper point of view for judging this period. From the irrational importance still attached to the rise of the Critical doctrine, and also from national vanities, it is common to represent the nations which adopted that doctrine as the most advanced members of the West. This illusion seems also to be confirmed by the fact that the populations which continued Catholic fell behind in the industrial and even in the scientific race. Now it is desirable to dissipate such pretensions at the outset, for they have become a hindrance not only to the formation of a sound judgment of the past, but also to the true conception of the future, especially the more immediate future.

The error will be effectually dispelled by two considerations equally indisputable, and intimately connected with each other. One is derived from the abstract appreciation of this disturbance, the other from a concrete comparison of the nations who accepted it or rejected it.

Looked at in its whole course, it was a movement of empirical negation at first directed against the regime only of Catholicism, then extended to the worship, and finally to the dogma, and really constituting a series of intervening steps between Catholicism and Islamism. The oriental Monotheism had in fact, nine centuries before, accomplished all the essential changes that make up the claims of the three successive founders of Protestantism. Now not only can no doctrine which is purely critical deserve profound esteem, but we see that this particular one had really no important difficulty to overcome, except to obtain a convenient opportunity, and this was provided in the decisive disintegration which Catholicism had undergone during the preceding phase.

Tenets of Luther, Calvin, and Socinus destitute of originality and intellectual vigour.

On these grounds the nations of Southern Europe from the first could not but disdain the so-called Reformation, which on the negative side was far from sanctioning the degree of emancipation already familiar to them, while from the positive point of view it only propounded an incoherent modification of the old belief. Their governments were very soon aroused to its political dangers by the attacks on social order which followed upon the outbreak of the critical doctrine. But the peoples had already rejected that doctrine because it was so bare of moral attractions; they saw that its various sects agreed only in renouncing the best institutions of Catholicism, purgatory, the worship of saints, and above all the adoration of the Virgin, the true goddess of Southern hearts.

To Southern Europe they were intellectually contemptible and morally repulsive.

All the poetical monuments of this period coincide with the more direct historical records in attesting that at the opening of the sixteenth century the South was in advance of the North in respect of intellectual emancipation. The success of Dante's poem was for a long time confined to the Southern populations, and shows their real mental attitude. They honoured Art for spontaneously usurping that most decisive of religious offices, the final judgment of individuals (p. 200); an office which the Church reserved for its invisible Head. As regards Spain in particular, we need but consider all the intercourse, hostile at first, but afterwards of a pacific character, which had in that country continued between two irreconcileable monotheisms, to recognise that Catholicism, as being the official faith, had become more than anything else a symbol of nationality. If emancipation had first crept in among the Templars in

Superior emancipation of South shown by its appreciation of Dante and Cervantes.

consequence of their relations with Mahometans it is easy to understand what an influence would be exercised by a more complete intercourse prolonged through the whole of the first Modern phase, and, with few intervals, under peaceful conditions. Hence it was Spain which spontaneously produced the poetic representative of Complete Emancipation, although it was necessary that every nation of the West should in turn bear its part in working out the movement. As for France she had always taken the initiative, and maintained the direction of the decisive measures which brought about the spontaneous decomposition of Catholicism. The reaction of this social disturbance upon thought, together with the special relations existing between the Central nation and the Southern Occidentals, could not but make her people almost as familiar as they with an unbelief which went far beyond the parody of Islamism set up by the doctors of Germany.

The Northern nations were as backward intellectually as they were socially.

As regards the Northern peoples, the inferiority of their civilisation would of itself be a sufficient proof that the success of Protestantism among them by no means resulted from a more advanced emancipation. This remark especially applies to the country in which the first outbreak of the Critical doctrine took place; for the Germans having been incorporated into the European system later and less completely than any other nation, were in the sixteenth century the least cultivated of all the populations of the West, and the least disengaged from old warlike habits. In England social needs rather than any intellectual demands were the chief inducement to the people to accept Protestantism.

Imaginary hypothesis of a voluntary wind-up of the Catholic organisation by the Pope in 1376.

In order to mark with greater precision the character of the Protestant movement, I will here introduce an hypothesis analogous to that which I employed above with respect to the Western revolution considered as a whole (p. 429), but in this instance my hypothesis will more nearly correspond to the actual possibilities of the case. On returning from Avignon the Popes, conscious that their spiritual authority was fatally on the wane, turned their chief attention to their temporal principality. Now if this policy of transformation, instead of being merely empirical, could have been thenceforth systematically designed and directed, it would have led to the suppression of clerical celibacy, with a view to making the papal throne, like other sovereignties, pass by hereditary trans-

mission, which men would have preferred to the nepotism soon afterwards prevalent. By thus gradually relinquishing its spiritual character, the Papacy would have sanctioned the spontaneous dissolution of Catholicism, and would have dissipated in advance those jealous apprehensions of its tyranny which were the main motive for the outbreak of Protestantism. Such a policy would have further required that the pope should abolish simultaneously the convents and universities, transferring to the different national governments the direction of the special schools, especially those of Law and Medicine, of which indeed they did make themselves masters before long. At the commencement of the fifteenth century the Papacy had still sufficient influence to have secured an acceptance in every country for this final exercise of its power, which was in full conformity with the real needs of the West. True, the metaphysical form of emancipation must still have prevailed with the Northern peoples, but since there would have been neither intellectual organs nor social passions to aggravate its action, violent secessions would have been avoided.

The Reformation would then have been avoided.

This hypothesis may be of service in helping us to perceive that the success of Protestantism is to be principally attributed to the need felt for escaping from the domination of the Papacy which, having become essentially Italian, pressed most heavily on the North ; while in the South it was practically nullified by the nationalisation of the clergy. This preliminary question having been settled I proceed to examine this movement of revolt, which was at first partial in operation, but before long excited a general ferment.

Intellectual dogma of Protestantism : Right of Private Judgment.

The fundamental principle of the negative doctrine appeared at the outset in the asserted right of every one to constitute himself supreme judge upon religious questions, irrespective both of his own competency and the authority of the past. During the Protestant phase this individualism did not extend beyond the interpretation of the revealed books, but in the end it could not but embrace the entire domain of theology. Even its earlier field comprised divagations wide enough to render all spiritual organisation impossible; thus manifesting how essentially anarchical was the principle which exalted individual opinion against the judgment of society. But though each fresh innovator endeavoured to confine scepticism within the limits he chose to lay down, such arbitrary bounds were one

after another extended, and Negativism attained in the end the full scope its true destination required. At first it was the Catholic regime alone which was dissolved by a series of illogical assaults; but the like process soon impaired the worship, and finally nullified the doctrine by assailing the special conditions on which Western revelation rested (p. 387).

Social dogmas of Protestantism: Sovereignty of People and Equality.

The negative doctrine, having thus obtained a firm footing in intellectual matters, required to be extended to social ideas to qualify it to become provisionally the systematic organ of the spontaneous aspirations of the West towards universal regeneration. And this was in fact the principal result of the political application of the negative doctrine to the two preliminary crises which were soon excited by the inevitable struggle between the disintegrating spirit and the counteracting policy of oppression. In the most honourable and least stormy of these modern conflicts, the revolutionary principle put forth the dogma of the Sovereignty of the People, the first purpose of which was to deliver Holland from the yoke of Spain. After having thus proclaimed the right of external liberty, metaphysical negativism set itself to internal reform, and attempted in an abortive but well marked undertaking, to regenerate England on the principle of Equality.

William the Silent and Cromwell.

These two contests, admirably conducted by the two most eminent statesmen of Protestantism, gave the critical doctrine its decisive developement. The principle indeed of Private Judgment directly assumed Equality as its fundamental condition, and could appeal to no other authority than the Supremacy of Numbers. But the two derivative dogmas, though involved in the fundamental one, could not have gained sufficient hold if each had not been inaugurated by a special application.

These dogmas were equally active in the so-called Catholic countries.

Thus arose in the West a systematic anarchy, such as up to that time had never been known, which characterised the interregnum necessarily intervening between the failure of Theologism and the advent of Positivism. Its general principle consisted in this, that the Individual, in direct revolt against the Race, now recognised no other authority than his own for the decision of all questions whatsoever, above all the most important and the most difficult. This principle had been first inspired by the mental cravings which Monotheism excited but could not satisfy; in the sequel, however, it served as the organ of social aspirations which took for granted

that an order which had become retrograde must be dissolved. Neither in its intellectual nor its social aspect could it be confined to the countries in which Protestantism was officially adopted. Amongst the populations which continued Catholic in name the same tendency was equally active, and even gave birth to national heresies, which were fully as contrary to the mediæval ecclesiastical order as the Protestant dogmas themselves.

The Critical doctrine impaired sense of Continuity and Veneration, and fostered Pride.

Not to speak of the intellectual aberrations which are its direct characteristics, the disease which had thus attacked the West soon impaired sociability by the indirect sanction which it necessarily accorded to absolute individualism. Solidarity suffered; but the principal danger was to Continuity, which became gradually more ignored until men came even to deny that the present owed any subordination to the past or any obligation to the future. The reaction of this mental and social disorder upon the affections consisted in stifling Veneration, the normal basis of human discipline, and in developing Pride, the chief source of insurrectionary passions.

Deterioration of private life. Introduction of Divorce.

Under the Spontaneous phase, this modern anarchy had commenced its moral ravages by dissolving the ancient ties of public life, which was henceforth openly given over to egoism. The Protestant phase carried on the like process into domestic life, directly threatening the fundamental bond of marriage by an anarchic retrogression in favour of divorce, and even by a tendency to the dogmatic revival of polygamy. Happily both aberrations were spontaneously frustrated by the ancient habits of the West, which were in full conformity with the true nature of modern civilisation; but they nevertheless left everywhere deep traces, which were aggravated under the Deistical phase, and are too perceptible even now. Thought and Feeling henceforth underwent a common deterioration which was manifested in the general and increasing repudiation of the Middle Age, and a more distinct contempt for the resistance of women to the Revolution. The Aristocracy having become morally degraded (p. 455), the opposition of the affective sex to modern barbarism was henceforth exemplified among the middle classes; and when they too became corrupt, it was left to the women of the proletariat to play this part.

Luther and Melanchthon authorise Philip of Hesse to have two wives at once.

Having thus characterised the main current of the Protestant movement, I have to speak of its necessary reaction upon the

Noble attempt of Loyola to arrest decline of religion.

concentration of the temporal power which had commenced in the preceding phase. But, before doing so, I must estimate the principal effort of resistance made by Catholicism against the dissolution of Monotheism.

His aim was to establish a supplementary Pope and Clergy,

This consisted in the attempt of the Jesuits to regenerate the Papacy, the spiritual office of which had been really in abeyance since its transformation into a temporal sovereignty. As it had been the vital centre of the Catholic system, its decay, whether manifest or unacknowledged, had occasioned all the deteriorations which the regime, the worship, and even the dogma of the Church had everywhere undergone. Of the connection between these facts the eminent founder of Jesuitism was deeply convinced: accordingly, under the modest title of 'General' of the order, he set before himself the task of establishing by the side of the Roman prince a true Pope, a free leader of a new clergy, to overcome Protestantism by reorganising Catholicism.

To substitute the Virgin for God, and to take the lead in scientific education and foreign missions.

That such was the design of Jesuitism becomes undeniable when we study the nature and course of this institution, not only at its commencement, but also during the whole of the first generation of its activity, which is now too much confounded with its subsequent career. The noble enthusiast who, in founding the Jesuit Order, announced himself as the defender of Catholicism and the adorer of the Virgin, deserves from the sociological point of view to be honoured as the true successor of the church-reformers of the thirteenth century (p. 408), whose failure he wished to repair. Profoundly shocked by the degradation which the spiritual power had everywhere undergone in various forms since the close of the Middle Age, he endeavoured to arrest the dissolution of religion by reconstituting Catholicism upon the basis of the worship of the Virgin, the goddess of the West. Attributing the failure of his Franciscan predecessors to their efforts being too dispersed and too dependent on the general ecclesiastical system, he instituted his order with the design of once more uniting the functions of preaching and confession, and separated it from the nominal chief of the Church with the view of better subordinating it to its real chief. He strove to get the true Priesthood everywhere transferred to his Jesuits, by procuring for them the general direction of an education suited to the aspirations of the time, and the superintendence of the foreign

missions which the universal expansion of the West seemed to demand.

Such was the original plan of Jesuitism. It differs little from the scheme I have hypothetically suggested as capable, had it been adopted at the commencement of the fifteenth century, of preventing the outbreak of Protestantism. The intellectual and social ascendency to which the new corporation aspired was in fact equivalent to the abolition both of the old monastic orders and of the universities which fostered the metaphysical spirit. The essential difference between the two methods consists solely in the maintenance by the Jesuits of the celibacy of the priesthood. Originally adopted by them, in imitation of the elder brotherhoods, as a guarantee of independence and a basis of discipline, this obligation soon became a source of moral corruption. With that exception we are bound to recognise that the action of Jesuitism was inspired by a sincere and deep desire to reestablish the spiritual authority in a fit manner, by making it better qualified to fulfil its social office than in the Middle Age. The sociocratic tendency of this grand effort is clearly shown in the energetic protests of the first Jesuit fathers against the usurpation of spiritual functions by the temporal power. Sociocratic character of early Jesuitism.

This was the true Reformation of the sixteenth century; but it failed more rapidly and more completely than that of the thirteenth, being overborne by the same fatality more fully developed (p. 430). Measures which, if taken a century before the outburst of Protestantism, might have sufficed to prevent it, were now impotent to stay its course. Nothing could now avail for such a purpose but that which was not yet possible—a radical change of doctrine, the substitution of Positivism for Theologism. For the explosion of Negativism was creating a dim feeling of the profound incongruity of Catholicism with the scientific spirit and the industrial mode of life, both of which were evidently destined to prevail, while neither could be disciplined except by a demonstrable faith. In short, mental anarchy having become systematic, nothing could hinder it from running its entire course, because the final solution required as a preliminary condition the full developement of such anarchy, at least in the central nation. Its success impossible.

Although this fatality was beyond the ken of the founders of Jesuitism, it was not long before their successors perceived

Conspiracy between Jesuits and Freethinkers against popular enfranchisement.

the impossibility of regenerating Catholicism. Thenceforth they confined their efforts to systematising the policy of obstruction and retrogression. Thus the plan which had been originally designed to direct a progressive reconstruction became totally perverted. The reactionary policy soon rested its success on a vast hypocritical conspiracy. Men of emancipated minds, the large majority of whom belonged to the cultivated classes, all made common cause with the Jesuits against the enfranchisement of the people from theology, lest their joint domination should be imperilled. By lending themselves to this compact, the freethinkers purchased full toleration; while as to their private life, now that it was freed from the only effectual control of public convictions, they secretly abandoned themselves to their personal inclinations.

Disastrous introduction of Colleges for the young.

And so, before it had been fifty years in operation, this chimerical scheme for spiritual reorganisation turned into a system only too real of hypocrisy and obstruction, which, to arrest mental anarchy, developed moral corruption. To illustrate this contradictory tendency we need not have recourse to the equivocal evidence alleged by a blind hatred of the Jesuits; it is enough to point to their disastrous multiplication in every country of colleges,—institutions, the like of which were as unknown to the Middle Age as to Antiquity. Now although the Jesuits were disqualified by their celibacy from fully appreciating family life, they knew that the principal merit of Catholicism had really consisted in fostering the due developement of all family ties during the whole Mediæval period, a period which for that reason I have termed the Affective Transition. Nevertheless, so absorbed were they in their reactionary task that they scrupled not to compromise moral progress by cutting off the young from domestic relations, hoping by a system of scholastic seclusion to withdraw them from the general movement of emancipation. Such isolation of the young, however, could never have become a common practice without the consent of families. Here then we may satisfy ourselves how far mental anarchy had at this time extended its dissolving influence upon morality. It had reached even the hearts of mothers.

Resistance to Jesuits in all Catholic countries.

In this its final form, Jesuitism did not merely call forth the hatred of Protestants. It also met with continuous and profound opposition from the Catholic populations, among

whom its career became really an incessant struggle, especially as against the more ancient organs of the defence of theology. Its tendency to renovate both the regular and the secular clergy could not but excite the special antipathy in Spain of the Dominicans, and in Italy of the Franciscans, because these orders had respectively assumed in those countries more or less completely the practical direction of the national church, whilst the endeavour of Jesuitism was to subordinate all national churches to the universal priesthood. The principal developement of Jesuitism was accordingly confined to France; but there too it encountered obstacles, less concentrated indeed but more decisive, from the metaphysical corporations, who were the rivals of monks of every kind. Nevertheless, from a sociological point of view, Jesuitism must be considered to be the last form of Western Monotheism. Notwithstanding all appearances consequent upon its official suppression, it cannot cease to exist until theology itself ceases to be. While the title of *Catholicism* can be properly applied only to the normal condition presented by the Mediæval Church, the name of *Jesuitism*, which recalls a fictitious founder, suits the final degeneration of the supernatural system better than any such appellation as *Popery*, since the decline of the Papacy everywhere preceded that of the Catholic belief.

The degenerate modern Catholicism is more properly called Jesuitism.

I now proceed to characterise the course of the decomposition of the temporal organisation during the second phase of the Modern Movement, in which all political action was soon centred in the general struggle between Jesuitism and Protestantism.

(β) Temporal Decomposition, pp. 473–476.

The direct effect of the outbreak of the negative doctrine was to develope everywhere to a further degree that fusion of the temporal and spiritual powers which had spontaneously commenced during the first phase. This corruption of the polity which had constituted the chief progress of civilisation in the Middle Age, was common to all Europe, but was first systematised by Protestantism, the success of which arose chiefly from its inherent tendency to subordinate the priesthood to the government. Having rejected all spiritual authority by exalting the right of Private Judgment, it could only avoid entire anarchy by subjugating the Church to the State —the latter power representing the material supremacy of Numbers, according to the principle of Equality. Catholicism,

Consisted during this Phase in further and systematic usurpation by State of spiritual powers;

however, suffered at the same time a nearly equivalent subjection and degradation, although in this case the fundamental separation of the two powers was never formally disclaimed. The real difference between the two modes of degradation was reduced to this, that in Catholic countries only the highest ranks of the priesthood were filled by State-nominees, who retained their hierarchical influence over their subordinates, whilst in the Protestant states the usurpation of the temporal power extended even to the lowest clerical grades. This diversity simply means that the clergy in each case naturally tended to support that system of dictatorship which was most able to guarantee them a livelihood. Catholicism was thus led to give its assistance to the ascendency of monarchy, and Protestantism to favour the supremacy of aristocratic rule.

Which was acquiesced in by Priesthood.

In Catholic and Protestant countries alike the dictatorial form of government now made a conspicuous advance by successfully usurping the chief functions of the priesthood, whilst continuing to maintain a purely temporal character. For it everywhere drew to itself the supreme direction of public education, special as well as general, and endeavoured to assume a kind of universal direction like that of the ancient theocracies, with the full consent of servile churchmen, who were now ready to grant to the strong dispensation from all duties on the sole condition of orthodoxy. It is important to understand that such was the origin of this vicious concentration, of which the advantages were but partial, and indeed more nominal than real; whereas its general influence has proved disastrous, for it has leagued together all ambitious persons, whether of the speculative or active class, against the separation of the two powers.

Protestantism at first allied itself with Tudors in England, and with Condés, Châtillons, and Rohans in France;

On the purely temporal side, the dictatorial rule obtained in every country an indirect support from the ultimate tendency of the negative movement to throw its weight on the side of whichever of the two temporal elements had already acquired a preponderance over the other. But this result was for a long time hindered by the encouragement that Protestantism at first afforded to the defeated power, which had in the first instance been disposed to acquiesce in its subaltern position. Thus, if we compare the two principal cases, we may observe how Protestantism soon inspired both the English monarchy and the French nobility with the hope of recovering

the political ascendency which they had lost. These two reactions, opposite as they are, admit of the same explanation, if we consider that Protestantism had two forms, and was disposed to support monarchy or aristocracy, according as its own organisation was episcopal or presbyterian. In England this gave rise to long conflicts: the papal power having been there officially transferred to the sovereign, the nobility had hard work to reduce his authority again to that condition of political nullity to which it had been spontaneously brought during the preceding phase. In France the leaning of Protestantism towards the defeated power produced no grave disturbances, until the crown itself, under the influence of an aristocratic court, vacillated in its policy, and hung back from supporting the Parisian populace, whose sure instinct and energy, in spite of demagogic seductions, saved the centre of the West from Protestantism. Nevertheless in France, as in England, the form of dictatorship which had been instituted in the first phase had acquired complete supremacy at the close of the second, and the subaltern element ratified its own final degradation by consenting to adorn the triumph of its rival, which soon took a retrograde direction.

But finally accepted Dictatorship of Crown in France and of Aristocracy in England.

Throughout all the stages of its gradual rise to full power, the modern dictatorship pushed on without intermission the spontaneous decomposition of the ancient political organisation. Thus, more especially if we examine the monocratic mode, the only direct and complete form of the dictatorship, we see arising out of its very triumph a decisive decline in character, which was the first symptom of its final ruin. From the commencement of the second phase, kings had grown strangers to the real government of their affairs, both at home and abroad, so much so, that one of these unreal dictators lost a famous battle because he was ignorant of the number of his soldiers. Ministerial power, completed by diplomacy, continually tended to become predominant, and royalty was soon reduced to occupy itself with display, such as had been hitherto disdained by the worthy organs of a concentrated temporal power. In the case of the aristocratic mode of dictatorship the same excessive accumulation of incoherent attributes in the official government led to a similar surrender of essential functions: the process was tardier and more disguised; the result was the same in the end. In every country persons

Dictatorship was no sooner established than its decline began.

Francis I. at Pavia.

holding apparently subaltern offices, and springing from all classes indiscriminately, obtained, no less than the great Richelieu, political supremacy, which being now dissociated from the class in which it formerly resided was destined to keep drifting promiscuously until a new class should arise to hold it. What made this transformation more decisive was the further lowering of military functions which had been already affected by the institution of paid armies. The chiefs of these forces now passively subordinated themselves to ministers or diplomatists who were often strangers to war, and had sometimes sprung from the lowest ranks.

Legists and Metaphysicians cease to be useful.

As for the special elements of the Modern Transition, the influence they had for a time exercised was now seriously impaired in the midst of their apparent triumphs, in consequence of the unreasonable ambition which tarnished for ever the honourable character they had manifested during the first phase. The Judiciary, claiming the credit, especially in France, of having brought about the dictatorial power, to the rise of which they had merely contributed, strove to monopolise the ministerial functions, in proportion as these became of capital importance. They even endeavoured, by making their offices transmissible by purchase, to establish themselves as a dominant caste in close relation to the nobility, and to assume the political pretensions of that order. The sovereigns, however, easily overcame this new obstacle in their path, so long as they themselves maintained a truly progressive character, that is to say, until the commencement of the third phase. Moreover towards the end of the second phase these former allies of the crown found, to their surprise, their own special functions directly abridged by the institution of the Police, which having up to that time served the tribunals only as a passive instrument, now tended more and more to supersede them. As for the Metaphysicians, their previous success against the clergy during the first phase led them now to become throughout the West the systematic organs of resistance to the Jesuits. They formulated such resistance into dogmatic shape by promoting the various national heresies. The radical incoherence, however, of their theories never allowed them to gain any permanent advantage over the last defenders of western monotheism. Like the legists, the metaphysicians soon became impressed with a retrograde tendency, to develope which became the final aim of both.

Before describing the positive movement of the second phase I must here complete my examination of the negative movement during that period by pointing out how the modern revolution spontaneously extended to Islamism, the decomposition of which was profoundly connected with that of Catholicism. Philosophers at the present day should familiarise themselves with this connection in order that their sociological conceptions may sufficiently correspond to the general situation common to all the advanced populations. Nothing can better show what must be the true nature of the universal religion than the fact that it is bound to reconcile these two opposite religious experiments.

The Negative movement extended to Islamism;

During the first phase of the Modern Movement, Islamism had completed its destined area as a political power by the gradual conquest of the East, which Catholicism, by a tacit compromise, spontaneously abandoned when crusades fell into desuetude. Despite theological prejudices, the Western nations always instinctively felt the social superiority of the Mussulmans over the Byzantines. They preferred the avowed fusion of the spiritual and temporal powers to a deceptive separation; accordingly they made no effort to save the Byzantine empire. After reaching this final limit, Islamism lost, no less than Catholicism, the enthusiasm with which the hope of universality had long inspired it. The process of its spontaneous dissolution was nevertheless somewhat retarded at the commencement of the second phase by maritime expeditions, which, taking the place of the former land invasions, served for a while to sustain the prestige of the Mahometan name. This however was soon revived by a decisive victory, the only one of which the West could boast since the close of the Middle Age, but which must also recall the religious dissensions and political jealousies that threw the common defence into the hands of the Spanish Dictator.

Which began to decline when it lost the hope of universality.

Battle of Lepanto.

When the Monotheism of the East had finally lost its initial impulse, a tendency to spiritual decay soon appeared. This was much facilitated by the union of the two powers and by the simplicity of the creed. Under both these aspects the system of Islam had always presented the type to which the efforts of Protestantism were now aspiring. Its organisation did not admit of any metaphysicians or even legists, properly so called: a fact which now proved to be a compensation for its comparative imperfection during the Middle Age, when Catholicism had justly obtained the direction of social progress.

Comparison between Islamism and Protestantism.

The Revolution always remained in the Spontaneous stage in the East.

From my theory of the general division of the Modern Revolution into two periods, the one of spontaneous, the other of systematic decomposition, it is easy to see that such a distribution applies only to the West, because it depends upon the separation of the two powers. In the East, the process of spiritual decay always remained spontaneous. It necessarily commenced as soon as the military enthusiasm was radically exhausted by the accomplishment of the principal Mahometan conquests, and it never became ambiguous (p. 464). If Islam appears to have maintained its full power longer than Catholicism, this was only because it had been later established. Preserved from the Incomplete form of emancipation, the Mahometan mind soon attained Complete enfranchisement. This however was spontaneously confined to the governing classes, anarchy and retrogression being thereby both avoided. In this special manner, then, the East prepared herself for the decisive adoption of the universal religion (as soon as that faith should be sufficiently elaborated in the West), in virtue of the solidarity between the two civilisations which had already been developed and even recognised, before the end of the second phase.

(*b*) Positive movement, pp. 478–492.

This was common to East and West, and was more systematic than during First Phase.

The positive movement, from whence the ultimate solution was to issue, thenceforth became common to both parts of the Roman world, in consequence of the noble readiness of the Turks to adopt Western progress, which indeed at first owed its prolongation, after the break up of ancient civilisation, to the intervention of the Arabs. Both in East and West, the regeneration in speculation, art, and practical life now advanced beyond the stage of spontaneous action which had marked the first phase. Political rulers bestowed their encouraging assistance, which took more and more a systematic character. Of this policy Colbert furnished the best example. It should be noticed that the dictatorial form of government, from whence such assistance and direction came, was native in the East, while in the West it had only been established after long and difficult efforts. Of course the positive progress of which I am speaking should be especially studied in the central seat of its activity; yet it was important here to mark in advance how it will finally be extended to the populations which are most favourably disposed to accept the lead of the West. For without this preliminary explanation, an erroneous idea might have been

formed respecting the area over which, at the close of the Middle Age, the intellectual and social problem had spread, under the unifying influence previously transmitted from the Roman dominion.

Encouragement by Dictatorial Governments.

The general motive which inspired the policy of systematic state-aid towards the positive movement was not the same in the third phase as in the second. For at first the dictatorial governments bestowed their patronage in this direction with a view to amplify their own glory and power, but in the end they found it imposed upon them as a social duty. During both phases, however, the nature and the efficacy of their intervention were much influenced by the mode in which the dictatorial rule was constituted. Monarchical governments contributed to the movement more order, and aristocratical governments more liberty.

Without insisting further upon these general distinctions, I will now proceed to estimate the special developement accomplished during the second phase of the Modern Revolution, first in the province of theory, then in art, and lastly in practical life.

(a) Scientific Results.

As scientific investigation produced decisive results during this phase, it will be proper to examine the advance in Science before the consequent progress in Philosophy. Both these evolutions were alike profoundly governed by the definitive discovery of the double motion of the Earth. Nevertheless, it is convenient to estimate the direct influence of that doctrine before pointing out its indirect consequences.

Doctrine of Double motion of the Earth at last became socially opportune;

I have already shown in the fourth chapter (p. 274), that the delay in discovering the true theory of the Earth's motion should not be ascribed to the insufficient qualifications of ancient science, but in the main to the adverse character of the prevailing philosophy and the corresponding constitution of society. This explanation I would here confirm by calling attention to the manner in which the reconstruction of Astronomy now took place. The new doctrine was no sooner announced than it began to gain rapid predominance, although the special knowledge on which it was based had not become more complete than in Antiquity. The only really novel steps required were, first, the establishment by Kepler of the uniform and rectilineal character of every motion, and, following upon that, Galileo's law respecting the compatibility

of the special motion of any part of a system with the common motion of the whole.[1] Now, although both these discoveries were difficult, they depend upon such everyday observation, that they must have been arrived at long before, unless the human mind had been diverted from them by a philosophical disposition determined by social influences. The truth was that the doctrine of the Earth's motion was incompatible with all Theologism, and could not be fully recognised until Monotheism was radically worn out. But it now became as opportune as previously it had been the reverse. For the Negative outbreak was making it clear that nothing but a Positive synthesis could henceforth unite the intellects of the West; and for such a synthesis this new discovery furnished the first basis. Moreover, although the new astronomical theory rests upon mathematical ideas which have now made their way everywhere, yet its full results are still not appreciated except by intellects sufficiently emancipated. The like reason explains why it was more rapidly received in the first instance among the Northern populations than among those of the South.

And was therefore accepted even before it was conclusively demonstrated.

If we look at the course of this great revolution in science we shall find that it confirms the judgment we have just arrived at from the sociological point of view. To the learned class the double motion of the Earth had become so necessary that they adopted it a century before those proofs were discovered which we now deem the most decisive. The public also required no other preparation to enable them to pass from the ancient to the new system than two intermediate steps, each of which occupied but a single generation: first, the adoption of the Sun as the true centre of the planetary motions; and, secondly, the acceptance of the Earth's rotation. A transformation so radical, and rendered all the more decisive by the futile resistance offered by theology, showed that the Western populations were prepared to change, not merely their scientific theories, but their spiritual guides also. The Positive faith, which was already established in the domain of Mathematics, now showed its capacity for extension to all classes of phenomena; for here was the new Astronomy, simply because it was opportune, winning universal acceptance without demonstration—individuals, as in all such cases, subordinating their judgment to that of the race.

[1] Astronomie Populaire, pp. 386–388.

As regards theoretic results, the revolution in Astronomy gradually brought about the systematisation of the special sciences which make up Cosmology (p. 42), with the exception of Chemistry, which was necessarily reserved for the next phase. First Kepler deduced from it the final constitution of Celestial Geometry, which is inconsistent with the immobility of the Earth. Next, animated by the same doctrine, Galileo founded, and Huyghens completed, Rational Mechanics. Then upon this twofold basis, Newton constructed his general theory of Celestial Mechanics, the developement of which belongs to the third phase. In this manner, society being ripe for the change, the renovation of Cosmology was accomplished in a single century—a result which the genius of Antiquity had failed to attain, solely because prevented by social conditions. The first encyclopedic couple having been definitely constituted, the second couple was soon completed by the introduction of Physics as the intermediate science between Astronomy and Chemistry. Synthetical minds could thenceforward grasp the entire hierarchy of Natural Philosophy, so as to feel the necessity for constructing the sciences relating to Life and Society, in order to effect a final combination of the whole with Moral Philosophy—which, and which alone, could form the final term of the positive conception.[1]

Its special scientific consequences. Discoveries of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton. Physics instituted as a separate science.

To the renovation in Astronomy thus brought about by the social situation, we must also ascribe another consequence, which

Discoveries of Descartes and Leibnitz.

[1] Encyclopedic Hierarchy, from the Historical point of view :—

Preliminary Science, or Natural Philosophy.	Cosmology.	1. MATHEMATICS.	
	Physics.	2. ASTRONOMY.	
		3. PHYSICS (proper).	
		4. CHEMISTRY.	
	5. BIOLOGY.		
Final Science, or Sociology.	6. SOCIOLOGY (proper).		
	7. MORALS.		

From the Dogmatic point of view the arrangement is somewhat different :—

Cosmology	Abstract, or	1. MATHEMATICS.	
	Concrete, or Physics.	2. ASTRONOMY.	
		3. PHYSICS (proper).	
		4. CHEMISTRY.	
Sociology	Preliminary, or	5. BIOLOGY.	
	Final, or	6. SOCIOLOGY (proper).	
		7. MORALS.	

if less direct was more profound—I refer to the admirable revolution which Descartes accomplished in Mathematics especially by founding the science of General Geometry (p. 254). The progress of Algebra which in Antiquity had been arrested in the same manner as Astronomy (p. 276), now became indispensable to the advance of astronomical science of celestial geometry in the first instance, and soon afterwards of celestial mechanics. Descartes began by developing Algebra; he then, with that systematic genius which marks him as the greatest of modern philosophers, came to perceive that this logical instrument might furnish means for generalising and coordinating geometrical conceptions. By his decisive combination of algebra with geometry, the philosophy of mathematics was constituted on the basis of a general relation between the abstract and the concrete. Nor was it long before the same relation was extended to mechanics, so as to transform algebra into a universal nexus of all mathematical conceptions. But to qualify Algebra fully for this eminent function, a final developement of it was necessary. By founding the infinitesimal calculus, Leibnitz at length enabled the Cartesian generalisation to be applied to the most direct and the most ancient department of geometry (pp. 182, 248).

All these discoveries were connected logically and scientifically with the new Astronomy.

We thus recognise the logical and scientific bond actually connecting all the great discoveries of the second phase with the revolution in astronomy which, as we have seen, had itself resulted from the convergence of social influences. The theoretical progress of this period was confined to Cosmology and even essentially to its first two departments. These, however, formed the necessary basis of the Positive Synthesis, and, though isolated, showed already a power to make a decisive impression upon the general system of human thought. Some important notions were also started in Chemistry, and still more in Biology, but they were too precocious to have any theoretic value until they were reconstructed later on, when the time was ripe for them.

(β) Philosophic Results. The new Astronomy inaugurated Positivism.

There is nothing then to prevent our perceiving that the social influences of the new astronomy tended to the entire regeneration of Philosophy. The establishment of the Earth's motion was destroying Theologism, and consequently also Ontologism (p. 32), by inaugurating Positivism; for to substitute

once for all, the relative idea of *the World* for the absolute conception of *the Universe*, was to inaugurate Positivism. Thus at last ended the domination of Astrology, which, having had its source in Astrolatry, had necessarily prevailed even over Theology, so long as the earth was regarded as the centre and ultimate purpose of the system of nature. Henceforth the real connection of the Earth was limited to the planetary group of which the sun is the focus, and beyond the internal economy of which we cannot healthily speculate, since the other worlds cannot affect it in any way. Moreover, as this tiny field only deserves our interest so far as it concerns Humanity, Subjectivity, as well as Relativity, became at last a predominant principle in natural philosophy.

Synthetic attempts of Descartes, Bacon, and their successors, Hobbes Leibnitz, and Bossuet.

After this transforming conception, every Objective Synthesis became at once useless and vicious. If the incomparable Descartes constructed the best type of one, he did so only in order to bring into clearer view the need of subjective unity by showing the impossibility of an objective coordination reaching beyond our notions respecting the inorganic world. His theory, however, though provisional, was of eminent service. While immediately furnishing a powerful stimulus to the improvement of the lower sciences, it enabled the Positive spirit to give direct evidence of its capacity for carrying out the final systematisation, and even thus early to get rid of Entities. Connected as it was with the entire body of mathematical science, the impulse thus given by Descartes cooperated with the logical influence of Bacon to produce a first outline of the sound philosophy. We should also remark that the serious gaps which remained unfilled were better indicated in the general conceptions put forth by these illustrious men than in their special precepts. Descartes was so far alive to the need of an essentially subjective synthesis that he attempted to construct one, though his effort was illusory and even retrograde, because he founded it on individual intuition. But Hobbes soon perceived the true nature of the problem, and, following in Bacon's track, contributed the only real improvement to social science which had been accomplished since the time of Aristotle. Leibnitz and Bossuet also did much to further the tendency towards a Subjective Synthesis: the former by his two conceptions of the dualism between Man and the World,

and of the alliance of Philosophy with History; the latter b admirably inaugurating the direct appreciation of the entir past of human civilisation.

Growth of an anarchical specialism.

Under the impulse so given towards the Subjective Syn thesis, and by the renovation of Cosmology, the system o speculation which had been established in the Middle Age and developed during the first phase of the Modern Move ment, was at the end of the second phase in a condition o dissolution (p. 458). On the one hand, the geometers bein more and more absorbed in working out their own specia subject, could no longer, as formerly, become physicians On the other hand, the physicians found themselves less an less able to make their biological inquiries fit on to the cosmo logical studies which had hitherto been so justly considere their necessary preparation. Attempts were made to unit these two learned classes by founding scientific academies, bu such artificial bonds failed altogether to overcome the in creasing incompatibility of the divergent lines of inquiry Natural Philosophy, being thus divided, gradually fell into veritable anarchy: and as its professors were mostly mediocri ties attracted by the artificial encouragement of endowments the result was not so much a division of labour as a dispersio of thought. At the same time Moral Philosophy was radicall sundered from its scientific basis, and handed over, as formerly i Greece—with a few admirable exceptions—to vague and feebl minds, often coupled with hearts corrupted by a preposterou ambition. Thus it was that the spirit of Generality sponta neously disappeared in the West at the very time when, i consequence of the increasing anarchy, it was most needed there: nor did it reappear until objective science had grow complete enough for the advent of the Final Synthesis chara terised both by Relativity and Subjectivity.

(γ) Esthetic Results.

The Theoretic progress of the Protestant phase having bee judged, I must next estimate its Esthetic developement, whic is essentially reducible to the growth of the Fundament art.

Grand poetic developement

The first phase of the Modern Revolution, transmitting th Mediæval influence, produced an impulse which gave rise i the second phase to a truly admirable poetic movement, which all the nations of the West took part. If the Germa people formed a partial exception, this was not due solely

the Protestant agitation, but is to be attributed principally to the tardy developement of their language, although proofs of its esthetic capabilities had already been given by Holland, in this as in other respects, the foremost representative of Germany. This general poetic activity derived its source from the profound inspiration which had been imparted to all the West by the poem of Dante and even by that of A'Kempis, which by their pictures of the Middle Age cooperated, each in its own way, in inaugurating modern civilisation.

In spite of Protestantism.

The general tendency of the West towards a rational and pacific mode of life had now become predominant enough to call forth an indirect and preparatory idealisation of it. The Art thus evoked naturally found its chief subject in private life; but it succeeded in embracing public life also by drawing its themes from the Past, as the Present was too unsettled for such a purpose. In both these fields of poetic activity Protestantism was an obstruction, disturbing the domestic relations, and inspiring dislike to the Middle Age, the memories of which were alone able to stir the popular heart. This is why Aristocratical power, wherever it was in the ascendant, seemed to be less favourable to Art than Monarchical rule. The patronage of Sovereigns, lavish as it was, turned out to be better suited to stimulate mediocrity than to assist genius. There is in truth no better proof of the natural energy of our esthetic faculties than their immense developement at this time in the midst of such a confused and fluctuating situation, where mental and moral anarchy was tending to paralyse the guidance coming from the Past.

Ariosto and Tasso.

At the commencement of the second phase appeared an epic poem unlike anything which had preceded it, to set before the West an admirable spectacle of private and public life combined, though not giving the latter its due relative dignity. In it Ariosto also furnished indirectly the first rudimentary example of Historic poetry, by painting the life of the Middle Age, the chivalrous character of which he brings out most powerfully. In his steps followed Tasso, with a composition of purer taste, but otherwise less remarkable. This attempt at a direct idealisation of the crusades was inspired by a worthy spirit, but the poet failed to appreciate the difficulty of such a task, which could not but be premature, so long as it was impossible to do justice to both Catholicism and Islamism.

Cervantes and Calderon.

Stimulated by these two Italian types Spain soon produced, first in epic romance, and then in poetical drama, incomparable representations of private life, both in its personal and its domestic aspects. In Spain more than in any other country had this, the fundamental form of human existence, escaped the injurious influences of modern anarchy. Accordingly, both its aspects are found delineated in happy combination in that marvellous composition, in which Cervantes so naturally gathers all the family affections round a character of the most eccentric individuality, striking out, at the same time, though he was not aware of it, the true theory of Madness (p. 19). Thus was the way prepared for Calderon, whose best dramas directly idealised the whole group of domestic ties, with admirable skill bringing home to the heart their natural fitness to constitute the chief basis of human happiness.

Shakespeare, Corneille, and Molière.

The profoundly original genius of Shakespeare sought to represent the union of private and public life, assigning its due preponderance to the latter, and breaking free from the trammelling distinction between the epic and dramatic forms, a distinction which is more seeming than real, and will in the end be given up. The Protestantism, however, in the midst of which he lived, made him turn away from the Middle Age, and even hindered his attaining a due appreciation of Antiquity, so that this freethinker was obliged to devote his chief pieces to the illustration of periods that were too near his own time to admit of being satisfactorily idealised. Accordingly the *decisive* introduction of Historic Poetry was reserved, in the natural course of events, for the great Corneille, who in an incomparable series of dramas portrayed with true insight all the principal phases of Roman civilisation, at that time better adapted for ideal treatment than any other. After this grand representation of public life in the Past, the Modern Movement, whether in its critical or organic aspects, could be represented only in pictures of private life. Both these aspects are estimated, not systematically indeed but spontaneously, in the incomparable set of pictures by Molière, who knew how both to stigmatise the retrograde classes and to correct the errors of the representatives of progress. Justly feeling the Western Revolution to be in its real nature more intellectual than social, and having experienced the impulse of the Cartesian

philosophy, he strove to discredit the Metaphysicians, and at the same time to set right the Physicians, who were taking up a false attitude in proportion as they were losing their scientific primacy. Thus in all its forms modern poetry fulfilled more or less directly its mission of helping forward on the one hand the negative movement, and on the other the positive work of construction—in both functions alike following the impulse given to it by its sublime father (p. 460).

Milton.

The inimitable poem of Milton was the final manifestation of this kind. It was more truly esthetic than any of those we have mentioned, because in it the organic genius was pure from any debasing admixture of the critical spirit. Set free from public life by the failure of a premature political crisis, and seeing around him no satisfactory types of private life, this noble republican could only create a vague ideal picture under the patronage of a moribund theological creed. Such a design could produce no decisive results. It serves nevertheless as the highest measure yet reached of our poetic powers, while letting us see that their principal developement is reserved for society in its final and regenerated state.

The Special Arts, particularly Painting.

With respect to the Special arts, the really eminent advance during the second phase was confined to the three arts of Form; for Music, which by its nature must be preceded by Poetry, necessarily remained limited, almost as much as in the Middle Age, to the service of Theology. In the plastic arts, the main progress was in Painting. Under the admirable impulse given by Italy, Holland Spain and France produced an immense series of pictures of truly permanent worth, although their principal merit lay in the skill of their execution. The retrograde tendency to commemorate military or theological types in the midst of an industrial and scientific civilisation—to commemorate them therefore without enthusiasm or conviction—deprived art of all genuine originality, except as regards the insufficient province of private life.

Art a bond of union to the West.

Provisional as was this developement of the secondary arts, yet, combined with that of the principal art, it availed to draw forth and cultivate our esthetic powers, and even to prepare them for their final destination (i. 243). Moreover, the simultaneous progress of the arts throughout Europe during this period had a tendency to compensate for the estrangement between the

nations of the West produced by intellectual anarchy. This admirable harmonising office belonged principally to Poetry, which, just because it lost so much of its charm in translation, soon led to a general study of the languages of Southern Europe, especially of that one which was from its birth destined to become finally the Universal Language.

General study of Italian language.

(δ) Practical or Industrial Results.

To complete my judgment of the Positive movement during the second phase of the Modern Revolution, I have still to estimate the Industrial developement. And first I must describe the systematic encouragement which it everywhere met with at its rise.

State patronage of Industry prompted by perception of services it could render.

The favour which every dictatorship, whether monarchical or aristocratic, showed towards Art and even towards Science, was prompted mainly by a desire to adorn its rule, apart from any personal sympathies of particular rulers. In some cases, however, this natural disposition was strengthened by a spontaneous appreciation of the social influence of the intellectual evolution. The noble protection Louis XIV. always bestowed on Molière, which constitutes his best title to fame, did not proceed merely from his genuine admiration of the poet during the period while his dictatorship was still progressive; it arose from his perception that the poet's penetrating criticism might serve him in the task of humbling the aristocracy and even the clergy. This influence of Intellect, however, was generally too little understood to have any considerable effect upon the habitual conduct of governments: the desire of glory was nearly always the leading motive of their patronage. On the other hand, the protection they accorded to Industry was essentially due to the new means they saw it could give them for the increase of their political power; furnishing them with the wealth which had become indispensable for the support of military ascendency. The deplorable wars for the possession of Italy, and afterwards the more honourable struggles which arose out of the religious conflict, created throughout the second phase an urgent demand for the developement of modern armies beyond the resources previously possessed by Western governments. Forced by this necessity to be continually augmenting the public expenditure the dictatorial rulers were one and all impelled to countenance more and more industrial activity. The spontaneous advance of Industry had alone enabled them to impose regular taxes

and its further developement could alone make the taxes more productive. Industry therefore henceforth took its place in the system of Western polity.

Governments tend to become directors of national wealth.

This connection between Governments and Industry accelerated in two ways the dissolution of the old regime, and the preparation of the new. On the one hand modern governments became in consequence more and more sociocratic, despite the theocratic character which the servility of the priesthood was continually endeavouring to bestow upon them. Throughout the West political rulers, whether monarchical or aristocratic, were now forced to have recourse to the public in order to meet the expenses for which they could no longer provide, as in the Middle Age, out of their own domains; accordingly they of necessity transformed themselves into responsible administrators of the national wealth. Private property, likewise, which the lawyers were declaring to be absolute, at the same time began to assume its proper character as a social institution (pp. 310, 456). Not only was the authority of the public treasury over individual possessions generally recognised, but the owners of wealth showed their readiness to accept a moral responsibility for its application, such as was now universally required of the state. On the other hand, in their increasing efforts to systematically develope Industry, modern rulers revealed the fact that for such a function they were disqualified by their military character, so that the need of a new government gradually began to be felt.

Voluntary character of Pacific Activity becomes distinctly remarked.

A further effect of such state protection was that the general character of Pacific activity became better appreciated everywhere. Hitherto, because it had been spontaneously formed during the preceding phase upon foundations laid in the Middle Age (p. 414), this character had not attracted decisive attention. As Industry was now tending to become the principal object of modern polity, it began to manifest the fundamental change which it was introducing into the practical life, not only of the individual but of the community. From that time forward, men began to feel that although the constitution of society on its temporal side must always rest ultimately on force, a profound transformation in practice had nevertheless been gradually taking place, ever since the abolition of serfage, by the substitution of Wealth for Physical Compulsion as the

ordinary means of maintaining discipline in all material undertakings. In the new activity there was nothing either of military oppression or of theocratic authority; and though it more and more tended to become collective, all its cooperation was conditional upon free consent. This had been the noble aspiration of the Middle Age (p. 389), and Industrial life alone could realise it. Masters and workmen were learning to renounce resort to military force or even judicial authority for the settlement of their disputes, and were becoming content to look simply to the concession or refusal of voluntary cooperation. Industrial struggles were thus reduced to the normal antagonism between capital and numbers (ii. 326).

Paltry ambition of Employers. Growth of industrial manners among Workmen.

This natural organisation, however, was disturbed during the second phase by an abnormal tendency, which rose spontaneously and was aggravated by the systematic patronage of Industry mentioned above. The directors of the new activity, instead of making it their aim to take the place of the ancient patriciat by a suitable adaptation of the feudal type, endeavoured, like the lawyers, to incorporate themselves into the now degenerate aristocracy by the help of marriages and even by obtaining grants of nobility. The normal spirit of fraternity, which had been growing up during the preceding phase between employers and employed, gave place to an increasing disdain on the part of the industrial chieftains for Labour, which they began to regard simply as the private basis of this so-called exaltation in rank. Aristocratic governments gave less countenance to this aberration than monarchical; but, on the other hand, they upheld more tenaciously the political preeminence of the ancient patriciat. Under both forms of the dictatorship, the tendency towards collective action, which industrial life had spontaneously manifested during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, was now obscured by the vain ambition of employers, whose chief object of success was to desert their class. Nevertheless, the direct developement of modern manners did not fail to continue amongst the workmen, above all through their increasing dislike of military life. This dislike obtained freer scope in consequence of the desuetude of feudal obligations, and became so general that voluntary recruiting was found to be no longer adequate for the maintenance of the armies that were

always increasing in number. Hence during the wars which brought the second phase to a close, a system of forced military service was everywhere introduced.

Manufacturing industry becomes predominant. Spanish and English colonisation contrasted.

Looking at the special results of the Industrial development during this period we find that they were chiefly commercial, whereas in the preceding phase they had chiefly related to manufacture. That pacific activity turned chiefly in this direction resulted naturally from the universal extension of the Colonial System founded at the close of the first phase. Colonisation was pursued more systematically or more spontaneously, according as it was directed by monarchical or aristocratic governments. This contrast comes forcibly into view if we compare Spain which had reached the complete dictatorship a century before France, and England, the typical instance of the incomplete form, although she only entered upon a colonial career in imitation of Holland. So systematic was the colonial work of Spain that it soon became an indispensable element of her retrograde policy. It not only enlarged her material resources, but, what was still more important, it supplied her people with a moral and mental outlet, by which the most unruly spirits were dispersed far from the mother country. On the other hand, the English colonies were essentially the fruit of free expeditions; the founders were private adventurers, who, far from being willing agents of a dictatorial policy, were often themselves fugitives from political or religious persecution.

Negro slavery worst in colonies of Protestant and Aristocratic nations.

We may trace the consequences of this natural contrast in the institution, baneful as it was unstable, which everywhere disgraced the expansion of Western rule. Colonial slavery has no claim to be considered as even a retrograde institution, for it differed radically from the slavery of Antiquity, which had always a normal character, so long as it merely meant that the producer of wealth was necessarily subordinate to the conquering warrior. But when it means the subjection of the labourer to an employer, it is equally degrading to both one and the other. It can never be anything else than a social monstrosity; an infamous oppression inflicted on the affectionate black race by the intellectual white race, in abuse of the power that had been developed by Humanity for their due cooperation and common welfare. But the depravity of the system manifested itself in

its worst form in the colonies of aristocratic and Protestant states. Owing to their free origin, these societies eluded the spontaneous control of modern morality over daily life more easily than those organised under a rule of monarchical and Catholic centralisation.

Colonial system contributed to Revolutionary Movement.

Everywhere, however, the conduct of the Western Priesthood in the face of this shameful institution completed the full measure of their social degradation. They showed themselves incapable of applying their own doctrine, and even scrupled not to resort to absurd sophisms for the purpose of confirming the oppression of the subject race. In every other respect also we must consider that the colonising expansion of the West accelerated the radical dissolution of the theological and military system, by extending industrial life, and presenting the problem of universality on a wider scale than before. At first indeed it seemed to give a new life to both Theologism and Warfare, in finding them a new field. But before long colonial experience helped to discredit the one and supplant the other, for it showed that a demonstrable faith and a pacific activity were alone suited to the whole of the human race.

(3) Third or Deistic Phase (A.D. 1685–1789) pp. 492–509.

The examination of the second phase of the Modern Transition having now been completed, it remains for me to estimate the third and last. This was the shortest but also the most decisive. Anarchy reached such a pitch that the urgent need of reconstruction became evident; but the organic preparation for this was still incomplete.

(a) Negative movement, pp. 492–502.

This final phase occupied the century commencing with the expulsion of the Calvinists and the triumph of the Anglicans, and terminating with the outbreak of the French Revolution. We must now concentrate our attention more than before upon the negative movement, which is the exclusive characteristic of the phase; the positive movement being merely a continuation of the course pursued before. We shall comprehend this agitation better as a whole if we subdivide it into three periods of about equal duration. First comes a generation of retrogression: then follow two generations of progress, in which the critical philosophy attacks the spiritual and temporal orders successively.

subdivided into three periods of Retrogression, Spiritual Advance, and Temporal Advance.

(α) Retrogression in Monarchical

We have seen that during the first or Spontaneous phase of the Modern Movement, when there was as yet no indication

countries, France, Spain.

that it would take a subversive turn, the Dictatorship was thoroughly progressive. But during the second or Protestant phase, the outburst of negativism showed such anarchical tendencies that governments were thrown back into a retrograde attitude. In Spain, indeed, this transformation had been already consummated, for that country having been the first to develope royalty into preponderance, was naturally the earliest to exhibit its degeneracy. Nevertheless the reactionary movement, as first exemplified in Spain, was essentially a policy of self-defence, since it consisted principally in preserving the southern West from Protestantism. But this policy took a more pronounced form when extended to the central nation, whose rulers, especially the great Richelieu, whilst protecting the Protestant principle abroad, had always managed to keep it within bounds at home. Accordingly in that country, no less than in others, royalty had no sooner consummated its triumph over aristocracy and clergy than it fell into retrograde courses, swayed partly by its inclinations, partly by its fears. Thenceforth it became the rallying point for the servile remnants of the various classes whose ruin it had effected, and with their concurrence set itself to organise an active resistance to the Modern Movement as a whole. Although the popular revolution in England had necessarily failed because it was premature, it had opened the eyes of statesmen to the radical subversion towards which the West was tending, without at the same time indicating to them that a better order was at hand.

Louis XIV. becomes reactionary under influence of Mme. de Maintenon;

This irretrievable degeneracy of French royalty is the more sharply marked for having begun under a dictator, who had shown himself nobly progressive during the first half of his reign, until the death of the eminent Colbert, and the triumph of a scheming adventuress. After that, the retrograde policy passed under Jesuitical impulses, and both at home and abroad obtained a plenitude of activity such as had never been possible before. It aimed directly at the universal destruction of heretical influence, in spite of the decisive compromise which since the middle of the seventeenth century had divided the West between Catholicism and Protestantism. The limits then established coincided, as was natural, with those which separated the monarchical and aristocratic modes of dictatorship. Nevertheless, so normal is the preponderance

of the central power that two Protestant countries, Prussia and Holland, the one Episcopalian, the other Calvinist, formed noble exceptions to this rule, and were governed monarchically; while there is no instance of a Catholic country governed aristocratically. This religious division of the West, so essentially in conformity with its political division, surmounted the culpable efforts of French royalty to destroy it, and received complete confirmation in the issue of the disastrous wars which occupied the first generation of the third phase. At home too, the same reactionary policy failed, no less unmistakably; a signal manifestation being furnished on the occasion of the funeral of the degenerate dictator, when the population exhibited their unanimous abhorrence of the hypocrisy of the Government.

Fails to destroy religious equilibrium established by Peace of Westphalia.

To complete my account of the retrogression during this first generation, I must show how it extended essentially to the other mode of Dictatorship, the perfect type of which is to be found in England rather than in Sweden. The British aristocracy, whilst battling abroad under their Dutch chief against French royalty, endeavoured at the same time to set up at home a system of hypocrisy even more hostile to the Modern Revolution than that of the Jesuits, against which they exclaimed so loudly. The premature crisis directed by the great Cromwell, had been a warning to monarchs that the movement of the West would everywhere result in the republican situation, which indeed is alone compatible with final sociocracy. But it had also thoroughly impressed upon the lords that this issue, whenever it should be realised, would prove anything but a consecration of Parliamentary ascendency and that, on the contrary, it would ensure a stronger preponderance to the central power. Moreover, the English patriciat had taken alarm at the subversive dispositions which had shown themselves as the natural sequel of an attempt based on a purely negative doctrine. Accordingly, as soon as they had made good their triumph over Jesuitism, they organised retrogression, with the view of maintaining both public order and the ascendency of their own class.

Retrogression in Aristocratic countries; England after Cromwell.

In France, as compared with Spain, the reactionary policy had assumed a more oppressive form, but it had not succeeded in obtaining so firm a hold, because it was less in harmony with the situation. For in France it had commenced a century

League of nobility, landed gentry, and bourgeoisie against progress.

later, and during this interval there had been a spontaneous progress of the Complete form of emancipation. But in England, the half satisfaction which Protestantism afforded to the want felt for spiritual enfranchisement had, more than in other countries, brought the negative movement to a natural halt, each individual insisting that it should stop at the point occupied by himself. In England too, the alarm felt at the apparition of the Levellers had specially aggravated the estrangement, elsewhere not uncommon, between employers and employed, and the result was to bring about an alliance of the *bourgeoisie* with the nobility by the aid of the intermediate class, which had in earlier times united them against the throne. Nevertheless what specially strengthened the reactionary attitude of England was the rise and persistent pursuit of a thoroughgoing system of national egoism such as the Venetian had only exhibited in a rudimentary form when industry existed on a narrower scale. So it was that the British patriciat organised against the regeneration of the West a resistance that was more subtle and dangerous than any other, because by holding out as the true national object commercial conquests abroad, instead of social reform at home, it corrupted even the popular instinct.

(β) Spiritual Advance. France resumes her normal primacy.

The two modes of Dictatorship having thus become equally retrograde, though under different forms, there was no other issue left open to the modern movement than a radical agitation directed alike against Protestantism and Catholicism. Without such a decisive effort the West must have continued to float indefinitely between two tendencies, which had become equally vicious and incapable of serving Order any more than Progress. But it was in the central nation that this explosive force necessarily exhibited the greatest intensity. Thenceforward we see France recovering the normal initiative conferred on her by the Middle Age, although during the second phase, from exceptional circumstances, the focus of the West might seem for a time to have shifted elsewhere. If France now acquired a larger territory and a more complete solidarity than any other member of the Modern Republic (p. 403), it was mainly to guarantee her independence and to insure the effectiveness of her presidency over the West. For neither the tendencies towards anarchy nor the aspirations after organisation could ever have become sufficiently decisive to bring about a real

reconstruction, unless they had been first developed amongst a people powerful enough to make itself respected by all, while stormily working out the problem which concerned all.

Negativism popularised by Voltaire and French Deists, who attack the Church, but respect Civil institutions.

In France, therefore, during the second generation of the third phase, the Critical doctrine was put forward directly, and became popular, whereas before it had only been propagated indirectly by means of its partial application. True, in theory it had already been generalised by eminent thinkers, especially by Hobbes in the supplementary ideas he contributed as to a combination between freedom of thought in spiritual matters and dictatorial power in temporal government; a combination which characterises the true regime of the Modern Transition. The new effort, therefore, did but expand and popularise this negative system. Accordingly the leadership of the revolution naturally passed into the hands of the subaltern class of writers, which university culture had multiplied throughout the West, and which, ever since the isolation of philosophy during the preceding phase (p. 484), had been of a literary, rather than of a philosophic turn. These men now eagerly accepted the glorious mission which called not so much for thinkers as for preachers. Their best type and their natural leader devoted his long life to the work of extirpating reactionary beliefs, and from first to last displayed an admirable combination of secondary faculties, especially a sagacity that, unsympathetic as it was, showed itself often worthy of being compared to feminine intuition. Nevertheless, whether from their innate feebleness, or from their desire to humour the weakness they attributed to the people, these litterateurs confined themselves to prolonging the Incomplete Emancipation; the rejection of Revelation being the only point in which they went further than the Protestants. Although their vain Deism could have no coherence, even of an intellectual kind, yet it was the last halting-point of Negativism, and, as such, soon did more to impede the solution of the Western problem than it had at first done to further it.

(γ) Temporal Advance. Roussean attacks civil institutions, but props up Theologism.

Being naturally absorbed in the work of demolishing Christianity these inconsistent organs of the final emancipation found themselves obliged in the main to pay respect to the temporal dictatorship; and this, notwithstanding the hopelessly reactionary character which it had assumed, especially in France. At first this attitude was necessary: for the

revolution was in its nature an intellectual rather than a social one, and if religion and political institutions had been simultaneously assailed, the inevitable result must have been total anarchy. Nevertheless, it was impossible for Deism, aspiring as it did to universal domination, to refrain from those political applications of its principles which had formerly constituted the strength of Protestantism. This final extension of Negativism was ever becoming more urgently needed, as the dictatorial Government became more degraded. But though the locality was to be the same, new organs were required, and in the third generation of the phase they appeared. These, in their turn, from the same motive inversely applied, respected the Spiritual order and framed a Deism more akin to Christianity; whereas that of their predecessors had leant rather towards Positivism. Thus arose the provisional schism between the followers of Voltaire and those of Rousseau, the former being the more rational, the latter the more passionate; but both alike inconsistent in protecting the system which they were demolishing. This inconsequence on their part appears more striking if contrasted with the thoroughgoing revolutionary policy of Cromwell's Independents, who, despite the inadequacy of their doctrine, and with nothing but a confused instinct to guide them, had energetically sought after a complete regeneration.

Third or Organic school of *completely* emancipated thinkers.

Owing to their tendency to neutralise each other, these two inconsequent schools, each at once anarchic and retrograde, might have prevented the third phase from attaining a thoroughly decisive character, had it not been for the spontaneous predominance of a third school, whose Complete Emancipation could not fail to give an impulse towards reorganisation. In truth, the eighteenth century, unsatisfactory as it inevitably was, would not be worthily represented by mere literary men incapable of producing a single new conception. Their temporary popularity could not outlive their provisional services; and they have already ceased to eclipse the school of genuine thinkers who in the future will alone be the definitive representatives of this phase. The last school, undazzled by an imposing political fabric, and free from all supernatural beliefs, strove to form a direct conception of the final regeneration as a whole, so far at least as was possible while the organic movement was still so imperfect. Their minds were constantly absorbed by the future, but at the same time they yielded

a proper submission to the dictatorship, then in its decline maintaining towards it an attitude equally removed from servility and disrespect. Without disguising their consciousness of their own superiority over the one-sided schools, they were never jealous of the temporary renown which these latter were to achieve by a work better suited to the time, and therefore more readily appreciated by the public. They even attempted to establish a practical reconciliation between the Philosophical and the Political forms of the Critical doctrine, as being both equally necessary, giving, however, a preference to the former because it was more in harmony with the nature of the Western revolution, of which they themselves alone constituted the complete organs.

Diderot and Frederick the central figures of a glorious group.

This grand school, the sole representative of the eighteenth century towards both the future and the past, furnished the connecting links to the seventeenth century in the person of Fontenelle, and to the nineteenth in that of Condorcet. Its special organs naturally group themselves around two types of the first order, Diderot and Frederick, the former a thinker and the most encyclopedic spirit which has arisen since Aristotle, the latter a practical genius who, in political capacity, comes nearest to Cæsar and Charlemagne. But these two essential representatives of the third phase had not equal opportunities of making their personal value felt; one was permitted by circumstances to pursue his true vocation, the other was not. And so, whilst the dictator furnishes the best model of the modern politician—as having established, in accordance with Hobbes's ideal, a reconciliation between power and liberty—the philosopher, born to construct, saw himself compelled to take part in the work of demolition, which alone was then practicable, and never found an adequate field for the employment of his principal faculties. Nevertheless Positivism, which always permits the worth of a man as an individual to be appreciated, even when it has to be disentangled from his historical situation, will soon procure for the greatest genius of the eighteenth century a final ascendency such as will be a just compensation for the fatality which thwarted his life by external hindrances and filled it with bitterness. Between these two types, though they never came into personal contact, there is a natural connection; and round them will always be grouped the men who were the chief glory of those days, and

who can never find a place in either of the secondary schools —Hume, d'Alembert, Montesquieu, Buffon, George Leroy, Turgot, &c. As for the men who were illustrious purely by their services to science, they too ought to be classed with this supreme school, which alone was capable of appreciating their labours. For the savants, from their want of philosophic views, were becoming unworthy to admire Clairaut, Lagrange, and Berthollet.

Diderot, aided by d'Alembert, causes the two *Incomplete* schools to cooperate in the Encyclopedia.

It was owing to the part which the Organic school necessarily took in the elaboration of the negative doctrine that the two incomplete sects were enabled to develope their respective tendencies without their common destination being marred by their mutual antagonism. Diderot's energetic wisdom founded the Encyclopedia as a sort of workshop in which the Political school—which had hardly yet assumed a distinct character—might cooperate on tolerable terms with the Philosophical school. This concentration of efforts tended to remind the writers of their *organic* purpose, in the midst of their *critical* labours, by constantly bringing back their thoughts to the construction of a complete synthesis. The plan of the Encyclopedia also did something to remedy the anti-historical spirit of the third phase, partly by the direct opening which it gave to history proper, but still more by its method of tracing the filiation of scientific conceptions. Diderot himself, however, had too synthetic a mind to be deceived as his colleague was with regard to the nature and destination of the compilation, which was calculated to bring into clearer light the impossibility of constructing any system at that time.

Rousseau did but popularise a doctrine formulated by Helvetius.

So really dominant was the Organic school during the third phase, that it was one of its subaltern members who first presented to the world the Critical doctrine in the shape of a definitive system. That system starts with Equality and ends in Individualism, for in attributing the differences of results exclusively to outward circumstances, it postulates that all intelligences should be deemed intrinsically equal, and that morals should be based on personality alone. The eloquent sophist who popularised the negative polity had only to develope this ingenious work. It was the natural summing up of modern metaphysics, of which Diderot alone among his contemporaries felt the radical error.

To the great school of the eighteenth century we must also

To the Organic School also belonged the Jurists and Political Economists.

attribute two special branches of the Critical doctrine, which still retain some credit, because they are Organic as far as they go, though after an indirect and confused fashion. Of these two the more important was the attempt made by Economists to discover the laws of the material existence of societies by studying such existence apart from the intellectual and moral order. The enterprise was necessarily abortive because it rested on a vicious method. Still the labours of those who took part in it helped on the revolutionary cause by casting discredit on the system of patronage, which the governments of the West had adopted towards pacific activity. They also facilitated the positive evolution in so far as they brought the attention of theorists to bear on industry, and made men begin to feel the contrast between the ancient and the modern civilisation in respect to practical life (p. 51). Secondly, the study of legislation, especially of penal law, helped to demonstrate the urgency of a general reconstruction of society. Here the Advocates showed their tendency to supersede the Judges, who by this time had become irrevocably identified with the reactionary dictatorship. It was only by means of these two accessory studies that negative metaphysics succeeded in penetrating immediately to Catholic populations, where indeed jurists and, still more, economists received their first patronage from the empirical instincts of statesmen.

Disastrous effects of Negativism on public and private life.

I have now sufficiently shown how the work of elaborating the Critical doctrine in its application to society was definitively set on foot. It will therefore be easy to complete this examination by determining the influence which it exercised upon the developement of modern anarchy. Dispersion of thought had by this time reached such a point that the followers of the negative doctrine were divided into irreconcilable sects. But where the mental disorder more particularly displayed itself was with regard to the conception of the past—though it was precisely here that the one possible solution was destined ultimately to arise. The two incomplete schools had both tended utterly to disregard the historical point of view, the one reducing to a system that reprobation of the Middle Age which up to this time had been merely spontaneous, the other shutting out from consideration the entire past, except when it sought to obtain credit for its own abortive utopias by presenting a perverse picture of antiquity. As for the effect

upon society, it may be easily imagined what mischief followed from a doctrine which, from whatever aspect it looked on humanity, placed perfection in a state of non-government. In morals Deism first promoted the attacks of Protestantism on the regime of the family to the point of ignoring marriage altogether, and then directly impaired personal discipline by sanctioning suicide (p. 381), and by holding up pride and vanity as virtues (p. 380). In politics it completed the discredit which had fallen on the doctrine of the separation of the temporal and spiritual powers, by aiming directly at the establishment of an absolute supremacy of numbers, the result of which would have been to leave no guarantee for material order except violence and corruption.

Through which, however, appear first aspirations towards Final Regeneration.

Yet from this impure and contradictory source was destined to spring the first manifestation of the decisive tendencies of the West towards the final regeneration. This was the work of the Organic school. In estimating its programme as a whole, what strikes us most at the present time is how altogether incompatible it is with the views and sentiments inculcated by the two Critical schools, although it never disavows these schools. For we see this curious contrast—on the one hand a thoroughly sociocratic republic, having its foundation in a generous impulse for a universal education in which morality was to be detached from theology of every kind; and, on the other, a brutal domination of numbers, a flat denial of the existence of the benevolent instincts, and a complete disdain for the cultivation of feeling. This inconsistency is explained by my theory of history, which shows how impossible it was at this time for the positive movement to keep pace with the negative impulse. Nevertheless, such contradictions enable us to see beforehand that the first attempt at regeneration, as directed by such a philosophy, was necessarily doomed to utter failure.

Three triumphs of Negativism: Suppression of Jesuits; Administration of Turgot; American Revolution.

In spite of all these vices, negative metaphysics during the last generation of the third phase, by virtue merely of being suited to the time, obtained three characteristic triumphs over the reactionary dictatorship, and this amidst the universal plaudits of the public of the West, including even the aristocracy and the clergy. The first and most decisive of these triumphs was the official abolition of Jesuitism. This measure emanated, it is true, from Catholic jealousies, but the whole

advantage of it was reaped by the revolutionary philosophy which thus found itself aided by its natural adversaries; so completely had all parties alike at that time lost sight of general views. The second triumph was when the Encyclopedic school was summoned directly to govern, in the person of its most eminent practical statesman, whose short administration soon made men feel that nothing but a convulsion of society would get rid of the dictatorial coalition which was a bar to all progress. Thirdly, negative metaphysics became the faith of the people from having presided over the American crisis. Though the chief import of that movement lay in its being the commencement of the irrevocable disruption of the Colonial system, which at that time was everywhere bound up with the retrograde policy, a secondary and more special result was that the want of organising power in the doctrine was disguised by the part it played in American emancipation. For, though it could not direct internal reorganisation, it showed itself able to break a foreign yoke just as it had done before in Holland.

(*b*) Positive movement, pp. 502–509. This remained preparatory.

To complete my review of the third phase, I must now describe the march of the Positive movement. That movement of necessity still remained in a purely preparatory stage; nevertheless, it pointed to the final solution, the outlines of which were indeed directly sketched by the last representative of the Encyclopedic school (p. 527). The encouragement which during the preceding phase governments had everywhere accorded to Science, the Fine Arts, and Industry now assumed a more systematic character, thus pointing to what will one day become the principal function of modern statesmanship. The consequence of the brilliant progress made in these three directions was that governments could no longer look on their patronage as a resource, of which they were free to avail themselves at their option, for procuring their own glorification and aggrandisement, but were compelled to exercise it as an official duty, the discharge of which placed the recipients of the public bounty under no sort of personal obligation.

(*a*) Philosophic Results. These now resume primary importance.

In examining the progress of speculation I must on this occasion treat of Philosophy before Science, thus inverting the order which I adopted in reviewing the second phase. For Philosophy, though still too weak to make decisive progress had now grown so far independent of fresh acquisitions from

Science as to be able to hold her own. This was owing to the force of the subjective impulse which had already followed upon the renovation of objective studies. Thus early appeared the normal tendency of Philosophy to rule Science, while founding itself upon Science, when each should be sufficiently regenerated by the universal substitution of the Relative for the Absolute.

Steps towards Relativity. Hume, Diderot, and Kant.

Towards this change, which amounted to nothing short of a radical transformation of the human understanding, a direct step was accomplished by two spontaneously convergent dissertations of capital importance; first, that of Hume against Causality, and then Diderot's discourse on the two principal cases of Intellect deprived of one of the senses. Kant's treatise was really no more than a methodical summary, appearing somewhat late in the day, of the results of these two works, for it consisted in the enunciation of certain formulæ, characterising aptly enough the fundamental dualism between the spectacle and the spectator (ii. 310), which had already been seized partially by Hume and completely by Diderot. If Philosophy had not been by an unfortunate necessity isolated from Science, the powerful thinker who, pursuing his speculations freely under the worthy protection of the great Frederick, sought for a complete synthesis, would have felt that the preparation thus made must continue to be merely negative until Laws should be everywhere substituted for Causes. But that substitution could not be decisively effected until the true laws of mental progress should be discovered; in other words, until the foundation of Sociology (p. 39). But Sociology required for its basis Biology, which was still wanting, although everything indicated that it would soon be supplied. This explains how it was that, after having long waited for the objective basis indispensable to the subjective synthesis that had been vainly sought for since the time of Descartes and Leibnitz, the German philosopher was impelled by his systematic instinct to create an illusory fabric such as Hume and Diderot had alike disdained.

Preparations for Sociology. Statical contributions of Vico and Montesquieu.

True Subjectivity was now drawing near; and what announced and hastened its coming was the natural convergence of the social necessities with the intellectual cravings of the period. For to this end were working together all the efforts which tended to constitute Humanity, as a whole, the subject

of scientific meditation. Thus from the Statical point of view a profound sense of the existence of Sociological laws had already been manifested in the systematic studies of the eminent Vico, and also in the historical inquiries, incoherent as they were, of his successor Montesquieu, although neither was able to add anything to the foundation which Aristotle had laid, and Hobbes alone had done anything to improve (pp. 259, 483). But Vico and Montesquieu had alike radically misconceived Social Dynamics, although that was the study on which especially depended the direct construction of a social science capable of solving the problem of the West. The first germ of the fundamental notion of continuous developement dates from the grand controversy which inaugurated the third phase, and which was prompted by the scientific impulse of that time. That impulse was worthily represented by Fontenelle, who already felt that it was possible to forecast the progress of thought. But these introductory speculations, which at first related exclusively to mental developement, were afterwards extended to Social developement by Hume's indirect dissertation [1] on the general comparison between the Industrial Civilisation of modern life and the Military Sociability of the ancient world (p. 51). In another direction we find the same philosopher commencing the refutation of the Egoistic Metaphysics; [2] a refutation afterwards decisively completed by George Leroy on the plan suggested by Diderot. Thus at last speculative reason was brought into harmony with the practical instinct of mankind as to the natural existence of Altruistic Sentiments. Philosophy thus furnished support to the direct effort of the admirable Vauvenargues to revive the cultivation of the heart, then universally neglected, by means of a sounder knowledge of human nature, which that noble thinker saw had its centre in the affections.

Dynamical contributions of Fontenelle, Hume, Leroy, and Diderot.

These were the chief contributions of the third phase towards the final regeneration of Philosophy. They could not give decisive results; still in all respects they paved the way for the approach of the Subjective Synthesis which Descartes had projected, and which had been more thoroughly conceived by Leibnitz. But this general tendency did not immediately react upon any special branch of thought except History. This

Historical studies. Hume, Robertson, and Voltaire.

[1] Essays on Commerce and The Populousness of Ancient Nations.
[2] Essay on The Reason of Animals.

study grew and improved. Hume, and Robertson also, by their historical works, did something to remedy the revolutionary impairment of Continuity. The best exponent of the Critical doctrine (p. 496) was himself unconsciously so much influenced that he devoted a part of his career to History, the opportuneness of which he felt. It was only in the purely Political school (p. 511), just where it should have been most appreciated, that the need was ignored.

(β) Scientific Results.

The Scientific movement during this phase presents three principal features: the complete systematisation of Astronomy, the decisive advent of Chemistry, and the direct preparation of Biology.

Astronomy finally completed and restricted to the solar system.

With respect to the first of these—and to this the development of Rational Mechanics, and even the necessary extension of the Calculus naturally belong—the third phase is entitled to the entire credit of having constructed the theory of gravitation. True, the general principle of this theory had been discovered by Newton towards the end of the second phase. But that eminent founder of celestial mechanics had, in respect to this subject, really done no more than present in a dynamical form the geometrical laws of the great Kepler relating to the elliptic movement of the planets and the satellites by treating these bodies as if they were homogeneous spheres, each condensed into its own centre. This proved the gravitation of each planet towards the focus of its orbit, and even—judging from the case of the moon—the identity of this celestial force with terrestrial weight. Still the explanation could not then be extended, except by a vague induction, so as to refer to the same force the action of all the various planetary masses on one another. This final complement of the theory could not be definitely added until the secondary influences of the heavenly bodies on one another had been studied so as to explain both the special perturbations of the elliptic movement and the exact configuration of our planets. Hence arose the admirable series of laborious investigations by which the worthy successors of Newton developed the main influence of his fundamental law, first on Science and then on Philosophy. Thenceforward Astronomy was summed up in this general fact: that all the molecules of our world gravitate towards each other in direct proportion to their masses and in inverse proportion to the squares of their mutual distances,

but with the same intensity in every direction. This mechanical systematisation, like the geometrical systematisation which served for its basis and was perfected by it, rests necessarily limited, both for statical and for dynamical purposes, to the internal constitution of the solar group with which alone Man is concerned (i. 411), any attempt to extend it to the heavenly bodies beyond being irrational and useless.

This limitation of Astronomy, ignored only by academic specialists, completed the demonstration of the impossibility of finding an Objective Synthesis, and so confirmed the tendency which had been bequeathed by the preceding phase to search for the Subjective Unity. It led genuine thinkers to make the earth the centre round which they grouped all their astronomic studies, and irrevocably to dismiss from their attention even those members of the solar system which exercise no influence on the human planet. At the same time, by a series of special proofs, Relativity became closely bound up with Subjectivity, especially after scientific demonstrations had cleared away all element of the Absolute from the notion of Weight, the case in which, more than in any other relating to matter, such a transformation of ideas might seem to be impossible.

Chemistry acquires a Positive character.

But, whatever might be either the immediate import or the indirect results of the grand elaboration of Astronomy, the encyclopedic influence of the third phase consisted chiefly in the decisive advent of Chemistry, which completed the constitution of Cosmology and the preparation for Biology, and linked them together (p. 411). This intermediate science cannot be truly systematised except under the subjective impulse of the sciences constituting the *Final* division (p. 481). This was soon proved by the inevitable failure of the brilliant theory which inaugurated it (Phil. Pos. iii. 189). Nevertheless, the effort to found Chemistry was wholly opportune, and the first check which it thus experienced did not deprive it of its principal value, consisting in its reaction both on Philosophy and on Science. Thus it was a philosophical advance that even the elements were treated as substances undecomposed without being pronounced undecomposable, since the principle of Relativity was thus introduced into the most searching study of the constitution of matter. So again, from a scientific point of view, the general analysis of the solid and liquid substances that form man's terrestrial environments, enabled thinkers at

Lavoisier's theory of Combustion.

last to institute directly the fundamental conceptions of Biology.

Biology: theory of Classification.

Before this last preparation, Biological speculations had been decisively ushered in by the institution of a general comparison of living bodies, from both a statical and dynamical point of view; the study of life being necessarily an indivisible whole, the first step was to form an immediate appreciation of the largest and most abstract relations, partial differences being always considered in reference to the general coordination. It was thus that Linnæus, following the lead of Bernard de Jussieu, created the fundamental theory of Classifications. To this Buffon was certainly an opponent, but on empirical grounds only: indeed, his genius unconsciously promoted the theory by imparting to it a synthetic spirit and a subjective destination, both of which were lost sight of under a mere objective analysis. At the same time, Haller and Vicq-d'Azyr gave a better direction to the preliminary studies which, during the preceding phase, had been made in Anatomy and in Physiology, and thus prepared the field for Bichat, from whom the regenerating impulse was to come. When once Relativity combined with Subjectivity had become the accepted principle of Cosmology, the philosophical foundations were laid for Biology, which had only to complete them by developing such attributes as it was especially qualified to appreciate; and this without waiting for its own constitution as a science.

Growth of Specialism.

During the last generation of this phase, the academic world had made no contribution to science except in elaborating the theory of the mechanism of the heavens; and its anarchy was now notably aggravated by the advent of Chemistry which curtailed still further what had once been the encyclopedic domain of the physicians (p. 459). Already in the preceding phase they had lost the presidency over science generally, but they had still retained in their hands the cultivation of chemistry. And in so doing they were only fulfilling the requirements of the subjective hierarchy, inasmuch as the proper destination of Chemistry is to provide conceptions to serve as connecting links between Cosmology and Biology (p. 481). But the laws of combination being now developed into a special study, Chemistry became the exclusive property of an intermediate class of savants to whom the cosmological and biological points of view were alike unknown. Being thus

pursued in a more irrational manner than any other science, it soon passed under the yoke of geometers; so much so indeed that biologists found themselves obliged to seek an escape from mathematical oppression by establishing an Academy of their own. This parcelling out of natural philosophy into three irreconcilable divisions reacted on the first pair of the encyclopedic hierarchy, which having from this time attained their partial systematisation, now took a retrograde direction towards objective metaphysics, as is already exemplified by the Calculus of Chances and even by Sidereal Astronomy (i. 381, 412).

(γ) Esthetic Results. Poetry takes the shape of Novels.

In Esthetic progress a phase devoted to the establishment of absolute scepticism could hardly show any results beyond those which are to be attributed to impulses previously in operation. In the *fundamental* art, the only advance consisted in the worthy developement, especially in France and England, of a form of composition which had already come into vogue under the indirect influence of the Middle Age—I mean epic idealisation of private life, both personal and domestic. Nevertheless I cannot here pass over, because it has been so little understood, the self-sacrifice made at this time by the tragic poet who was then directing the Spiritual Emancipation, and who made his dramas subordinate to that object, thus renouncing unostentatiously the first place in the second rank of poets, which he might have secured if he had laboured for it. In the *special* arts, the only important feature presented by this phase was the decisive rise of Dramatic Music. Here the most touching of the arts, under the impulse of poetry, is detached at last from its theocratic stem, and devoted to the direct expression of purely human sentiments. At this period also theatres multiplied everywhere, and although this developement, except in the case of the opera, was purely provisional, it must here be recorded as a spontaneous symptom of the irresistible impulse that was urging the West towards a new life.

Self-sacrifice of Voltaire.

Operatic music.

(δ) Practical or Industrial Results. Banking and Machinery.

With regard to the industrial order, this phase brought into full operation two elements of progress closely connected and equally adapted to mark the pressing need for the final organisation of the practical forces of society, all the essential preparations for which were now matured. The two previous phases had successively developed Manufacture and Commerce; under this phase Banking grew up, which till then had not

been a sufficiently distinct business for want of a suitable field for its operations, although its germs had been introduced in the Middle Age. Even at its rise, this highest form of Industry showed signs of its normal aptitude to become the systematic bond of pacific activity, since from the first it acquired a political character by its connection in all countries with that necessity of modern states, national debts. At the same time, as a result of the whole body of theoretical and practical knowledge, the institution of machines received a greater developement than during the whole period which had elapsed since the abolition of serfdom, when it first became incorporated as an essential element of Western life. It had the effect, however, of aggravating the tendency of employers to separate themselves from the working class, thus showing that although the proper constitution of the industrial ranks was becoming continually more urgent on social grounds, it was a movement which was being as much retarded by moral errors as it was being advanced by the superior methods of industry devised by the intellect.

Commerce united with, and made to flourish by, War.

The wars of this period, arising out of the expansion of the colonial system, must here be noted, because they were a spontaneous symptom of the decisive transformation which now at last passed over the military protectorate of Industry. Hitherto Industry had been encouraged by governments from the desire of political aggrandisement; but from this time forward armies were kept up principally to push commerce. This reversal of policy was a source of both moral danger and material weakness; but it deserves to be mentioned here on sociologic grounds, as constituting a proof at once of military decline and industrial ascendency.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, pp. 509–531.

I will now complete this concluding chapter by a summary estimate of the necessary crisis in which the Western Revolution found its issue in France. The features to be noted are, first, the Social movement, and then the Mental developement, the two together leading up to the solution of the general problem. But in judging them I must restrict myself to what is strictly necessary to explain the result, putting aside whatever is merely a spontaneous prolongation of the previous movements, whether positive or negative. Such accessory considerations, if introduced here would only confuse our conception of the upshot of the Western Revolution. Moreover they may be found

discussed in the sixth volume of my fundamental treatise (Phil. Pos. vi. 416–488).

(*a*) Negative movement, pp. 510–526.

As to the social movement, the judgment which I have just passed on the last phase as a whole suffices to explain how it was that the regenerating impulse soon changed into a subversive commotion. This unavoidable but unfortunate alteration resulted mainly from the unequal rate at which the negative and positive evolutions had proceeded; the former now necessitating a renovation which the latter was not yet ready to direct. All the religious faiths had broken up, and the reactionary dictatorship, which rallied around it the fragments of the ancient regime, had irrevocably fallen into discredit. The only bond that kept such a society together was the Affections; but these too now began to exhibit a profound deterioration, resulting from the anarchy of Thought. This was shown by the steady decline of the influence of women and by the increasing insurrection of the intellect against the heart. On the one hand, Science was still limited to the study of inanimate nature, and was even tending towards its present degeneracy under the rule of special Academies. On the other hand, Philosophy, for the want of an objective base, was wasting itself in vain aspirations after a subjective synthesis. Thus the organic evolution was unable to satisfy the wants created by the critical movement. A social upheaval then became inevitable, and indeed was also indispensable if the regenerating conceptions were to be decisively extended and freely propagated. To account for the fatal direction which this necessary commotion spontaneously took we have only to consider the general state of speculation at the close of the deistic phase.

Explosion inevitable and indispensable; Reasons why it was subversive.

First Reason: it was presided over by Rousseauists.

The revolutionary party was divided into three schools, and no one of them was suited to preside over the renovation which, though being worked out in France alone, was anxiously observed by the whole West, because destined to be universal. The school of Diderot, inclining by nature to organisation, though, for want of a positive doctrine, necessarily vague, had possessed a greater number of eminent members than any other. Preserving this preeminence, it now produced two worthy types, one a practician, the other a theorician: the great Danton, the only statesman the West can boast of since Frederick, and the admirable Condorcet, the one philosopher who, in the midst of the storm, pursued his meditations for

the regeneration of society. But this supreme school was too imperfect and too little understood to command habitual assent, although whenever a specially difficult emergency arose, it was always appealed to. Hence the direction of the Revolution oscillated between the Philosophical school of Voltaire, and the Political school of Rousseau; the first sceptical and proclaiming Liberty, the second anarchical and bent on Equality; the first frivolous, and the second declamatory; both alike incapable of constructing anything. Nevertheless the school of Rousseau, just because it alone possessed what seemed to be a doctrine, soon acquired predominance and kept it for a few years, during which the *Contrat Social* inspired more trust and veneration than ever were commanded by the Bible and the Koran. For want of a theory of society, the instinct for regeneration was obliged to guide itself by such maxims as were already familiar to it from the course of previous struggles, and a denial of government of every kind was spontaneously erected into the final type of human order.

Second Reason: apparent success of revolutions directed by Negativism elsewhere.

Such an illusion had no chance of being subjected to a rational judgment, since it sprang precisely from the absence of the doctrine which would have enabled men to estimate it aright. Its hollowness could not be detected by the light of mere experience, for, up to that time, the application of the Negative Metaphysic to politics told in its favour. Its impotence to construct might indeed have been long before learnt from the abortive issue of the English Revolution, had not the want of a theory of history blinded statesmen to the real source of that failure. The only country where the Critical doctrine had worked not unsatisfactorily was Holland, where the revolution only consisted in casting off foreign oppression, without producing any internal reform. The same doctrine had failed in England, where it had been called upon to direct a reorganisation which presupposed a positive conception of modern society. But the failure in this case was ill-understood and little known; besides, it seemed to be compensated by the recent success of the Negative Metaphysic in the American Revolution, where the two earlier cases appeared to be combined, though the Dutch type alone was really reproduced. Thus it was that, on the one hand, the impossibility of recognising the futility of the Critical doctrine and on the other the necessity of having a theory of some sort, combined to create and to

maintain the fatal illusion under which the direction of the Revolution was handed over to the Critical school, to be retained by them until their triumph discredited them for ever.

Third Reason: incapacity of Louis XVI.

This unavoidable mistake is sufficient to explain how a movement, which was at first proclaimed by the common voice to be Organic, degenerated into a subversive revolution. Nevertheless the disaster was notably aggravated by the radical incapacity of the last of the French kings.

He should have either assumed position of Republican Dictator, or abdicated.

At that juncture almost the sole revolutionary measure that was really indispensable was the suppression of royalty. That the throne was of itself tottering to its fall became plain when the people of Paris freely followed with songs of joy the coffin of the imposing dictator who had commenced the work of retrogression. But the abolition of the throne did not mean the abolition of the modern Dictatorship; on the contrary it had to be maintained and only needed to be transformed in a republican sense. And this indispensable change the reigning monarch might have accomplished peaceably in such a way as to preserve his power and to deserve glory, if he had had the wisdom to value at its true worth that ornamental theocratic inviolability with which he had been invested by a decayed faith. Unfortunately he was a man without energy or any moral worth beyond a personal good nature useless for any social end. Although he was not fit to carry out the policy I have indicated, he might, if he had been really honest, have rendered an equivalent service by nobly abdicating at the time when the fall of the Parisian fortress before the indignation of the populace brought home the gravity of the situation even to the dullest. His non-performance of this duty, independently of his culpable intrigues, justifies his tragical end. His abdication would have placed the chief power in the hands of a brother worthy to work out the change to a republic, as was shown by his wisdom when too late he became dictator; public order would have been in the main preserved; war would never have been declared; the subversive agitation would have been confined to the spiritual domain; and France would have been spared the sanguinary explosion which arose chiefly from the circumstances of a desperate defence.

Superiority of Louis XVIII.

Fourth Reason: Anglomania leading to Constitutionai-

To all these influences, social and personal, must be added another which arose out of an empirical estimate of the difference between the political institutions of France and England.

In the absence of a true theory, the break down of the monarchical mode of dictatorship naturally disposed men to imitate the aristocratic mode. This tendency was especially marked in the first Assembly, which, following the authority of Montesquieu, strove to reduce the French crisis to an importation of the political regime of England, and even went so far as to start a parody of her national church. This disposition not only disguised the republican character of the movement during its earlier period, but impaired it when the course of events had for ever cleared away the illusions as to a constitutional monarchy. For empirical reformers, even when giving up the phantom king, still clung mischievously to the parliamentary regime, in spite of its being an institution contrary to the entire past of France. Ambitious metaphysicians were thus led to imagine that the change to a republic meant the reign of an assembly, and unhappily such a chimera was too much in accordance with the general spirit of the Critical doctrine not to find general acceptance alike with the Rousseauist Mountain and the Voltairean Girondins.

ism in first two Assemblies, and Parliamentarism in Convention.

Danton and his followers, who represented the school of Diderot, were superior to these demagogic illusions. They alone carried on the traditions of France by looking on the republican situation as destined not to confer a triumph on the local authority, but to give fresh life to the central power, the ascendency of which was indispensable. And so, when the British aristocracy founded a reactionary coalition to suppress the impulse for regeneration, and when the national defence became the first public necessity for France, the government of the country naturally passed into the hands of these distinguished leaders, who were as well qualified by heart and intellect as they were by character. Their ascendency of ten months, intervening between the indispensable expulsion of the talkers and the sanguinary triumph of the fanatics, is the period which in the final judgment of history will always represent the one French Assembly that deserves to be remembered. For then, athwart clouds of metaphysics, shone out the admirable conception of revolutionary government, and the result was a dictatorship worthy of being compared with those of Louis XI., Richelieu, Cromwell, and even Frederick. It directed the defence of the republic with irresistible energy, and at the same time completed the abolition of royalty by sweeping away the

Dantonians alone had a true conception of Revolutionary Government. Their prominence after 31st of May.

various fragments that had appertained to that institution. Judging that the time had now come for coordinating in a normal system the various empirical elements of the organic movement, this *progressive* dictatorship dared even to suppress, with proper discretion, the state patronage which the *retrograde* dictatorship had conferred upon them. Especially should we admire it for the discerning energy with which, in the face of prejudices not yet altogether discredited, it abolished the Scientific Associations. For these had now become hostile to speculative progress by their irrational constitution, which enabled a majority, necessarily consisting of incompetent persons, to decide all questions.

Suppression of the Academies.

But when Danton had succumbed to the sullen jealousy of a sanguinary declaimer, the new Dictatorship degenerated into a reactionary anarchy which is, and will remain, unparalleled. No sooner was the independence of France fully secured against both domestic and foreign enemies than there was an attempt to regenerate society by direct means, those who made it not having been able to see in time that the dominant doctrine, thenceforward identified with the national defence, was powerless for construction. Arbitrary power was in their hands; they made a most decisive application of their theory; and its subversive character stood revealed. For in order that it might triumph, it became necessary to extend the system of sanguinary oppression to the elements of the new system no less than to the fragments of the old. Whoever now-a-days has any inclination to regard negative metaphysics as representing the instinct for progress may here learn how inherently incompatible with the notion of continuous developement are the Rights of Man, in their very conception stationary and unalterable. Short as was this period of madness, public opinion, occasional oscillations excepted, always looked on the triumph of the Critical doctrine as a decisive proof of its worthlessness, for there were no exceptional circumstances save the fact that it had got hold of power. This explains why republican convictions melted away with those persons who had no other basis for their belief than metaphysical dogmas, and why the same convictions held their ground exclusively in the school of Diderot, whilst the schools of Voltaire and Rousseau furnished instruments to the reactionary tyranny that followed.

Robespierre's attempt to regenerate society on Rousseauist principles discredited them.

In this manner a social commotion of decisive character, lasting five years, ushered in the exceptional century which was to separate the extinction of Theologism from the advent of Positivism. Although the third generation of this century is still in the future, I shall be able to determine its character by inference from that of the first two generations. I postpone doing so, however, until my account of the Final State shall have been completed in the following volume. At present I have only to explain how the necessary solution of the Western problem began to make its appearance from the time of the French crisis.

The Revolutionary century beginning in 1789 lies between the death of Theologism and the decisive advent of Positivism.

That thorough upheaval had been mainly accomplished by the school of Diderot in their remarkable ten months of power. But that period had been preceded by the eight months in which the Voltaireans displayed their social impotence, and was followed by the four months which revealed the anarchical nature of Rousseauism. As a whole, therefore, the crisis left on men's minds a double impression. It brought home to them the urgent need of escaping once for all from the theological regime, and the hopelessness of attempting to construct anything on the basis of metaphysics. Henceforth the problem set before the West was how to satisfy these equally urgent conditions. Divine Rights had become retrograde; Human Rights are always subversive; both had therefore to be superseded by Universal Duties founded upon intelligible relations.

Its first five years showed the impossibility of founding anything on Metaphysical doctrine of Rights of Man.

In a word the real want was to establish the true religion, to discover at once for public and for private life a single centre round which men may rally their feelings, their thoughts, and their actions. This want Danton alone and his representatives had worthily comprehended. They had even made an attempt to satisfy it, which, though necessarily a failure, we of the present day ought none the less to regard as truly honourable to them. Compared to the vague conceptions on the same subject that have been put forward by emancipated minds in ancient or modern times, it shows a notable advance, inasmuch as, substituting the subjective for the objective, it abandoned the adoration of the outer world in order to give predominance to the human type. That this substitution fell short of what was required is to be attributed to its metaphysical origin. For it was because metaphysic was

Dantonians saw the need of a true religion. Worship of Goddess of Reason inadequate.

incapable of rising to the contemplation of society as a whole that it was forced to select for worship man's most individual attribute. Still such an experiment, however futile might be the answer it offered, made the question itself felt, and so shines in marked contrast with the frivolity of the Voltaireans, who evaded the problem on the plea that it was useless, and with the vanity of the Rousseauists, who thought it was solved when the inconsequent rationalism of the Protestants had been extended to Revelation.

A Dictatorship needed to preserve order, with freedom of thought and discussion.

After this series of proofs it was patent that every doctrine then known, whether metaphysical or theological, was unfit to serve as the religion of society; it therefore became necessary that the temporal dictatorship should resume fresh energy in the centre of the West until the decisive advent of the new faith. During that interregnum, the duration of which no one could forecast, material order would have to be maintained in the midst of intellectual and moral disorder. Not only is Material order always the necessary basis of the other two orders, but it was then specially indispensable for the purpose of ensuring the calm without which the religious solution could be neither thoroughly worked out nor freely propagated. This condition, no less difficult than important, required that the nation invested with the initiative should be placed under a strongly concentrated government, but that the new dictatorship should feel bound to renounce all spiritual supremacy in order to guarantee freedom of exposition and even of discussion. This was necessary to the elaboration of the theory, a work which, charged as it was with the destinies of mankind, deserved profound respect rather than bare toleration. Such then was the political problem of the transitional situation: energetically to maintain material order, judiciously to assist the developement of industry, and scrupulously to respect the intellectual movement, however irregular it might become. This last requirement indicated the approaching reinstatement of religious discipline as the one authority competent to put an end to mental aberrations of all kinds by the only appropriate remedy—the establishment of fixed convictions common to all.

But this Dictatorship being necessarily retrograde in

Nevertheless, as no government, be it ever so practical, can altogether dispense with some general doctrine, this dictatorship, in order adequately to fulfil its transient destination,

could not avoid assuming a character more or less reactionary, for so long as the final conception of order had not arisen, all notions of it were necessarily connected with the old type. As to the metaphysical spirit, after the decisive proof it had given of its anarchical nature, it was forced to retire into opposition, forfeiting whatever share in the government it had been suffered to take before the Revolution, when as yet its tendency remained unknown. It was necessary therefore that the transitional dictatorship should be animated with Catholic predilections, on the condition, however, that it should make no attempt to enforce them by oppressing religious liberty. That such an arrangement was not impracticable there was a long course of experience to show, and indeed no lack of direct types; for during several centuries the French royalty had managed to maintain a popular attitude, notwithstanding the aristocratic tastes of its sovereigns resulting from birth and education.

principle could never do its work well.

But the situation, if it necessitated such a regime as I have described, also tended to compromise it, inasmuch as the arrangement could be nothing more than an empirical one. Except on the contingency of a series of Fredericks, a secular dictatorship which had no theory to enlighten it, could not be exercised without often falling into contradictions. Its most energetic organ was a capital example of this fatality. He restored several institutions that the Dantonian party had happily suppressed, although such factitious restoration was in no respect necessary for order, and in some cases even raised serious dangers for himself. His official reestablishment of Catholicism may be explained—though not justified—by his own personal inclinations and by the apparent desire of the people. Its free exercise ought to have been protected, but all state subsidies withheld. On the other hand, his restoration of the University, which was an act far more injurious, was a piece of inconsistency due solely to his want of theory. For he had a profound prejudice against ontology, and before thus reconstructing the main stronghold of these doctrines he had himself wisely suppressed the Academy that had been their centre. Such contradictions serve to show how difficult it was then for such a policy to be carried out in a worthy way, simple as it now seems at first sight when systematised. How this latter result was gradually attained I will now proceed to explain in a general manner

Bonaparte re-establishes Church.

Suppresses Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, but establishes the University.

and so complete my social estimate of the movement belonging to the two generations which separate us from the third phase.

Course of the Dictatorship during first two generations of the Revolutionary century.

For the systematic combination of Material Order with Intellectual Freedom government had to undergo two successive modifications. First, the retrograde tendency had to drop so much of its intensity as was incompatible with spiritual freedom; then the central power had to recover the ascendency it had lost from having been thus liberalised.

Retrogression dated from Robespierre's establishment of Deism.

The retrogression really dates from the legal establishment of Deism, for that was the beginning of a series of oscillations, all more or less stormy, which are destined to continue until the Final Transition shall have been systematised by the Positive religion. But it was not possible that the alternate successes of the theological resistance and the metaphysical attack should present the same character after the great crisis as before it. The second of these conflicting influences had been as much favoured by the government as by the public while its anarchical tendencies remained latent. But now that illusion on this head had been once for all extinguished, statesmen were obliged to repel the metaphysical spirit as often as any popular manifestation in its favour showed that it was gaining ground, which, however, was mainly occasioned by provocation from retrograde follies. Short fits of anarchy, producing in their turn long periods of, first, acute, and then chronic retrogression—such had now become the natural course of the malady of the West.

And reached its maximum when Bonaparte revived Catholicism and Militarism.

Owing to the ineffaceable horror which had been everywhere inspired by the bloody triumph of the Deists, the retrograde tendency soon afterwards reached its maximum, and the apparent result was to reestablish the military and theological system in its entirety, Catholicism and war being both brought back together. And this double programme received a deplorable support from public opinion. The republicans indeed opposed it, but they were unable to make any effective appeal either to the reason or to the passions of their countrymen. It is true that the spiritual influence and the temporal power could never act thoroughly in concert, but neither was prevented by hostility towards the other from taking an active part in this retrograde policy.

History has too much ignored the immortal school which

arose at the commencement of the nineteenth century under the noble presidency of De Maistre, and was worthily completed by Bonald with the assistance of Chateaubriand's poetry. These teachers succeeded in systematically discrediting negativism by proving that its vices, which were empirically perceived, were by no means fortuitous, but, on the contrary, were the necessary result of the doctrine, and would reproduce themselves whenever that doctrine prevailed. The demonstration so given ran counter to modern prejudices, but it was one which only incurable revolutionists can deny. Accordingly it soon told on public opinion and brought about a vague reaction against the preceding century, though the ancient faith continued steadily to decline. Thenceforward there was a general recognition of the constant need of a religion of some sort, and metaphysicians found it to their interest to make their deism more reactionary though it remained as anarchical as ever. Moral culture remained as neglected as before, but nobody ventured, as in the eighteenth century, to dispute its importance. There even appeared an affected sentimentality which spread everywhere. The result on honest minds was to produce a hypocrisy not unlike that of Kant, who, after having decisively demonstrated the unreality of supernatural beliefs, had made an attempt to reestablish them on the plea of their necessity to society. In him this was sincere: but in the case of others—especially vulgar natures, whether of the revolutionary or the reactionary type—the same disposition was full of danger both to the intellect and to the morals. At the present day, however, we must acknowledge that it helped to state provisionally the problem of the West.

Catholic revival. De Maistre exposes weakness of Negativism; but faith continues to decline.

With respect to the war, posterity should rather direct its reproaches against the public opinion of France, than reserve them all for an empirical dictator carried away by his military instinct, which the people might have easily controlled if they had withstood it at the outset when he first went astray. All that would have been necessary was to have passed a noble censure on the spoliation of Italy and the invasion of Egypt. Instead of that these two deeds of oppression only evoked unanimous enthusiasm throughout France and especially from the literary class. From the moment that the complete success of the republican defence had been established by the provisional occupation of Belgium and Savoy, all military

Military revival; French people to be blamed more than Bonaparte.

activity became necessarily opposed to the mission which France had to discharge towards the Western World.

At the outburst of the French crisis the people had nobly pledged themselves to make no conquests even for the purpose of propagating their institutions, which could only obtain universal prevalence by means of voluntary adhesion. But these solemn declarations were quickly forgotten when the metaphysical doctrine which had formulated them lost its ascendency, as it did after a decisive trial. The consequence was that a career which had begun so nobly speedily underwent an unexampled perversion, and the vain pretext which was at first put forward of a compulsory propagandism was soon superseded by an avowed selfishness. Such is the weakness of sentiments resting on no fixed convictions.

But military spirit continues to decline.

But even in the midst of this anomalous warfare the modern instinct for peace maintained its character. Wars like these, however great their popularity, could only be carried on by that system of forced conscription which had originated in the second phase, and had gradually expanded during the third. Nor were the officers slower than the rank and file in giving proof that the love of the military profession was spontaneously on the wane. For, notwithstanding the seductions offered by marvellous promotion in the army, civil careers were invariably preferred by all who were free to choose. The decline of the military sentiment is further proved by the power which now fell to both gendarmerie and police, who seemed on the way to supersede the army and the law-courts, although there was no lack of time-serving magistrates and unworthy warriors.

Louis XVIII. inaugurates long peace and less reactionary government.

When the final orgy of the military instinct was completely exhausted, the second generation of the Exceptional Century was inaugurated by an incomparable peace under the best of the five dictators that have arisen since Danton. This put an end to all danger of retrogression, which derived its strength chiefly from war. Spiritual liberty rose of its own accord under the mere impulse of peace, and notwithstanding hindrances thrown in its way by government. Nor was it long before the intellectual principle which was to solve the problem of the West made its appearance, as I shall presently explain. But one consequence of the fall of the reactionary tyranny was a fatal attempt to found a Parliamentary regime, which, without

Vices of Parliamentarism.

being able to acquire a firm hold on any class, least of all upon the people, still gained credit by contrast with the late oppressive centralisation. This fresh mistake was more mischievous and more lasting than that which had preceded it, notwithstanding that it brought with it peace and liberty. It profoundly damaged men's hearts, minds, and characters, by developing habits of corruption, sophistry, and intrigue. And such vices as were natural to the system were still further aggravated by the opening it gave to litterateurs and lawyers to exercise an influence over Society. These classes, under types which became more and more degraded, now established themselves as the provisional directors of public opinion, first in the tribune and then still more in the press. In order the better to appreciate the ravages that such a regime could not fail to inflict on the intellects and morals of the generation during which it prevailed, it should be borne in mind that at its outset a coalition formed itself to turn to profit the opportunities for evil which the circumstances of the time naturally presented.

Coalition of Bonapartists and Robespierrists.

After a brief episode all those who had ambition but no convictions were tempted to form a coalition for the purpose of furthering their own political advancement, mutually conceding to each other two deplorable rehabilitations, in the teeth of the opinions respectively avowed by the parties to the compact. The success which attended this immense confederacy of the French press, notwithstanding the noble protests that were made against it, is easily accounted for by the mental anarchy of the time which left the public without protection against any temptation, if only sufficiently prolonged or well concerted. Amongst the confederates, posterity will be unable to distinguish any figure but that of a song-writer, who, however, from his evil influence deserves to bear on his own head the disgrace of the entire plot.

Deplorable influence of Béranger.

Mischievous interference of Europe with France after Waterloo.

All the same, this unexampled collusion could never have really succeeded had not the governments of the West made it possible beforehand by their unwarrantable interference with the internal affairs of France, though in the preceding year they had been wise enough to show respect for her due independence. From this mistaken policy, Frenchmen came to associate for a time their sense of nationality with their recollections of the retrograde tyrant, and this association in turn

helped the illusion by which the military dictator was destined to pass into the standing representative of revolutionary tendencies. The Western governments hastened to aggravate their fault by a disposition to subordinate their collective policy to an essentially Oriental power, which they now admitted to their common deliberations, and often even allowed, nominally at least, to take the lead. As this alliance was motived solely by a similarity of official religions, for that very reason it was necessarily of a retrograde character, because it strengthened the tendency to bring about the factitious restoration of the fallen faith. The motive, however, was more apparent than real, inasmuch as it soon served to awaken the just antipathies of the West towards the Greek church. It had always been the Ottoman policy to abstain from any interference of this kind with Europe, although from time to time since the Middle Age the mutual influences of Islamism and Catholicism upon one another had often brought about an intimate connection between the destinies of the Turks and those of the West. Had Russia followed this discreet example, had she felt that it never belongs to less civilised populations to control those that are more advanced, her government, which at home was progressive, would never have compromised this character by becoming the chief hope of an impossible retrogression abroad.

Holy Alliance.

Thus, under a combination of influences, some foreign, others domestic, France fell into a course of aberrations which in the history of this exceptional century will distinguish the generation of Parliaments from the generation of the Revolution. If, however, the complete extension of modern anarchy long retarded the rise of the organic doctrine, it also brought out into clearer prominence the double want of the time—a spiritual reconstruction and a temporal dictatorship.

Rise of Socialism.

The negative metaphysic met each fresh difficulty by a fresh proposal of destruction. From criticising political power it now passed to questioning social ties, and started utopian notions subversive of both family and property. Women began to affect a vain sentimentality and suffered in consequence a notable loss of real influence. Indeed the attitude of the affective sex deteriorated so much that there were even women who themselves became organs of anarchy. The dispersive tendency of special sciences reached the lowest point

Anarchical doctrines extended to Family and Property.

of degeneration and afforded a proof how wise it would have been to keep in force the first suppression of the academic regime which was now struggling to stifle the synthetic discipline inaugurated by the New Philosophy. But the course of intellectual and social divagations tended quite as much to expose the error of reactionary inclinations as to show the danger of revolutionary aspirations. God was invoked alike in both camps; Deists denied the programme of the eighteenth century, and Catholics accepted the doctrine of the Sovereignty of the People. There was thus no refuge left for either Order or Progress, except in the rising Religion of Humanity.

The long peace promoted, and was promoted by, the rise of the Labour question.

Whilst confusion of this sort was spreading far and wide, the growth of industry consequent on the establishment of peace throughout the West naturally brought to the front the great question of modern times, the incorporation of the proletariat into society, which had been ignored so long as the anomalous interval of warfare had lasted. This influence of peace on the social question became all the more irresistible because, the greater the internal disorder, the less disposed or able were statesmen to indulge in war. The British aristocracy, which before had banded the West into a league against France in order to prevent the propagation of republican principles, now found itself compelled to base its entire policy on the maintenance of a permanent peace under which the growth of popular tendencies was inevitable.

Peterloo massacre, and insurrection of Lyons.

Two disturbances, one at Manchester in 1819, the other at Lyons in 1831, the former the more violent, the latter the more characteristic, were the forerunners of the decisive explosion of June 1848, the result of which was once for all to inaugurate the proletariat question in the metropolis of the West. The true solution of that question had been already indicated by the New Philosophy. It lay in the establishment of a new universal morality, constructed on a positive basis and worthily applied to all ranks alike by a universally respected priesthood which should be the normal arbiter in the main conflicts arising out of practical life. This would realise *systematically* the programme imagined by the Dantonians *spontaneously*. For they alone had appreciated the interdependence of the two problems bequeathed by the Middle Age—the incorporation of the proletariat into modern society,

and the replacement of supernatural creeds by a demonstrable faith.

The stupid incapacity of the Conservatives drove the people into Rousseauism.

As for the revolutionists they were incurable. Seeing nothing beyond their own vain deism, they split up the Western problem, and strove with only too much success to occupy the proletariat with metaphysical expedients, which, as purporting to regulate by laws matters essentially depending upon manners, were at once anarchical and retrograde. Developing the programme which had been indicated under the bloody rule of the Rousseauists, they made the Organisation of Industry consist in the abolition of the one basis which the past supplied for it, the general distinction between employers and employed (p. 439). But if these subversive utopias obtained a deplorable credit with the people, the blame must rest on the apathetic and incapable policy of the Conservatives, who, throughout this period—brief intervals of oscillation excepted—were everywhere in possession of temporal ascendency. Though always talking about a general reconciliation of Order with Progress they allowed the very doctrine which completely instituted it to rise before their eyes unnoticed. Their hand-to-mouth policy was unable to cope with Communism except by measures of repression which proved a double hindrance to the true solution by raising the persecuted anarchists into martyrs, and by creating a feeling that the fundamental institutions of society did not admit of being defended by honourable means. In short, but for the part thus played by Conservatives, history would be at a loss to explain how it was that throughout the West the party of *progress* found itself for a time under the leadership of revolutionists, who, partly from their metaphysical notions and partly from ignorance, necessarily worshipped *immobility*. The Christian conception of Fraternity having become incapable of sanctioning the legitimate aspiration of the proletaries they were obliged to fall back provisionally on the Rousseauist doctrine of Equality, which degraded their sentiments by stimulating envy against eminence of every kind, and distrust towards all authority.

Neither reactionists nor revolutionists make any way.

This estimate, from the social point of view, of the generation of parliamenteers may be summed up by the remark that the objects aimed at in the two camps necessarily and mutually neutralised each other. The retrograde policy of the empirical Conservatives turned out utterly futile: the more sweeping and

severe were the measures of repression they promulgated, the more steady was the advance of anarchy. The futility of the Revolutionary policy is equally demonstrated by failure. The acute or chronic agitation, being destitute of organic qualities, gains none of its objects. On the contrary it continually causes the weight of law to be thrown on the side of the reactionary principle which had lost all hold of opinions and manners.

Parliamentary system facilitated instead of preventing oppression;

As the natural consequence of this situation prevailing in the centre of the Western movement, the Parliamentary regime fell everywhere into discredit, and all the efforts made by empirical politicians, placemen no less than demagogues, were unavailing to restore it to ascendency. It had been introduced in order to guarantee Liberty; but in practice it facilitated oppression by dividing responsibility. And in this degeneracy revolutionists must be held equally guilty with reactionists; for, being conscious that their doctrine was no longer capable of bearing a thorough examination, they strove more and more to stifle discussion under the pretext of Equality. Thus constituted, the Parliamentary regime was equivocal, inconsistent, and enervating to all government; and so, when called upon, as it soon was, to maintain order, it simply produced a crop of agitation and intrigue. So contrary was it to the entire past of France that, in the space of thirty years, it failed to gain any hold on the working classes or even on the bourgeoisie, and this in spite of the special facilities it held out to ambitious mediocrities. The natural antipathy of all Catholic populations towards this Protestant or rather British form of constitution first found vent on the liberation of Spanish America. For when the Colonial system of that continent broke up, as that of British North America had done before, and the Revolutionists, like their Dutch prototypes, abolished the central control of the parent state, they abstained from transferring political power to local assemblies, so that all their subsequent conflicts turned only on a change of dictators.

Has never been really popular except in Protestant countries.

Revolution of 1848 irrevocably abolished hereditary Monarchy.

After such examples it was easy to foresee that the Parliamentary regime in France was doomed to speedy extinction as incapable alike of consolidating order and of promoting progress. It could not hold out much longer when a decisive insurrection had overthrown the solemn sham of a strictly hereditary throne existing in a situation which, after the capture of

the Parisian fortress by the people, was always republican, and in its place had set up political reality. The exposure once for all of this imposture seemed to result for the moment in a rehabilitation of the un-French constitutionalism, owing to the empirical illusion that the overthrow of monarchy must mean an exaltation of the local power at the expense of the central. But this metaphysical error could not now become so firmly rooted as in the old revolution, because the tendency of the republican situation to guarantee progress and to endanger order had become too plain to be denied. Fresh agitation soon added confirming proof, and induced besides a general feeling that republicanism would admit, just as much as it required, the continued preponderance of the central power. When the Parliamentary regime had completely developed its dangerous influences by extending its intellectual and moral debasement even to the proletariat, an energetic and thoroughly opportune stroke abolished it for ever, without meeting any resistance. The more the people reflected on this interference by the executive the more they endorsed it; and from that time the dictatorial principle, though its title may vary and it may be clothed in legal fictions, has been irrevocably established.

Coup d'état irrevocably established Dictatorship

Thus it was that the regenerating doctrine, after having been retarded in its early course first by an oppressive centralisation and then by a dispersive constitutionalism, at last shook off these impediments. Its advent will be the distinguishing feature of the third generation of this Exceptional Century; the first generation having been characterised by revolution leading to retrogression, the second by parliamentarism; while the upshot of both was a sufficient combination of dictatorial power with liberty, allowing for the oscillations resulting from the absence of sound theory. Having thus traced the history of events that brought about the situation suitable for the developement of spiritual reorganisation, I will now explain the process by which the religious and philosophic elements of the doctrine of the West were gradually wrought into shape. This final chapter will then be completed.

And cleared the way for the advent of Positivism.

From the Theoretic point of view Positivism was the result of a combination, at first spontaneous, afterwards systematic, of two decisive impulses proceeding, the one from Philosophy, the other from Science.

(*b*) Positive movement, pp. 526–531.

(a) Philosophic Results.

The first of these impulses emanated from the combination of the two opposite influences of Condorcet and De Maistre, the first revolutionary, the second retrograde; the one thinker having been influenced by the French crisis, the other by the reactionary movement which followed it.

Condorcet indicates true foundation of Sociology, but fails to create that Science.

In the midst of the storm the last representative of the encyclopedic school, with an incomparable devotion, undertook to found Polity upon History at a moment when anti-historic opinions and feelings were at their strongest. With ruins all round him, and seeing social speculations ending in incoherent negativism, he felt that the only means of rallying opinions was to subordinate the study of the Future to the interpretation of the Past, as the one foundation for fixed and common convictions by which society could be regenerated. But his attempt, admirable as it was, served only to indicate, once for all, the basis on which spiritual reorganisation had to be built. It necessarily failed because thought was not ripe for it; for the scientific preparation was insufficient, being still essentially limited to Cosmology. Biology not yet having arisen, the genius of Condorcet could not make up for the deficiency, and his Sociological speculations were necessarily wanting in positivity. His revolutionary prejudices also helped to mislead him, inspiring him as they did with a blind hatred towards the Past which he wished to explain. And so as a whole his essay was inconsequent; for it represented final progress as the result of an unbroken series of retrogressions.

De Maistre revives respect for the Middle Age.

It was the spectacle of this inconsistency that prompted De Maistre to undertake the work in which he worthily appreciates the Middle Age, at least on its spiritual side. How thoroughly opportune was this rectification of prevailing doctrines was soon proved by the decisive reaction which set in everywhere in favour of our pious and chivalrous ancestors. We must even attribute to this impulse the definitive rise of the historical branch of epic poetry in the admirable novels of Walter Scott—a path which Chateaubriand had already attempted and Manzoni afterwards pursued. So far from upsetting Condorcet's project of basing polity on history the influence of De Maistre corroborated it; for, by throwing light on the conditions of its success, he hastened its realisation, which must have come sooner or later. The doctrines of the retrograde school were duly completed by the statical concep-

tions of Bonald, and diffused everywhere a feeling that the Past as a whole cannot be understood unless it is steadily respected.

Philosophies of Condorcet and De Maistre could be harmonised only through Science.

Thenceforward the problem of constructing Sociology was reduced to the question of how to effect a satisfactory reconciliation between the two antagonistic influences of Condorcet and De Maistre, the one furnishing the principal idea, the other the view essential to its completion. But put in this form the question at first seemed insoluble, since all the energetic minds of the period were radically divided between two schools to all appearance incompatible with each other, though both alike found favour with the public. The reconciliation could only be accomplished in a region of speculation lying above both revolutionists and reactionists. Here it is that the philosophic root of Positivism joins its scientific root, which alone could furnish inspirations capable of becoming universal.

(β) Scientific Results.

Rapid growth of Biology.

Lamarck.

Whilst this preparatory conflict was going on, biology was rising irrevocably on the basis of chemistry in the decisive work of Bichat, who was followed by Broussais. Then Gall, following on the speculations of Cabanis, completed the work of Bichat. Previously to this Lamarck had summed up the results of all these preliminary attempts to institute a comparison of living beings; striving to reconcile vital spontaneity with the influence of the environment. To this, which had been hitherto left out of sight, he gave for the time exaggerated importance.

Bichat and Broussais.

His work paved the way for Bichat. This incomparable thinker now found himself in a position to establish directly the fundamental conception of Life by combining once for all the two aspects from which every being can be regarded, the statical and the dynamical. First he established the complete separation of the vegetal from the animal life; then to this physiological basis he gave anatomical support by his admirable theory of the tissues: the general tissue for universal functions: the special tissues for functions of a higher order. After Bichat it became possible to form a conception of the study of Life as a whole—that is as a synthesis exhibiting in more and more complete developement the harmony which necessarily subsists between acts and their agents. His efforts, however, in this direction were not followed up, and in consequence the establishment of a synthesis

such as he had in view remains to be definitively accomplished, and this can come only from the regenerated philosophy. Bichat was soon succeeded by Broussais, who completed the general theory of normal life by extending it to pathology. Ever since, disease and health have ceased to be regarded as radically separate from each other; the differences between the two being recognised as differences only in the degree of intensity in the phenomena, the nature of which remains unchanged. But the labours of Bichat and those of Broussais were apparently concentrated on the bodily life, whether vegetal or animal. The cerebral life was still neglected, though it alone constitutes the link which immediately connects biology with any inquiry on positive principles into the order of man.

Cabanis and Gall.

Nevertheless, by an advance which is readily accounted for by the indivisibility that characterises the study of life, biological conceptions rapidly spread to the higher domain of man. First Cabanis, rising above metaphysical prejudices, produced a lasting sense of the futility of any attempt to investigate the intellectual and moral functions apart from the inferior attributes of animal life. Indeed his elaborate and conscientious work established the general interdependence of all the functions by the inverse process of proving the dependence of the lower on the higher. Thus the way was prepared for the conception of Gall, by which it became for the first time possible to institute the positive theory of human nature. That theory reconciled the obvious fact of the plurality of these mental and moral functions with the fact that all alike had their seat in the brain. Under the impulse of Gall's genius, and despite the defects and imperfections of his work, the dualism of body and soul, which had hitherto baffled genuine science, became a positive notion, based on the regular correlation between the life of the brain and the life of the body. These general tendencies towards a reconstruction of the study of Man were specially forwarded when Gall endorsed George Leroy's empirical refutation of previous theories as to the sympathetic instincts. These were now definitely established as belonging to distinct organs in the brain.

The two fundamental laws of Sociology discovered by the Author.

Such was the twofold scientific preparation which, joining with the twofold philosophic impulse mentioned above, enabled the Positive spirit to take definite possession of the domain of Society, where alone it finds the limit of its continuous exten-

sion. For this purpose all that was needed was that the demands of science and the exigencies of politics should make themselves felt with equal force in a young mind aspiring to realise the connection which had been bequeathed by the Middle Age between the solution of the proletariat difficulty and the demonstrable synthesis. So it was that in 1822 I was led to discover and announce the first two sociological laws (p. 58). These laws are intimately allied, as is sufficiently clear from the fact of my having simultaneously discovered them both. In their combination they constitute directly the basis of Positivism such as I have definitively developed it in my philosophic treatise.

Insufficiency of his Positive Philosophy remedied by his attachment to Madame Clotilde de Vaux.

But that work which was finished in 1842 remained purely intellectual, although, as my earlier essays had sufficiently shown, its purpose was social. To accomplish this final mission it was not enough that human progress was at last reduced to positive laws which, in a complete explanation of the past, satisfied the test of verification prescribed alike by Condorcet and Descartes. Although, by virtue of its characteristic reality, Positivism had embraced moral phenomena sufficiently to recognise gradually, in the midst of modern anarchy, the fundamental truth of the preponderance of the heart over the intellect, it was still inadequately developed from the affective point of view. From the absence of any direct and continuous appeal to feeling, its normal ascendency was not duly recognised. Yet without such recognition the synthesis could not be complete; and if not complete, then neither could it be decisive, even intellectually; much less could we rise by it from Philosophy to Religion. The necessary complement of the system was now supplied by an angelic inspiration too soon developed by death,[1] and sufficiently described in the dedication of this treatise.

Lectures on 'General View of Positivism.'

In that outpouring of my heart the religious side of Positivism found its fundamental expression, and a few months later my public course of lectures for 1847 marked the definitive advent of Positivism by concentrating our Feelings, our Thoughts, and our Actions around Humanity, the final substitute for God. Thenceforward commenced the work of elaborating simultaneously the doctrine, the worship, and the life proper to the demonstrable faith, and the reduction of these to a complete

Commencement of the 'Positive Polity.'

[1] Appendix to the Preface, p. xxvii.

system is the main object of the present treatise. So opportune, however, was this advent of Positivism that in the next year it so far extended its social influence as to undertake the regulation of the present with a view to the future as deduced from the past, by means of a treatise in which, in order to meet an urgent need, I anticipated the normal conclusions of this work. The views there put forward were presented in an imperfect form and isolated from their connection with the synthesis as a whole. Still they met with a public appreciation sufficient to bring home to practical men who were complete strangers to the Positive Religion how universal its power really is. Later on, I interrupted the present doctrinal work in order to write a little treatise in which there are undeniable traces of the subjective assistance of my eternal patroness, and which completed the constitution of Positivism by systematising its propagation. From this time dates the commencement of the gradual reorganisation of the West, the peculiar work of the third generation of this exceptional century. For woman, whose influence has always been opposed to the influence of modern society, has now come to constitute its principal support, and her conversion is due to the fact that Philosophy has been transformed into Religion. The positivist Priesthood, finding itself chiefly hampered by unscientific anarchy, will make good its title to social ascendency by putting an end to the metaphysical plague, against which governmental action will never prove successful.

Publication of 'General View.'

Publication of 'Positivist Catechism.'

GENERAL CONCLUSION OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

In comparing this volume as a whole with the preceding one, we see that in Sociology, even more than in any other science, Dynamics must henceforth be regarded as only a vast corollary to Statics. If we contemplate the history of the entire past, stretching from the first rudiments of civilisation down to the present condition of the most advanced nations, the spectacle presented to us is that of an uninterrupted developement of the order determined by the fundamental laws of human nature. The long series of movements—movements which at first sight appear confused and even mutually opposed—make up the preparatory evolution of the Great Being from which we emanate, and of which we shall for ever form a part, if only we have worthily served her. Humanity has now completed her Initiation, for she has arrived at a full consciousness of her destiny, as indeed is proved by the mere execution of the picture of the past, which I have just completed. She now begins to systematise her conduct with a view to bring it into conformity with the order of the world to which she is subject, and which at the same time she perfects. She therefore renounces the fictions which she created for herself as the guides of her infancy, but in renouncing them she never forgets the services they rendered before they became incompatible with her progress.

Always and everywhere men have been more and more ruled by the whole body of their predecessors. The empire of the past is one which the present can modify but can never escape. But before this subordination could be recognised, a long period had necessarily to elapse, during which each man sought elsewhere for a power to guide him. With this view he transported the human type to beings outside his race—at first to real beings, and then to fictitious ones: and thus each individual was enabled to provide himself with a synthesis at once personal and absolute. So long as this search after Causes prevailed

over the study of Laws it prevented the real Providence from being recognised, by turning men's minds to imagine fictitious influences. At the same time the numerous and continued wars, aggravated as they were by the mental divergencies resulting from such vague doctrines, made it impossible to conceive of a collective Being composed of diverse elements which seemed incompatible with each other (p. 53). Still, in the midst of these wars and these fictions, Humanity was maturing, and when at last they were exhausted she arose, and taking her stand on peace and truth ushered in the Universal Religion.

Unity of faith is an object which mankind has always pursued, but has hitherto never attained. Unity seemed to exist spontaneously at the commencement of civilisation, Fetichism having long prevailed everywhere, even before the time when difference of race had been effected by the continuous action of the material environment. But though this primitive mode of the provisional synthesis lasted longer than any other, at the present day it survives only amongst a minority of our race, which proves both its own instability and the incapacity of Theologism for becoming universal. Moreover, what uniformity there was in Fetichism was more apparent than real, being due only to its spontaneity. For the adoration of the outer world gave rise to diverse and often antagonistic worship, down to the time when Fetichism became astrolatric. Until it took this shape—from which it soon passed into Polytheism—its social efficacy was confined to domestic life. In fact, the constitution of the Family and the subordination of Man to the World are its fundamental services, though it also helped to lay the basis for Public Order in so far as it brought about the prevalence of Sedentary life and the rise of the Priesthood.

Theocracy followed, and its faith being better qualified than that of Fetichism to inspire a wide and complete assent, systematic efforts were now made to establish a universal religion. But those efforts also failed. On the one hand the imaginary nature of the doctrines could not but engender discordances of opinion, on the other the political government with which those doctrines were of necessity bound up interposed a social barrier to their universal extension. All that the sacerdotal castes achieved amongst the populations subject to their sway was to carry the systematisation of human life

further than Fetichism could do, and to prepare for the yet distant Positive Synthesis which alone can regulate human relations on the vastest scale. This provisional coordination, in which discipline preceded developement, instead of following it, degenerated everywhere into oppression, and, had it remained unmodified, would have left no free career open to the Intellect or the Activity of man. Such a modification, however, came to pass in the nations which had been saved from Theocracy by Military Polytheism, and amongst them now commenced the evolution peculiar to the West. Greece elaborated Science; Rome incorporated the nations; the one country directing the mental, the other the social preparation for the Positive state. But both of these Transitions were partial; and ended in manifesting the necessity of providing some control for the forces of Intellect and Activity which they had respectively developed. Their combined result therefore was the Third Transition, which related to Feeling. In this phase Monotheism sought to systematise life as a whole, by establishing a separation between the two human powers. But this was a premature attempt which could not but prove abortive, and the result was that Theologism was exhausted before Positivism was ready to take its place. Hence the Revolution of the West, which broke up the Preliminary Regime, and at the same time developed the elements proper to the Final Order.

From this double movement there is a single issue—the Universal Religion. It has now been decisively ushered in, and stands before us to-day at once as the necessary outcome of all anterior preparations, and as the indispensable basis for future efforts destined to overcome modern anarchy. It points out, and itself completes, the kindred collapses of Theologism and War, and is thus already able to calm all anxiety by showing that only a brief transition separates us from the Normal State. A thoroughly homogeneous polity, based on a complete explanation of the past, will guide us directly towards the future, without any risk of the recurrence of storms which really arose from the impossibility of systematising the progress of the West.

By way of summing up this volume, I will now carry further the mathematical illustration which I employed before to represent the conclusions of the preceding one (ii. 385). I then remarked that Statical Sociology merely ascertained the general system of the asymptotes belonging to the orbit which Humanity

may be said to describe, but that it did not decide the character of the curve itself: those fundamental data being such that they might be equally well satisfied by more than one curve. But Social Dynamics have now determined the actual curve, for they have explained in detail an arc of sufficient length to enable us to foresee what course the arc must take when continued, with as much accuracy as is suited to the practical aim of a study in which we must never try to forecast too precisely. The fundamental theory thus stands completed and confirmed. The laws originally deduced from an abstract examination of human nature have been demonstrated to be real laws, explaining the entire course of the destinies of the human race. Sociology has, for each epoch in turn, exhibited the present as the necessary outcome of the past, and so has enhanced its own authority by a continuous accumulation of decisive proofs. It is therefore now in a position to set about constructing a forecast of the future, and that by a direct procedure. But this new inquiry, whether pursued from a Statical or a Dynamical point of view, must always be limited to what is strictly requisite for the practical wants of man. Otherwise it cannot fail to degenerate into the pedantry of the Academies—a fault inexcusable in a science which especially professes to expose the mischief that pedantry has wrought both to the heart and to the intellect. In truth, Sociology is under a special obligation to respect the encyclopedic system which it has constituted: it must uniformly give the first place to Moral Philosophy; and this, if it is to serve as a practical rule of life, must in its turn be based upon an adequate understanding of the World and Humanity.

Accordingly in my next volume I shall complete the foundation of Positive Religion by laying down the general theory of the Future of Humanity. This decisive complement of the system will consist in portraying the Normal State with as much definiteness as is requisite for practical purposes. Even within these limits the task would have been impossible had it not been preceded by an adequate explanation of the past. As this process will be based on the general combination of the present volume with the preceding one, so will it more completely bring out their necessary connection. There will thus be a double guarantee for reality. But besides this the theory will

be verified by what is the most conclusive test of all: it will be shown to be in complete harmony with the wants of the time. For it will launch in a worthy manner the Organic Transition, the accomplishment of which is reserved for the third generation of the present century. Henceforward those who desire to terminate the Revolution of the West will have no excuse open to them for not accepting the mental and moral obligation of acquainting themselves with the only laws capable of regulating the Present with a view to the Future on the basis of the Past.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME

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LONDON: PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
AND PARLIAMENT STREET

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